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1 Introduction 
 
In its election manifesto of 1945, the Norwegian Labor Party declared that 
“the monetary policy of the Bank of Norway, the credit policy of the banks, 
and the foreign exchange policy should be subordinated the Ministry of 
Finance”.1 This declaration reflected a general ambition to increase public 
control over the economy, an ambition that Norwegian politicians shared 
with the majority of post-WWII policy-makers all over the world. Previous 
liberalist ideals of promoting growth and prosperity through non-
interventionist policies and free-market solutions were widely replaced by 
ideas of active state intervention in order to secure not only economic 
growth and stability but also a socially just distribution of wealth. Supporters 
of these new ideals argued that government intervention could contribute to 
better and fairer results than those achieved by market mechanisms only, not 
just because market mechanisms per se produced slow and unreliable results 
but also because the introduction of labor unions and the rise of big business 
in manufacturing industries and finance had led to the centralization of 
power and made markets less flexible and ‘neutral’. 
Ideas of more active and interventionist governments had spread gradually 
since the late 19th century, and were also manifested in formal institutional 
changes. Starting out with the introduction of legislation to protect industrial 
workers from ill treatment, Western governments had tried out various types 
of regulations in order to overcome the negative side effects of free-market 
arrangements. These attempts were encouraged by experiences during World 
War I, which gave the first comprehensive examples of how economic 
activity could be successfully directed by the state. Even so, at that point of 
time centralized planning and control were still commonly seen as 
exceptions from normal economic and political conditions. Thus, it was not 
until the world economies were hit by crisis during the interwar years that 
ideas of government planning and control achieved a major breakthrough in 
Western countries. Massive unemployment, debt crises, and bank failures 
contributed to a general distrust in the ability of uncontrolled markets to 
create growth and prosperity. During World War II, it was once more proven 
that state planning and control could be efficient, and by the end of the war 
there was therefore relatively broad support in most countries for increased 
                                                     
1 The Norwegian Labor Party (DNA), election manifesto of 1945, section “Finanser, 
handel, lønninger”. 
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government intervention in order to pursue goals set up by the national 
political authorities. 
In Norway, the chief advocate of such ideas was the Labor Party. Already 
during World War II, Labor politicians – in close cooperation with a new 
generation of economists – had planned guidelines for the post-war 
economic policy. And even if there were some internal disagreements within 
the party regarding the nature and degree of the government intervention, the 
key message was that market regulations should be considered not only as a 
wartime necessity but also as essential in a long-term perspective. So by the 
end of the war, Labor was ready to promote active state planning and 
regulation in order to obtain superior goals of stable and rapid economic 
growth, full employment, and the socially and geographically just 
distribution of welfare. This political message was well received by the 
Norwegian public and in the 1945 general election, Labor won a 
parliamentary majority. It thereby had an excellent starting point for 
transforming its ambitions into actual politics. 
New ideas and norms for governing the economy, combined with new 
instruments for planning and control, changed the institutional framework 
within which all economic actors, whether individuals, firms, financial 
institutions, or public agencies, performed their tasks. One of those actors, 
which will be the center of attention in this dissertation, was the central 
bank, the Bank of Norway (BoN). Since its foundation in 1816, the BoN had 
gradually achieved a strong, politically independent position in Norwegian 
society. In accordance with traditional liberalist ideals, by the turn of the 20th 
century, the central bank had been in charge of formulating and executing 
monetary policy, an obligation it had, to a large extent, performed regardless 
of political opinions. However, vital preconditions for this independence had 
collapsed during the interwar period with the fall of the gold standard, an 
international system of foreign exchange (predominant between 1870 and 
1914), which had assigned central banks the important tasks of gold 
redemption and stabilizing exchange rates through active use of the discount 
rate. When the gold standard finally collapsed in 1931 after a turbulent 
process of trying to reestablish the system during the 1920s, the future tasks 
and position of central banks in general were uncertain. And once new ideas 
of political planning and control gained a firm foothold in Norway after 
World War II, ideas that presupposed centralized coordination of the 
monetary policy with other policy areas, it seemed obvious that the BoN no 
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longer could operate as a freestanding agency. Consequently, the role of the 
Bank had to change. 
My main research interest in this dissertation is to analyze how the role of 
the Norwegian central bank changed after World War II.2 How did the Bank 
respond to the changes in its political and economic environment? Did it 
adapt passively or did it offer any resistance? And what kind of role did the 
BoN find within the new post-WWII political context? Was it reduced to a 
mere executive of the orders from the Ministry of Finance, as Labor had 
declared in 1945, or did it maintain any of its former autonomy and 
authority? 
By analyzing how the role of the BoN changed, I will also add an 
explanatory dimension and discuss why these changes took place. The 
question of why covers the reasons for the changes that undermined the 
former independent position of the central bank in the first place, as well as 
the underlying causes of the new role that the central bank achieved within 
the post-WWII regime. Both these types of changes will be discussed by 
highlighting institutional factors, such as alterations of economic 
organization as well as political and cultural elements, and behavioral 
factors, that is the behavior of the Bank given such institutional changes. 
The political and economic development in Norway after World War II 
reflected international trends in the sense that increased government 
intervention and market controls, combined with institutional changes in the 
international exchange of goods and capital, in general led to increased 
political control over central banks. However, as the sociologist Susan 
Stockdale has pointed out, although such geopolitical and economic 
transformations may explain the general direction of changes in central bank 
independence (CBI), they cannot explain the variation in particular forms of 
independence adopted by central banks in different countries.3 Thus, in order 
to understand how and why a specific central bank, such as the BoN, ended 
                                                     
2 Here, the concept of role means the function of central banks in the economic 
policy, including its tasks, policy measures and its position regarding the political 
authorities and the financial system. 
3 S. Stockdale, Money Production and Boundary Construction: Explaining Shifts in 
Central Bank Independence, Dr. Philos. thesis in sociology, Los Angeles: University 
of California – Los Angeles (UCLA), 2003, p. 1. 
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up in a specific role – constituted by its concrete tasks, degree of authority 
and autonomy from the political authorities as well as the financial markets – 
it is necessary to carry out in-depth empirical studies of historical policy-
making processes in which this central bank takes part. 
Existing research traditions 
Two types of central bank literature are of particular interest for this 
dissertation: one regards the particular historical case of the BoN, while the 
other treats general aspects of central banking with emphasis on the question 
of political independence. Here, I will discuss the two types separately in 
order to position my own research as regards contents as well as scientific 
approach. At a general methodological level, my main argument is that in 
order to understand and explain the role of central banks it is necessary to 
analyze the particular institutional and historical context of each central bank 
rather than to regard central banks as standardized, a-historical units that act 
in the same way regardless of time and space. And in the special case of the 
BoN during the post-WWII period, I challenge the conventional view that 
the central bank was reduced to an agency of little importance and influence. 
The historical case of the Norwegian central bank 
The existing literature on the role of the BoN during the post-WWII period is 
relatively limited. A common feature of this literature, however, is the 
assumption that after 1945 the Bank lost all its former power and 
independence. Throughout the post-WWII period until the 1980s, there were 
few public confrontations between the BoN and the political authorities, a 
characteristic that was strikingly different from the pre-1930 period when the 
central bank regularly confronted the government in order to pursue 
established monetary targets. In international central bank literature, such a 
lack of public confrontation is usually interpreted as an indication of the 
powerlessness of central banks.4 This observation, combined with the 
declared ambitions of the Labor Party to subordinate the central bank to the 
Ministry of Finance, has led most scholars to conclude that the power and 
independence of the BoN after 1945 was next to none. 
                                                     
4 See for example J.T. Woolley, The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary 
Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; G. Toniolo (ed.), Central 
Banks’ Independence in Historical Perspective, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988; A. 
Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and 
Evidence, Cambridge, Mass; MIT Press, 1992. 
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There are two official accounts of the historical development of the BoN, 
which were published by its officials in connection with the Bank’s 150th 
and 175th anniversaries. Both these publications give only brief descriptions 
of the tasks and functions of the central bank during the post-WWII period 
and shed little light on the role of the BoN in practical policy-making. This 
appears a deliberate choice, since most of these publications were authored 
by the Bank’s own officials, who sometimes had first-hand information on 
these processes but nevertheless omitted all detailed information on what 
was going on behind the scenes. Moreover, in the 150th commemorative 
publication, the BoN engaged Gunnar Jahn, the governor from 1946 to 1954, 
to write the volume on the period before 1940, when he had limited first-
hand knowledge of internal procedures and debates, whereas the volume that 
covered Jahn’s governance was written by an economist from outside the 
Bank, Preben Munthe. Hence, these publications hardly touch upon the 
challenges and processes underlying the development of a new role for the 
BoN in the changing post-WWII context.5 
A more detailed, professional discussion of the changes in central bank 
policies during the first post-WWII decades is given by the historian Egil 
Borlaug. Taking the loss of independence and power as a stated fact, 
Borlaug discusses why these behavioral alterations did not induce any 
legislative changes. He thereby brings focus to an important characteristic of 
the post-WWII monetary regime: the declared ambitions of the Labor Party 
to deprive the BoN of its former independence were never manifested in new 
legislation. The old Central Bank Act of 1892, which in a liberalist tradition 
granted the BoN extensive operational autonomy, was kept virtually 
unchanged until 1985. This highlights an important point, which we will 
return to later: there can be considerable discrepancy between a central 
bank’s formal or legislative independence and its actual position. 
Borlaug explains this discrepancy in the Norwegian case mainly as a 
practical solution to a technical problem associated with the so-called gold 
clause case, which we will discuss in more detail in chapter 5. According to 
Borlaug, the Norwegian government maintained the old liberalist legislation 
in order to spare the State a possibly costly fiscal burden related to claims 
from French bond owners, which could have been triggered by introduction 
                                                     
5 G. Jahn, A. Eriksen and P. Munthe, Norges Bank gjennom 150 år, Oslo: the Bank 
of Norway, 1966; P. Bang and J.P. Holter, Norges Bank 175 år, Oslo: Aschehoug - 
the Bank of Norway, 1991. 
Introduction 
6 
of a new Central Bank Act.6 In itself, this seems like a quite reasonable 
explanation, and Borlaug demonstrates that the gold clause case caused 
considerable concern among civil servants in the Ministry of Finance. Even 
so, given the former strong position of the BoN it would also be interesting 
to pay more attention than Borlaug has done to the new political and 
economic context of the post-WWII period and examine to what extent the 
lack of new central bank legislation also can be explained by more 
fundamental elements regarding the role of the central bank. 
In his legal dissertation, Helge Syrstad has studied the independence of the 
BoN from an economic, political, and legal perspective.  Syrstad is 
primarily concerned with the contemporary position of the central bank, but 
also draws long historical lines from the initial start of central banking in the 
17th century until the present, in order to understand to what extent and why 
the BoN today operates independently of the political authorities. In this 
historical analysis, which is based on secondary sources, the period 1945 to 
the mid-1980s appears as a time of strict political control over the central 
bank. It thereby falls into line with the conventional view of this period. 
Syrstad’s main contribution, however, is related to his comprehensive 
account of the constitutional framework and formal relationship between the 
political authorities and the central bank as well as his discussions of the 
bank’s tasks and organization, which gives interesting insights into the 
matter of CBI.7 
The historian Francis Sejersted has also been interested in the question of 
independence, and in an implicit way he has discussed the role of the BoN 
after 1945. Without carrying out any specific studies of the post-WWII 
period, Sejersted combines primary studies of the BoN during the 19th 
century and the interwar period with his personal reflections on the role of 
the Bank today, and confirms the impression that from World War II until 
the mid-1980s the BoN was under strong political control. Sejersted’s prime 
interest, however, does not lie in this era of political control but in the 
preceding and succeeding periods of CBI. He argues that CBI can be an 
effective instrument to obtain economic stability because, unlike politicians, 
a central bank can more easily withstand pressures that might lead to 
                                                     
6 E. Borlaug, Styringa av Norges Bank. Om endring i teori, praksis og lovgjevning, 
1945-1960, post-graduate thesis [hovedoppgave] in history, Oslo: University of 
Oslo, 1994. See also chapter 5.7. 
7 H. Syrstad, Sentralbankens uavhengighet, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2003. 
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inflationary policies. Delegation of power can thereby (somewhat 
paradoxically) lead to better fulfillment of the politicians’ stated goals. 
Sejersted argues, however, that the efficiency of this instrument depends on 
the degree of legitimacy and trust attached to the central bank. Thus, the key 
to whether CBI will work is the definite institutional setting and historical 
experiences in each particular case.8 
Sejersted’s emphasis on legitimacy and trust in the central bank as necessary 
preconditions for the efficiency of the independence model generates the 
question of whether these are also crucial elements for understanding the 
changing role of the BoN after World War II. Can the degree of such 
legitimacy and trust explain how and why its role changed? Sejersted 
pinpoints another important perspective by underlining the importance of 
specific institutional and historical contexts for understanding the role of 
central banks. As I will elaborate below, I share this view, and this is why I 
assert that more thorough historical examinations of the changes that took 
place after World War II are needed before any conclusions can be drawn 
regarding the status of the BoN. Compared with earlier and later periods, the 
post-WWII role of the BoN undoubtedly had a different character, as there 
were fewer public confrontations between the central bank and political 
authorities and the content of the monetary policy changed. However, this is 
does not necessarily imply that the central bank lost all independence, power 
or influence. It can alternatively indicate a change of form in the relations 
between the central bank and political authorities, a change that implied a 
new role for the central bank without necessarily depriving it of all authority 
and autonomy.  
A different indirect approach to the role of the BoN during the post-WWII 
period has been taken by the historian Einar Lie, who in his comprehensive 
study of the Ministry of Finance from 1945 to 1965, has analyzed how the 
Labor Party, supported by a new generation of young economists trained by 
later Nobel Prize winner Ragnar Frisch, transformed the Ministry of Finance 
                                                     
8 F. Sejersted, Ideal, teori og virkelighet. Nicolai Rygg og paripolitikken i 1920-
årene, Oslo: Cappelen, 1973; F. Sejersted, ”Norges Banks autonomi. En historisk 
randkommentar”, Sosialøkonomen, no. 3, 1984, pp. 5-6; F. Sejersted, “On the 
socalled ‘authonomy’ or ‘independence’ of central banks. Reflections on the 
Norwegian case of minimal formal autonomy”, TMV working paper, no. 75, Center 
for Technology and Culture (TMV): Oslo, 1994; Francis Sejersted, “Norges Bank 
mellom avhengighet og uavhengighet”, in F. Sejersted, Norsk idyll?, Oslo: Pax, 
2000, pp. 131-144. 
Introduction 
8 
into a “Super-Ministry”, with an overarching responsibility for economic 
policy. Lie suggests that rather than passively adapting to a subordinate role, 
the BoN actively promoted its own opinions during the first post-WWII 
decade, often in opposition to the political authorities. However, according 
to Lie, the central bank had little influence on policy formulation and 
implementation and fought a losing battle against the Ministry of Finance, a 
defeat he links to a perception that the Bank’s governor Gunnar Jahn 
represented an old regime of economists who in vain tried to block increased 
stated intervention and market controls.9 
Lie’s study provides important contributions to our understanding of how 
Labor developed a new economic policy after World War II, not least his 
analyses of the ideas and ambitions of Ragnar Frisch and his students. 
Nevertheless, by consequently taking on the perspective of the Ministry of 
Finance, Lie tends to view many policy-making processes as games 
controlled by the Ministry and he sometimes misses out on other agencies, 
including the BoN, which also contributed to Labor’s policy formulation and 
implementation. It is thus interesting to examine how some of these 
processes appeared from the central bank’s point of view and to discuss 
whether the Ministry of Finance had less control than Lie proposed. 
Furthermore, the assumption of a clear duality between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
economic theory regimes suggests a static situation in which the economists 
had defined their views once and for all. However, considering the extreme 
war-related challenges of this period and the changing institutional 
conditions, there is reason to propose an alternative, more dynamic approach 
and ask whether these economists instead developed their views over time. 
Did perhaps practical problem-solving count just as much as economic 
theory in the search for new policy solutions? If so, what consequences did 
such a dynamic process have for the creation of a new role for the central 
bank? 
The most recent contribution to the study of Norwegian economic and 
political development has been carried out by the economic historian Sverre 
                                                     
9 E. Lie, Ambisjon og tradisjon. Finansdepartementet 1945-1965, Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1995. 
For a discussion of the concept of "Super-Ministry" [overdepartemensmodellen], see 
T. Bergh, “Arbeiderpartiet og statens styrende hånd”, in T. Nordby (ed.) 
Arbeiderpartiet og planstyret 1945-1965, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1993. 
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Knutsen, who in his comprehensive study of the Norwegian financial 
markets in the 20th century interprets the first post-WWII decade in the 
conventional way as a transitional period from an old to a new political 
regime. Knutsen gives a detailed account of how the Norwegian financial 
markets were transformed as part of Labor’s “strategic capitalism” during 
the period 1950-1980. Regarding the role of the central bank, Knutsen 
demonstrates how the BoN took part in these policy-making processes, but 
since his main purpose is to understand long-term general changes in the 
financial system, he does not pay explicit attention to the changing role of 
the Bank. Besides this analysis of the post-WWII period, Knutsen’s perhaps 
main contribution is his reevaluation of the causes of the economic crises in 
the interwar period, as we will discuss more thoroughly in chapter 1, where 
he rejects the traditional emphasis on monetary policy as the main cause and 
instead focuses on the boom during World War I as an underlying 
explanation for the following calamities.10 
The above account suggests that in order to establish and explain the nature 
of the new role of the BoN during the post-WWII period, it is necessary to 
carry out fresh in-depth examinations of how and why the central bank took 
part in Labor’s policy-making. This is additionally born out by the fact that 
much of the existing literature omits the influence of the international 
context on the role of the central bank. By the time of Liberation, the lack of 
a complete and fully working international currency system made access to 
foreign exchange a critical economic problem. This, combined with the fact 
that the handling of foreign exchange was traditionally a key task of the 
central bank, calls for new examinations of how foreign exchange matters 
influenced the participation of the BoN in policy formulation and 
implementation. 
I will limit my study to the period 1945-1954, first because this coincides 
with the term of office of governor Gunnar Jahn, a liberal politician and 
economist who was known for openly opposing the new majority 
administration of the Labor Party. As mentioned above, this has led 
historians to believe that the BoN was completely marginalized. Most 
scholars have thus concentrated their studies on the post-1954 period, when 
Labor strategist Erik Brofoss succeeded Jahn as governor. From the 
                                                     
10 S. Knutsen, Staten og kapitalen i det 20. århundre – Regulering, kriser og endring 
i det norske finanssystemet 1900-2005, Dr. Philos. thesis in history, no. 287, Oslo: 
University of Oslo, 2007. 
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perspective of the central bank, the first post-war decade therefore appears as 
an understudied period. Moreover, this decade was a time of change and 
transformation both internationally and in Norwegian politics, from war to 
peacetime economies, and new institutions and policy measures had to be 
developed and implemented. This created challenges, for example in terms 
of international currency problems and domestic inflationary pressures, but it 
also represented exceptional opportunities for designing and undertaking 
new tasks and responsibilities. While both the international institutional 
framework and Labor’s economic policy from the mid-1950s onwards had, 
more or less, found their form, the first post-WWII decade represented a 
relatively open situation where the scale, scope and nature of the future 
economic policy was yet to be decided. A key question in our context thus 
becomes, to what extent did the BoN also find a new role already during this 
period? 
A second limitation in my study concerns the tasks of the central bank. As 
my main research interest is the role of the BoN in policy formulation and 
implementation, the Bank’s technical tasks, such as issuing and distributing 
coins and bills, will in general not be subject to analysis. The only exception 
is occasions when these technical tasks became a matter of politics, such as 
during World War II, when the occupying regime financed their activities by 
printing money in the BoN. This had a fundamental impact on Norwegian 
economy after the war and, as we will see, also on the tasks and legitimacy 
of the central bank. 
Central bank literature and the matter of independence 
During the last couple of decades, there has been a renewed interest in the 
role of central banks among scholars as well as politicians. Changes in 
economic policy and deregulation of financial markets in many Western 
countries during the 1980s fueled a debate on the division of authority and 
tasks between central banks and political authorities, a debate that was 
reinforced by the creation of the European Central Bank in 1992, and by the 
more fundamental political and economic changes in Eastern Europe and 
Russia after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. As part of these processes of 
change, a vast literature on the role of central banks sprung up. The purpose 
and methodology of this literature varies considerably, but a substantial part 
of it aims at taking part in policy-making processes in which a key issue has 
been to decide just how independent central banks should be. Through 
theoretical reflections and empirical examinations, scholars from disciplines 
such as economics, political science, sociology and history have from their 
various angles discussed why and to what extent central banks should be 
allowed to operate as independent agents in charge of monetary policy 
without regard to the immediate interests and opinions of the political 
authorities. 
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Critics of independent central banks have argued that monetary policy has 
too profound an impact on the economy to be left in the hands of a few 
central bank economists. Instead it should be under democratic control, the 
political authorities having a right to intervene if they deem it necessary. 
Some critics also have argued along the lines of post-WWII economists and 
politicians, who regarded monetary policy as an integrated part of the 
economic policy that should be subject to systematic coordination with other 
policy areas.11 Today, however, such opinions are rarely heard, and there is 
widespread international support for a policy model promoting strong, 
politically independent central banks. Many countries, including Norway, 
have introduced, or are in the process of introducing, this model, which is 
promoted as a universal ideal that can and should be implemented 
everywhere. The independence model is meant to restrain political 
authorities from pursuing a monetary policy that may give short-term 
political benefits but will have harmful consequences in the long run. By 
delegating power to the central bank, politicians reduce their ability to yield 
to temptations (for instance of indulging in over-expansionary policies in 
order to win an election), which may produce negative long-term effects 
(inflation). In this respect, CBI reflects concerns that monetary policy is too 
important to be left to the vagaries of partisan politics or government 
meddling. 
In our context, the normative question of how independent central banks 
should be today is of less interest. My main concern is to analyze changes in 
the role of a central bank that took place in another time period and under 
different economic, political, and institutional circumstances. Nevertheless, 
the literature provides important perspectives, not least by illuminating 
different possible approaches to the study of central banks. Regarding 
purpose as well as methodology, this literature can very roughly be divided 
into two parts. One group of scholars – of what can be labeled a static-
generalizing tradition (as opposed to a dynamic-institutional tradition, which 
will be presented below) – tends to regard central banks as rational actors 
that behave in the same way regardless of time and space. They assume that 
central banks generally are more conservative and predictable than 
politicians in terms of both budget politics and initiating new policy 
solutions, thereby also supposing that central banks always keep low 
                                                     
11 For an overview of the debate on democratic control, see Ø. Berre, Ideen om en 
uavhengig sentralbank. En kritisk analyse, post-graduate thesis in political science, 
Oslo: University of Oslo, 1996; Syrstad 2003, pp. 47-54. 
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inflation as their superior policy goal. Methodologically, these scholars 
usually combine mainstream neo-classical economic theory or game theory 
perspectives with quantitative empirical studies in order to measure the 
degree of CBI, discuss theoretical topics such the relationship between 
independence and levels of inflation, and try to predict how central banks 
will behave in various situations. The main research interest of these 
scholars is usually to generate general theories, and they often, without any 
contextual reservations, support CBI as a preferred policy solution.12 
A second group of scholars, whom I label the dynamic-institutional tradition, 
takes a different approach. Rather than viewing central banks from a static, 
generalizing perspective, these scholars bring focus to the variations and 
time- and space-specific dimensions of central bank behavior. By studying 
central banks in various historical and geographical settings and over longer 
time periods, the dynamic-institutional scholars have demonstrated that the 
role of central banks, including their degree of independence, has varied 
considerably. While some central banks at certain times have been almost 
completely independent, others have been supervised continuously by the 
political authorities, or the authorities have intervened in special cases. 
Plurality of objectives and tasks has also been common, and central banks 
have been known not simply to defend price stability, but also for example 
to act as creditors to the public or to promote structural changes in the 
banking sector. From a historical perspective, therefore, the static-
generalizing research tradition’s assumption of stability in the role and 
preferences of central banks appears as too simplistic. According to the 
dynamic-institutional tradition, in which I include my own study of the 
                                                     
12 Works that may be included in the static-generalizing research tradition are: 
Cukierman 1992; A. Alesina, “Politics and business cycles in industrial 
democracies”, Economic Policy, no. 8, 1989, pp. 57-98; K. Banaian, L. Laney, and 
T. Willett, “Central bank independence: An international comparison”, Economic 
Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, (March) 1983, pp. 1-13; S.C.W. Eijffinger 
and E. Schaling, Central Bank Independence: Criteria and Indices, research 
memorandum no. 548, Tilburg University, Department of Economics, 1992; P. 
Kenen, Comparative Analysis of the Central Banks of the World, Bicentennial 
Symposium of Banque de France, Paris: Banque de France, 2000, pp. 223-228; H. 
Berger, J. de Haan and S.C.W. Eijffinger, “Central bank independence: An update of 
theory and evidence”, CESifo Working Paper no. 255 (February), 2000; M. Arnone, 
B.J. Laurens, J.F. Segalotto and M. Sommer, “Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons 
from Global Trends”, IMF Working Paper No. 07/88, International Monetary Fund, 
2007. 
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Norwegian central bank, these variations can be explained by different 
historical experiences and different institutional settings. Thus, in order to 
understand and explain how central banks behave, it is necessary to analyze 
their role in specific processes of policy formulation and implementation 
over time.13 
From one perspective, the two above research traditions can be seen as 
complementary in the sense that to a certain degree they have different 
purposes and methodological approaches. Whereas the static-generalizing 
tradition usually aims at the generation of general theories and policy advice, 
scholars of the historical-dynamic tradition – with a few important 
exceptions – are more concerned with understanding and explaining specific 
historical events, cases, and changes. The application of quantitative 
methods and general behavioral assumptions makes the static-generalizing 
tradition well suited to comprehensive comparative studies, since it enables 
the relatively easy comparison of a large number of units. Hence, such 
studies can provide theoretical and empirical evidence, which can support 
                                                     
13 Works that exemplify the historic-dynamic tradition are: Toniolo 1988; C. 
Goodhart, The Evolution of Central Banks, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
1988; G.A. Epstein and J.B. Schor, “The divorce of the Banca d’Italia and the Italian 
Treasury: a case study of central bank independence”, in P. Lange and M. Regini 
(eds.), State, market, and social regulation. New perspectives on Italy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 147-164; J.B. Goodman, “The Politics of 
Central Bank Independence”, Comparative Politics, vol. 23 (April), 1991, pp. 329-
349; H. Berger and J. de Haan, “A state within the state? An event study on the 
Bundesbank (1948-1973)”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol. 46, no. 1 
(February), 1991; S. Bell, “The limits of Rational Choice: New Institutionalism in 
the Test Bed of Central Banking Politics in Australia”, Political Studies, vol. 50, 
2002, pp. 477-496; Stockdale 2003; S. Bell, Australia’s money mandarins. The 
Reserve Bank and the politics of money, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 
G. Nardozzi has made a similar distinction between two research traditions on 
central banking, which he labels American (≈ static-generalizing) and European (≈ 
dynamic-institutional). While these labels gave an accurate description of the 
literature until the late 1980s, more recent contributions clutter up the picture. For 
example, works that easily can be included in Nardozzi’s ‘European” tradition 
include the Australian scholar Stephen Bell (2002) and the American scholar Susan 
E. Stockdale (2003). Thus, rather than focusing on the authors’ geographical origin, 
I have chosen to develop a typology that describes the content of the different 
approaches. See G. Nardozzi, ‘A Central Bank Between the Government and the 
Credit System: The Bank of Italy after World War II’, in Toniolo 1988. 
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generalizing theories as well as widely applicable policy advice. On the 
other hand, the lack of institutional and historical context makes this 
approach less fruitful for analyzing the role of specific central banks. For this 
purpose, the methodological approach of the dynamic-institutional tradition, 
based on in-depth qualitative examinations of decision-making processes, 
might be more fruitful because it allows more complex and multi-layered 
analyses. 
Theories on changing central banks 
Despite the fact that the two above research traditions are partly 
complementary, in other respects they can also be viewed as competing, 
especially as regards the generation of general theories. Even if most 
scholars of the dynamic-institutional tradition primarily analyze particular 
historical cases, some also aim at the generation of more abstract general 
theories.14 Unlike the static-generalizing tradition, however, the general 
theories of the dynamic-institutional tradition attach great importance to the 
historical and institutional context of central banks in order to understand 
their development and behavior. Thus, rather than trying to decontextualize, 
simplify and fix central bank behavior, these general theories incorporate 
social and institutional complexity as well as dynamic perspectives in order 
to understand how and why the behavior of central banks change. 
In our context, one of the most interesting theoretical perspectives within the 
dynamic-institutional tradition has been developed by the sociologist Susan 
E. Stockdale, who has explained the nature and timing of shifts in CBI by 
                                                     
14 An instructive distinction regarding the generation of theory has been made by 
Francis Sejersted, who claims that there is a fundamental difference between 
historical theories developed within the discipline of history and the generalizing 
theories of the social sciences. The purpose of historical theories is to comprehend 
an individual reality through totalization, that is, synthesizing and explaining 
analyses of specific events. According to Sejersted, this represents an opposite to 
generalizing theories. Whereas generalizing means to disintegrate a historical 
situation in order to isolate certain selected mechanisms that are assumed to occur in 
other cases, totalizing means to provide integrating, unified accounts of specified 
historical phenomena. (See F. Sejersted, “Litt av en historie. Om forholdet mellom 
samfunnsvitere og historikere”, in F. Sejersted, Demokratisk kapitalisme, Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1993, p. 350). It is particularly in the field of generalizing that 
the dynamic-institutional and the static-generalizing research traditions are 
competing, since the latter scholars are rarely interested in the generation of 
historical theories or the interpretation of specific historical events. 
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comparing four twentieth-century legislative events in the USA and Great 
Britain: the 1935 Banking Act (US), the 1946 Bank of England Act (GB), 
the 1980 Monetary Control Act (US), and the 1998 Bank of England Act 
(GB). While the two earliest of these events represent shifts towards less 
CBI regarding monetary policy, the two later events were shifts toward 
greater independence. Stockdale interprets central banks as organizations 
that exist in the boundary between state, society, and economy. As boundary 
organizations, they mediate the relationship between these realms by 
managing the tension not only between the public and private sectors, but 
also between domestic and international concerns.15 
The concept of boundary organizations, which was originally derived from 
principal-agent theory, has been promoted most effectively by the political 
scientist David H. Guston, who argues that the success of a boundary 
organization is determined by principals on either side of the boundary, both 
of whom rely on the boundary organization to provide them with necessary 
resources. Applied to central banks, this would mean that their chances of 
success in terms of political influence and autonomy depends on their ability 
to act as intermediaries and provide necessary resources to principals of, for 
example, the political authorities on the one hand, and the financial 
institutions on the other. As pointed out by Stockdale, changes in the role of 
central banks can thereby be explained not only by exogenous factors, such 
as changes in political and economic conditions, but also by factors 
endogenous to central banks themselves, such as ideological and mental 
elements, which central bank officials can influence through networking and 
active participation in policy-making processes. Hence, according to this 
perspective, the degree of CBI is a direct consequence of boundary 
construction, reconstruction, and maintenance activities of central bank 
officials.16 
                                                     
15 S. E. Stockdale, “Mediating the boundaries between state and society: Explaining 
shifts in central bank independence”, Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 13, 
1999, pp. 3-35. 
16 Stockdale 1999; D.H. Guston, Between Politics and Science. Assuring the 
Integrity and Productivity of Research, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000; D.H. Guston, “Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science: 
An introduction”, in Science, Technology & Human Values, vol. 26, no. 4, 2001, pp. 
399-408. On principal-agent theory, see J.W. Pratt and R.J. Zeckhauser (eds.), 
Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1985. 
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The theory on boundary organizations brings light to two mutually 
dependent levels of analysis that are necessary to explain changes in the role 
of a central bank: the individual level with central bank officials and other 
principal actors who take part in policy-making, and the organizational level 
with its focus on the position of the central bank as an organization in this 
policy-making environment. Both levels will be important in this 
examination of the Norwegian central bank. I will discuss how personal 
networks and relations between key individuals influenced the changing role 
of the BoN and also examine to what extent the central bank held a 
mediating position between politicians and financial institutions, between 
domestic and international concerns. Can this position as a boundary 
organization – or the lack of such a position – explain how and why the BoN 
developed a new role during this period? 
Another fruitful theoretical contribution within the dynamic-institutional 
research tradition is provided by the political scientist Stephen Bell, who 
adds a third level of analysis to the study of changing central banks, namely 
the institutional environment surrounding these banks. In his examinations 
of Australia’s recommitment to CBI in the 1990s, Bell emphasizes the 
importance of the international context to domestic policy-making processes. 
Based on an inductive, historically grounded political economy approach, 
Bell introduces a model of ‘embedded statism’ that places such domestic 
processes, in which politicians and central bankers act in relatively closed 
‘state-directed’ monetary policy network, in a wider, international context. 
Bell argues that standard theories of political science based on closed-
economy models are insufficient in order to explain Australia’s 
recommitment to CBI since they exclude the fundamental structural changes 
and globalization of international financial markets that embedded this 
domestic process. Whereas political scientists traditionally have tended to 
view changes in the role of central banks as a result of domestic pressure 
group politicization over monetary policy, political business cycles and 
government-central bank conflict only, Bell argues that these domestic 
processes are decisively influenced by the international institutional, political 
and economic context in which they take place.17 
                                                     
17 S. Bell, “Open-economy Central Banking: Explaining Australia’s Recommitment 
to Central Bank Independence”, Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 367, 
no. 3, 2001, pp. 459-480; Bell 2002. 
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In accordance with the approach of the dynamic-institutional tradition, Bell 
limits his model of state embeddedness to a specific historical setting: the 
globalized economy of the 1980s and 1990s. However, perhaps his 
theoretical perspectives also can be applied to the pre-globalization period 
after World War II. During the first postwar decade, a new institutional 
framework for the exchange of goods and capital had to be developed to 
replace the former gold standard system. As a small, traditionally open 
economy, Norway totally depended on taking part in this process, which was 
characterized by much uncertainty as well as economic and political unrest. 
Based on Bell’s model of embedded statism, the question in our context is 
thus to what extent and in what way did this international process affect the 
development of a new role for the BoN. 
In his most recent academic contribution, Bell has focused on another 
important dimension in the study of central banks, namely the balancing of 
theory versus practice. Commenting on the contemporary literature on CBI, 
Bell argues that although this model has been underpinned theoretically, 
there is a critical shortage of empirical studies on how CBI has worked in 
practice. Based on his own empirical studies, Bell questions the theoretical 
presumptions that monetary policies and independent central banks are 
characterized by rule compliance and transparency (such as inflation 
targeting and publications of inflation forecasts) rather than discretion and 
political consultations in policy-making. Bell argues that the very nature of 
central banking, as part of a political system, encourages various forms of 
non-transparency, and he rejects the idea that central banks are insulated 
from particular interests and thus ‘depoliticized’.18 
Bell’s call for empirical studies of today’s central banking agrees well with 
Stockdale’s emphasis on the need for such examinations in order to 
determine the changing role of central banks also in a historical perspective. 
Moreover, Bell and Stockdale share a common theoretical view of central 
banks as institutionally embedded, yet capable of maneuvering purposefully 
within this institutional framework. As Bell has described it: 
                                                     
18 Bell 2004; M. Beeson and S. Bell, “Independent Central Banks and the 
Democratic Deficit: The Reserve Bank of Australia and the Politics of Ambiguity”, 
unpublished paper available online at: http://eprint.uq.edu.au/archive/00001701, 
Brisbane; University of Queensland, 2004. 
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The role of institutional arrangements is context specific and 
variable. Neither governments nor central banks are necessarily 
passive in the face of institutional arrangements and their strategy 
in this respect will depend on their own motives and on the wider 
context.19 
In order to understand how and why the role of the BoN changed after 
World War II, such general, yet historically rooted theories on changing 
central banks are useful, among other things, for empirically examining, 
identifying and explaining social relations and behavioral characteristics. In 
the following section of this chapter, I will elaborate on my approach to 
theory and its application in general. 
Theoretical considerations 
Basically, I have an eclectic approach to theory in the sense that I apply 
various theories or parts of theories, which can shed new light on the 
different aspects of my particular historical study. Along with many 
historians, and in contrast to natural sciences and many social scientific 
disciplines, my approach to theory is not driven primarily by an ambition to 
develop new theory. Instead, theory is a source of new research questions, 
concepts, and explanatory models, which can add to the understanding of 
historical events. In the words of the historian Rolf Thorstendahl, these 
different approaches to theory reflect different scientific purposes of natural 
and social scientists, on the one hand, and most historians, on the other: 
Science lives by theories and in science ‘news’ means new 
theories, which are accepted as the valid ones. Historical 
scholarship lives rather by a combination of factual findings and 
reflections on the validity of evidence for the understanding of the 
past. Theories enter this understanding as the instruments for 
creating historical news rather than as part of an objective of 
theory-making.20 
Despite these limited theoretical ambitions, theory is an important part of 
any scientific study. All scholars use theory throughout the research process, 
from the generation of research questions, via the selection of empirical 
                                                     
19 Bell 2001, p. 468. 
20 R. Thorstendahl, “Thirty-Five Years of Theories in History”, Scandinavian 
Journal of History, vol. 25, no. 1-2, 2000, pp. 1-26 (quote: p. 2).  
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evidence, to the interpretation and presentation of their findings. Whereas 
some disciplines apply theory explicitly by requiring that scholars state their 
theoretical standing in detail, historians traditionally have used theory more 
implicitly by for instance interpreting actors as rational or utility maximizing 
without actually pronouncing any specific framework of behavioral theory. 
A classic argument for the first approach is that explicit theoretical accounts 
make underlying assumptions more visible and easier to evaluate, while 
scholars of the latter tradition argue that a strict and complete theoretical 
framework will impose “tyrannical” guidelines on research and restrict the 
analytical perspectives of researchers.21 A compromise between these two 
extremes, which is preferred by many historians today including myself, is to 
select certain key concepts and build loose theoretical frameworks, which 
can contribute to systematizing a course of events and clarifying causal 
mechanisms without being too deterministic.  
Even though I prefer an eclectic approach to theory, most of the theoretical 
perspectives I apply are rooted in institutional theory, a theoretical category 
of wide scope. Institutional theory includes variants of different behavioral 
assumptions and epistemological approaches, such as economic institutional 
theory, which regards individuals as rational actors who use cost-benefit 
logic when they relate to their institutional setting, and sociological 
institutional theory, which usually emphasizes how the structural 
surroundings determine individual actions by the internalization of values 
and establishment of routines. A common feature, however, is the perception 
that institutions constrain and regularize individual behavior, as expressed by 
the economic historian Douglass C. North: 
[Institutions] establish the cooperative and competitive 
relationships which constitute a society and more specifically an 
economic order (...). It is the institutional framework which 
constrains peoples’ choice sets.22 
                                                     
21 See the classic debate in Norwegian historiography between the historian Jens A. 
Seip and the sociologist Gudmund Hernes: J.A. Seip, “Modellenes tyranni”, in 
Problemer og metode i historieforskningen, Oslo: Gyldendal, 1975/1983, pp. 199-
227; G. Hernes, “Modellenes maskerade”, Historisk Tidsskrift, vol. 56, no. 1, 1977, 
pp. 80-90. 
22 D.C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1981, p. 201. 
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According to North, institutions control human behavior much in the same 
way that rules of a game control the players. He uses the metaphor of a 
soccer game, and argues that the institutional rules that influence human 
action can be compared to the three types of rules that structure this game. 
There are formal rules, which lay down the number of players, the size of the 
pitch, and how to carry out the game; informal rules, which constitute the 
culture and norms that create notions such as fair play and team spirit; and 
meta-rules, which determine how to change the rules. By using the metaphor 
of a game, North acknowledges that individuals are not free to do entirely 
what they want, but at the same time he presents the rules as relatively 
explicit and understandable. As a representative of the economic branch of 
institutional theory, he also emphasizes the ability of individuals to reflect 
consciously upon their institutional framework and choose whether or not 
they should obey the formal and informal rules. In this respect, North’s 
approach diverges from other branches of institutional theory, more oriented 
towards sociology, which tend to see institutions as internalized norms and 
values that individuals follow routinely. Some sociologists, associated with a 
so-called cognitive branch of institutional theory, go even further and regard 
institutions as symbols, words, signs, gestures that shape the meanings actors 
attribute to objects and activities, and help them make sense of what is 
happening. In the terminology of North’s soccer game metaphor, this far 
more abstract approach to institutional theory entails that the game not only 
involves rules and enforcement mechanisms, but also consists of socially 
constructed players.23 
From an eclectic’s point of view, the various behavioral theories and 
epistemological traditions of institutional theory do not necessarily represent 
a problem. On the contrary, they can make an excellent starting point for 
discussing different interpretations of human interaction and for giving 
balanced assessments of historical events. People are multi-dimensional, and 
human interaction is a complex matter. Thus, rather than constructing 
general theories by reducing the number of dimensions shaping human 
behavior, as many social scientists would do, I aim at accentuating and 
understanding this complexity by applying different theoretical perspectives. 
As a historian, I believe that human behavior cannot be generalized but 
depends on the historical and geographical setting in which it takes place. 
                                                     
23 For a concise overview of the various branches of new institutional theory, see R. 
Scott, Institutions and Organizations, 2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications, 2001, chapter 3. 
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Human behavior is not either rational and profit maximizing or totally 
determined by external forces; it is usually a combination of these extremes. 
People might be partly trying to increase their personal power or wealth, but 
at the same time be influenced by their institutional setting, a setting upon 
which they can reflect only partly, since it is, to some extent, internalized. In 
other words, people are complex, and if scholars operate with too rigid and 
simplified behavioral assumptions, they might miss out on important aspects 
of their object of study. 
Institutional theory generally emphasizes the stabilizing effects of rules, 
norms and values on social development as well as individual behavior. 
However, from the 1920s to the mid-1950s, the political, economic and 
cultural environment underwent considerable changes, which means that the 
period in question here was one of institutional change rather than stability. 
Old rules, norms and values met new ones, and there were no clear breaks 
between two consistent institutional regimes. Rather than being surrounded 
by a fixed, unambiguous institutional framework, individuals and 
organizations faced inconsistent and changing expectations, as well as new 
challenges and opportunities. 
A theoretical concept that aims to explain such institutional changes is 
‘institutional entrepreneurship’, a term that has attracted considerable 
attention in recent years. This concept combines perspectives from literature 
on institutions, which emphasize the stabilizing effect of rules, norms, and 
cognitive perceptions, and entrepreneurship, which accentuate how 
institutions are themselves shaped by creative entrepreneurial forces that 
bring about change. It thereby brings light to the dual perspective that often 
emerges in historical examinations that organizational and social processes 
are usually characterized by both continuity and change. This theoretical 
approach tends to view actors as institutionally embedded, but by developing 
strategies of change and entering into negotiations with other organizations 
or individuals, they can also bring about institutional change that again 
constitutes a new, stabilizing institutional framework. By emphasizing the 
strategic elements and forces behind institutional change, this approach tends 
to present this as the result of strategic and skillful action by entrepreneurs 
who “narrate and theorize change in ways that give other social groups 
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reason to cooperate”.24 However, as we will see below, such strategic and 
conscious explanations constitute only one of several possible perspectives 
underlying individual behavior. In order to understand the mechanisms 
underlying institutional change, it might thus be necessary also to apply 
other theoretical perspectives. 
In conclusion, as a student of social matters and human interaction, I choose 
to apply a wide set of tools – theories as well as key concepts – in order to 
interpret the particular events at hand. In the following, I will discuss some 
key concepts that can add to our understanding of how and why the BoN 
developed as it did during the post-WWII period. 
Key concepts I: Roles 
A key concept emphasized by the normative branch of institutional theory is 
the notion of roles. Defined as “patterns, as configurations of goals, attitudes, 
and behaviors that are characteristic of people in particular situations”, the 
concept of roles draws attention to an often-occurring standardization of 
human action.25 Roles can be generated from formal positions – for example 
the position of central bank governor – in which an actor is expected to 
behave in a particular way, or they can take shape over time from informal 
interaction that creates expectations of a certain behavior. An important 
aspect of this concept is that a role not only imposes constraints on social 
behavior: by being associated with certain rights and privileges, it also 
empowers and enables social action. 
According to the underlying behavioral assumptions of economic 
institutional theory as defined by Douglass North, we have seen that the key 
question for an individual in a social setting would be: What are my interests 
in this situation and how do I fulfill them – by manipulating or adapting to 
the institutional framework? In contrast to this ‘cost-benefit’ logic, the 
normative branch of institutional theory argues that rational action is 
grounded in social contexts that specify appropriate means to particular ends. 
                                                     
24 R. Garud, C. Hardy, and S. Maguire, ”Institutional Entrepreneurship as Embedded 
Agency: An Introduction to the Special Issue”, Organization Studies, vol. 28, no. 7, 
2007, pp. 957-969 (quote: p. 962). This special issue gives an up-to-date 
introduction to the term institutional entrepreneurship and its application in various 
fields of research. 
25 Quoted from Scott 2001, p. 39. 
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This generates a different key question for individuals: Given my role in this 
situation, what is expected of me? According to the normative branch of 
institutional theory, values and normative frameworks structure the actors’ 
choices by, on the one hand, defining what are preferred or desirable goals 
and, on the other hand, specifying the suitable way to pursue these goals. 
However, even if the values and normative institutions are often internalized, 
this does not imply that human behavior is unreasoned or automatic. Since 
institutional rules have to be adapted to every particular situation, actors 
must select and interpret the appropriate rules. And in this process of 
selection and interpretation, the normative branch of institutional theory 
assumes that actors will attach more importance to environmental 
expectations than to their personal preferences. 
The concept of roles can add important perspectives to our understanding of 
how and why the individuals who participated in developing a new role for 
the BoN acted as they did. Rather than interpreting policy initiatives or 
confrontations as mere reflections of quests for power and influence, the 
concept of roles draws our attention towards the institutional context of these 
events and suggests that they alternatively – or partly – were attempts to 
meet environmental expectations. During the period of interest here, the 
expectations regarding the central bank and its governor were shifting from 
anticipations of political independence towards notions of the central bank as 
part of a politically controlled bureaucracy and the governor as a loyal civil 
servant. A question is thus how did the BoN respond to these changes and to 
what extent did the governor and his officials take new expectations of 
political loyalty into account. By applying the concept of roles as an 
alternative dimension to the notion of power-seeking strategists, we can 
thereby more easily explore and explain complexities in individual and 
organizational behavior. 
Key concepts II: Organizations vs. institutions 
In everyday language, the two concepts of organizations and institutions are 
often used as synonyms. Large firms or organizations are referred to as 
institutions without any further reflection. Institutional theory, by contrast, 
provides a clear conceptual distinction between the two: institutions are 
defined as the formal and informal rules that regularize behavior, while 
organizations are viewed as a specific type of participant within this 
institutional framework. In the case of central banks, this conceptual 
distinction can add to our understanding of their nature since they can be 
viewed as both organizations and institutions. 
On the one hand, central banks are organizations that have to relate to a 
surrounding institutional context. In interaction with the political authorities, 
the financial markets and the general public, central banks have to take a 
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wide set of rules, norms and values into account in order to perform their 
tasks effectively. And when this institutional framework changes, as it did 
from the inter-war period onwards, central banks might have to change their 
behavior in order to survive. Hence, studying how the BoN operated as an 
organization becomes an important element in explaining the development 
of a new role after World War II. 
On the other hand, central banks constitute part of the institutional 
framework in which they operate. By virtue of its long history, its economic 
expertise and its traditionally key role in conducting monetary policy, the 
BoN had traditionally been an important generator of economic institutions 
such as legislation, directives, and informal rules as well as more abstract 
values and norms. During the post-WWII period, the position and tasks of 
the BoN changed, and an important question is to what extent did the central 
bank continue to serve as part of, and further develop, the institutional 
framework that regulated economic behavior in general and the working of 
the financial markets in particular. 
Key concepts III: Central bank independence 
While I have generated the two above concepts directly from institutional 
theory in order to achieve a better understanding of the behavior of 
individuals and organizations in my empirical study, the final key concept – 
central bank independence (CBI) – needs some further elaboration and 
development. As mentioned earlier, during the post-WWII period there was 
a recognized discrepancy between the legislative status and the actual 
position of the BoN. Despite political ambitions to control the central bank, 
the liberalist central bank law of 1892, which granted the BoN extensive 
operational autonomy, remained virtually unchanged until the mid-1980s. 
This discrepancy indicates that the concept of CBI is ambiguous and has to 
be discussed more thoroughly. 
Lexically the concept of independence is defined as the power to act, speak 
or think without externally imposed restraints. Based on this definition, a 
central bank would be politically independent only if it could act in whatever 
way it preferred. For central banks this will never be the case, since they are 
created as part of a political and economic system. Most scholars agree that 
whether a central bank has an independent or politically controlled position, 
the political authorities usually decide policy objectives and define a 
framework within which it has to operate. However, when it comes to the 
importance and nature of this framework the opinions diverge. Some 
scholars stress the element of conflict between the political authorities and 
the central bank when trying to define the concept of independence: 
Introduction 
25 
A central bank is independent if it can set policy instruments 
without prior approval from other actors and if, for some minimal 
period (…), the instrument settings clearly differ from those 
preferred by other actors .26 [My underlining] 
By this definition, independence to a large extent reflects the ability of 
central banks to resist political pressure. Thus, it is closely associated with 
the behavioral assumptions of the static-generalizing tradition of central 
bank literature that depicts central banks as more conservative and 
predictable than political authorities. This definition makes no 
acknowledgement of the fact that the socio-economic context surrounding 
central banks has changed over time and between countries, and that in some 
periods central banks have been viewed as an integrated party of policy-
making processes rather than a corrective of ‘lavish’ politicians. A definition 
that to a larger extent emphasizes how central banks are part of political 
systems is: 
Autonomy is the scope allowed to the central bank to formulate 
monetary policy as it thinks best (…) in the light of the 
Government’s policy and the socio-economic situation.27 [My 
underlining] 
This definition explicitly states that the degree of independence is result of 
political decisions. It can more easily be applied to various cultural, 
economic and political settings, and therefore corresponds better with the 
                                                     
26 Woolley 1984, p. 13. 
27 Nardozzi 1988, p. 192. 
Introduction 
26 
historical approach of my dissertation.28 This definition also acknowledges 
the fact that even independent central banks have to take the preferences of 
politicians into account, since ultimately it is the political authorities that can 
grant central banks independence and can thereby also abolish it. As Francis 
Sejersted has pointed out: 
It is only on the surface that the CBs [central banks] can act 
independently. In a broader perspective the CBs must act as an 
integrated part of a political system which is designed to serve the 
common good and which has defined reasonable stability as 
desirable. The CBs can only confront the government in conflict as 
long as there is a deeper consensus on the policy pursued.29 
Most scholars who study the matter of independence quickly realize that 
there often are discrepancies between a central bank’s legal status and its 
actual role. Usually, central bank legislation only gives a rough indication of 
the actual role, and in some cases – as in post-WWII Norway – it can be 
directly misleading. Thus, scholars often establish a dual conceptual 
distinction between the formal, legal or de jure status of central banks, on the 
one hand, and their actual, behavioral or de facto position, on the other.30 
According to this approach, the conventional view on the BoN during the 
post-WWII period would be that its de jure position was one of political 
                                                     
28 The definition also draws attention to a possible conceptual distinction between 
independence (which is most frequently used) and autonomy. The two concepts are 
often used alternately, but one possible interpretation is that the concept of 
independence emphasizes the lack of institutional constraints (lexically defined as 
“existing alone”), whereas the concept of autonomy entails operational freedom 
(defined as the “power or right to govern oneself”). Throughout this dissertation, 
both concepts will be applied but, in accordance with the present discussion, their 
meaning will be associated with operational freedom, since I have argued that 
central banks always will be part of political systems and do not exist alone.  For a 
discussion of this conceptual distinction and the concept of autonomy, see T. Lybek, 
“Central Bank Autonomy, Accountability, and Governance: Conceptual 
Framework”, presentation at the LEG 2004 Seminar at the International Monetary 
Fund, August 18, 2004 
[http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2004/cdmfl/eng/lybek.pdf]. 
29 F. Sejersted 1994, p. 11. 
30 In the international literature, various concepts have been used to establish this 
distinction. I have picked the concepts of de jure and de facto independence from 
Kenen 2000. 
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independence, while its de facto role was characterized by total political 
control. 
Based on my suggestion that the BoN obtained a more influential role than 
usually assumed, I find it necessary to introduce an additional conceptual 
distinction: the declared position of central banks. The concept of declared 
independence captures the publicly announced ambitions of the political 
authorities regarding the central bank, whether they wish to control it or to 
grant it independence. In our case, the declared position of the BoN was one 
of total political control and organizational subordination to the Ministry of 
Finance. Then it remains to be seen throughout this study whether this 
declared position equaled the central bank’s de facto role. 
Methodological approach 
Although theoretical frameworks and concepts can add to our understanding 
of the changing roles of central banks, I realized early on in my study that in 
order to survey and explain the specific nature of the changes that took place 
in Norway after World War II, it was necessary to carry out in-depth 
empirical examinations of how, to what extent, and why the BoN took part 
in policy formulation and implementation. Empirical spot tests drew a 
complex, and partly confusing, picture that suggested that the central bank, 
on the one hand, participated more actively in the development of Labor’s 
economic policy than usually assumed but, on the other hand, was subject to 
fundamental intervention from the political authorities. Hence, in order to 
understand how and why the BoN found a new role, and thereby explain this 
apparent paradox between active participation and extensive political 
control, I had to study in detail policy-making processes in which the central 
bank took part or tried to take part. Moreover, as I argued above, even 
though embedded in institutional frameworks and international and national 
contexts that restrain their freedom of action, central banks are actors 
themselves and have a possibility of forming their role in interaction with 
their surroundings, an assumption that also calls for examinations of how the 
central bank operated in practice. 
Based on these considerations, my methodological approach has been to 
examine the relations and interaction between the BoN and selected agencies 
that were important in policy-making processes that traditionally had 
included the central bank. With reference to the theoretical notion of central 
banks as intermediaries between public and private sectors, between the 
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political authorities and the financial markets, these agencies should include 
representatives of, on the one hand, the political authorities, which were in 
charge of designing and implementing a new economic policy more in tune 
with new ideals of economic planning and controls and, on the other hand, 
the financial institutions, which were subject to these regulations.31 
Perhaps the most important representative of the political authorities in our 
context was the Ministry of Finance [Finansdepartementet], as Labor in 
1945 had explicitly made this agency responsible for coordinating the 
monetary policy, including the operations of the BoN, the credit policy of 
the banks, and the foreign exchange policy with its broader economic policy. 
However, even though the establishment of the Ministry of Finance as a 
‘Super-Ministry’ was a declared ambition, the formal responsibility for some 
of these policy areas was assigned to other agencies, such as the Ministry of 
Commerce [Handelsdepartementet], which was in charge of important parts 
of the foreign exchange policy. It is therefore necessary also to examine the 
relations and interaction between the BoN and this Ministry in order to 
detect whether the position of the Ministry of Finance became as dominant 
as originally intended or whether the Ministry of Commerce also influenced 
the position of the central bank. 
While the Ministries of Finance and Commerce appear as the most important 
representatives of the political authorities, the financial institutions were 
represented by their national organizations, the Norwegian Bankers’ 
Association [Bankforeningen], which in 1945 served the approximately 100 
joint-stock banks, and the Central Association for Norwegian Savings Banks 
[Sparebankforeningen], which organized more than 600 savings banks.32 
These two banking associations played an important part in the 
communication between the political authorities and the individual banks, as 
the decentralized structure of the Norwegian banking sector, with a large 
number of units spread around a wide geographical area, made direct contact 
with each bank a time-consuming and difficult task. Influencing the banks 
through their national associations thereby appeared as one possible way to 
control the volume and allocation of credit. The BoN had, in addition to its 
regular communication with individual banks, traditionally used the banking 
                                                     
31 By the concept of ‘political authorities’, here I mean the Stortinget (the national 
assembly), the government, and the different Ministries serving the government. 
32 Historisk statistikk 1978, Central Bureau of Statistics: Oslo, 1978, tables 261 and 
262. 
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associations to exchange information with the banking sector, information 
that the central bank could use not only as part of conducting policy but also 
to establish an influential position regarding the political authorities. Hence, 
developing constructive interaction with the banking associations could 
potentially be an important element in creating a new role. Examining these 
relations thereby becomes an important approach in my study. 
The relations between the political authorities, the banking associations and 
the central bank were developed not only at an organizational level, through 
the formal communication of their official views and arguments. They also 
evolved through interaction between individuals – such as the central bank 
governor, the finance minister and the head of the Bankers’ Association, 
who participated in informal and formal discussions regarding policy 
formulation and implementation. This type of individual interaction can 
uncover unexpected positions and alliances that can help to explain how the 
central bank found a new role. Examining such individual interaction 
‘behind the scenes’ in addition to the more formal procedures will thus form 
a crucial part of this study. It is important to note, however, that such 
emphasis on individual action does not imply a disregard for either the 
surrounding economic and political events or the international and national 
institutional context. Quite the contrary: as I have argued above, this context 
constitutes a setting that not only influenced the participants in general, but 
also often had direct consequences for the influence and autonomy of the 
central bank. 
Research questions and dissertation outline 
Based on the above account, the main research question of this dissertation 
can be summarized as follows: 
• How did the BoN find a new role during the period 1945-1954 – and 
why? 
Throughout this introductory chapter, I have presented some supplementary 
problems for discussion that elaborate important aspects of this question: 
• To what extend did the BoN participate in the formulation and 
implementation of Labor’s economic policy after World War II, and 
how did this influence the development of its new role? 
• How significant was the international context for this development? 
Is the theoretical notion of ‘embedded statism’ relevant for 
understanding the changing role of the Norwegian central bank?   
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• To what extent did the BoN serve as a boundary organization 
between politicians and financial markets, between domestic and 
international concerns, as suggested by theory? And – if so – how did 
this position as mediator influence the development of its new role? 
• How do the concepts of legitimacy and trust relate to this process? 
• What was the relation between the de jure, the declared, and the de 
facto position of the BoN during this period? And why was the old 
Central Bank Act of 1892 not replaced by new legislation? 
• Can the concept of roles, as generated from the normative branch of 
institutional theory, add to our understanding of the policy-making 
processes after World War II, including the process of finding a new 
role for the central bank? 
The above discussion has also generated a question of more general interest 
for students of Norwegian economic policy in the 20th century: 
• Is the concept of a static dichotomy between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
economic theory regimes adequate for understanding the policy-
making process after 1945? Or was this process characterized more 
by dynamic development and perhaps convergence between different 
views? How important was reasoning based on economic theory, 
compared to practical problem solving, for the development of 
Labor’s new economic policy? 
These questions will be discussed throughout the remaining dissertation, 
which is organized in five empirically based chapters and one concluding 
section at the end. The five empirical chapters constitute an in-depth 
examination of the BoN in the formulation and implementation of Labor’s 
economic policy during the first post-war decade. This analysis is presented 
chronologically, where chapter 1 establishes the position of the central bank 
by 1945. Based on a historical overview of its traditional tasks, authority and 
autonomy, chapter 1 discusses the consequences of the economic crises of 
the interwar period as well as World War II for the legitimacy, authority and 
operations of the central bank. It also examines whether the BoN at this 
point in time held a position as a boundary organization. The chapter also 
debates why the majority Labor government chose to appoint Gunnar Jahn, a 
prominent political opponent and economist of traditional orientation, as the 
new central bank governor, instead of a party member or a sympathizer of 
centralized planning and market controls. 
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Chapters 2 and 3 examine the role of the BoN during the recovery years 
(1945-50), when the economic policy still was characterized by direct 
controls and primarily aimed at reconstructing the economy from wartime 
devastation. Chapter 2 (1945-48) discusses the position of the central bank in 
maintaining these domestic regulations, before turning attention towards the 
foreign exchange policy to analyze how and why events in the international 
capital markets triggered the domestic process of finding a new role for the 
BoN. This chapter continues the analysis of the central bank as a boundary 
organization by examining one side of this position: the relations with the 
political authorities, represented by the two Ministries of Finance and 
Commerce. 
Chapter 3 handles the second half of the recovery period (1948-50), which 
was a turbulent period both internationally and in Norway, as it became 
increasingly difficult to maintain an economic policy based on direct 
regulations. The chapter continues the analysis of the complex interaction 
between the BoN and the political authorities. Through analyses of various 
policy processes, it identifies four important dimensions of concern for the 
development of a new role for the central bank, namely ownership, 
organization, financial status, and its constitutional position. The chapter 
also suggests that the Labor government was torn between ideological 
considerations and practical problem solving and debates how this affected 
its initiatives towards the central bank. 
The years 1950-51, which will be analyzed in chapter 4, represented a new 
window of opportunity for the BoN, as the economy was on the verge of 
transformation from extraordinary to ‘normal’ times. Due to the new 
international obligations to liberalize and the domestic problems with 
maintaining the direct regulations, the extraordinary measures of the 
recovery period had to be replaced by new policy instruments, a situation 
that created an opening to reintroduce the central bank to domestic policy-
making. The chapter discusses how the BoN responded to this opportunity, 
and why during these years of transition it managed to establish what would 
become a lasting position in the formulation and implementation of Labor’s 
new credit policy. The final empirical chapter, chapter 5, concerns the last 
years of Gunnar Jahn’s governance (1950-54), and debates to what extent 
this new position in the credit policy, combined with the changes that had 
taken place since the war, contributed to the institutionalization of a new and 
redefined role for the central bank that would have lasting implications. 
The concluding chapter summarizes my empirical findings regarding how 
and why the BoN found a new role in new and unfamiliar institutional 
surroundings during the first post-war decade. It will also bring forth 
theoretical perspectives and implications for this case study as well as for the 
role of central banks in general. 
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1 Changing context and preconditions: 
The Bank of Norway at the threshold of the 
post-WWII world 
 
In order to understand how and why the role of the Bank of Norway (BoN) 
changed after World War II, we need to establish the status of the Bank by 
1945. This chapter will trace important characteristics of the Bank’s long 
history, identify key features of its role during the gold standard period and 
illustrate how the outbreak of World War I and suspension of the gold 
standard in 1914 marked the beginning of the end of the traditional version 
of central banking. The economic crises of the 1920s and 1930s generated 
new ideas of increased state planning and control, and the chapter addresses 
how and why this influenced the authority and tasks of the BoN. This 
increased criticism of free-market solutions, combined with positive 
experiences with market regulations during World War II, implied that by 
1945, the Norwegian central bank faced a whole new political and economic 
setting of increased political control and market regulations. What role was 
prepared for the BoN and other central banks in this new setting, and how 
did the central bank respond to the fundamental changes in its surroundings? 
To evaluate the above perspectives and questions, this chapter is organized 
in nine sections, of which the first two analyze how the BoN developed 
during the 19th century and moved towards becoming a modern central bank. 
Section 1.1 examines the position and strategies of the central bank in 
monetary policy formulation and implementation, while section 1.2. debates 
the matter of central bank independence (CBI) and analyzes the relationship 
between the BoN and the political authorities on the one hand, and the 
banking sector on the other. Section 1.3 discusses how events during and 
after World War I fundamentally threatened the legitimacy of the BoN in 
terms of questioning its authority as well as autonomy, and section 1.4. 
evaluates how economic crises and the growing critique of free-market 
economies after the final breakdown of the gold standard in 1931 created 
new preconditions and tasks for the central bank. Section 1.5 examines the 
consequences of World War II for the already battered legitimacy of the 
BoN. It also demonstrates how the occupation of Norwegian territories 
created new alliances, which would endure well into the postwar period of 
reconstruction and form an important basis for the further relations between 
the political authorities and the central bank. 
The point of departure for sections 1.6 and 1.7 is the appointment of a new 
central bank governor in January 1946, Gunnar Jahn, who was a well-known 
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liberal politician and economist of traditional orientation. Section 1.6 tries to 
explain why the newly elected Labor government chose this political 
opponent rather than a party member as the new governor, while section 1.7 
debates why Jahn, despite serious reservations, accepted this post. Through 
these explanations, the two sections also sum up important characteristics of 
the political setting in which the central bank was to find a new role. The 
changes in the role of the BoN from the 1930s onwards were part of general 
trends in international central banking towards increased political control. 
Section 1.8 presents some contemporary theoretical perspectives on how 
central banks should relate to their new surroundings, and examines to what 
extent the new governor of the BoN acted in accordance with theories. 
Section 1.9 draws some summary conclusions on the changing context, 
preconditions and characteristics of the BoN during its first 130 years of 
operation. 
1.1 Central banking and monetary policy during the 19th century 
In an international perspective, the Norwegian central bank has a long 
history. While most modern central banks were established towards the end 
of 19th century or later, the Norwegian authorities decided to establish a 
national bank with the exclusive right to issue bank notes already in 1816, 
only two years after Norway became an independent kingdom in personal 
union with Sweden.1 At this point in time, central banks had little in 
common with the modern version of the concept, and instead served mainly 
as ordinary commercial banks. In Norway, there was hardly any financial 
infrastructure and when the BoN started its operations in 1818, it served as 
the country’s only commercial bank, issuing notes and providing loans to the 
public. 
The BoN was initiated by the State but the owners were mainly private. 
When the original idea of funding a joint public-private national bank failed, 
the authorities instructed private individuals to contribute to a statutory fund 
for the new bank by issuing a mandatory ‘silver tax’. Later, there were many 
tales of people who were forced to give up their savings and family silver in 
order to establish the first national bank, and from then on, private 
individuals and organizations played an important part in the ownership of 
                                                     
1 By 1816, only six countries had established (what gradually would become) central 
banks: Sweden (1668), England (1694), Spain (1782), France (1800), Finland (1811) 
and the Netherlands (1814). See P. L. Siklos, The Changing Face of Central 
Banking, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, table 1.2.  
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the BoN. However, from the very beginning these private owners were 
passive, in the sense that they did not have any influence either on the 
conduct of the Bank or the appointment of managers and other 
representatives. Instead, they merely collected their annual share dividend 
and thereby in practice appeared more like bondholders.2 
The rationale behind this arrangement was that the interests of the private 
owners were protected by their elected representatives in the Norwegian 
national assembly, the Storting, which according to the Constitution, section 
75c, was responsible for superintending the national monetary system.3 
Monitoring the operations of the central bank was defined as part of this 
responsibility. Thus, from early on, the formal reporting line from the BoN 
to the political authorities went to the Storting rather than the government, a 
constitutional practice that, as we will see, the Labor government challenged 
after World War II.4 
Due to the slow growth of the Norwegian financial system, the development 
of the BoN from a commercial bank towards a modern central bank gathered 
headway only from the 1870s onwards. Far into the 20th century, the BoN 
continued to offer credit to the public, especially in the Northern regions of 
the country where the banking system was poorly developed, but towards the 
end of the 19th century, there was a growing acknowledgement of the need 
for a professional central bank with a unique position in the financial system, 
as expressed by finance minister Evald Rygh in a parliamentary debate in 
1890: 
(…) the position of the central bank should be that of a regulator 
(…). It should not be a forerunner in the competition with the 
private banks. The bank’s mission is, besides note issuing, to 
secure a reserve capital for the whole commercial life of the 
country and in particular for the banking community. In places 
where the circumstances are more mature than here, the most 
                                                     
2 On history of the silver tax and the establishment of the BoN in 1816, see N. Rygg, 
Norges Banks historie. Første del, Oslo: Norges Bank, 1918, pp. 1-118. 
3 Constitution for Kongeriget Norge, signet at Eidsvoll May 17, 1814. Section 75c 
states that ”Det tilkommer Storthinget (…) at føre Opsyn over Rigets Pengevæsen”. 
For a legal discussion of section 75c of the Constitution, see Syrstad 2003, chapter 
8. 
4 See chapter 3.2. 
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important role of the central bank is to be, if I may say so; the bank 
of the banks; the banker of the bankers.5 
Besides serving as “the bank of the banks”, the main task of the BoN was to 
formulate and implement the monetary policy. During the 19th century until 
the breakdown of the gold standard system in 1914, the principal objective 
of this policy was to maintain the convertibility of the Norwegian currency, 
the krone, from 1842 to silver and from 1874 to gold. These were market-
based international monetary systems with free capital flows, in which the 
national currencies were fixed at specific levels related to silver or gold. The 
key policy instrument was the central bank’s discount rate, that is the rate of 
interest banks paid when they rediscounted commercial papers in the central 
bank. Traditionally, monetary policy during the gold standard has been 
interpreted as more or less automatic responses to changes in the gold 
reserves, where the central bank raised the rates by gold outflow and lowered 
them by gold inflow. Such changes in the discount rate influenced the 
balance of payments both by stimulating the inflow or outflow of short-term 
capital and by affecting the domestic demand for consumption and 
investment goods. In theory, the gold standard was thus a self-regulating 
system that ensured a stable framework for business activities and 
consumers alike, all in accordance with the predominant liberalist ideology 
at the time, which assigned no place for more active government or central 
bank intervention in the economy. 
In practice, the working of the gold standard system probably was more 
complex than the above account suggests. A single focus on the external 
value of a currency could have serious consequences for the domestic 
economy, if for example a raise of the discount rate due to gold outflow 
coincided with a business cycle contraction or with seasonal variations that 
caused foreign reserves to be at a low ebb at the same time as domestic 
demand for money peaked. This systemic tension between international and 
domestic concerns was acknowledged at the time, and recent research by the 
economic historian Lars F. Øksendal indicates that the BoN at times 
exercised considerable discretion in its monetary policy. Øksendal 
demonstrates how the central bank changed its discount rate not only to 
influence the external balance but also to accommodate changes in seasonal 
variations in the demand for money and smooth business cycles at home. 
                                                     
5 Quoted in L. F. Øksendal, “Monetary policy under the gold standard – examining 
the case of Norway, 1873-1914”, essay for doctoral dissertation, forthcoming 
September 2007, Bergen: NHH, 2007a, p. 61. 
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Moreover, in order to shelter the domestic money supply from changes in the 
balance of payments, the central bank also counterbalanced declining gold 
reserves in economic downturns by expanding its own domestic lending, and 
used its relatively large note reserves and holdings of foreign bonds and bills 
as an operational buffer. This type of monetary sterilization was far from the 
notion of an “automatic’ system, but, according to Øksendal, as long as the 
central bank did not undermine its credibility by systematically violating the 
fundamental link between the gold reserves and the number of notes in 
circulation, there was room for such discretion also during the gold 
standard.6 
Øksendal demonstrates that the BoN from surprisingly early on used rather 
advanced techniques in its monetary operations. He also adds important 
nuance to the conventional view of the late 19th century as a pure liberalist 
area and the monetary policy of the time as an automated procedure. 
However, despite these important modifications, compared to later periods 
of active state intervention in the economy, the direct involvement of the 
central bank during the gold standard appears quite moderate. 
The introductory chapter presented a theory on boundary organizations, 
which portrays central banks as agencies operating in the boundary zone 
between international and domestic concerns and between the public and 
private spheres, and asked to what extent this theoretical perspective could 
contribute to our understanding of the role of the Norwegian central bank. 
During the 19th century, the BoN did develop clear characteristics of a 
boundary organization. In this section, we have seen that within the 
framework of the gold standard system, the central bank actively handled 
tension between domestic and international concerns in the monetary policy. 
Moreover, in the process of managing the foreign exchange rate, the BoN 
developed close relations with other central banks, the Bank of England and 
the other Scandinavian central banks in particular, and thereby obtained 
information and gained experience in international policy matters and central 
bank cooperation.7 In the following section, which discusses the matter of 
CBI during the 19th century, we will see that the BoN, to an increasing 
extent, also fulfilled the second dimension of this theoretical perspective and 
                                                     
6 Øksendal 2007a 
7 See Øksendal 2007a; L. F. Øksendal, ”The impact of the Scandinavian Monetary 
Union on financial market integration”, forthcoming in Financial History Review, 
vol. 14, 2007c. 
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established a boundary position between the political authorities and the 
private banks. 
1.2 Independence and political supervision 
The ideal for central bank operations towards the end of the 19th century was 
one of political independence. In order to prevent the government from 
financing its activities by printing money, as had happened for example 
during the Napoleonic Wars, or influencing the monetary policy to please 
the electorate in the short run, monetary policy formulation and 
implementation were to be left in the hands of an independent and powerful 
central bank, which was assumed to be better equipped to secure the long-
term monetary interests of the nation. Internationally, this rationale often 
was confirmed by institutional arrangements, such as assigning the 
responsibility for monitoring the central bank to the legislative assembly 
rather than the executive government or establishing by law the de jure 
independence of the central bank. In the case of Norway, the liberalist idea 
of CBI was a declared ideal during the 19th century. However, to what extent 
was this manifested in practice? Did the legal framework surrounding the 
central bank underpin the idea of political independence? And did the 
organization and operations of the central bank reflect this ideal? 
Until the 1870s, the BoN had a weak organizational structure, poorly suited 
for efficient policy-making and independent action. The governing bodies of 
the Bank employed by local merchants and civil servants with limited 
understanding of monetary policy, and who served in a part-time capacity 
only. Moreover, the central bank had a decentralized structure with a series 
of branches that enjoyed a strong level of autonomy. The branches had their 
own boards and the right to set their own interest rates, which obviously 
undermined the discount rate of the head office as a policy instrument. In 
addition, the head office was placed in Trondhjem, a provincial city far from 
the commercial and financial markets in the capital Kristiania. This has 
usually been interpreted as an act to ensure political independence, since 
Trondhjem was a distant location also in a political context. However, in 
practice, this placing helped undermine the authority of the head office, since 
the branch in Kristiania employed far more resources and often clashed with 
the head office on policy issues.8 Thus, during its first decades of operation, 
                                                     
8 This account is based on Øksendal 2007a, pp. 19-20, and Rygg 1918. Rygg also 
mentions an alternative argument for placing the head office in Trondhjem, namely 
regional policy reasons: ”not all institutions should be situated in the capital” (p. 
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the BoN had neither the organizational structure nor the resources to serve as 
an authoritative central bank. 
Around 1890, several institutional reforms helped strengthen the BoN as a 
professional organization. In 1893, Karl G. Bomhoff was appointed as the 
first full-time governor. Moreover, a unitary bank rate was introduced for the 
whole country. These changes substantially reduced the power and 
autonomy of the branches, a process that was confirmed with the relocation 
of the head office to Kristiania in 1897. These reforms were based on 
ideological and political acknowledgements of the need for an autonomous 
“bank of the banks” as part of the modernization of the financial system. 
Such acknowledgements represented an informal institutional change, a 
normative and cultural precondition for de facto CBI, which in 1892 was 
confirmed by broader formal institutional changes. Then the Storting passed 
a new Central Bank Act, which established the BoN as a de jure autonomous 
entity and granted it a large degree of operational freedom from political 
intervention. However, the Central Bank Act of 1892 also demonstrates how 
the BoN was politically embedded. The Act not only established strict 
technical specifications for the monetary policy that the central bank had to 
obey, but also granted the political authorities the right to appoint its 
governing bodies.9 
In the literature, one classification criteria used for measuring central bank 
independence is how and for how long the governing bodies are appointed. 
Political appointment and limited tenures suggest a higher degree of political 
control, and vice versa.10 From this perspective, the Central Bank Act of 
1892 prepared for political control rather than independence. All members of 
the governing bodies were political appointees. Three out of five members of 
the Board of Directors [Direksjonen] and all 15 members of the Supervisory 
Council [Representantskap] were nominated by the Storting, while the 
government appointed the two head members of the Board: the governor and 
the deputy governor. The fact that the executive branch of the political 
                                                                                                                            
257). In Norwegian politics, such regional considerations have a strong standing to 
this day, and Øksendal supports this interpretation and describes the choice of 
Trondhjem as ”an act of political horse trading” (p. 19). 
9 The Central Bank Act of April 23, 1892, in Norges Lover 1685-1979, Oslo: Det 
juridiske fakultet, 1980. 
10 See for example A. Alesina, ”Macroeconomics and Politics”, NBER.. 
Macroeconomics Annual, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 13-52; Cukierman 1992. 
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authorities appointed the two assumingly most influential members of the 
Board reinforces the impression of political control. 
The Board of Directors was responsible for the daily management of the 
central bank, including current policy-making, while the Supervisory 
Council formally determined the central bank’s order of business and 
provided the official communication with the Storting. According to the 
1892 Act, there was a mutual 6-month period of notice for the governor and 
deputy governor, but they could be removed instantly (with compensation 
for lost salaries). This gave the political authorities a potentially strong 
power to intervene. The members of the Supervisory Council, on the other 
hand, served six-year terms, and thereby outlasted the three-year election 
periods of the government and Storting. This implied a potential degree of 
independence, as the Council members did not follow shifts in the 
parliamentary majority. The governance bodies of the central bank could 
thus be dominated by the political opposition, as will be demonstrated in 
chapter 3.11 
Based on the above provisions, the Central Bank Act of 1892, despite being 
inspired by liberal ideals of CBI, appears to have prepared for a certain 
degree of de jure political control. A systematic study of the de facto role of 
these governing boards and their relations with the political authorities 
during the 19th century exceeds this thesis and should be a subject of future 
research. However, Øksendal suggests that there were tighter links between 
the political authorities and the central bank than is usually assumed when he 
points out that a number of directors in the BoN also served as members of 
parliament. The involvement of the politicians was also reflected in 
connection with the annual reports from the central bank to the Storting, 
which the members of parliament scrutinized and debated thoroughly.12 
This contact between the BoN and the Storting adds some nuance to the 
picture of a completely independent central bank during the gold standard. 
Nevertheless, in practice, the role of the political authorities towards the 
central bank was characterized more by supervision than by control and 
intervention. In accordance with liberalist ideals, the division of tasks 
between the authorities and the central bank implied that the former 
established a technical and political framework within which the latter could 
                                                     
11 See the Central Bank Act of April 23, 1892, chapter IV. 
12 Øksendal 2007a, p. 19. 
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operate freely. Furthermore, the de jure political authority to appoint and 
remove members of the governing bodies apparently had few practical 
consequences for the conduct of the central bank. The political authorities 
never executed their right to remove the central bank governor and between 
1893 and 1945 there were only two governors, who each served for about a 
quarter of a century.13 
These long periods of service had at least two important consequences. 
Firstly, they resulted in an increasingly strong associative link between the 
BoN and its governor in the public mind. In a sense, the governor appeared 
publicly as a personification of the central bank, while his officials were 
noticed only rarely. Secondly, the long periods of service probably increased 
the de facto influence of the central bank governor, both internally towards 
the governing bodies and externally towards the political authorities. 
Governors Bomhoff and Rygg outlasted a series of governments and elected 
parliaments as well as most members of the Board of Directors and the 
Supervisory Council. Hence, these two first full-time governors 
institutionalized a tradition of prominent individuals who left their personal 
mark on the formulation and implementation of the monetary policy, a 
tradition that also appeared in central banks elsewhere.14 
The professionalization of the BoN from the end of the 19th century onwards 
led to increased authority and autonomy in policy formulation and 
implementation. It also improved the position of the central bank as a 
boundary organization between the public and private spheres. The de facto 
independent position of the central bank vis a vis the political authorities 
implied that both the government and the Storting depended completely on 
the resources of the BoN for monetary policy formulation and 
implementation. The authority of the central bank vis a vis the growing 
banking sector also increased. 
During the gold standard, the Norwegian banking sector developed in scale 
and scope into a decentralized unit bank system of numerous small, locally 
                                                     
13 Karl G. Bomhoff served as governor during 1893-1920, while his successor 
Nicolai Rygg held office during 1920-1945. 
14 Examples of prominent central bank governors of the later interwar period are 
Montagu Norman (the Bank of England), Benjamin Strong (the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York), Emile Moreau (the Bank of France), and Hjalmar Schacht (the 
Reichsbank). See Syrstad 2003, p. 19; Toniolo 1988. 
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oriented savings banks and fewer, somewhat larger joint-stock banks. In 
1870, there were 252 savings banks with total assets of 91 million NOK 
[Norwegian kroner], while the 8 existing joint-stock banks had total assets of 
51 million NOK. By 1913, the number of banks had grown substantially to 
519 savings banks and 116 joint-stock banks. The balance between the two 
groups had shifted, however, as the total assets of the savings banks 
amounted to 684 million NOK against the 910 million NOK of the joint-
stock banks.15 
As the level of activity increased, the banking sector needed loans and 
professional assistance from the central bank, and gradually the interaction 
between the two grew, both in terms of information exchange and financial 
assistance. A breakthrough in this development – and also in the process of 
transforming the BoN into a modern central bank – occurred with the so-
called Kristiania crash of 1899, a collapse in the capital’s real estate market 
that sent several banks into crisis.16 During this crisis, the BoN for the first 
time performed as a lender of last resort, a key feature of modern central 
banking that implies that an agency – usually a central bank – assists banks 
in crisis by increasing liquidity and providing loans. By helping many of the 
banks to pull through, the central bank also protects depositors and prevents 
further damage to the financial system. As a lender of last resort during the 
Kristiania crash, the BoN thereby manifested its superior position in the 
financial system, and also helped establish the central bank as a necessary 
provider of resources to the banking sector. 
By the outbreak of World War I, the BoN thus was established in a boundary 
position between international and domestic concerns, and between public 
and private spheres in demand for the central bank’s expertise and resources. 
The Bank’s governor and his officials experienced a high degree of 
autonomy and authority in policy formulation and implementation. This 
position was based on a high degree of trust in the BoN from politicians and 
bankers as well as the general public. However, this situation was soon about 
to change. 
                                                     
15 Knutsen 2007, table 3.1.  
16 See T. J. Hanisch and H. Ryggvik, ”Eiendomskrakket i Kristiania”, TMV working 
paper, no. 62, Oslo: Centre for Technology and Culture (TMV), 1993. 
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1.3 War, economic crisis and declining legitimacy 
In August 1914, the gold standard system was suspended due to the outbreak 
of World War I, and the institutional, political and economic setting for 
central banking changed dramatically. Instead of a market-based monetary 
policy system with convertibility and free capital flows, the BoN faced an 
international setting of extensive wartime regulations aiming at controlling 
the volume and allocation of resources. Fixed exchange rates were replaced 
by volatile currencies and, for now, convertibility was a thing of the past. 
The ideal of CBI was also put aside, and the BoN experienced first-hand 
how the final authority in policy matters ultimately belonged to the political 
authorities. An example was the fisheries agreement with the British 
authorities in 1916, which allowed British purchases of Norwegian fish to be 
financed through the BoN. The agreement had substantial inflationary 
effects in the domestic economy but was nevertheless concluded without 
prior consultations with the central bank. Moreover, the discount rate was set 
aside as a flexible monetary policy instrument and instead kept at a relatively 
stable and low level, a policy that further fueled inflation.17 Hence, during 
the war, monetary policy was no longer a result of independent evaluation by 
the central bank, but rather appeared as an integrated part of complex 
political considerations. 
This reduced autonomy and authority of the central bank during World War 
I was caused by an extraordinary situation, which in itself did not create a 
precedent. However, events during and after World War I did, indirectly, 
have fundamental consequences for the future role of the BoN. These events 
caused not only a serious weakening of the idea of CBI, but also undermined 
the general trust in free market systems.  
As a neutral country, Norway experienced high economic growth during and 
immediately after the war, a growth that escalated into a financial boom 
characterized by asset price inflation in the stock market and strong credit 
expansion. The banking sector boomed too, as the number of joint-stock 
banks increased from 119 in 1914 to 192 in 1920 and the total assets of these 
banks more than quintupled from 979 to 5461 million NOK.18 This intense 
boom came to an abrupt end in 1920, when post-war depression hit the 
international economy. During the following decade, the Norwegian 
economy was characterized by deflation, debt crisis, bankruptcies and 
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18 Knutsen 2007, table 4.1. 
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unemployment. The financial system was seriously threatened as a number 
of banks and insurance companies had to shut down, despite partly 
successful efforts from the central bank to perform as lender of last resort. 
Hence, both at the time and in retrospect, the period from 1920 to the early 
1930s was associated with unprecedented economic crisis and collapse. This 
created a deep mistrust in the concept of free markets, in Norway as in other 
parts of the world. 
The causes of the interwar crisis have been subject to intense debate among 
Norwegian historians. Some have focused on the monetary policy and 
argued that the attempts to reintroduce the gold standard and restore the 
value of the Norwegian currency to prewar parity implied raising interest 
rates and deflation, which in turn resulted in debt crisis, bankruptcies and 
unemployment.19 In this explanation, the BoN plays a prominent role since 
the newly appointed governor Nikolai Rygg became the chief advocate of 
the par policy when, in 1920, he declared his determination to return the 
krone to par value. Rygg, who had a professional background in law but 
possessed considerable expertise in economics and statistics as well, saw the 
reintroduction of the gold standard as a precondition for a functioning 
economy. Based on liberal ideals, he also emphasized this as a necessary 
framework to protect individual legal rights.20 In 1920, these ideals still had 
a strong standing, and the political authorities backed the decision to 
reintroduce the gold standard. Thus, once more the BoN was granted 
operational independence. Throughout the 1920s, the central bank pursued a 
deflationary monetary policy that eventually reestablished the Norwegian 
krone at par value in 1928. However, this reintroduction of the gold standard 
was short-lived, as in 1931 Great Britain abandoned this international 
currency standard for good and the whole system broke down. 
 
In the latest contribution to the debate on the interwar crisis, Sverre Knutsen 
rejects the par policy as the main cause of the crisis. Despite Rygg’s 
                                                     
19 T. J. Hanisch, ”Om virkninger av paripolitikken”, Historisk Tidsskrift, vol. 58, pp. 
239-268; T. J. Hanisch, E. Søilen and G. J. Ecklund, Norsk økonomisk politikk i det 
20. århundre, Kristiansand: Høyskoleforlaget, 1999, chapter 3. 
20 F. Sejersted, Ideal, teori og virkelighet. Nicolai Rygg og paripolitikken i 1920-
årene, Oslo: Cappelen, 1973. In 1910, Nikolai Rygg was appointed professor of 
political economy and statistics, a position he held until 1913, when he became head 
of the National Bureau of Statistics (SSB). He succeeded Bomhoff as central bank 
governor in November 1920, after an initiative from Prime Minister Gunnar 
Knutsen. 
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intentions of pursuing a deflationary monetary policy from 1920 onwards, 
Knutsen argues, the BoN did not succeed in implementing this in practice 
until 1924/25 when the crisis, at least in the banking sector, was a stated fact. 
Knutsen explains the inflation that occurred in 1920-1922 as a reflection of 
international price developments, whereas the BoN rather countered this 
tendency by following an expansionary monetary policy as part of its efforts 
to perform as lender of last resort. Since most bankruptcies in the banking 
sector occurred before the par policy was properly implemented, Knutsen 
concludes that this cannot explain the crisis. Instead, Knutsen applies a 
financial fragility perspective and suggests that the foundation of the crisis 
was laid down during the proceeding economic boom. Reckless lending and 
excessive borrowing during the boom increased the financial fragility and 
systemic risk and more or less inevitably led to crisis once the boom 
busted.21 
Knutsen’s examinations bring important new perspectives to our 
understanding of the interwar crisis. His empirical findings suggest that the 
par policy intensified rather than caused the banking crisis. Regarding the 
role of the BoN, Knutsen tones down not only the negative consequences of 
the monetary policy but also an underlying tendency to blame governor 
Rygg and the central bank for causing the crisis. Instead, Knutsen 
emphasizes the positive contributions of the BoN in limiting the systemic 
consequences of the crisis by acting as lender of last resort. However, even if 
the role of the central bank in retrospect appears more nuanced, in the 
contemporary setting, the BoN was closely associated with the negative 
consequences of the crisis. This impression was reinforced by the fact that 
the political majority explicitly rejected any appeals of intervention in 
monetary policy by referring to the expertise and independence of the central 
bank.22 
Moreover, the perceived link between the par policy, the BoN and the crisis 
was not only a mental construction, but also had a justified basis. Even if the 
par policy was not the main cause of the banking crisis, it did undoubtedly 
reinforce the crisis once it was implemented. Many businesses, farmers, 
municipalities and private individuals, who had increased their loans during 
and after World War I when interest rates were relatively low, inflation high 
and credit widely accessible, failed to meet their obligations once the BoN 
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raised the discount rate in order to increase the external value of the krone. 
In Norway, unlike many other countries, there was a strong link between the 
discount rate and the general level of interest rates, and banks were quick to 
follow once the central bank raised its discount rate.23 Combined with 
deflation, this increase in nominal rates led to a substantial raise in the real 
interest rate, which in turn resulted in payment problems and further crisis. 
Hence, whereas during the stable period of the gold standard, the central 
bank had actively tried to balance international and domestic concerns – in 
accordance with theories on boundary organizations – it failed to do so in its 
efforts to reestablish this system during the 1920s. In this latter context, 
governor Rygg gave priority to the external value of the krone, while the 
short-term domestic consequences of this policy were of secondary 
importance, or rather seen as a necessary cost for securing domestic 
economic growth in the long run. 
Rygg’s priorities agreed well with orthodox economic theory and liberalist 
ideals, but were to an increasing extent subject to both professional and 
political criticism. The crisis seriously undermined the trust in free markets 
and market-based policy instruments and paved the way for new economic 
theories and political movements that advocated increased state planning and 
control. Moreover, while in theory the par policy could have increased the 
credibility of the BoN, which had demonstrated its dedication and ability to 
reestablish a declared monetary policy goal, in practice it helped undermine 
the bank’s legitimacy as an autonomous organization. 
1.4 Managing direct regulations and formal cooperation 
The events during and after World War I represented fundamental 
challenges to the traditional tasks of the central bank as well as to its position 
towards the political authorities. After the final breakdown of the gold 
standard, there were no longer free capital movements or convertibility, 
international trade became based on bilateral agreements, and the domestic 
monetary policy no longer had a definite target. The main focus of political 
authorities worldwide during the 1930s was to overcome the economic crisis 
and reduce the high unemployment rates, whereas the nature of the future 
economic policy was subject to the heated debate of to what extent should 
the economy be subject to centralized planning and direct regulations in 
order to prevent similar systemic crises. All in all, this was a transitional 
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period during which the world economy gradually recovered while policy 
formulation and implementation – including the future role of the central 
bank – were under serious question. 
For the BoN, the 1930s thus offered new challenges. Instead of maintaining 
a free-market system, in which the domestic monetary policy and the foreign 
exchange policy were intimately connected, the central bank now faced a 
setting in which the two were handled separately. The discount rate policy 
could be adapted to domestic considerations, and after the breakdown of the 
gold standard the discount rate level fell dramatically from a peak of 8 per 
cent in September 1931 to 3.5 per cent in May 1933, which was the lowest 
rate since 1895/96. From October 1931 until May 1940, the average discount 
rate was 4.4 per cent, compared to an average of 5.7 per cent from the 
summer of 1920 to the end of the gold standard. The frequency of change in 
the discount rate also dropped dramatically. Calculated as the number of 
changes per month, the frequency fell from 0.19 during the period June 
1920-September 1931 to 0.9 after the breakdown of the gold standard to the 
outbreak of World War II. This indicates a new practice with less ‘fine-
tuning’ of the discount rate in the current monetary policy.24 
Whereas the discount policy was implemented to counter domestic 
depression and stimulate economic activity, the foreign exchange policy 
became a separate matter based on a completely new rationale: rationing 
through moral suasion. After the currency crisis in the autumn of 1931, 
Norway faced potentially serious balance of payments problems, as domestic 
demand for foreign exchange exceeded the central bank’s reserves and 
access to fresh credit abroad. Due to the economic crisis, the market-based 
solution of raising the discount rate was unacceptable, and instead the BoN 
introduced rationing of foreign exchange in the banks as an emergency 
measure. These regulations were implemented not by statutory provisions 
but through formal and voluntary cooperation with the currency banks in a 
newly established council, the Currency Committee of the Banks [Bankenes 
valutakomité], which was headed by the central bank governor and had 
                                                     
24 From June 1920-September 1931, the discount rate was changed 24 times, while it 
was changed 10 times from October 1931 to May 1940. An overview of the discount 
rate of the BoN during 1850-1986 can be found at the official website of the Bank: 
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representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the private joint-stock 
banks.25 
Through this Currency Committee, the BoN not only managed the foreign 
exchange crisis, but also experienced a new type of contact with the banking 
sector. Previously, during the gold standard system, these relations had been 
based primarily on the banks’ need for loans and other assistance from the 
central bank. In the new setting of the 1930s, the BoN established what 
governor Rygg later characterized as “a very useful cooperation” with the 
banking sector, a cooperation that was based on the ambitions of the political 
authorities to achieve a specific policy objective, in this case the rationing of 
foreign exchange.26 In practice, this cooperation reflected a high degree of 
moral suasion, defined as an application of pressure, but not force, by an 
authority to persuade members to adhere to a policy. In later chapters, we 
will see that this type of moral suasion became an important characteristic of 
the new credit policy after World War II and also was decisive in the 
development of a new role for the BoN.27 
During the 1930s, the BoN gained experience of maintaining direct 
regulations of foreign exchange also in a wider sense. In the new 
international trade system that evolved after the breakdown of the gold 
standard, an important feature was the bilateral clearing agreements, which 
replaced the earlier free movements of capital. The core of the clearing 
agreements was that any payment transactions between two countries with 
inconvertible currencies had to go through their respective central banks. In 
order to cope with the growing clearing system, the BoN established a 
separate clearing office, which in 1935 had 43 officials and later expanded 
further. The central bank thereby developed experience and expertise in a 
                                                     
25 The representatives of the banks were appointed by their national association, the 
Norwegian Bankers’ Association [Den norske bankforening]. For an account of the 
Norwegian foreign exchange rationing in 1931-32, see H. Koefoed, 
Valutarasjoneringen i Norge efter suspensjonen av gullinnløsningen høsten 1931.En 
oversikt over Valutakomitéens arbeide, gitt på Den Norske Bankforenings årsmøte 
1932, Oslo: Den Norske Bankforening, 1931; Rygg 1918, pp. 465-470; W. Keilhau, 
Den norske pengehistorie, Oslo: Aschehoug, 1952, pp. 202-203; H.W. Nordvik, 
”Penge- og valutapolitikk, bank og kredittvesen og krisen i norsk økonomi på 1930-
tallet”, in E. Hovland, E. Lange and S. Ryssdal (eds.), Det som svarte seg best. 
Studier i økonomisk historie og politikk, Oslo: Ad Notam, 1990, pp. 177-191. 
26 Rygg 1918, p. 469. 
27 See chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 1 Changing context and preconditions 
49 
new field, namely maintaining direct foreign exchange regulations. This 
expertise would become a key to renewed influence once the political and 
economic context changed further after World War II.28 
Even though the institutional setting and the nature of monetary policy 
changed fundamentally during the 1930s, the role of the BoN in terms of 
responsibility and influence in policy formulation and implementation 
apparently remained much the same. It was still governor Rygg and his 
officials who decided – independently – when and how the discount rates 
should be adjusted and they were also in charge of maintaining the foreign 
exchange regulations. However, this was also about to change. The ideal of 
CBI appeared as an integrated part of a liberalist economic policy based on 
free markets and limited state intervention. Many took the crises of the 
1920s and 1930s as evidence of a failing free-market system, and in order to 
prevent cyclical fluctuations and unemployment felt it was necessary to 
introduce comprehensive state planning and regulations, including increased 
control of the central bank. 
Internationally, a whole set of new economic theories and policy advice 
advocating increased state intervention was developed, most famously 
presented by John M. Keynes in his General Theory of 1936. In Norway, 
similar ideas were promoted by the later Nobel Prize winner in economics, 
Ragnar Frisch, who from the early 1930s onwards became a chief advocate 
for centralized planning and control. Compared to his colleague Keynes, 
however, Frisch was generally more critical of the capitalist market economy 
as a fundamental economic institution. Frisch argued that the authorities 
should use a higher degree of direct controls and centralized coordination of 
the different parts of the economic policy. He believed monetary policy in 
the orthodox sense should be abolished and interest rates ought to be kept at 
a stable low level regardless of supply and demand. This policy of low 
interest rates – or a cheap money policy – would secure a high level of 
investments as well as social benefits for the ordinary man. Frisch assumed 
that low interest rates could be obtained regardless of market conditions, by 
keeping the central bank’s discount rate at a fixed low level and by curbing 
any excess demand for credit through direct regulations. Here, Frisch’s 
                                                     
28 See chapter 2. For a more comprehensive account of the clearing system, see 
Rygg 1950, pp. 542-44; Gunnar Jahn, ”Moderne handelspolitikk og clearing”, 
lecture at Sosial-økonomisk Samfunn on December 3, 1936, printed in Jahn 1949, 
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technique diverged fundamentally from Keynes, who also defended a cheap 
money policy, but argued that the authorities should pursue this by supplying 
the financial market with securities of different types and maturities so as to 
allow it to satisfy its preferences within the interest rated policy decided by 
the authorities. In other words, where Frisch advocated direct regulation, 
Keynes recommended manipulation of the market mechanisms.29 
Regarding the role of the central bank, Frisch and Keynes disagreed even 
more fundamentally. Keynes attributed great importance to the existence of 
central banking institutions, both as underwriters of the stability of the 
financial system and as instruments of monetary policy. He rejected the idea 
of direct democratic control by subjecting the central bank to the general 
direction of the government, and argued that formulation and 
implementation of the monetary policy should be under the expert control of 
the central bank. However, it was the government that decided the main lines 
of policy, such as the aim to pursue a cheap money policy, and Keynes also 
stressed the need for close cooperation between the central bank and the 
Treasury. Keynes’ views thus end up somewhere between traditional 
independence and complete political control, where the former aspect is 
emphasized just as much as the latter.30 This clashes completely with Ragnar 
Frisch’s approach to this matter. Based on the idea of centralized 
coordination of the economic policy, Frisch rejected any notion of CBI, not 
only in policy formulation and implementation but also even in terms of 
organizational and legal autonomy. Instead, Frisch, who was known to 
sometimes push things to extremes, argued that the BoN rather should be 
reduced to “a cashier’s office” in the Ministry of Finance.31 
Ragnar Frisch’s political economy theories were not merely theoretical 
considerations: they also had practical consequences. As professor at the 
                                                     
29 For a discussion of changes in Keynes’ theories and advice on monetary policy, 
see D.E. Moggridge and S. Howson, ”Keynes on Monetary Policy, 1910-1946”, 
Oxford Economic Papers. New Series, vol. 26, no. 2, July 1974, pp. 226-247. 
30 J. Bibow, “Keynes on Central Banking and the Structure of Monetary Policy”, 
History of Political Economy, vol. 34, no. 4, 2002, pp. 749-787. 
31 Quoted from P. J. Bjerve, Økonomisk planlegging og politikk, Oslo: Samlaget, 
1989, p. 119. 
For a more comprehensive comparison between Keynes and Frisch, see E. Søilen, 
Fra Frischianisme til Keynesianisme? En studie av norsk økonomisk politikk i lys av 
økonomisk teori 1945-1980, Dr. Oecon. thesis in economic history, Bergen: Norges 
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University of Oslo, Frisch trained a new generation of economists who soon 
formed close relations with the growing Labor movement. In 1928, the 
Norwegian Labor Party entered government for the first time, an intermezzo 
that only lasted a few weeks, but in 1935, it formed a minority government 
that marked the beginning of a new political era. Labor was to remain in 
office for three decades, from 1945 onwards with the backing of a 
parliamentary majority. This gave the Party increasing freedom to transform 
its economic policy, and several of Frisch’s students became highly involved 
in this process. 
For the BoN, the alliance between Frischian economists and Labor 
politicians implied even more fundamental challenges than those caused by 
the institutional and economic problems at the time. When the volume of 
direct economic regulations increased during the 1930s, governor Rygg and 
his officials had managed to adapt to the new surroundings and maintain a 
high degree of operational freedom. The idea of turning the central bank into 
a subordinated office for monetary transactions in the Ministry of Finance, 
however, represented a whole new dimension of threat. If carried through, it 
would not only fundamentally reduce the traditional responsibilities of the 
central bank, but would also threaten its very survival as an autonomous 
legal entity. In retrospect, Frisch’s proposal regarding the BoN may appear 
unrealistic, but at the time, based on the lack of trust in the central bank, it 
represented one possible outcome. In later chapters, we will see that the idea 
of a fundamental undermining of the authority and autonomy of the central 
bank was very much alive in influential parts of Labor, even though the 
initiatives to carry this through had a somewhat more subtle form than 
Frisch’s proposal. Hence, in order to survive, the BoN had to take these 
prospects seriously. 
1.5 World War II: changing alliances and legitimacy problems 
By the end of the 1930s, the political state of affairs was characterized by 
heated debate between sympathizers of increased state planning and controls 
and more conservative opponents, who argued that such solutions would not 
only have undesirable economic consequences in terms of inefficient 
distribution of resources and reduced growth, but also represented a threat to 
democracy. These debates came to an abrupt (if only temporary) end in April 
1940, when Nazi Germany occupied Norway. While Norway as a neutral 
country had operated on the political outskirts of World War I, this time, it 
became directly involved. World War II thus created an even more 
extraordinary situation, in which former opponents joined forces for the 
liberation of Norway. The resistance movement was organized in domestic 
groups that linked people of various social, political and economic 
backgrounds, as well as abroad, since the King and his family, the 
government, and many leading politicians fled the country and established a 
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resistance base in London. A corresponding division took place in the 
organization of the BoN during World War II, as the central bank was split 
between a London office, approved by the government in exile, and the Oslo 
office headed by governor Rygg, which continued its operations. The central 
bank thereby became directly involved in highly complex political 
considerations regarding how to handle the occupying regime without 
compromising itself and the Norwegian economy. 
For the BoN, World War II had both direct and indirect consequences. 
Indirectly, the political setting in which the central bank operated changed. 
The joint resistance against the Nazi regime created new alliances, and in 
many ways, the resistance movement functioned as a melting pot in which 
individuals of every social and political background worked together, despite 
previous discrepancies. Their mutual experiences and struggles during the 
war contributed to a unique sense of community and loyalty. It also created 
conceptions of “us” and “them”, of whom to trust and whom not to trust, 
which lead to strong personal relations that would last long after the war had 
ended. This wartime sense of community continued after the Liberation, 
manifested in a common drive for reconstruction and modernization of the 
economy. This atmosphere constituted an important part of the context in 
which the BoN had to maneuver, both during and after the war. 
By the Liberation, the role of the BoN during World War II was subject to 
question. Many asked to what extent had the central bank managed to strike 
a proper balance between conducting its daily operations and the taboo of 
collaborating with the enemy. There had been virtually no contact between 
the Oslo office and the London office during the war, and London had little 
knowledge of how governor Rygg and his officials in Oslo had dealt with the 
occupiers. Hence, during the war, the London office had issued letters to 
foreign central banks and Norwegian legations that declared that the BoN in 
Oslo had no official authority, an initiative that weakened the legitimacy of 
Rygg and his staff. Furthermore, it was a stated fact that the occupying 
regime had opened a separate account in the BoN – later known as the 
occupational account [Okkupasjonskontoen] – from which it withdrew more 
than 11 billion NOK in order to finance its activities. By the end of the war, 
over 8 billion NOK was still outstanding from this account and a substantial 
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part of this monetary expansion had ended up as increased disposable 
income of the general public and the private banks. 32 
From the perspective of the central bank, this monetary expansion had two 
important consequences. First, in a postwar situation characterized by pent-
up demand and the scarce supply of goods and raw materials, a monetary 
surplus of this kind represented a serious threat of inflation. This 
fundamental economic and political problem will be discussed more 
thoroughly in chapter 2. Second, the huge outstanding sum on the 
occupational account had serious implications for the legitimacy of the 
central bank. From a political perspective, the main question was whether 
this implied that the Oslo office had cooperated in an unacceptable way with 
the occupying regime. Could the central bank have prevented the German 
access to the printing press? For the credibility of the BoN as a professional 
central bank, an additional problem was that the occupational account in fact 
amounted to nine-tenths of the central bank’s total assets. After the war, 
these means were registered without any formal debtor, since the Norwegian 
authorities refused to take any formal responsibility for actions of the 
occupying regime. Technically, the BoN was therefore insolvent. The central 
bank feared that this would seriously undermine its international credibility 
and was eager to settle this problem, but as chapter 3 will show, the Labor 
government was in less of a hurry.33 All in all, by the Liberation, there was 
considerable uncertainty regarding the political and economic status of the 
central bank. This implied that the already battered legitimacy of the BoN 
was further weakened, both at home and abroad. 
Governor Rygg and the Oslo office were later cleared of all accusations of 
collaboration during the war. The formal investigations of war crimes 
instead revealed that the BoN, in cooperation with resistance cells in the 
Banking Inspectorate, had successfully prevented attempts to Nazify the 
                                                     
32 O. Aukrust (ed.), Norges økonomi etter krigen. The Norwegian Post-War 
Economy, Samfunnsøkonomiske studier (SØS) no. 12, Oslo: Central Bureau of 
Statistics of Norway, 1965 [hereafter: SØS 12], pp. 365-366. 
33 See chapter 3.5. 
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Norwegian banking sector.34 Nevertheless, due to the legacy of the interwar 
crisis and the close association between Rygg and the market-based par 
policy, the political and public trust in the central bank was at a low ebb. The 
BoN in 1945 was thus characterized by standstill, and a change of 
management as well as conduct was imminent. 
1.6 Why did Labor appoint Jahn? 
On January 7, 1946, the Labor government appointed Gunnar Jahn as new 
governor of the BoN. Labor had won a parliamentary majority in the 
previous autumn election and was thus in a unique position to implement its 
ambitions of centralized planning and market controls. Hence, the choice of 
Gunnar Jahn appears as a surprise. As former finance minister from the 
liberal party Venstre and economist of more traditional orientation, Jahn was 
a well-known opponent of both Frisch’s economic theories and Labor’s 
governing ambitions. Based on the legacy of Bomhoff and Rygg, the 
governor of the Norwegian central bank traditionally had a prominent and 
influential position, so why did Labor still chose Jahn over a party colleague 
as head of the central bank? This section discusses several possible reasons 
for this appointment, reasons that also reflect important characteristics of the 
political setting in which the central bank would develop a new role. The 
following section 1.7 debates the equally puzzling question why Jahn 
accepted his new post. 
The perhaps most immediate explanation why Labor chose Jahn was their 
war-related alliances. Unlike Rygg, Jahn had got through the occupation 
without any serious questions regarding his national loyalty, despite the fact 
that he worked in direct contact with the occupying regime. From his 
position as head of the National Bureau of Statistics (SSB) and member of 
the Board of Directors of the BoN, Jahn had actively contributed to the 
resistance movement. In the summer of 1941, he became a member of 
Kretsen – a civilian resistance group consisting of leading politicians and 
                                                     
34 A formal investigation of the wartime activities of the BoN, which was carried out 
in 1947-48, concluded that there was no reason to criticize the “national attitude” of 
the BoN during the war. See “Innstilling fra Komiteen til granskning av Norges 
Banks virksomhet i okkupasjonstiden”, box: 447 in the archives of the Ministry of 
Finance, Ekspedisjonskontoret, at the National Archives of Norway [hereafter: FIN-
Eks], pp. 58-69. 
See also: G. J. Ecklund and S. Knutsen, Vern mot kriser? Norsk finanstilsyn 
gjennom 100 år, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2000, chapter 6. 
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civil servants, including Labor’s first postwar prime minister, Einar 
Gerhardsen. Later, Jahn became part of the main assembly of the Home 
Front [Hjemmefrontens hovedkomité], before he was arrested for conspiracy 
on October 25, 1944. Jahn stayed imprisoned at Grini prison camp until May 
5, 1945, along with a series of businessmen, civil servants and politicians, 
including Gerhardsen, who jointly planned and discussed how Norwegian 
society should develop once the war was won. When in June 1945 
Gerhardsen formed a temporary coalition government, he was eager to 
include Jahn as finance minister and agreed to several of Jahn’s 
preconditions regarding the organization of policy formulation in order to 
make him accept this post.35 Thus, in the atmosphere of cooperation and 
community immediately after the war, Gunnar Jahn appeared as a reliable 
and experienced representative of the political opposition, whose 
contributions in the resistance movement were undisputable. Gerhardsen 
could thereby safely include him in policy administration, at least in the 
short run.36 
                                                     
35 Jahn was appointed finance minister in the coalition government on June 21, 
1945, after having demanded that Labor abolish plans to establish a new Ministry of 
Economic Affairs [Økonomidepartement], independent of the Ministry of Finance, 
in charge of economic planning and control, and that the director of the Price 
Directorate, Wilhelm Thagaard, who was an influential advocate of extensive direct 
market regulations, was subordinated to Jahn as finance minister. Jahn’s third 
precondition concerned the reputation of central bank governor Rygg. Jahn 
demanded that Rygg should not be dismissed in a humiliating way by being replaced 
by a temporary governor. 
Gunnar Jahn’s diaries, the manuscript collection at the National Library of Norway 
[hereafter: GJD], June 5, 14, 20 and 21, 1945. 
36 Before World War II, the peak of Jahn’s political career had been his time as 
finance minister in the liberal Mowinckel government from November 1934 to 
March 1935. Once German forces occupied Norway, Jahn became a member of the 
Administration Council [Administrasjonsrådet], a caretaker government that 
administered the occupied areas of Norway before the Norwegian Nazi party headed 
by Vidkun Quisling took over the government in September 1940. Jahn was 
appointed to the central bank’s Board of Directors in January 1941 after the 
initiative of governor Rygg and with the support of the finance minister in the 
Quisling government, Erling Sandberg, against the will of Quisling and the other 
cabinet ministers.  
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The wartime alliances between Jahn and the Labor politicians appear as a 
necessary, yet not sufficient reason for his appointment as governor. Once 
Labor had won a parliamentary majority, the party was in principle free to 
implement an economic policy based on planning and control, a policy that 
Jahn opposed openly. So, why did Labor still let Jahn head the central bank, 
which suggested more long-term inclusion in policy-making? A second 
possible explanation for this was Jahn’s professional background as an 
economist and senior manager in the Civil Service. In several industrial 
projects at the time, the Labor government strived to recruit “the best and 
most competent” people to run the new state-owned factories, seemingly 
regardless of party affiliation and ideological orientation. The aim was, on 
the one hand, to ensure efficient technical and organizational management of 
the factories, and, on the other hand, to increase the legitimacy of the new 
companies in the eyes of the public as well as competitors, possible venture 
partners, and political authorities abroad.37 
In the case of Gunnar Jahn and the BoN, this latter perspective of legitimacy 
is obviously relevant. As we have seen, the legitimacy and trust in the 
Norwegian central bank had been seriously undermined during the interwar 
crisis and World War II, and as a well-known economist with long 
experience as a general manager of the SSB, Jahn could add credibility to its 
operations. Moreover, Jahn had a solid international reputation. He had 
become a well-known figure abroad through participation in academic 
conferences and several international commissions on statistics and 
economics. He was also actively engaged in broader political issues, and in 
retrospect he undoubtedly enjoyed internationally renown for his service as 
                                                                                                                            
See Wilhelm Haffner, Storting og statsrådet 1915-1945, vol. 1, Oslo, 1949, p. 363. 
On Jahn’s appointment to the central bank’s Board of Directors, see governor 
Rygg’s testimony in the public criminal case against Erling Sandberg, appendix 3 to 
“Erklæring fra sjefsdirektør Rygg og direktør Thorkildsen av 28. februar 1948”, 
FIN-Eks box: 447. 
37 This strategy can be linked to the state-owned factories AS Norsk Jernverk (an 
ironworks established in 1946) and AS Årdal og Sunndal verk (an aluminum plant 
established in 1947). Although these managers were recruited mainly for their 
professional skills, most of them also had an additional qualification: they had 
participated actively in the resistance movement. Thus, mutual trust created during 
the war probably facilitated the recruitment process. 
Quote: ”De beste og dyktigste krefter” from A. K. Børresen, Drømmer av stål. A/S 
Norsk Jernverk fra 1940-årene til 1970-årene, Skriftserie fra Historisk institutt, no. 
10, Trondheim: University of Trondheim, 1995, p. 101 
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chairman of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee. Hence, as governor, Jahn 
could add credibility to the BoN in international financial circles as well as 
in the eyes of political authorities abroad.38 
However, it was not only the central bank that was in need of increased 
legitimacy. The same could be said of the new Labor government itself. An 
illustration of this can be found in internal notes from the Bank of England, 
which in 1945 evaluated members of the temporary coalition government 
and the succeeding Labor government in Norway. While the British civil 
servants described Gunnar Jahn as “a very good man indeed” and “the 
leading financial figure in Norway”, they had far less to say about Labor’s 
new political elite. The notes offer a brief description of Einar Gerhardsen as 
a “former messenger boy” and founder of the Municipal Workers Union, 
who had spent three years in Nazi concentration camps, while finance 
minister Erik Brofoss, who would become one of Labor’s leading postwar 
strategists, was characterized as a little-known civil servant, who “seems to 
be of the theoretical socialist type with little force and no practical 
                                                     
38 As for Gunnar Jahn’s educational and professional background, he studied law 
(Cand.Jur. 1907) and economics (Cand.Oecon. 1909) in Norway, before continuing 
studies in political economy and statistics in Heidelberg, Berlin and Paris. He was 
simultaneously teaching at the University of Oslo. In 1911, he started work in the 
SSB as a secretary (1911-1917) becoming departmental manager (1917-1918), and 
managing director (1920-1945), after a brief intermezzo as managing director of the 
Directorate of Rationing (1919-1920). His international experience included 
representing Norway at meetings and conferences on statistical and economical 
issues. He was also a member of various international committees, including the 
statistical expert committee of The International Bureau of Labor in Geneva (from 
1936), and several expert committees at the League of Nations (the economic 
committee (1928-30 and 1936-37), the statistical expert committee (1930 onwards) 
and the committee for distribution of the League’s expenses (1934)), and a honorary 
member of Institute International de Statistique. Jahn was a member of the Nobel 
Peace Prize Committee from 1937-1966, and chairman from 1941 onwards. 
For a more detailed list of Jahn’s assignments before 1945, see  Haffner 1949, pp. 
361-63; the homepage of the Nobel Institute at 
www.nobel.se/peace/articles/committee/nnclist/bios/jahn.html. For an account of 
Jahn’s role in the Nobel Peace Prize Committee, see B. Norberg, Gunnar Jahn: For 
rettferd og fred. Et innblikk i avgjørelsene til Det Norske Stortings Nobelkomite 
1937-1966, post-graduate thesis [hovedoppgave] in history, University of Oslo, 
2001. 
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experience”.39 The latter comment turned out to be very far from the truth, 
but it indicates that in 1945, the new Labor government and the new 
generation of Norwegian economists had not yet achieved international 
recognition, at least not in financial circles. 
By recruiting Jahn as the new governor, the Labor government could signal 
to financial markets and political authorities worldwide that it would not take 
undue advantage of its newly gained power and finance policy initiatives by 
printing money. Moreover, Jahn could also increase the government’s 
legitimacy at home. In a postwar situation characterized by consumers 
impatient to indulge in much-missed goods and services, and a parliamentary 
majority of Labor politicians eager to fulfill promises of prosperity and 
social security, a scenario of over-expansionary economic policies was not 
merely a speculative threat but a highly realistic possibility. Hence, the 
government had to curb pressure from its own electorate and members of 
parliament in order to prevent over-expansionary policies. In addition, 
despite its parliamentary majority, the government, Prime Minister 
Gerhardsen in particular, also wished to put the non-socialist opposition at 
rest in order to ensure cooperation across party lines during the 
reconstruction period. By appointing Jahn, the government could, at least in 
theory, counter these challenges. 
While Jahn’s professional background could add legitimacy to the central 
bank as well as the government, it is less likely that he was recruited for his 
technical skills in monetary policy, although he had both expertise and 
experience in the matter. During the interwar period, Jahn had, among other 
things, been chairman of the Monetary Committee [Komitéen til utredning 
av Økonomiske og Pengepolitiske Spørsmål or Den pengetekniske komité], 
which was in charge of evaluating the par policy, as well as a member of the 
Foreign Exchange Commission of 1925 [Valutakomisjonen av 1925]. As 
chairman of the Board of Directors of the Norwegian Industrial Bank 
[Industribanken] from 1936 to 1947, Jahn also knew the more practical sides 
                                                     
39 Note of June 27, 1945, ”Norway”, and handwritten comment on note of 
November 1, 1945, “Norwegian Cabinet. November 1945”, both by the Overseas & 
Foreign Office, file: OV26/, the Bank of England Archives, London [hereafter: 
BoE].  
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of banking.40 Nevertheless, this competence in money and banking appeared 
less relevant to the Labor government, first and foremost, because Jahn 
fundamentally disagreed with Frisch’s ideas of conducting a cheap money 
policy. Hence, his competence was related to traditional monetary policy, 
which from Labor’s point of view was a thing of the past. In later chapters, 
we will see that the government had no intention of returning to a monetary 
policy based on flexible discount rates and market-based instruments. Nor 
was the notion of an independent central bank in charge of monetary policy 
formulation of much interest. The Labor government aimed at a centralized 
policy-making process, and to the extent that the central bank would 
contribute to this, it would do so as a subordinate agency. Thus, the 
monetary expertise of the new governor was hardly seen as important. 
This brings us to a final explanation why Labor appointed Jahn. While the 
above account has emphasized the positive contributions Labor might have 
expected from Jahn, an alternative approach is to interpret his appointment 
as an attempt to remove a bothersome opponent. Jahn himself hints at this 
explanation in his diaries when he suggests that his colleagues in the Home 
Front, who urged him to become the new governor, in fact tried to push him 
to the BoN in order to get rid of him.41 
As head of the SSB, Gunnar Jahn controlled the national collection and 
production of statistics, a matter in which he also was on professional 
collision course with the Frischian economists. While the latter saw the 
production of statistics primarily as an instrument for national accounting 
and economic and political planning, Jahn defended a traditional approach to 
the science of statistics, which emphasized the collection and classification 
of data in order to map social and economic characteristics of a society as a 
whole, not just of selected sectors.42 Thus, by removing Jahn from the SSB, 
                                                     
40 Jahn was also a member of several other domestic boards and committees, 
including the board of appeal for the trust control [Trustkontrollens ankenemnd]  
(1930-1940), chairman of the Export Council [Rådet for utenrikshandel] (1939-
1940), and chairman of the tax burden committee of 1930 [Skattetrykkutvalget av 
1930], as well as a member of several arbitration tribunals. He was also member of 
the board of the National Association for Political Economists [Statsøkonomisk 
Forening] (chairman 1932-37). 
41 GJD May 25, 1945. 
42 E. Lie and H. Roll-Hansen, Faktisk talt. Statistikkens historie i Norge, Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 2001, pp. 300ff, 319, 351ff. 
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Labor could more easily fulfill their economic and political ambitions. When 
Jahn left for the BoN, he was indeed replaced by Labor sympathizers and 
Frischian economists, who gradually integrated the SSB into what later has 
been labeled “the iron triangle”, a tight network of economists in the 
Ministry of Finance, the SSB, and the Department of Economics at the 
University of Oslo, who had a fundamental impact on Norwegian economic 
policy until the 1980s.43 This course of events indicates that the appointment 
of Jahn as governor, in addition to having positive professional and political 
explanations, was also partly a ‘negative move’ in the sense that it was part 
of a process to clear the way for new economic and political initiatives. 
1.7 So why did Jahn accept? 
From the 1920s onwards, we have seen that Gunnar Jahn had established a 
prominent position both at home and abroad, a position from which he was 
free to pursue his professional interest in statistics as well as his involvement 
in broader political and social issues. Thus, when the request to become the 
new governor of the BoN was brought up in the summer of 1945, he 
originally dismissed the idea. In his diaries, he stated that, unlike statistics, 
central banking and monetary policy were areas “of which I do not have 
complete control and which I do not know whether I will enjoy”.44 He was 
also well aware of Labor’s ambitions to incorporate monetary policy into 
broader economic policy and he expected that the BoN would be 
“completely subordinated to the Ministry of Finance in the future”.45 So, by 
leaving his post as head of the SSB in favor of the central bank, Jahn not 
only abandoned his main professional interest but seemingly also gave up a 
fair amount of power. Why did he still finally accept this appointment? 
                                                     
43 From 1946-1948, the managing director of the SSB was Arne Skaug – a Labor 
member, a former Frisch student, and civil servant of the SSB, who later would 
become Minister of Trade and Shipping (1955-1962). In 1949, Skaug became State 
Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Labor government appointed 
Petter Jakob Bjerve as head of the SSB, a position he held until 1984. Bjerve, who 
also was a Labor party member and a former Frisch student, transformed the SSB 
into a supplier of inputs for macroeconomic planning. See Lie and Roll-Hansen 
2001, part 4.  
44 Ouote: “Jeg føler det som om jeg går fra det som jeg kjenner best borti noe som 
jeg ikke helt har herredømme over og som jeg ikke vet om jeg vil trives med.”, GJD 
November 30-December 12, 1945. 
45 Ouote: “…jeg har ikke noen særlig interesse av å arbeide i Banken som forresten 
vil bli helt underordnet Finansdepartmentet i framtiden.”, GJD May 25, 1945. See 
also GJD July 7, 8 and 11, 1945. 
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One possible reason is of course that Jahn at the time hoped that Labor’s 
governance would be only a short-lived affair, and that he as governor of the 
BoN, pending a non-socialist return to power, could help to modify the more 
extreme ambitions of the Labor party. This explanation agrees well with the 
conventional view of Labor and Jahn as fundamental opponents and 
representatives of distinctly different policy regimes. However, an 
alternative explanation is that Jahn’s acceptance was, instead, based on the 
fact that, despite some fundamental differences, he and Labor also held 
important points of view in common. These common views can be 
summarized in four points, which together formed a basis for cooperation 
and ability to compromise during the first post-WWII decade. 
Firstly, along with a large majority of Norwegian politicians, Jahn and the 
Labor party agreed on the main goals for the postwar economic policy, 
namely those of full employment, stable economic growth, and social 
equalization. These goals were first established in the joint political program 
of the temporary coalition government, Fellesprogrammet, which stated that: 
The task of our industry and commerce and all economic activity 
in our country is to create work for everyone and increase 
production, so that the results can be distributed in a socially just 
way and create good living conditions for everyone.46 
Secondly, Jahn accepted that in a short-term perspective it was necessary to 
continue the wartime direct regulations of prices and resource allocation. In 
a speech in June 1945, Jahn declared that it would be “worse than a 
stupidity” to leave the reconstruction of Norwegian economy to the free play 
of the market and let the spending power of wealthy individuals direct the 
development.47 Also in this respect, there was broad agreement among most 
Norwegian politicians, who in turn reflected general trends in most Western 
countries by the end of World War II. Based on ideological and theoretical 
arguments as well as experiences of depression and war, governments 
                                                     
46 ”Arbeid for alle. De politiske partiers samarbeidsprogram for gjenreisningen”, 
reproduced in K. E. Eriksen and G. Lundestad (eds.), Norsk innenrikspolitikk, in 
series ”Kilder til moderne historie II”, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972, pp. 28-36, 
quote pp. 30-31 [”Quote: Oppgaven for vårt næringsliv og all økonomisk virksomhet 
i landet er å skape arbeid for alle og øket produksjon, så en gjennom rettferdig 
fordeling av resultatene kan gi alle gode kår”]. 
47 G. Jahn, ”Krigen og Norges økonomi”, in Statsøkonomisk Tidsskrift no. 1-2,1945, 
pp. 1-12, reproduced in Jahn pp. 209-221 (quote: p. 218).  
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worldwide prepared for continuing wartime regulations for a limited 
reconstruction period at the least. Centralized planning and strict direct 
regulations in Britain and the USA during the war had proved that extensive 
state intervention in the economy could be both efficient and effective. 
Hence, in a postwar situation of scarce resources and huge economic and 
political challenges, the continuation of wartime controls was an obvious 
short-term solution. 
A third element in the basis for postwar cooperation and compromise was a 
more positive view of state intervention also in a long-term perspective. 
After World War II, it was not only Labor and the Frischian economists who 
argued that the state had to play a more active role in the economy. With the 
exception of a relatively few hard-core liberalists and orthodox economists, 
most policy-makers agreed that in order to avoid a repetition of the interwar 
depression and employment crisis, increased state intervention was 
necessary. Jahn had also become more positively inclined towards state 
intervention, after he had previously rejected the idea. In the 1930s, Jahn had 
actively opposed Keynesian and Frischian ideas of counter-cyclical policy 
initiatives, but after World War II, he seems to have changed his views. 
According to Petter Jakob Bjerve – Labor member and former Frisch 
student, who would succeed Jahn as managing director of the SSB – Jahn 
admitted in retrospect that he regretted not having implemented counter-
cyclical policy measures during the 1930s depression when he had the 
chance as finance minister in the Mowinckel government.48 
Even though a member of the liberal party Venstre, by 1945 Jahn does not 
appear as a liberalist in the sense that he urged for a return to a free market 
system without state intervention. He explicitly distanced himself from the 
most prominent advocates of liberalist views, which in Norway first of all 
were associated with the magazine Farmand and the newspaper 
Morgenbladet. In his diaries Jahn depicts how he tried to convince the editor 
of Farmand, Trygve Hoff, that the current social structures implied that one 
should not try to reconstruct a liberalist system of free competition in the 
1850s sense.49 He also describes how he “smilingly” refused an offer to join 
the Board of the Morgenbladet and explained that even though he was 
critical of some elements in the Labor party, particular the dictatorial 
tendencies, his general attitude was more in accordance with Labor’s goals 
                                                     
48 Bjerve 1989, p. 49. 
49 GJD May 25, 1945. 
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than with the people in the Morgenbladet.50 This was confirmed when Jahn 
later commented on Labor’s election program, which he felt contained 
“many very good things” despite being too ambitions and “immature”.51 
There is little written evidence to offer any details of these changes in Jahn’s 
economic and political views, but indirectly his actions during and after 
World War II suggest that even though he criticized the nature of Labor’s 
policy measures – that is, their emphasis on regulation rather than 
manipulation of market forces – he shared the view that the state should 
intervene more actively in the economy. The perhaps most convincing 
indication of this is Jahn’s later initiatives to introduce new market-based 
policy measures designed for consecutive intervention in the financial 
markets, which will be subject to study in chapter 4. Another indication of 
Jahn’s changing views is his close interaction with some of Frisch’s 
students, such as Eivind Erichsen, Odd Aukrust and Petter Jakob Bjerve, 
who would all become important contributors to Labor’s postwar economic 
policy. While Jahn had a strained personal and professional relationship with 
Ragnar Frisch, he actively supported Frisch’s students by supplying them 
with data, serving as a sparring partner in lengthy professional discussions 
and commenting on drafts of their written studies. Jahn also provided public 
support and legitimacy for this new generation of economists, for example 
when he wrote an approving preface for Aukrust and Bjerve’s examination 
of the costs of World War II for Norway.52 These acknowledgements reflect 
not only the views of a generous opponent, but also Jahn’s changing view on 
the role of the state in the economy, a change that promoted a postwar 
cooperation across party lines. 
The fourth and final element in common economic and political basis that 
Jahn shared with Labor – and probably one that was particularly important 
for Jahn’s decision to accept the post as governor of the BoN – is an 
                                                     
50 GJD May 22, 1945. 
51 GJD June 5, 1945. 
52 Bjerve 1989, pp. 48-53; O. Aukrust and P. Jakob Bjerve, Hva krigen kostet Norge, 
Oslo: Dreyer, 1945, pp. 5-6. In his preface, Jahn declared that he had learnt a lot 
from the young economists, and that even though he felt that the new economic 
theories underestimated the element of human response and reactions (that is, they 
overestimated the efficiency and effect of market controls), Frisch’s doctrine had 
given the two younger economists a firm grip of the postwar problems. Jahn also 
praised the theoretical contributions of the new generation of economic theorists in 
general and stated that they had “injected fresh blood to science”. 
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emphasis on solving practical problems. Unlike some of the more extreme 
advocates of ‘new’ and ‘old’ economic theories, such as Ragnar Frisch on 
the one hand and liberalists from the Farmand and Morgenbladet on the 
other, Jahn emphasized that during the reconstruction period practical 
problem-solving should outweigh theoretical and ideological principles. Jahn 
declared that emphasis on systemic differences between the free markets and 
planned economies had more to do with ideas than reality, and that the most 
important point during the extraordinary reconstruction period was practical 
cooperation rather than futile discussions.53 Jahn thereby played down the 
differences between various economic theories as well as the importance of 
such theories for practical policy-making. This view allowed Jahn to 
compromise with his theoretical opponents, a pragmatic approach that also 
agreed well with the ideas of Einar Gerhardsen and other leading Labor 
politicians at the time. Jahn thereby could assume the position as governor of 
the BoN with the relatively positive ambitions of contributing actively to the 
process of reconstructing the Norwegian economy. 
1.8 Post-WWII central banking: adaptation to new conditions 
Labor’s ambitions to increase control over the BoN were part of a general 
trend. After the interwar depression, the trust in independent central banks 
had been undermined in most countries, and particularly in countries that 
had pursued a par policy, such as Britain, the USA, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Sweden, political control over the central banks was 
tightened. This response was later characterized as a ‘deflationary trauma’, 
as opposed to the ‘inflationary trauma’ of Germany, which experienced 
hyperinflation during the interwar period caused by politicians indulging in 
over-expansionary policies. Based on different historical experiences, 
Germany chose an opposite strategy from the general trend, and established 
the most independent central bank in the post-WWII period, the 
Bundesbank.54 In accordance with traditional ideals of CBI, the Bundesbank 
was supposed to operate as a counterweight to the political authorities. Most 
other central banks, however, had to adapt to new terms of conduct. 
                                                     
53 G. Jahn, ”Krigen og Norges økonomi”, in Statsøkonomisk Tidsskrift no. 1-2 
(1945), pp. 1-12, reproduced in Jahn 1949, pp. 209-221.  
54 Francis Sejersted, “On the so-called ‘autonomy’ or ‘independence’ of central 
banks. Reflections on the Norwegian case of minimal formal authority”, TMV 
working paper, no. 75, Oslo: Center for Technology and Culture (TMV), 1994. 
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While previous theories on central banking had stressed the need for 
independence and the ability to resist political pressure, such theories now 
praised pragmatism and diversity. In the post-WWII world, central banks 
had to develop a new role within a new economic and political regime based 
on new policy goals, as suggested by the British economist R.S. Sayers: 
The central bank should be quick to adapt itself to changes in the 
economy, and should be ready to use any device it can find to 
control the behavior of the financial system in the interest of the 
“employment policy” adopted by the government.55 
This adaptation also implied that central banks no longer should focus solely 
on traditional monetary policy. New policy goals, such as full employment, 
required new policy measures, and modern central banks should therefore, in 
cooperation with the government, apply a wide range of techniques and 
means: 
We are gradually learning that while the dictator can use the big 
stick, and laissez faire can rely on the high price, economic 
planning in a truly democratic society means pressing into service 
every conceivable device – persuading, cajoling, inciting people, 
edging the economy now a little in this direction, now a shade in 
that. If central banks are to play their full part in this process, our 
central bankers must not be content to stick to the traditional 
technique.56 
According to these new economic and political standards, the road to 
influence for central banks was to work as an integrated part of a centralized 
policy-making process, a process designed and controlled by the political 
authorities. If central bankers refused to adapt to these new guidelines, they 
risked not being heard or worse. In 1946 the chief of the Foreign Research 
Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York admitted that the 
possibility of even limited autonomous initiatives for the central bank 
seemed remote: 
                                                     
55 R.S. Sayers, “Central Banking in the Light of Recent British and American 
Experience”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 63, no. 2 (May), 1949, pp. 198-
211 (quote: p. 211). 
56 Sayers 1949, p. 211. 
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All things considered, however, this (…) seems rather a forlorn 
hope, for the voices of central bankers today are apt to be only part 
of a large official chorus, or else crying in the wilderness.57 
Throughout this thesis, we will see that the Norwegian case to a large extent 
confirms this assumption. Whenever governor Jahn and his officials took 
policy initiatives that clashed fundamentally with cornerstones of Labor’s 
economic policy, they usually turned out to be “crying” in vain. However, 
being part of a chorus also offers possibilities of solo parts, in which one’s 
voice is clearly heard but can still harmonize with the surrounding context. 
This seems to be the way governor Jahn approached his new role. 
Both in public and in his private diaries, Jahn accepted that, under the 
present conditions, the BoN had to be under political control. He repeatedly 
reassured Erik Brofoss and other politicians that he had no intention of 
trying to act too independently, and he criticized his predecessor Nicolay 
Rygg for still regarding the BoN as a private bank that could act according to 
its own preferences.58 Moreover, in his first annual speech as governor, he 
underlined the necessity of close relations between the political authorities 
and the central bank, and stated that a central bank had to act in accordance 
with political directives: 
(…) insinuations of an antagonism [between the State and the 
BoN] are caused by lack of knowledge. It is obvious that a central 
bank cannot and should not follow a policy that disagrees with 
decisions made by the Storting and the government.59 
However, this adaptation to political guidelines did not mean that the central 
bank should be prevented from expressing diverging opinions: in the policy-
making chorus, the BoN had to have its own distinct voice. According to 
Jahn, if a central bank disagreed with the political authorities it was its duty 
to point this out. Conflict of opinions is always a blessing, he added, but 
nevertheless, in the extraordinary postwar situation, what was required first 
                                                     
57 Henry C. Wallich, “The Changing Significance of the Interest Rate”, The 
American Economic Review, vol. 36, no. 5 (Dec.), 1946, p. 766. 
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59 Gunnar Jahn’s speech at the meeting of the BoN’s Supervisory Council, February 
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and foremost was good cooperation.60 In this speech, which Jahn gave after 
all of a month in office, the new governor thereby pointed out what would be 
the underlying principles for his interaction with the political authorities 
during the following decade, namely a combination of opposition and 
compromise.  
1.9 Summary: from independence to uncertainty 
From its early establishment in 1816 until the end of World War II, the BoN 
underwent several fundamental changes, from serving mainly as an ordinary 
commercial bank, towards becoming a modern central bank with a unique 
position in the financial system, serving as lender of last resort and 
independently formulating and implementing the monetary policy, through 
wars and economic crises that seriously undermined the trust in this 
traditional type of central banking, to a new political and economic context 
that prescribed increased political control and market regulations. In this 
chapter, we have discussed this development with focus both on internal 
aspects such as organization and ownership of the central bank and more 
external dimensions concerning the relations with the political authorities 
and the banking sector as well as the surrounding international context. Our 
examinations have revealed an image of a central bank, which despite being 
embedded in the political context, managed to develop and maintain a high 
degree of operational independence. In this final section, we will sum up the 
most important aspects of this independence and other facets of the central 
bank’s traditional role, which by 1945 appeared as a thing of the past. 
During the gold standard, this CBI was in accordance with predominant 
liberalist ideals, which emphasized limited and predictable state intervention 
in the economy. By the end of the 19th century, once the Bank was 
established as a centralized organization with a full-time management, 
headquarters in the capital, and a single unified discount rate that could be 
used in a consistent monetary policy, the central bank obtained both the 
authority and expertise necessary to carry out these ideals in practice. Before 
1914, when the gold standard was suspended, this implied an orthodox 
monetary policy based on flexible interest rates; a policy developed in an 
international context of free capital flows and fixed exchange rates. This was 
a market-based system in the sense that demand and supply decided the 
flows of capital, and to the extent that whenever the authorities intervened, 
they used mainly changes in the price mechanism, the interest rate, to 
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influence the outcome. Unlike later policy regimes, the gold standard 
thereby appeared as a self-regulating system, in which the central bank acted 
as a completely independent agency in charge of maintaining the external 
value of the krone, that is, its convertibility into gold. 
In practice, we have seen that both the working of the gold standard system 
and the position of the central bank towards the political authorities probably 
was less straightforward. First, new research indicates that monetary policy 
during the gold standard contained considerable elements of discretion. 
Rather than keeping a single focus on the external value of the currency, the 
BoN, without seriously violating the link between the gold reserves and the 
volume of notes in circulation, actively tried to balance the systemic tension 
between international and domestic concerns and often changed the discount 
rate also to smooth seasonal variations and business cycles at home. Second, 
there also were some discrepancies between the ideal of CBI as declared by 
the political authorities and the de jure position of the BoN as stated in the 
new Central Bank Act of 1892, since the governing all bodies of the central 
bank, including the governor, were appointed by the political authorities. 
Moreover, there was also a greater overlap between the central bank and the 
authorities than is usually assumed since a number of directors of the BoN 
also served as members of parliament, the Storting, which according to the 
Constitution was formally in charge of superintending the central bank as 
part of the monetary system. 
The above points add some important nuances to our understanding of the 
gold standard system as well as the traditional role of the BoN. Even so, in 
practice and, particularly when compared with later periods, the gold 
standard was characterized by predictable and limited state intervention and 
de facto CBI. The political authorities never exercised their right to remove 
the Bank’s governor, and in practice the first two full-time governors 
established a tradition of long-serving, prominent individuals with a high 
degree of personal influence over the internal governing bodies of the central 
bank as well as the political authorities. Thus, although politically 
embedded, the BoN in practice experienced a high degree of autonomy and 
authority in policy formulation and implementation, and the political 
authorities limited their activities to supervision rather than direct control 
and intervention. In fact, the relations between the BoN and the Storting 
during the gold standard probably rather reinforced the independent position 
of the central bank than the opposite, by soothing the numerous passive 
stockholders as well as adding legitimacy in the eyes of the public in 
general. 
The outbreak of World War I and succeeding economic crises, including the 
suspension and reintroduction of the gold standard, represented a serious 
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blow to the ideal of CBI, in Norway as in most other countries. Although 
new research indicates that the deflationary monetary policy pursued by 
governor Rygg and the BoN reinforced rather than caused the economic 
crises of the 1920s, in the contemporary context, there was a strong 
associative link between the central bank and the negative consequences of 
the crisis. This was reinforced by the fact that the political authorities at the 
time distanced themselves from the par policy by referring to the expertise 
and declared independence of the central bank. Moreover, the deflation 
caused by the par policy, once it was implemented, did undoubtedly 
contribute to the debt crisis, bankruptcies and high unemployment. So even 
though the BoN limited the systemic crisis by serving as lender of last resort, 
it later contributed to the depression by consistently giving priority to the 
external value of the krone, regardless of the domestic costs of this policy in 
the short run. The consequence for the central bank was a serious 
undermining of its public trust and legitimacy. 
The final breakdown of the gold standard in 1931 represented a fundamental 
change of context for central banking throughout the world. Free capital 
movements and convertibility were replaced by bilateral agreements and 
capital controls, and from now on the domestic monetary policy and foreign 
exchange policy were no longer intimately connected. Hence, the monetary 
policy was directed towards domestic concerns, and, in Norway, the discount 
rate fell drastically and was changed less frequently as part of the attempts to 
overcome the depression. The foreign exchange policy, on the other hand, 
was characterized by completely new instruments, such as formal 
cooperation with the banking sector to implement rationing of currency and 
extensive direct regulations and clearing agreements to control foreign 
exchange transactions, controls maintained by a growing staff in the central 
bank. Through these experiences with moral suasion and direct regulations 
in the 1930s, the BoN gained experience and built up expertise that would 
later prove crucial in the process of developing a new role after World War 
II. 
The crises of the interwar period generated increasing protests against free 
markets, orthodox monetary policy, and independent central banks, from 
politicians as well as economists worldwide. In Norway, the most prominent 
advocate of this criticism was the Labor Party, in alliance with a new 
generation of economists trained by Ragnar Frisch. Unlike his more famous 
colleague John M. Keynes, Frisch rejected the idea of a capitalist market 
economy and argued in favor of extensive market regulations and centralized 
planning. While Keynes proposed a cheap money policy in which interest 
rates were kept at a low stable level by manipulating market liquidity, Frisch 
recommended direct regulations of interest rates and credit rationing. While 
Keynes was in favor of politically independent central banks in charge of 
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maintaining such a policy, Frisch suggested that the BoN should be reduced 
to an office for mere accounting transactions in the Ministry of Finance. 
Even though Frisch in this latter case might have represented an extremist 
view, there is little doubt that the Norwegian central bank faced a 
particularly challenging setting, in which politicians and economists joined 
forces against its traditionally independent role.  
Throughout its first 130 years of operation, we have seen that the position of 
the BoN varied in terms of serving as a boundary organization. During the 
19th century, the Bank gradually entered such a position between 
international and domestic concerns, and between the public and private 
sectors. The attempts of the Bank during the gold standard to balance the 
tension between the external value of the krone and domestic seasonal 
variations and business cycles fits into such a theoretical framework. Once 
this system was suspended, however, and the BoN tried to reintroduce par 
value of the krone, it abandoned this boundary position and gave priority to 
international concerns, at least in the short run. On the other hand, when the 
gold standard finally broke down, the Bank could again give priority to 
domestic concerns and still continue its close relations and frequent 
transactions with other central banks and thereby also maintain contact with 
new international concerns. 
The BoN also obtained a boundary position in the second dimension of this 
theory, between the public and private spheres. The ideal of CBI implied that 
the political authorities relied completely on the expert resources of the BoN 
in the formulation and implementation of the monetary policy. Even when 
the gold standard was abandoned and the ideal of CBI was waning, the BoN 
in practice maintained much of its operational independence. The Bank 
remained in charge of both the domestic monetary policy and the new 
foreign exchange policy based on direct controls, and the political authorities 
still depended on the Bank for information and professional advice. Also the 
growing banking sector was in demand for the resources of the central bank 
throughout the 19th and early 20th century, in terms of information exchange 
as well as financial assistance. In times of crisis, this demand peaked in the 
central bank’s function as lender of last resort. After the breakdown of the 
gold standard, the nature of the relations between the central bank and the 
banking sector changed somewhat. While their relations previously had been 
dictated mainly by the needs of the banking sector, during the formal 
cooperation and moral suasion of the 1930s, the requirements of the 
authorities were the driving force. In either case, however, the BoN operated 
actively in the boundary zone between political authorities and private 
banks. 
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By 1945, the BoN was characterized by standstill and uncertainty regarding 
both its actions during the war and its future role. Both the ambitious Labor 
Party and the new generation of Frischian economists dismissed the idea of 
traditional CBI, and instead portrayed a new type of economic policy based 
on state planning and control, in which the central bank served as an 
integrated part. Still the government appointed a well-known political 
opponent, Gunnar Jahn, as the new governor of the Bank in January 1946. 
We have suggested several reasons for this, including Jahn’s background in 
the resistance during World War II, the need for added legitimacy for both 
the BoN and the fresh Labor government, at home as well as abroad, and the 
possibility that the appointment was rather a ‘negative’ initiative to remove 
Jahn from his post as head of the National Bureau of Statistics (SSB) to the 
presumably less important position as the governor of the subordinated 
central bank. 
Jahn tended to support this latter interpretation, and yet he still accepted his 
new post. We have explained this by emphasizing a four-point common 
basis on which Jahn and the Labor government could develop a constructive 
cooperation: 1) they agreed on the main economic-political goals of full 
employment, stable economic growth and social equalization; 2) they 
accepted the absolute need for short-term direct regulations after the war; 3) 
they also shared a more positive view on long-term state intervention in the 
economy, although they disagreed on the nature of such market 
regulation/manipulation; and finally and most important of all 4) Jahn and 
leading Labor politicians had a common pragmatic approach to policy-
making in which solving practical problems had priority over theoretical and 
ideological principles. 
As newly appointed governor, Jahn accepted both publicly and in private 
that the BoN should be under political control. His statements thereby agreed 
with the contemporary theories on central banking that prescribed adaptation 
to new economic and political conditions. Jahn nevertheless insisted that 
central banks should maintain an autonomous voice in the political debate 
and was obliged to protest in cases of disagreement. In this way, Jahn 
identified what would become the two pillars of the BoN’s interaction with 
the political authorities during the following decade: a complex combination 
of opposition and compromise. 
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2 From marginalization to cooperation (1945-48) 
 
In mid-August 1946, Gunnar Jahn had a meeting with Erik Brofoss, finance 
minister and leading economic and political strategist of the Labor 
government, and noted the following comments in his diary: 
All in all, today he [Brofoss] appeared as a man who sought advice 
regarding both this [the inflationary dangers] and the budget. 
Rather curious, by the way, considering he has not found the time 
to speak to me since April.1 
This casual remark reveals what must be considered an all-time low in the 
power and influence of the Norwegian central bank. The fact that the finance 
minister, despite facing massive challenges of economic recovery from war 
damages, did not consult the governor or the central bank for months was a 
rather dramatic sign of disregard in itself, but even worse considering Jahn 
had just entered office. When Jahn accepted the governorship, he had been 
well aware that new economic theories and norms for central banking, 
combined with Labor’s political ambitions, indicated that the BoN would 
play a subordinate role in the post-WWII economic policy. However, this 
feeling of being ignored must have been even worse than expected. 
In this chapter, we will discuss to what extent this complete marginalization 
of the BoN continued and became a permanent feature of Labor’s new 
policy regime after World War II, as has usually been assumed by scholars 
who have examined this period. In his study of the Ministry of Finance, 
Einar Lie suggests that due to the different political and economic theory 
convictions of governor Jahn and the Labor Party, the BoN failed to 
contribute to policy formulation and implementation before the mid-1950s, 
when Erik Brofoss succeeded Jahn as head of the Bank. Instead, the BoN 
ended up in futile opposition to the Labor government, while the Ministry of 
Finance to a large degree coordinated and controlled the policy-making 
process. Other historians have supported this view, most recently Sverre 
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[Quote: ”Han var i det hele tatt i dag en mann som søkte råd både om dette 
[inflasjonsfaren] og budsjettet, nokså kuriøst forresten når han ikke har hatt tid til å 
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Knutsen, who in his dissertation on the Norwegian financial system during 
the 20th century characterizes this period as part of Labor’s “strategic 
capitalism”, an economic and political scheme that promoted industrial 
development and economic growth through a cheap money policy and credit 
controls. In this system, the BoN is portrayed as a subordinate agency that 
hardly took part in Labor’s policy-making during Jahn’s governance.2 
Based on our previous observations of a common basis for interaction 
between Gunnar Jahn and the Labor government, as presented in chapter 1, 
there is reason to question these interpretations regarding the role of the 
central bank. Although there were obvious professional and political 
disagreements between governor Jahn and Labor, they found some common 
ground for cooperation in the fact that they agreed on the main goals of full 
employment, economic growth and social equalization. They also shared an 
acceptance of the need for short-term regulation as well as long-term state 
intervention, even though they disagreed on the nature of this latter policy. 
And, most importantly, both Jahn and leading Labor politicians had a 
pragmatic approach to policy-making in which solving practical problems 
outweighed theoretical and ideological considerations.3 Is it hence possible 
that the BoN found a way out of the political backwater already during the 
tenure of governor Jahn? Through its long history, the central bank had 
developed considerable experience and expertise that could be of use to the 
new government, and the above quote indicates that finance minister 
Brofoss, even though initially ignoring the new governor, did eventually ask 
Jahn for advice. Was this a mere one-off incident or the start of a more 
systematic interaction? According to contemporary theory, in the post-WWII 
world central banks had to expand their traditional goals and policy 
instruments in order to obtain influence. To what extent did the BoN manage 
to carry out such ideas in practice?  
In this chapter, we will discuss the above questions and examine the role of 
the BoN during the first half of the recovery period, 1945-1948. The chapter 
is organized in five sections. Section 2.1 discusses the role of the central 
bank in the domestic economic policy, a policy characterized by extensive 
direct regulations. Sections 2.2 through 2.4 bring focus to an often-neglected 
part of the central bank’s traditional field of work: the foreign exchange 
policy. The BoN had considerable expertise in this area, from the market-
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based policies of the gold standard period to the market regulations during 
the 1930s, and once foreign exchange problems again arose after World War 
II this experience could be of use. Section 2.2 presents the fundamental 
challenges of the foreign exchange policy at this point and discusses the 
failing communications between the central bank and the government 
regarding these problems before the autumn of 1947, when the foreign 
exchange situation turned into a severe crisis. Section 2.3 analyses this 
currency crisis, which appears as a turning point in the attempts of governor 
Jahn and his officials to influence policy formulation and implementation. 
Section 2.4 examines the renewed authority of the BoN in the foreign 
exchange policy after this crisis. The concluding section 2.5 sums up the 
changes in the tasks and authority of the central bank during these first 
postwar years, and discusses how these changes influenced the process of 
developing a new role within Labor’s new policy regime. 
2.1 Marginalization of the BoN in the domestic economic policy 
One of the most heated topics in the Norwegian economic debate during the 
recovery period was how to cope with the extreme monetary surplus created 
by the occupying regime. By the Liberation, over 8 billion kroner (NOK) 
was still outstanding on the so-called occupational account, and in chapter 1 
we discussed how this helped to undermine the legitimacy of the BoN, both 
at home and abroad.4 Here, we will discuss the economic and political 
dimension of this problem, related to its potential inflationary consequences 
as well as its consequences for the role of the central bank in domestic 
policy-making. 
A substantial part of the monetary expansion during the war had ended up as 
increased disposable income in the hands of the general public and the 
private banks. The general public’s stock of notes and demand deposits 
increased from about 900 million NOK by the end of 1939 to 5.3 billion 
NOK by the Liberation. During the same period, bank deposits increased 
from about 2.7 billion to 4.2 billion NOK.5 This implied that in 1945, the 
Norwegian public had plenty of money at its disposal while simultaneously 
craving for consumer goods that had been unavailable for years, goods that 
were still hard to get hold of. This pent-up demand for scarce consumer 
goods combined with the monetary surplus represented a severe inflationary 
potential that had to be curbed. 
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The immediate solution to the inflation problem was to prolong the wartime 
direct regulations. On Liberation Day in May, 1945, the Labor government –
in exile in London made the War Cabinet pass a new provisional law, Lex 
Thagaard, which allowed the authorities not only to control prices but also 
to prohibit or order the production of goods, control the volume of 
production, tax commodities, and prevent companies from being started or 
expanded.6 In addition, other provisions passed during the war ensured the 
comprehensive control of all imports, exports and capital movements to and 
from Norway, as we will discuss more thoroughly below. Altogether, these 
statutory provisions in principle gave the authorities power to control all 
aspects of domestic production, including what, where and how to produce, 
and at what price, as well as all transactions of goods, services and currency 
to and from other countries. 
From Gunnar Jahn’s point of view, Lex Thagaard and the other direct 
controls represented both democratic and economic problems. Although 
Jahn accepted the need for extraordinary direct regulations during a 
transitional period in order to cope with the economic imbalances created 
during the war, in the longer term, he argued that direct regulations were 
undesirable. From a democratic perspective, such regulations implied undue 
interference in peoples’ lives. From an economic perspective, he believed 
they would lead to inefficiency, both because people would gradually learn 
to evade the laws and because an administrative rather than a market-based 
allocation would lead to a waste of resources. Hence, Jahn argued that the 
direct regulations should be abolished as soon as possible and replaced by 
more efficient market-based instruments. 
A precondition for deregulation was an improvement of the imbalances in 
the domestic economy between the abundance of money and the scarcity of 
capital and labor. As finance minister in the temporary coalition government 
of 1945, Gunnar Jahn had therefore proposed carrying out a comprehensive 
monetary reorganization in order to withdraw excess liquidity. Already 
during the war, economists in the BoN and the National Bureau of Statistics 
(SSB) had prepared a proposal for a comprehensive monetary 
reorganization, which finance minister Jahn later used as basis for a 
                                                     
6 “Provisorisk anordning av 8. mai 1945 om prisregulering og annen regulering av 
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parliamentary bill.7 However, this initiative failed. When Labor’s new 
majority government entered office in the autumn of 1945, it replaced Jahn’s 
bill with a circumscribed version, which in practice did not have any 
traceable effect on the liquidity.8 
Unlike countries such as Belgium, Finland and Denmark, where the 
authorities carried out drastic monetary reforms immediately after the war, 
high liquidity continued to mark the Norwegian economy throughout the 
recovery period. And rather than preparing for liberalization and market-
based instruments, the government chose a policy based on the so-called 
stabilization line [stabiliseringslinjen], a three-fold strategy introduced in the 
autumn of 1945 to stabilize prices at the present level. The stabilization line 
combined quantitative direct controls of prices and resource allocation with 
income policy initiatives to prevent wage rises, and a fixed exchange rate 
based on consideration of the domestic price level. By setting maximum 
prices, rationing consumer goods, raw materials, fuel, and building 
materials, by establishing a detailed licensing system for imports, exports 
and foreign exchange, by compensating for inflation with price subsidies in 
exchange for wage moderation and thereby breaking the traditional index-
linked wage system, and by fixing the exchange rate at 20 NOK to the 
                                                     
7 For a discussion of the different phases of and motivations behind the monetary 
reorganization, see E. Lie, “Pengesanering og reguleringsøkonomi”, Historisk 
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Scholars have debated why the Labor government refused to carry out a 
comprehensive monetary reorganization. Preben Munthe has argued that this was 
mainly due to new theoretical perspectives on the importance of money as an 
inflationary factor. The Frischian economists rejected the traditional quantitative 
theory of money that assumes that an increase in the quantity of money will result in 
inflation without any positive effect on economic growth. Instead, they argued that 
the main cause of inflation was found on the supply side of the economy, linked to 
the scarce supply of goods. Einar Lie to some extent agrees with Munthe, but refutes 
the assumption that it was only the new generation of economists who rejected 
quantitative theory. He argues that also presumably ‘orthodox’ economists such as 
Erling Petersen based their arguments on more modern monetary theory. Lie 
therefore suggests that the main reason was that Labor, for political reasons, was in 
no hurry to return to a market economy. Preben Munthe, ”Pengesanering og 
stabilisering”, in A.J. Isachsen (ed.), Ni artikler om penger, kreditt og valuta, Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1991, pp. 218-28; Lie 1994, pp. 64-65; Lie 1995, p. 67ff. 
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British pound – instead of a proposed 24 NOK rate that would have helped 
the export industries – the Labor government attempted to control prices and 
resource allocation, curb a possible price-wage spiral and avoid imported 
inflation, while simultaneously directing resources to high-priority sectors 
such as shipbuilding and export industries.9 
The high liquidity, direct regulations and the declared stabilization line 
implied that the role of the BoN as participant and advisor in the domestic 
economic policy would be less prominent. In January 1946, Gunnar Jahn 
stated in his diaries that he now realized that the new Labor government had 
no intention of carrying out a comprehensive monetary reorganization and 
that the direct regulations therefore would be continued on a broad basis.10 
And in his first annual speech as central bank governor a month later, Jahn 
acknowledged that this would have fundamental consequences for the 
central bank: 
The war, with the abundance of money we have inherited from the 
Germans, implies that the Bank of Norway will not be able to play 
a big role in the domestic monetary policy, and it [the central bank] 
will also be less important as an advisory organ for the 
Government and the State in the monetary policy. This is 
something we have to face up to.11 
The monetary surplus, combined with extensive direct regulations, prevented 
the BoN from using its traditionally most important policy instrument: a 
flexible discount rate. Already by the outbreak of World War II, the discount 
rate had been frozen at a three per cent level, and in January 1946, the 
government instructed the BoN to reduce the discount rate even further to an 
all-time low of 2.5 per cent. At this point of time, the low discount rate 
reflected the high market liquidity. However, in accordance with the 
economic theories of Ragnar Frisch, Labor had added to its party program 
the goal of keeping domestic interest rates “as low as possible” also in the 
                                                     
9 For a summary of the historical debate on the stabilization line, as well as its 
background and content, see Søilen 1998, pp. 3\52-55. 
10 GJD January 18, 1946. 
11 Gunnar Jahn’s speech at the meeting of the BoN’s Supervisory Council, February 
11, 1946, Norges Banks beretning og regnskap, 1945, quote p. 7. 
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long run.12 By the end of World War II, several countries embarked on 
similar cheap money policies, among them neighboring Sweden and Great 
Britain, Norway’s closest ally during the war. The rationale behind the cheap 
money policy was that low interest rates, on the one hand, would contribute 
to a high investment level, which in turn was assumed to induce economic 
growth and, on the other hand, would be socially beneficial by providing 
cheap housing for the general public. An additional fiscal reason, which was 
particularly emphasized in heavily indebted Britain, was that low interest 
rates would limit the State’s interest payments.13 
Tracing the origins of the Norwegian cheap money policy exceeds the scope 
of this thesis, but Gunnar Jahn was among those who presumed that it was 
initially based on a British model, which again was inspired by Keynes’ 
economic theories.14 However, whereas Britain and most other countries 
abandoned or eased their cheap money policies around 1950, Norwegian 
governments – regardless of party affiliation – continued to pursue low and 
stable interest rates as a policy target until the mid-1980s. The cheap money 
policy thereby appeared as a cornerstone of Norwegian economic policy, 
which it gradually became politically unacceptable to oppose. In 1945, this 
long-term scenario was of course unknown, and Jahn and other opponents of 
the cheap money policy would still try to convince the government to let it 
                                                     
12 Det norske Arbeiderparti, “Arbeid til alle. Oppgavene i Norge i etterkrigstida”, 
passed by the National Council of the Norwegian Labor Party, May 28-29, 1945, in 
Vi vil…Norske partiprogrammer 1884-2001, CD-Rom published by Norsk 
Samfunnsvitenskaplig datatjeneste and Institutt for samfunnsforskning, 2001, item 5 
[quote: “Renten for innenlandske lån holdes så lav som råd er.”]. 
13 For an overview of the British and Swedish cheap money policies, see S. Howson, 
British Monetary Policy, 1945-1951, Oxford: Claredon press (1993); M. Chick, 
Industrial Policy in Britain: Economic Planning, Nationalisation, and the Labour 
Governments, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1997), pp. 4-5; L. Jonung, 
“Riksbankens politik 1945-1990”, in L. Werin (ed.), Från räntereglering till 
inflationsnorm: det finansiella systemet och Riksbankens politik 1945-1990, 
Stockholm: SNS Förlag, 1993, pp. 287-419. 
14 See Minute from the annual meeting of the Nordic central banks by A. Eriksen, 
November 19, 1947, the Bank of Norway Archives, Statistisk avdeling, at the 
National Archives of Norway, Oslo [hereafter: BoN-S] box H-0006, folder no. 3. 
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go. However, for the BoN, the immediate consequence of the fixed discount 
rate was that monetary policy in the traditional sense was impossible.15 
A necessary institutional precondition for the cheap money policy was the 
new international payment system developed by the end of World War II to 
replace the previous gold standard regime, the so-called Bretton Woods 
system.16 The Bretton Woods system had two characteristics that enabled the 
domestic control of interest rates. First, it replaced the market-based 
exchange rates of the former gold standard system with a regime of 
administratively pegged, “stable but adjustable” exchange rates.17 Second, it 
                                                     
15 Jahn accused key Labor politicians of having an irrational obsession with keeping 
the interest rate at 2.5 per cent regardless of the monetary conditions. He also 
criticized the Frischian economists for not recognizing the monetary aspects of the 
problems of inflation and deficits on the currency account with which Norway 
struggled, but instead focusing solely on the real side of the economy. See Lie 1995, 
p. 220; minute from the annual meeting of the Nordic central banks by A. Eriksen, 
November 19, 1947, BoN-S box H-0006, folder no. 3; minute from the annual 
meeting of the Scandinavian central banks by A. Eriksen, December 12, 1946, BoN-
S box H-0001, folder no. 2. 
16 The Bretton Woods system was named after a conference at Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, USA, in July 1944, where the allied nations agreed to establish a new 
organization for the stabilization of currencies and the promotion of international 
trade – named the International Monetary Fund (the IMF) – and a new international 
bank for reconstruction and economic development (the I.B.R.A.D, or the World 
Bank). 
17 “Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund” (July 22, 1944), 
Article IV. A full version of the 1944 Articles of Agreement is printed in: J. K. 
Horsefield, The International Monetary Fund 1945-1965, vol. 3, Washington D.C.: 
the International Monetary Fund, 1969, pp. 185-214. According to Article IV, 
exchange rates were in principle fixed to a par value expressed in terms of gold or 
US dollars, but in cases of a long-term, fundamental disequilibrium (which in 
practice meant an unsustainable payments imbalance), the exchange rate could be 
altered with the approval of the IMF. 
See also: M. D. Bordo and H. James, “The International Monetary Fund: Its Present 
Role in Historical Perspective”, NBER working paper no. 7724, Cambridge, Mass.: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000; A. Britton, Monetary Regimes of the 
Twentieth Century, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
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permitted the member countries to maintain national capital controls.18 
While a main purpose of the Bretton Woods system was to promote 
international trade and the liberalization of goods and services, these two 
provisions allowed member countries to pursue national strategies in 
monetary policy matters, for example to replace orthodox discount policy 
with a policy of low interest rates. Hence, the Bretton Woods system 
constituted a fundamentally new international framework for post-WWII 
central banking. 
According to contemporary theories, the key to influence for central banks in 
the post-WWII world was to adapt their ways and techniques to the new 
political and institutional surroundings.19 The extensive direct controls in the 
domestic economy offered plenty of new tasks and challenges, and by 
participating in designing and maintaining these regulations, the BoN in 
principle could have contributed to Labor’s policy-making despite being 
precluded from using its traditional means. However, in practice, the central 
bank hardly took part in this new domestic policy regime. 
The administration and granting of licenses, control of prices etc. was 
handled mainly by the Ministry of Finance, the Price Directorate, and the 
Ministry of Supply and Reconstruction [Forsynings- og 
gjenreisningsdepartementet], while the BoN was not included. Moreover, 
neither Jahn nor other Bank officials took part in the process of drawing up 
national budgets, a key policy measure in Labor’s post-WWII economic 
policy. The national budgets had been initiated by Ragnar Frisch in the 
1930s, and continued by Frisch’s students during and after World War II. In 
March 1946, finance minister Erik Brofoss, the most eager advocate of these 
budgets in the Labor government, presented the first preliminary national 
budget, followed by a more complete version in February 1947.20 These first 
                                                     
18 “Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund” (July 22, 1944), 
Article VI, section 3, which stated that a “Member may exercise such controls as are 
necessary to regulate international capital movements, but no member may exercise 
these controls in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions or 
which will unduly delay transfers of funds in settlement of commitments (…)”. 
19 See chapter 1.8. 
20 Parliamentary document St.prp. no. 1 (1945-46), extraordinary appendix no. 11. 
For an interesting account of the process of developing national accounts and 
budgets as perceived by one of the key participants, the Frisch student and later 
manager of the National Bureau of Statistics, Petter Jakob Bjerve, see Bjerve 1989, 
chapters IV and V. 
Chapter 2 From marginalization to cooperation 
82 
annual national budgets contained detailed specifications of resource 
allocation and production volume for each industry and sector, down to the 
level of bricks and boards, and were designed specifically for ensuring a 
rapid and efficient reconstruction of the Norwegian economy. Later budgets 
were less detailed but not necessarily less ambitious, as their status as so-
called program budgets implied that estimates for production, consumption, 
investments etc., were meant not only as tentative predictions but also as 
specific targets for the economic policy. 
From Gunnar Jahn’s point of view, the national budgets helped to underpin 
what he regarded as a failed economic policy. His diaries indicate that 
although he had nothing in principle against the concept of a national budget, 
which he described as an “in a way logic” construction, but he felt that in 
practice the results were poor since the budget allowed the government to 
calculate with too high investments, too high imports, and too optimistic 
estimates of the productive capacity.21 Jahn therefore displayed little interest 
in either developing or implementing the national budget. The BoN as an 
organization did contribute in limited ways to the national budgets by 
providing the Ministry of Finance with statistical data, and, as we will see 
below, Jahn was involved in producing alternative foreign exchange 
estimates. Nevertheless, the Bank was not represented at the most important 
arena for preparing and designing the national budgets, the National Budget 
Committee [Nasjonalbudsjettutvalget], and all in all, it played only a minor 
role in Labor’s initiatives for economic planning.22 
The above account suggests that a main reason why the BoN ended up in a 
peripheral position in domestic economic policy during the recovery period 
was that Jahn and his officials were both unwilling and unable to contribute 
constructively to Labor’s policy formulation and implementation. The 
extraordinary economic situation and extensive direct regulations, combined 
with new political preferences and economic theory perspectives, prevented 
the central bank from implementing a traditional monetary policy, and it also 
failed to participate in maintaining and developing the direct regulations and 
national budgets. This latter lack of initiative can partly be explained at an 
individual level by Jahn’s opposition to the cheap money policy and other 
parts of Labor’s economic policy, as suggested by most studies of the central 
                                                     
21 GJD December 18, 1946. 
22 Parliamentary document St.meld. no. 10 (1947), pp. 8-10. See also: Bjerve 1989, 
p. 118. 
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bank during this period. However, from an institutional perspective, even 
more important was the fact that the central bank had little prior experience 
in maintaining direct controls outside the area of monetary policy. The BoN 
did therefore not appear as an obvious candidate for implementing either 
price controls, rationing systems or economic planning. In another policy 
area, however, we have seen that the central bank did have long traditions, 
namely foreign exchange policy. And when external events turned the 
foreign exchange policy into one of the most critical matters of the recovery 
period, the BoN could benefit from this knowledge. 
2.2 The Bank of Norway and the currency crisis of 1947 
In 1947, the world economy was hit by a severe currency crisis: a crisis that 
not only had well-known major consequences related to the Cold War and 
the political and economic balance between Western Europe and the USA, 
but indirectly also influenced the role of the BoN. The currency crisis was 
part of a more extensive set of problems in European economies. After a 
period of strong economic growth, European countries were experiencing 
increasing shortages of raw materials and fuel, low agricultural output, and 
signs of stagnation in the growth of production, in addition to the payment 
problems. This evolving economic crisis threatened to disturb not only the 
recovery of domestic economies but also the development of international 
economic exchange. In June 1947, the US Secretary of the State George C. 
Marshall gave his famous speech at Harvard University, where he launched 
the idea of the European Recovery Program (ERP), an aid program more 
usually known as the Marshall Plan, designed to help Europe move out of 
this critical state. 
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The importance of Marshall Aid for Europe’s economic growth has been 
subject to intense scholarly debate.23 A more important aspect in our context, 
however, is the fact that both the preceding currency crisis of 1947 and the 
aid program itself were events that together had both indirect and direct 
influence on the changing role of the BoN. By turning the political center of 
attention towards the foreign exchange policy, an area where the central 
bank had both experience and expertise, and by setting preconditions for the 
aid program that hastened the liberalization of domestic regulations, these 
two external events created a ‘window of opportunity’ that enabled the Bank 
to contribute constructively to the ongoing policy-making process within the 
new post-WWII policy regime, which in turn became the key to finding a 
new role. 
While the Marshall Plan was designed to help with the economic problems 
of Europe on a broad basis, including addressing the trade imbalances 
between Europe and the USA, the perhaps most critical element of the 1947 
crisis were the payment problems. In one respect, the payment problems 
were a long-term challenge related to the fact that most European countries 
experienced balance of payments problems due to growing deficits on their 
trade balances. In order to ensure a rapid recovery from war-related losses, 
many European countries, including Norway, conducted an economic policy 
                                                     
23  Classic contributions in the vast literature on the Marshall Plan include A. S. 
Millward, The reconstruction of Western Europe, London: Routledge, 1992, in 
which the author defends a counterfactual hypothesis of European self-support, and 
M. J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan. America, Britain, and the reconstruction of 
Western Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, which 
argues that Europe’s rapid recovery totally depended on American aid. Literature 
with a Norwegian perspective on Marshall Aid and the succeeding European 
Payment Union (EPU) includes H. Pharo, “Bridgebuilding and Reconstruction: 
Norway faces the Marshall Plan”, Scandinavian Journal of History, vol. 1, no. 1, 
1976, pp. 125-153; H. Pharo, “Marshall-planen sett fra amerikansk side. Norge i 
komparativt perspektiv”, Historisk Tidsskrift, vol. 68, no. 2, pp. 184-209; K. R. 
Pedersen, The United States and the Marshall Plan, 1947-53, Ph.D. thesis in history, 
University of Rochester (1988), Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1994; E. 
Lie, Pride and prejustice: Norway and the European Payment Union 1950-1955, 
post-graduate thesis in history, Oslo: University of Oslo, 1997; H. Pharo, Norge og 
Marshallplanen, Atlanterhavskomiteens skriftserie no. 198, Oslo: Den norske 
atlanterhavskomite, 1997; L. F. Øksendal, En fast kurs. Norsk betalingspolitikk, 
1945-58, post-graduate thesis [hovedoppgave] in history, Trondheim: Norwegian 
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in which their imports of goods and raw materials more or less permanently 
exceeded their exports, a strategy that in the long run might have had severe 
negative effects on both their international creditworthiness and their 
solvency. 
In 1947, however, the most urgent aspect of the payment problems was 
related to access to foreign means of payment in itself. The lack of 
international convertibility and a functioning multilateral payment system 
meant that many countries experienced exceedingly critical shortages of 
foreign exchange, US dollars in particular. Due to aggregating economic and 
financial imbalances between the USA and Europe – with European 
countries in desperate demand for raw materials and consumer goods and the 
USA as basically the only country with material and financial resources to 
spare – the European demand for US goods and dollars exceeded their 
ability to pay. The dominant position of the USA was manifested by the fact 
that US dollars were the only fully convertible currency at the time, while 
British pounds were valid in the sterling area only and remaining currencies 
could be used only on a bilateral basis.24 
In addition to the acute dollar shortage, many countries also experienced a 
general currency crisis, generated not only by the lack of convertibility but 
also by the nature of the bilateral trade system. Rather than promoting a 
balanced exchange, the bilateral system in practice produced a gap between 
so-called surplus countries, such as Belgium and Switzerland, whose exports 
generally exceeded their imports, and deficit countries, including Norway, 
which more or less constantly were indebted to their trading partners. The 
bilateral agreements contained buffer arrangements, such as short-term 
plafond credits, which were intended to even out seasonal variations and 
handle temporary imbalances. In practice, however, the imbalances between 
surplus and deficit countries continued, and many deficit countries started 
using plafond credits to finance long-term investments. The surplus 
countries, on the other hand, threatened to suspend further trade until their 
debtors met their obligations. Hence, by 1947, many countries faced a 
situation where they potentially had to execute massive cuts in their imports, 
which again would have had severe consequences for international economic 
exchange. 
                                                     
24 The Sterling area consisted mainly of countries then or formerly part of the 
Commonwealth, excluding Canada. 
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While the general payment imbalances between European countries and 
between Europe and the USA were a well-known problem, not all 
governments understood the severity and urgency of the currency crisis. The 
historian Helge Pharo has demonstrated that despite the unraveling currency 
crises in surrounding countries, including Great Britain, Sweden and 
Denmark, all of which had to cut imports due to dollar shortages, the 
Norwegian authorities for a long time did not regard the currency situation 
as precarious.25 This view has later been supported by Einar Lie, who in his 
study of the Ministry of Finance finds that the authorities misread the actual 
status of foreign exchange reserves due to a failure of coordination between 
the various agencies in charge of maintaining the currency controls. In 
theory, all imports and exports of foreign exchange were controlled by an 
extensive set of statutory provisions, which allowed the authorities to 
regulate transactions involving foreign exchange through a detailed license 
system.26 In practice, however, there were inadequate reporting procedures 
between the different agencies involved in the foreign exchange regulations 
and the Ministry of Finance, which thereby failed to coordinate their 
operations sufficiently. Hence, the Ministry of Finance did not realize that by 
August 1947, a large number of the foreign exchange licenses issued earlier 
that year or in previous years had not yet been carried through, and that the 
foreign exchange deficit was thereby far larger than the recorded statistics 
indicated.27 
The fact that the Ministry of Finance failed to recognize these problems, 
however, does not mean it did not have the opportunity to do so. In the 
following we will see that the BoN warned of the inadequate organization of 
the foreign exchange regulations well ahead of the crisis, but these warnings 
were ignored and instead mistaken for an attempt to increase the power of 
the central bank. 
                                                     
25 Pharo 1978; Pharo 1997. 
26 From the summer of 1946 onwards, the legal foundation of the currency control 
was an enabling act, the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act of July 19, 1946 [Lov om 
valutaregulering], which was based directly on a Royal decree of November 10, 
1944 “Bemyndigelse for Finansdepartementet til å utferdige bestemmelser om 
valutakontroll” issued by the London government-in-exile. This Royal decree 
replaced a provision issued by the caretaker government, Administrasjonsrådet, 
“Bestemmelser om utenlandsk betalingsmidler, fordringer og verdipapirer mv” of 
July 17, 1940. 
27 Lie 1995, pp. 103-107. 
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According to the statutory provisions on foreign exchange regulations during 
and after World War II, all transactions to and from Norway involving 
foreign exchange had to be reported to the BoN. The Bank was also to give 
consent to all such transactions. Hence, the underlying provisions envisaged 
that the central bank would have a coordinating role both in gathering 
information and in maintaining regulations. In practice, however, a series of 
different agencies was involved in maintaining the controls, among them the 
Ministry of Supply and Reconstruction, which handled applications for 
imports of goods and raw materials, and the Ministry of Trade, which, in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, was responsible for ship orders as 
well as principal matters of import and export controls and statistics.28 
Moreover, the Norwegian foreign exchange reserves were split between the 
Ministry of Finance, the BoN and Nortraship, and during the first postwar 
years, the division of authority for handling these reserves was unclear.29 
Thus, despite the intention that it should play a coordinating role, the BoN 
had neither the resources or routines nor the actual authority to monitor the 
activities of the other foreign exchange agencies. Thus the de facto position 
of the central bank in foreign exchange matters did not correspond with its 
de jure position. Even so, the fact that the central bank was unable to survey 
and control the foreign exchange policy properly meant that its officials 
experienced first-hand the weaknesses of the post-WWII control system. 
They were thereby in a position to question the system on a general basis, 
well before the crisis set in. 
                                                     
28 In foreign exchange issues, the Ministry of Supply was usually represented by the 
Directorate of Export and Import Controls [Direktoratet for eksport- og 
importreguleringer], the Ministry of Trade by its Shipping Department 
[Skipsfartsavdelingen], and the Ministry of Finance by the Foreign Exchange 
Department [Valutaavdelingen]. See T. Løvold, “Bidrag til Valutarådets historie”, 
unpublished manuscript available at the BoN Archives, Oslo 1988, p. 12; Gunnar 
Jahn’s annual speech for 1947 at the meeting of the Supervisory Council of the 
BoN, February 10, 1947, printed in Norges Banks beretning og regnskap (the BoN’s 
annual report) for 1947. 
29 Nortraship (The Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission) had been established in 
April 25, 1940, in order to administer the parts of the Norwegian merchant and 
whaling fleet that were still outside German control. After the Liberation, Nortraship 
was responsible for carrying through settlements of claims for Norwegian 
shipowners who had lost vessels during the war. 
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When governor Jahn entered office in January 1946, his officials were 
highly aware that the organization of the foreign exchange policy was far 
from optimal. At this point, there had been attempts to coordinate the foreign 
exchange regulations through the Interministerial Currency Committee [Den 
interdepartementale valutakomité], an advisory council with representatives 
from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Supply and Reconstruction, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the BoN. The civil servants from the central 
bank quickly realized, however, that this Committee did not work as 
intended. After only a few months, central bank officials complained that the 
members the Committee did not possess the necessary expertise and that the 
BoN instead had to seek advice directly from the ministries involved.30 In 
order to remedy this situation, one of the first tasks Jahn undertook as the 
new governor was to improve the control and coordination of the foreign 
exchange policy. 
In February 1946, the BoN took two important initiatives to reorganize the 
foreign exchange policy, and both implied that the central bank would 
assume a coordinating role more in accordance with the de jure position 
originally outlined in the statutory provisions underlying the foreign 
exchange regulations. First, in a letter to the Ministry of Finance dated 
February 2, 1946, the central bank pointed out the lack of coordination of the 
foreign exchange policy. In order to improve the ability of the authorities to 
coordinate and implement necessary controls, the letter proposed that the 
administration of all currency controls as well as the foreign exchange 
reserves should be entrusted to the BoN. Moreover, the letter also argued 
that the time had come to establish a permanent and more competent 
advisory council to replace the inefficient Interministerial Currency 
                                                     
30 The Interministerial Currency Committee had been established as a temporary 
arrangement in July 1945, after an initiative from the BoN. A Royal decree of 
November 10, 1944, which proposed the establishment of a similar council, is 
quoted in full in Parliamentary document Ot. prp. no. 64 (1945-46), “Om 
utferdigelse av lov om valutaregulering”, pp. 1-2. See also Løvold 1988, pp. 25-26. 
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Committee and thereby contribute to improved coordination and exchange of 
information.31 
The Ministry of Finance completely dismissed this initiative. In its reply, it 
did not emphasize the possible inadequacies of the foreign exchange policy, 
but instead focused on the position of the central bank and argued that 
transferring the foreign exchange policy to the BoN would give it too much 
power. The Ministry underlined that besides areas where the currency 
control was specifically assigned to the BoN, the task of the central bank 
was merely “to understand the technical implementation of the foreign 
exchange policy”, not to have a coordinating role. The Ministry concluded 
that the BoN should thus not try to exceed its area of responsibility in this 
policy matter.32 
It thereby seems that rather than giving serious consideration to the warnings 
of the central bank regarding the foreign exchange policy, the Ministry of 
Finance was more preoccupied with putting the central bank in its new place 
of political submission. However, this categorical dismissal did not 
discourage the central bank from taking new initiatives. In a new letter dated 
only four days later, the BoN informed the Ministry of Finance that it had 
been in contact with the Norwegian Shipowners’ Association in order to find 
an arrangement to control freight earnings from the merchant fleet. The 
central bank recommended that the government should establish a system of 
voluntary cooperation between the BoN and the shipowners, which could 
improve the control of and public access to foreign exchange obtained 
through shipping trade.33 This system of cooperation should be supported by 
a new advisory council with representatives of the central bank, the 
shipowners, and “whichever representatives of the State that the government 
                                                     
31 Letter of February 2, 1946, from the BoN to the Ministry of Finance, quoted in 
Løvold 1988, pp. 8, 13, and 26. Despite repeated inquiries and searches in the 
archives of the BoN, it has proved impossible to retrieve the original letters and 
internal notes referred to in Løvold 1988. My analysis is therefore based on this 
detailed account from Thomas Løvold, who was a long-standing senior civil servant 
first in the Ministry of Finance, then in the Ministry of Commerce. 
32 Letter of February 8, 1946 from the Ministry of Finance to the BoN, quoted in 
Løvold 1988, p. 13.  
33 According to a provision by the Ministry of Finance of November 17, 1945 – 
made after an initiative from the BoN – the authorities could instruct citizens to hand 
over foreign currency to the BoN in exchange for Norwegian kroner. This provision 
was intended to increase the national currency reserves. 
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find necessary”. The BoN recommended that this council would discuss and 
decide cases of principal interest, while the central bank could take care of 
day-to-day executive work.34 
In this second initiative, the BoN once again placed itself in a prime position, 
but this time it simultaneously underlined that the new council, rather than 
the central bank, would have final authority. Nevertheless, despite the fact 
that the government agreed that the control of freight earnings ought to be 
improved, it still seemed concerned that the position of the central bank 
would be too influential. The Ministry of Finance therefore agreed to 
establish a new advisory council, the Shipping Currency Committee 
[Skipsvalutakomitéen], but rather than appointing a representative of the 
BoN as chairman, as the central bank had suggested, the Ministry decided it 
should be headed by one of its own officials, namely the deputy secretary of 
the Ministry’s Foreign Exchange Division, who also was head of the 
Interministerial Currency Council. Thus, the Ministry of Finance aimed to 
keep the coordination of the foreign exchange policy within its own 
organizational boundaries, while reducing the role of the central bank to that 
of an ordinary council member.35 
The two initiatives from the BoN in February 1946 were both based on a 
general concern that the organization of the foreign exchange policy did not 
give the authorities sufficient information and control. At this time, however, 
there was no explicit fear of a currency crisis. Norway still had considerable 
currency reserves, and even if the government envisaged a sizable balance of 
payments deficit, there were few direct signs of the critical situation that 
would occur within a year and a half. Hence, given Jahn’s history as a 
political and theoretical opponent and the central bank’s legacy of 
independence, it is not surprising that the government interpreted these 
initiatives as an attempt to restore some of the central bank’s power. The link 
between the organization of the foreign exchange policy and the authority of 
central bank thereby drew attention away from the actual content of the 
central bank’s warnings: that a currency crisis could occur unless the 
government improved the coordination and control of this policy area. 
                                                     
34 Letter of February 14, 1946, from the BoN to the Ministry of Finance, quoted in 
Løvold 1988, p. 34. 
35 Letters of February 27 and April 9, 1947, from the Ministry of Finance to the 
BoN, quoted in Løvold 1988, p. 34. 
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2.3 From general awareness to full alert 
During the following year, the BoN’s concern over the currency situation 
continued. Gunnar Jahn was still worried that the authorities did not have 
sufficient overview, and in January/February 1947, he stated in his diaries  
“it is about time that we start to look more seriously at the currency 
situation”. He also repeated the idea of establishing a new division in the 
BoN that could take “firm control” of the foreign exchange policy, but it 
does not seem that he took any new initiatives in this respect.36 To some 
degree, however, Jahn did give several general public warnings. While his 
first annual speech as BoN governor hardly mentioned the matter of foreign 
exchange and was concerned mainly with domestic economic policy, Jahn’s 
address for 1946, which he gave in February 1947, had the balance of 
payments problems as a main topic. Jahn argued that even if Norway at the 
end of 1946 still had considerable foreign exchange reserves and that there 
seemed to be no immediate danger of a currency crisis, the balance of 
payments and foreign exchange situation had to be monitored carefully. 
Since much of the remaining foreign exchange reserves were illiquid and 
future access to foreign loans probably would be limited, Jahn advocated an 
austerity policy at home.37 
While the Ministry of Finance refused to accept the advice from the central 
bank to reform the foreign exchange policy at this stage, finance minister 
Brofoss did recognize some potential problems related to the balance of 
payments deficit and the currency shortage. The national budget for 1947, 
which Brofoss presented at the end of February, underlined that the shortage 
of foreign means of payment could be a decisive bottleneck not only in the 
recovery process but also in a long-term perspective. The budget stated that 
it would not be possible to enhance the future standard of living without far 
greater access to foreign exchange. In order to improve the balance of 
payments, the national budget prepared for a rapid reconstruction of the 
merchant fleet, an expansion of the export industries with particular 
emphasis on highly processed goods, and an increase in foreign loans. It also 
declared that exports paid in “hard currency” and imports paid in “soft 
currency” should have priority in order to ease the pressure on the foreign 
exchange reserves. 
                                                     
36 GJD January 30 and February 2, 1947. 
37 Gunnar Jahn’s speech at the meeting of the BoN’s Supervisory Council, February 
11, 1946, and February 10, 1947, printed in the BoN’s annual reports for the 
respective years. 
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The BoN contributed to this national budget by preparing a survey on 
currency incomes and expenses in 1946 and 1947, which the Ministry of 
Finance presented as part of its elaborating comments on the foreign 
exchange budget. Based on this survey, the Ministry acknowledged that the 
currency reserves by far were large enough to cover current needs, and that it 
would probably be necessary to borrow at least 2 billion NOK the following 
decade. The foreign exchange should therefore be managed with great 
caution. Apart from these general guidelines and warnings, however, the 
national budget of 1947 did not reflect much immediate concern for the 
foreign exchange situation.38 
Even though the BoN seemed more worried about the currency problem than 
the Ministry of Finance, Gunnar Jahn did not further intensify his warnings 
either to the general public or the government. After his early initiatives to 
improve coordination and control, Jahn’s admonitions in 1946 and the first 
half of 1947 were relatively moderate. On the one hand, this indicates that 
the BoN did not realize the extent of the currency problems. The bank’s 
concerns were based mostly on general experiences and considerations than 
on specific information on the actual state of affairs, and after the crisis 
became a stated fact, Jahn claimed that he was shocked by the authorities’ 
lack of overview, and admitted that the state of affairs was worse than he had 
expected.39 On the other hand, Jahn’s response also fell in line with what 
would become a typical approach of the central bank throughout the 
recovery period, namely to compromise with the government despite 
underlying disagreements. Thus, once the government had firmly rejected 
the initiatives of the central bank to reorganize the foreign exchange policy, 
Jahn lowered his profile and instead gave priority to upgrading his own 
officials on foreign exchange matters. 
Already during the 1930s, the BoN had established a large staff involved in 
maintaining the direct foreign exchange regulations.40 In 1945-46, the bank’s 
Foreign Exchange Division [Valutaavdelingen], which was in charge of 
collecting and processing statistics on foreign exchange, composing and 
following up the Norwegian clearing agreements, and maintaining 
regulations regarding foreign travel allowances and issuing licenses for 
immaterial transactions to and from Norway, employed around 50 officials. 
                                                     
38 Parliamentary document St. meld. no. 10 (1947), pp. 16, 20 and 66-72. 
39 GJD October 20, 1947. 
40 See chapter 1.4. 
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This staff worked systematically to improve the reporting systems not only 
between the BoN and the other ministries involved in foreign exchange 
policy, but also between the central bank and the authorized foreign 
exchange banks.41 Through this work, the BoN managed to gather more 
precise statistics from the banking sector on the foreign exchange situation. 
The central bank could thereby produce reliable information on the payment 
problems, and at a meeting of the National Budget Committee on August 12, 
1947, governor Jahn presented estimates that, according to his own account, 
came as a shock to the government: 
My exposition hit like a bombshell. They were very surprised even 
though I have said this many times before.42 
At this meeting, Jahn repudiated figures calculated by professor Trygve 
Haavelmo – an influential Frischian economist and later winner of the Nobel 
Prize in economics – who had estimated that the foreign exchange reserves 
would not be exhausted until the end of 1948. Jahn pointed out that 
Haavelmo’s estimates were calculated in Norwegian kroner, and thereby 
disregarded the shortage of specific foreign currencies as a separate problem. 
When this condition was added, estimates calculated by the BoN showed 
that the reserves of US dollars could be exhausted very shortly, at a time 
when foreign loans were extremely hard to obtain. Hence, Jahn concluded, 
Norwegian dollar imports could be cut off sooner rather than later.43 
While the government had earlier ignored the general warnings from the 
central bank, the Ministry of Finance was responsive to hard-core statistics 
and realized that the situation might be more serious than assumed. At a 
meeting at the Prime Minister’s office the following week, Haavelmo had 
replaced his figures with new and more pessimistic estimates, which 
                                                     
41 Interview with Øyvind Furuly, a retired civil servant of the Currency Office, the 
BoN, November 9, 2004.  
42 GJD August 12, 1947. [”Min framstilling kom som en bombe. De ble meget 
overrasket ennu jeg har sagt det mange ganger tidligere.”] It should be pointed out 
that this is Jahn’s own version of events. From a critical point of view, it is therefore 
necessary to point out that Jahn might have exaggerated the weaknesses of 
Haavelmo’s figures and the response of the Committee members, as well as his own 
successful performance. However, it seems clear that compared to earlier trends, 
from this point onwards the government to a much larger extent approved of the 
initiatives from the BoN regarding the foreign exchange policy. Thus, in rough 
terms, there is reason to trust Jahn’s account. 
43 GJD August 12, 1947. 
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confirmed that Norway would have serious foreign exchange problems even 
after considerable cuts in imports. In accordance with his fundamental 
approach to the payment problems, Gunnar Jahn had originally argued that 
import cuts alone would not solve the crisis and that the authorities also had 
to tighten the domestic economic policy. At this meeting, however, the 
governor took a more inviting approach and proposed the appointment of a 
small working committee that could compare the different statistical 
estimates made by the BoN, Haavelmo, and the Ministry of Trade (on the 
shipping incomes) and thereby obtain a more solid basis for further 
initiatives, a suggestion that the Ministry of Finance accepted without 
hesitation.44 
In the following weeks, the government’s understanding of the foreign 
exchange situation went from a general awareness to full alert as Ministry of 
Finance fully realized that Norway faced a severe currency crisis. One day 
after the above meeting, the British authorities suspended the convertibility 
of Sterling into US dollars as a response to the rapidly diminishing British 
foreign reserves, an act that reinforced the currency crisis in other countries 
that had counted on converting their Sterling reserves.45 The suspension of 
the pound had limited consequences for Norway but nevertheless underlined 
the severity of the situation, both internationally and at home. 
On September 15, 1947, the Norwegian government took drastic action to 
curb the growing currency crisis and introduced the rationing of foreign 
exchange. In a public statement, the government declared that that recent 
surveys had revealed a backlog of approximately 1 billion NOK for foreign 
exchange licenses issued but not yet redeemed. Moreover, import prices had 
increased far more than estimated in the national budget, and an execution of 
all issued licenses at new and higher prices would therefore imply a 
considerable additional expenditure on the foreign exchange budget. In order 
to improve the control of limited foreign exchange reserves, the government 
thus suspended prevailing practices that prescribed that the authorities 
should automatically provide foreign exchange for issued import licenses. 
                                                     
44 GJD August 19, 1947. For Jahn’s original proposal to tighten the domestic 
economic policy, see GJD August 12, 1947. 
45 For a comprehensive account of the British currency crisis of 1947, see J. Fforde, 
The Bank of England and Public Policy, 1941-1958, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, pp. 141-164. 
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In the system for rationing foreign exchange, the BoN was assigned a new 
role. The central bank was to give directives to the private banks regarding 
the amount of foreign exchange available for different payment transactions 
at any given time; an arrangement that also implied the possible curtailment 
of already licensed imports. In addition, the BoN was to reregister all 
licenses in order to sum up which ones would actually be redeemed and 
coordinate the new license statistics.46 
Four days after the above declaration, the government followed up with an 
initiative that would prove even more significant to the central bank. It 
appointed a new, permanent advisory council – the Foreign Exchange 
Council [Valutarådet] – to assist the Ministry of Finance in the formulation 
and implementation of the foreign exchange policy. A year and a half earlier, 
the BoN had proposed the establishment of such a council, but had been met 
with a flat refusal. After the currency crisis was a stated fact, however, the 
government not only accepted the idea but also appointed the governor and 
deputy governor of the central bank as chairman and deputy chairman of the 
new Council. In accordance with the original proposal from the BoN to 
involve all ministries concerned, the government also appointed two 
representatives from the Ministry of Finance, two from the Ministry of 
Supply and Reconstruction, and one from the Ministry of Trade. All the 
representatives were high-ranking civil servants, who held key positions in 
their respective Ministries and were deeply involved in the formulation of 
Labor’s economic policy.47 
                                                     
46 Public statement of September 15, 1947, by the Gerhardsen government, in the 
archives of the Ministry of Commerce, Valutaavdelingen, at the National Archives 
of Norway, Oslo [hereafter HD-V], box no. 5, file 1.2 “Valutautvalg. 
Sammensetning og mandate”. 
47 Royal decree of September 19, 1947, regarding the appointment of a foreign 
exchange council, HD-V box no. 5, file 1.2. The original members of the Council 
were, from the BoN: governor Gunnar Jahn (chairman) and director Hugo Heiberg 
Lund (deputy chairman), from the Ministry of Finance: secretary of the State 
Gunnar Bøe and director general [ekspedisjonssjef] Christian Brinch, from the 
Ministry of Supply and Reconstruction: director Gunnar Kjølstad, and, from the 
Ministry of Trade, secretary of the State Arne Drogseth. In addition attended 
initially director Arne Skaug, Jahn’s successor as head of the National Bureau of 
Statistics. Later one representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
included in the Council, initially director general Ræder. 
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There were several reasons why the government was suddenly willing to 
assign such an important position to the BoN in the autumn of 1947. First, 
the payment problems had escalated to a critical level that threatened to halt 
the recovery process. This altered economic situation forced the government 
to reconsider the Bank’s prior warnings regarding inadequacies in the 
foreign exchange policy as well as the role of the Bank in policy 
formulation. Second, since his first failed initiatives to reform the foreign 
exchange policy, Gunnar Jahn had worked consistently and quietly to 
upgrade the competence of the BoN in foreign exchange matters. By the 
autumn of 1947, there was still considerable room for improvement in the 
organization and resource base of the Bank’s Foreign Exchange Division but 
it nevertheless appeared as a more qualified organization that could provide 
the Ministry of Finance with much needed expert advice. Third, from the 
government’s point of view, there was less reason to fear that policy 
initiatives from the Bank merely reflected ambitions of increased 
independence. Since assuming office, Gunnar Jahn had demonstrated that 
diverging opinions did not necessarily equal a lack of loyalty and 
cooperativeness. Jahn had repeatedly declared in public that the BoN would 
no longer have a politically independent position, and he had demonstrated a 
willingness to cooperate and contribute to the recovery process, which 
somewhat increased the trust of many Labor politicians towards the Bank. 
2.4 The foreign exchange policy as a first step to a new role 
The first meeting of the Foreign Exchange Council was held on September 
22, 1947, only three days after it was established. This haste reflected the 
urgency of the currency crisis and the high priority the government at this 
point assigned to the foreign exchange policy. The new council was only one 
element of a more extensive reform that the government carried out during 
the autumn and winter of 1947/48 to improve the control of currency 
transactions as well as the coordination between the foreign exchange policy 
and other policy areas. By participating actively in this reform process, the 
BoN had a fresh opportunity to interact constructively with the political 
authorities and thereby not only contribute to solving one of the most crucial 
policy problems of the recovery period but also build long-term, mutual 
trust. For the Bank, the foreign exchange policy thereby became a first step 
towards finding a new role. 
With its mandate and authority yet to be decided, the Foreign Exchange 
Council immediately took a practical approach to the currency crisis, and 
already at its first meeting, the Council discussed several specific cases 
regarding the appropriation of foreign exchange. This was symptomatic for 
the following weeks and months when the Council spent most of its time 
discussing critical cases and trying to survey the actual state of affairs in the 
foreign exchange policy. However, the mandate and authority of the Council 
Chapter 2 From marginalization to cooperation 
97 
itself also had to be clarified. After a process that culminated with a formal 
set of instructions in November 1947, the BoN ended up in position that, 
judged from postwar experiences up till then, was surprisingly important. 
The instructions of November 1947 assigned special authority to the 
governor of the BoN. As chairman of the Council, the governor was 
responsible for summoning meetings as often as he found it necessary, at 
least twice weekly. He would also preside at meetings and in his absence the 
deputy governor of the BoN would act as stand-in chairman. The Council 
had a quorum of five members and votes were decided by general majority, 
but in cases of tied votes, the vote of the chairman decided the matter.48 
These formal instructions indicated that the governor would have a central 
role in coordinating the foreign exchange policy. Moreover, even more 
significant for the changing role of the BoN was the fact that the 
chairmanship was linked to the secretarial function of the Council. At the 
first meeting, the Council decided that head clerk of the Bank’s Foreign 
Exchange Office would serve as council secretary, an arrangement that 
continued on a permanent basis.49 
The assignment of the post of Council secretary to the BoN was a routine 
decision, but had wide implications for the Bank as an organization. Rather 
than being involved in the formulation and implementation of the foreign 
exchange policy only through the individual engagement of governor Jahn, 
the secretarial function implied that the Bank became integrated also at an 
organizational level. In practice, the civil servants of the BoN would not 
only follow up Council resolutions but also provide underlying records and 
statistics for most of the meetings. Combined with Jahn’s role as Council 
chairman, the secretarial function thereby integrated the BoN into both the 
formulation and implementation of the foreign exchange policy. 
The Foreign Exchange Council implied that the BoN had suddenly achieved 
a key position in Labor’s policy-making, as the government was prepared to 
                                                     
48 “Instruks for Valutarådet”, §§1 and 2, appendix to minute of November, 15, 1947 
from meeting of the Foreign Exchange Council, books of minutes in the BoN 
archives, Oslo [hereafter: BoN-V]. 
49 Minute of September 22, 1947, BoN-V. 
The Foreign Exchange Office [Valutakontoret] was a subdivision of the central 
bank’s Foreign Exchange Division, and the first secretary of the Foreign Exchange 
Council was head clerk Helge Schirmer. 
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include the Council in all crucial parts of the foreign exchange policy. 
According to the instructions of November 1947, the tasks of the Council 
included current surveillance of the balance of payments situation, 
evaluation of the estimates for foreign exchange in the national budgets, 
contributions to Norwegian positions in international and bilateral 
negotiations, the formulation and termination of clearing agreements, and 
generally to “assist the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Supply, and the 
BoN in the implementation of legislation on foreign exchange regulations 
and import/export controls, and serve as a coordinating and advisory agency 
for these ministries in the handling of cases related to foreign exchange, 
supply, and commercial policy”.50 Moreover, the government emphasized 
the undisputed position of the Council as a coordinating agency by closing 
down the Interministerial Currency Council and instead including a new 
member from the Ministry of Foreign affairs in the Foreign Exchange 
Council, which thereby had representatives from all ministries involved in 
foreign exchange matters. Indirectly, this also reflected the upgraded role of 
the central bank as head of the Foreign Exchange Council, since the 
Interministerial Currency Council had been chaired by the Ministry of 
Finance.51 
 
An examination of the minutes of the Council meetings during the first 
postwar decade suggests that its actual performance by large corresponded 
with the original mandate.52 After a running-in stage in the autumn of 1947, 
in which the Council met almost daily to cope with the immediate currency 
crisis, from January 1948 onwards the meetings settled into the twice-weekly 
                                                     
50 “Instruks for Valutarådet”, §6, BoN-V September 15, 1947. 
[Quote: ”…skal ellers bistå Finansdepartementet, Forsyningsdepartementet og 
Norges Bank med gjennomføring av lovgivningen om valutaregulering og innførsel 
og utførsel av varer, og fungere som koordinerende og rådgivende organ for de 
nevnte departementer ved behandlingen av saker som er av valutamessig, 
forsyningsmessig og handelspolitisk karakter.”] 
51 Minutes of September 22 and 25, 1947, BoN-V; letter of September 27, 1947 
from Chr. Brinch to governor Jahn, HD-V box no. 5, file 1.2. In accordance with 
recommendations from the Foreign Exchange Council, the government chose to 
uphold the Shipping Currency Committee as a contact between the authorities and 
the shipowners as well as an advisory agency subordinate to the Foreign Exchange 
Council. See minute of October 8, 1947, BoN-V; Løvold 1988, p. 36. 
52 The following summary is based on a detailed examination of the books of 
minutes from the Foreign Exchange Council during the period 1947-1954, in BoN-
V. 
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routine suggested in the mandate, a frequency that encouraged the creation 
of a dialogue and the exchange of information between the members. The 
BoN presided at all meetings, either in the person of Jahn or deputy governor 
Hugo Heiberg-Lund, and usually the chairman started the meeting by 
quoting the latest statistics from the Bank regarding the foreign exchange 
reserves and balance of payments situation in order to set the stage for the 
succeeding discussions. In addition to information exchange and 
coordination, the Foreign Exchange Council spent most of its time on two 
types of tasks. The first was to specify guidelines for the rationing of foreign 
exchange. Applications for foreign exchange were usually handled by the 
various ministries, but cases of doubt or fundamental difficulty would be 
submitted to the Council for advice, and this advice usually created a 
precedent for similar cases later. The second main task was to handle the 
balance of payments deficit, both in general and on a bilateral basis. Based 
on statistics coordinated by the BoN, the Council surveyed the foreign 
exchange reserves and the implementation of the bilateral clearing 
agreements, and issued warnings when the deficits became intolerable. In 
accordance with its mandate, the Council was also involved in deciding the 
contents of the clearing agreements. 
 
Initially, there were some doubts regarding the status of the Council 
resolutions. The Foreign Exchange Division of the Ministry of Finance 
complained at an early stage that rather than providing advice, the Council 
made final decisions without prior consultations with the Ministry, a course 
that appeared to place the authority of the Council above the political 
authorities.53 The worries of the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance were 
probably fueled by a resolution from the first Council meeting, which 
requested the Ministry of Finance to instruct all ministries involved not to 
give any promise of foreign exchange without prior approval of the Council 
or alternatively the BoN.54 Although this Council resolution appeared more 
as an emergency response to a critical crisis than an inaugural statement, the 
Ministry of Finance nevertheless found it necessary to emphasize to the 
                                                     
53 Undated note, journal no. 3245/47, by TL [Thomas Løvold], “Utkast til instruks 
for Valutarådet. Rådets brev av 20. oktober 1947”, HD-V box 5, file 1.2. 
54 Minute of September 22, 1947, BoN-V. 
Chapter 2 From marginalization to cooperation 
100 
Council that it should conduct its work “in close cooperation with the 
foreign exchange divisions of the BoN and the Ministry of Finance”.55 
In practice, the Foreign Exchange Council fulfilled an important task in the 
new foreign exchange policy by providing precedent interpretations of the 
currency controls and serving as a coordinating arena between the different 
agencies of the foreign exchange policy. In accordance with its mandate, the 
Council also took part in producing estimates for trade and foreign exchange 
in the national budget, and in some cases, it gave direct advice to the 
government, for example in connection with the national debate on whether 
to accept Marshall Aid.56 Despite these important tasks, the authority and 
influence of the Foreign Exchange Council was limited. First, it operated on 
basis of legislation and guidelines laid down by the political authorities, and, 
second, according to the remaining sources, it was hardly involved in more 
comprehensive policy-making processes such as the development of a new 
Foreign Exchange Regulations Act in 1951.57 
It seems that both the BoN and the Council accepted these limitations. There 
are few signs of conflict between the Council and the political authorities or 
internally between the Council members. The Council meetings usually 
ended up with unanimous decisions, and in fact, there is only one single 
example of Jahn using his casting vote as chairman to settle a case. 58 For the 
BoN, the Foreign Exchange Council became an arena for constructive 
interaction with the political authorities. Despite the fact that governor Jahn 
disagreed with the Labor government on the underlying reasons for the 
currency crisis and balance of payments problems, he still considered 
efficient currency controls as a necessary precondition for a successful 
recovery process. Hence, by focusing on practical problem solving, Jahn and 
his officials managed to cooperate smoothly with the various ministries. 
                                                     
55 Letter of November 22, 1947, quoted by Jahn at the meeting of the Foreign 
Exchange Council November 25, 1947, BoN-V. 
56  Minutes of June 8 and 11, 1948, BoN-V. 
57 The only references to this legislative process in the minutes are orientations from 
the Ministry of Commerce to the Council, see April 17 and May 15, 1951, BoN-V.  
58 Minute of October 3, 1950, BoN-V. 
The case in question concerned the import budget for 1951, where Jahn and deputy 
chairman Heiberg-Lund supported a proposal from the Ministry of Commerce to 
reduce the import volume to 3450 million NOK, while the remaining members 
wished to keep the volume at the 1950 level of 3660 million NOK. 
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Also at a personal level the contact between the Bank and the political 
authorities improved after the currency crisis, particularly between governor 
Jahn and finance minister Erik Brofoss. Throughout 1946 and early 1947, 
Jahn had repeatedly complained that Brofoss was “completely autocratic” 
and did not consult anyone, least of all the central bank.59 Moreover, as we 
have seen, Brofoss did not speak directly to Jahn between April and August 
1946, a clear indication that the finance minister had little interest in the 
Bank and its governor. After the currency crisis, however, things slowly 
changed for the better. Brofoss became more attentive and established 
regular meetings with Jahn, normally on a weekly basis. Here, they 
discussed not only matters related to foreign exchange but also to economic 
policy in general, and even though Jahn obviously often disagreed with 
Labor’s policy solutions, Brofoss maintained this routine.60 
The reinforced position of the BoN in the foreign exchange policy also 
implied closer relations with the private banks. While the high liquidity in 
the domestic economy had caused much of the traditional contact between 
the central bank and the banking sector to deteriorate after the war, since 
banks could finance their operations without borrowing from the central 
bank, through the new foreign exchange policy the BoN could reestablish 
some of these relations. In the aftermath of the currency crisis, the central 
bank’s Foreign Exchange Division was in daily contact with the authorized 
foreign exchange banks to gather statistics as well as implement currency 
controls. Already before the currency crisis was an acknowledged fact, 
Gunnar Jahn had used personal meetings with directors of the foreign 
exchange banks to plead with them to restrict their allocation of foreign 
exchange,61 and once rationing was formally introduced, this cooperative 
approach continued. In retrospect, a former civil servant of the BoN 
characterized this as a system where the authorized foreign exchange banks 
served as the extended arm of the authorities towards the public, while the 
BoN served as intermediate between the political authorities and banks and 
business life.62 The BoN thereby continued the elements of moral suasion 
that had been introduced into the foreign exchange policy in the 1930s, and 
                                                     
59 GJD December 3, 1947. See also August 14-17, 1946, and January 30, 1947. 
60 Gunnar Jahn refers systematically to these meetings in his diaries.  
61 GJD August 21, 1947. 
62 Interview with Øyvind Furuly, a retired civil servant of the Foreign Exchange 
Office, the BoN, November 9, 2004. 
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thereby gained useful experience that could later be applied also in the 
domestic credit policy.63  
Despite improved contact with both the political authorities and the private 
banks, the BoN still operated on the outskirts of the policy-making process. 
A symptomatic illustration of this is the fact that the most visible 
organizational element of the foreign exchange reforms – namely the 
establishment of a new Ministry of Commerce headed by Erik Brofoss – 
became known to governor Jahn only through the press. The Ministry of 
Commerce was established as a direct response to the currency crisis, and 
represented an attempt by Brofoss to develop further the coordination of the 
foreign exchange policy that had started with the establishment of the 
Foreign Exchange Council. The new Ministry was constructed by merging 
several government agencies that were already in regular contact through the 
Foreign Exchange Council, namely the Department of Trade Policy from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate of Export and Import Controls 
from the Ministry of Ministry of Supply and Reconstruction, and the Foreign 
Exchange Division from the Ministry of Finance. In addition, in an attempt 
to improve the coordination between the foreign exchange policy and the 
general economic policy, Brofoss also transferred the Ministry of Finance’s 
Monetary Policy Office [Pengepolitisk kontor], which was in charge 
developing the national budgets, to the new Ministry, where it was renamed 
the Office for National Budgets [Kontoret for nasjonalbudsjettet].64 
The new Ministry of Commerce was a logical continuation of the centralized 
coordination and administrative controls long advocated by Frischian 
economists and Labor politicians. From Jahn’s point of view, however, this 
reorganization reflected the worst aspects of Labor’s post-WWII regime, 
both from a democratic and economic and political perspective. In his 
diaries, Jahn characterized the new Ministry as a “Wirtschaftsdepartement”, 
designed after an idea from Hitler’s Nazi regime and disconnected from 
democratic standards. Jahn was also critical of this new Ministry from a 
professional point of view, since he fundamentally believed that the key to 
solving the foreign exchange problems was to improve the imbalances in the 
domestic economy, a problem that could be solved only from the Ministry of 
                                                     
63 See chapters 4 and 5. 
64 GJD October 30, 1947; Parliamentary document St. prp. no. 164 (1947) “Om 
opprettelse av et nytt departement – Handelsdepartementet”. See also Lie 1995, pp. 
102-107. 
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Finance, which was in charge of the fiscal and monetary policies. Jahn thus 
tried to convince Brofoss to continue as finance minister.65  Brofoss, on the 
other hand, believed that the foreign exchange problems could be solved 
through increased coordination and control, and on December 6, 1947, he 
assumed the post of Minister of Commerce, while his party colleague Olav 
Meisdalshagen became the new finance minister. In the following chapter 3, 
we will see that for the BoN, this new constellation would offer both 
fundamental challenges and new possibilities. 
2.5 Summary: towards renewed participation 
In this chapter, we have seen that throughout the first half of the recovery 
period, the BoN took its first steps towards finding a new role in Labor’s 
economic policy. In accordance with conventional views, the Bank was 
completely marginalized in domestic economic policy. Due to the high 
liquidity, extensive direct regulations and political ambitions of pursuing a 
cheap money policy, the Bank could not carry out an orthodox monetary 
policy based on a flexible discount rate, and it also failed to adapt to the new 
surroundings and participate in maintaining the direct regulations of prices 
and allocation of goods or in the development of the key instrument for 
centralized planning, the national budget. In the foreign exchange policy, on 
the other hand, governor Jahn and his officials managed to gain renewed 
influence after external events turned the attention of the government 
towards the expertise and experience of the Bank. 
In the process of developing a new role for the BoN in the post-WWII 
economic policy, the currency crisis of 1947 appears as a turning point. 
Before this crisis, the government rejected most policy initiatives from the 
Bank, not only in domestic economic policy, where governor Jahn and his 
officials advocated a comprehensive monetary reorganization followed by 
deregulations, but also in the foreign exchange policy, where the Bank in 
vain tried to warn the political authorities about the failures of coordination 
and control. The proposals for domestic economic policy completely 
contradicted Labor’s strategies of economic planning and market controls 
and their rejection is therefore not surprising. The initiatives in the foreign 
exchange policy, on the other hand, were directed towards improving the 
regulatory regime and thus presumably of interest to the government. 
However, Erik Brofoss and the Ministry of Finance chose to ignore the core 
advice of these latter proposals, namely that a crisis could occur unless the 
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administration and coordination of the currency controls were reformed, and 
instead interpreted them as attempts to strengthen the position of the Bank. 
In a situation where the future role of the Bank was still unsettled and the 
Ministry of Finance strived to obtain an overarching responsibility for 
economic policy, initiatives to assign a coordinating responsibility to the 
BoN could not be accepted. The Ministry of Finance thereby failed to 
recognize the economic and political message from the Bank. 
Once the extent of the currency crisis was acknowledged, however, the 
attitude towards governor Jahn and his officials changed. Increasingly, 
Brofoss seemed to accept the Bank as an expert organization in this matter, 
and assigned important tasks in the reformed foreign exchange policy to the 
BoN, most importantly, the position as head and secretariat of the new 
coordinating Foreign Exchange Council. The BoN managed to obtain this 
position in the foreign exchange policy, but failed to participate in the 
domestic policy. This was probably caused by a combination of individual 
strategy and appearance, on the one hand, and historical and institutional 
guidance on the other. Most scholars have emphasized the former aspect and 
explained the marginalization of the BoN in the domestic economic policy 
by referring to governor Jahn’s opposition to Labor’s economic policy. 
Continuing this perspective, the more influential position in the foreign 
exchange policy can be understood by the fact that Jahn here took a more 
conciliatory approach by acknowledging and promoting the need for 
improved controls and coordination in the short run, even though he was 
fundamentally critical of long-term regulations also in this policy area. 
However, just as important as this individual focus is an historical and 
institutional explanation that emphasizes the long traditions of the Bank in 
foreign exchange matters, and the lack of such in a domestic policy based on 
direct regulations. Since the stabilization of the exchange rate during the 
gold standard period, through the foreign exchange rationing and clearing 
agreements of the 1930s and the regulation of foreign exchange during 
World War II, the BoN had played a key role in the formulation and 
implementation of the foreign exchange policy. Hence, once the currency 
crisis of 1947 made the government realize that this policy area was out of 
control, the Bank appeared as an organization with both traditions and 
expertise, a status that gave it the legitimacy necessary for it to be granted 
increased authority. 
The new position in the foreign exchange policy implied that the BoN 
improved its relations both with the political authorities and the banking 
sector. Through the Foreign Exchange Council, governor Jahn and his 
officials had current interaction with senior civil servants from the Ministry 
of Finance and other parts of the Central Administration. Through these 
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working relations, the BoN once again could take part in policy formulation 
and implementation and could strengthen its reputation as an expert 
organization. Furthermore, the Bank’s links with the government also 
improved, as the personal contact between Gunnar Jahn and Erik Brofoss 
went from non-existent to regular interaction, when the finance minister 
established weekly meetings with the governor. At this time, these relations 
were rather limited, and Jahn certainly did not belong to Brofoss’ inner circle 
of advisors and confidants. Nevertheless, the Bank was out of the political 
backwater, and its improved relations with the political authorities 
contributed to renewed legitimacy and trust. 
Through the foreign exchange policy, the BoN also enhanced its relations 
with important parts of the banking sector. A traditional basis for such 
contacts, based on the banks’ demand for loans from the BoN, had been 
undermined by the high liquidity after the war, since the banks could fund 
their activities through deposits. However, the reformed system for the 
rationing of foreign exchange implied frequent contact with the authorized 
joint-stock banks to gather statistics and implement currency controls, just as 
had been the case during similar regulatory conditions in the 1930s.66 The 
BoN interacted with the banking sector at a senior level, through meetings 
between governor Jahn and leading bankers, and as part of the daily conduct, 
through interaction between the BoN bureaucracy and lower-level staff from 
the banks. Hence, the key position of the BoN in the foreign exchange policy 
also helped to reestablish an intimate contact with the authorized foreign 
exchange banks, which represented an important part of the banking sector. 
According to one former civil servant, the role of the BoN in this system of 
foreign exchange regulations was to serve as an intermediary between the 
political authorities, the banks and private business life. This brings us back 
to the theoretical perspective of boundary organizations. Chapter 1 
demonstrated that before World War II, the BoN did achieve a boundary 
position between the political authorities and the banking sector, which 
needed the expertise and resources of the Bank. After World War II, this 
position was lost. While the political authorities earlier had earlier depended 
completely on the BoN for the formulation and implementation of monetary 
policy, Labor’s new approach to policy-making after World War II initially 
rendered the Bank superfluous in the domestic regulatory regime. Once the 
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surplus liquidity also eliminated the banking sector’s need for its resources, 
the BoN ended up in limbo. 
After the currency crisis of 1947, the Bank regained some of its former 
boundary position, since the political authorities once more needed its 
expertise and experience in foreign exchange policy and the banking sector 
accepted the BoN as a connecting link to the political authorities. However, 
the BoN could still operate in only one of the two dimensions in the theory 
on boundary organizations, the one between public and private sectors, while 
it was prevented from balancing the second dimension, between 
international and domestic concerns, as long as it played no part in domestic 
economic policy. The question now was to what extent governor Jahn and 
his officials could manage to get access also to this latter policy area. 
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3 Downgrading vs. participation (1948-1950) 
 
The currency crisis of 1947 triggered renewed demand for the expertise of 
the BoN in the foreign exchange policy, and chapter 2 demonstrated how 
participating in solving these problems helped to reintegrate the central bank 
into policy formulation and implementation. However, the tasks, authority 
and autonomy of the central bank were by no means settled. During the 
second half of the recovery period, which will be covered in this chapter, 
governor Jahn and his staff faced a new political constellation in which Olav 
Meisdalshagen replaced Erik Brofoss as finance minister. Would the 
budding working relationship between governor Jahn and Brofoss continue 
to evolve when the latter moved to the Ministry of Commerce, and how 
would the new finance minister relate to the central bank? By taking a closer 
look at the political context in which the BoN operated, this chapter will 
discuss how different considerations and strategies within the ruling Labor 
party as well as within the political opposition influenced the further 
development of the central bank. 
The basis of this political analysis will be the initiatives to nationalize the 
BoN in the late 1940s, a nationalization process that also brings focus to 
other factors that possibly affected the changing role of the central bank, 
such as ownership and governance structure. Did a change of ownership 
have any practical consequences for the central bank? And what was the role 
of the governing bodies? We have seen that the governor of the BoN 
traditionally held a prominent position in the conduct of the Bank, but to 
what extent did the Board of Governors and the Supervisory Council also 
influence the process of finding a new role? An additional dimension in 
explaining this process is the international context, and earlier we have seen 
that the currency crisis and the anticipated Marshall Aid program helped to 
integrate the central bank into policy formulation and implementation. Did 
this tendency continue? How did the international context influence the 
Norwegian development, and how did the BoN relate to its international 
setting? 
This chapter will discuss the above questions in seven sections, where the 
first four relate to the process of nationalizing the BoN. Section 3.1 analyzes 
two initial proposals from the government to acquire ownership of the 
central bank and debates how the foreign exchange policy again influenced 
the domestic state of affairs, while section 3.2 discusses a third and final 
initiative for nationalization, which took this matter into the realm of high 
politics. Section 3.3 takes a closer look at the political confrontations over 
the proposed nationalization, which concerned not only the ownership and 
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authority of the central bank but also the constitutional division of power 
between the government and the Storting. Section 3.4 discusses the role of 
the governing bodies of the BoN, both internally towards governor Jahn and 
externally towards the political authorities. Section 3.5 focuses on the 
occupational account and asks to what extent settling this legacy from the 
war could provide a key to a new role for the central bank. Section 3.6 
analyzes the role of the BoN in a new dramatic turn of events in foreign 
exchange policy, concerning a possible devaluation, and emphasizes the 
function of the central bank’s international and domestic networks. The 
concluding section 3.7 summarizes the main development in the role of the 
Bank during the second half of the recovery period. 
3.1 Foreign exchange problems postpone nationalization 
Throughout the long history of the BoN, private ownership had been a basic 
element, first as a precondition for its establishment and later as a direct link 
between the central bank and the general public. Stocks in the central bank 
appeared as a low-risk investment, and by 1945, the State still controlled 
only 17 per cent of the 35 million NOK capital stock of the BoN, while 
commercial and savings banks owned 31 per cent, insurance companies 9 
per cent, and other private owners controlled 42 per cent (of which only 1 
per cent was in foreign hands).1 In Norway, the private owners never had 
any operational influence over the central bank and instead confined 
themselves to collecting an annual dividend. Nevertheless, in the new setting 
of increased political planning and control, private ownership of the central 
bank appeared as an anomaly associated with earlier, liberalist times. This 
had been acknowledged in several other countries, and since the 1930s, the 
nationalization of central banks appeared as an international trend. By the 
end of the recovery period, the authorities in countries like Denmark (1936), 
Italy (1936), Canada (1938), France (1945), Great Britain (1946), India 
                                                     
1 Parliamentary document Ot. prp. no. 65 (1949) “1. Lov om statens overtakelse av 
aksjene i Norges Bank. 2: Lov om endring i lov om Norges Bank av 23. april 1892”, 
p. 1. The stocks controlled by the State were split between direct ownership (4.2 
million NOK) and indirect control through public funds (1.8 million NOK). 
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(1948) and the Netherlands (1948) had acquired ownership of their central 
banks.2 
Hence, after World War II, based on this international trend as well as on 
domestic concerns, the nationalization of the BoN appeared imminent. 
However, in Norway, the nationalization process became less 
straightforward than one might expect given the passivity of the private 
owners combined with the high ambitions and parliamentary majority of the 
Labor party. Instead of being carried out swiftly and uncontroversially, as a 
mere confirmation of existing practices, the nationalization process was 
drawn out and triggered conflicts not only between the political parties but 
also between different wings of the Labor party. These controversies 
reflected underlying disagreements regarding priorities in economic policy 
as well as the autonomy and authority of the BoN. 
From Labor’s point of view, redemption of the privately owned stocks in the 
BoN was an obvious follow-up to the ambition to increase political control 
over the central bank. The fact that the State owned less than a fifth of the 
stocks was a reminder, at least in symbolic terms, of previous central bank 
independence. Hence, immediately after winning the election in 1945, the 
new Labor government started preparing for the acquisition of the privately 
owned stocks. During the following years, the government three times 
presented proposals to nationalize the BoN, first in the spring of 1947, then 
in 1948, and finally in the 1949. These three proposals reflected an ongoing 
tension in Labor’s policy-making during the recovery period between 
ideological considerations and practical problem solving. 
Compared to the scale and scope of the 1949 initiative, the first two 
proposals for nationalization were relatively uncontroversial. The 
government aimed at a ‘soft’ form of nationalization, by acquiring 
ownership of the central bank without letting the prior stockholders suffer 
any financial loss, a strategy that agreed with the general approach of the 
Labor government to state ownership. While countries like Great Britain and 
France nationalized already established, privately owned companies and 
                                                     
2 B. H. Beckhart, Banking Systems, New York: Columbia University Press, 1954; S. 
Arntzen, Norges Banks rettslige stilling i forhold til regjering og Storting, Oslo: Den 
Norske Bankforening and Forsikringsbankenes Felleskontor, 1958; J. B. Goodman, 
Monetary Sovereignty. The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1992; Fforde 1992, chapter 1.  
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industries after World War II, the main trend in Norway was to maintain 
existing ownership structures and instead establish new state-owned 
companies in key industries to compensate for the lack of private initiatives.3 
Immediately after the war, some fractions of the Labor Party still wanted a 
more active, intervening socialization policy, but in practice the government 
was careful to challenge private ownership through direct acquisition. The 
initiative to nationalize the central bank followed this moderate path, and the 
government was prepared to offer the private owners “a completely fair 
settlement” guaranteeing full compensation for the value of their stocks.4 
The nationalization proposals of 1947 and 1948 were never presented 
publicly. After being subject to internal debate in the Central Administration, 
they were postponed, in accordance with the advice of the BoN. The central 
bank argued strongly in favor of postponement, not because it rejected 
nationalization in itself, but because it believed the timing of these initiatives 
could cause serious damage to the reconstruction process. Commenting on 
the first proposal from the Ministry of Finance in May 1947, the central 
bank’s Board of Directors underlined that nationalization would not imply 
any changes in the de facto position or constitution of the central bank since 
the BoN as an independent, private organization had already been abolished 
and the control had been transferred to the State by the Storting. Thus, in 
reality, a shift would be a matter of form rather than substance. 
                                                     
3 Regarding Labor’s underlying motives and strategies towards state ownership, see 
the debate between T. Grønlie, Statsdrift. Staten som industrieier i Norge 1945-63, 
[Oslo]: Tano, 1989; E. Lange, “Førsteopponentinnlegg til Tore Grønlies 
‘Statsdrift’”, Historisk Tidsskrift, no. 3, 1991, pp. 406-422; S. A. Christensen, 
“Statlig eierskap og nasjonal kontroll”, in S. A. Christensen, H. Espeli, E. Larsen 
and K. Sogner, Kapitalistisk demokrati? Norsk nærlingslivshistorie gjennom 100 år, 
Oslo: Fagbokforlaget, 2003. 
4 Letter of February 25, 1947, from the Legal Division [Lovavdelingen] of the 
Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Finance (quote); letter of April 8, 1948, from 
the BoN’s Board of Directors to the Ministry of Finance; letter of March 13, 1948, 
from the Legal Division in the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Finance, all: 
archives of the Ministry of Finance, Finanskontoret C, at the National Archives of 
Norway, Oslo [hereafter: FIN-fin], box 449, file: “Statens overtakelse av aksjene i 
Norges Bank 1947-1949”.  
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Symbolically, however, a formal nationalization might have considerable 
negative effects – for the legitimacy of the central bank as well as for the 
Norwegian economy. According to the Board, “not insignificant circles” at 
home and abroad might perceive the nationalization of the BoN as a change 
of fact, a perception that could contribute to a growing lack of confidence in 
the Norwegian krone. Moreover, the redemption of the stocks could have 
unfortunate consequences for the domestic economy by increasing the 
amount of money available and thereby further fuel inflation. The Board 
therefore recommended that the matter of nationalization should be 
postponed until the authorities had conquered inflation, an advice that the 
government accepted.5 
In the spring of 1948, when the currency crisis was a stated fact, the BoN 
used similar arguments to postpone the nationalization, but this time 
emphasized also the potential negative effects on Norway’s international 
creditworthiness. There were internal disagreements in the central bank’s 
governing bodies regarding this advice, as we will discuss more thoroughly 
in section 3.4 below, but a majority of the Board of Directors, which 
included governor Jahn, once again advocated in favor of deferring 
nationalization. The Board majority argued that in their experience, “from all 
the times we have been in contact with foreign circles”, that nationalization 
would damage Norway’s access to foreign credit. According to the majority 
resolution, the matter of nationalization, along with the still unsolved 
problem of the occupational account (which will be discussed in section 3.5), 
played a major part in the discussions abroad regarding Norway’s economic 
position and creditworthiness. Hence, the BoN strongly advised the 
government against redeeming the privately owned stocks in the present 
situation.6 
                                                     
5 Recommendation of May 5, 1947, from the BoN’s Board of Directors to the 
Supervisory Council, quoted in Ot.prp. no. 65 (1949), p. 1. 
Normally, the Board of Directors discussed matters concerning the management and 
conduct of the Bank at their daily board meetings from which formal minutes are 
preserved. The minutes from the spring of 1947, however, do not report any 
discussions regarding nationalization. Hence, it seems that initially this matter was 
handled off the record in the central bank. See the Bank of Norway Archives, 
Direksjonen I at the National Archives of Norway, Oslo [hereafter: BoN-DirI], book 
of minutes A0074. 
6 Letter of April 8, 1948, the BoN’s Board of Directors to the Ministry of Finance, 
FIN-fin, box 449, file: “Statens overtakelse…”. 
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At the time of this second nationalization initiative, the BoN played an active 
role in the foreign exchange policy. Even though the currency crisis had 
become somewhat less acute, there was still a critical shortage of US dollars. 
Hence, the BoN and the Ministry of Commerce shared a common concern 
over the foreign exchange situation, and governor Jahn and his staff searched 
for ways to ease the balance of payments problems. As chairman of the 
Foreign Exchange Council, Jahn encouraged the government to draw on 
Norway’s credit rights in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and this 
was accepted as a short-term strategy. Thus, during the spring of 1948, Jahn 
negotiated on behalf of the government with the IMF and the World Bank in 
Washington on these matters. The BoN also contributed to ongoing talks 
regarding financial support through the Marshall Plan.7 
Eventually these efforts bore fruit as Norway did obtain two loans from the 
IMF and, more importantly, later received sufficient Marshall Aid to solve 
the dollar problems.8 At the time of the second nationalization proposal, 
however, the Norwegian authorities were not aware of the scope and nature 
of the Marshall Plan or to what extent this program would limit the 
possibilities of obtaining loans through the IMF and the World Bank. The 
redemption of the privately owned stocks in the BoN would very likely be 
perceived as controversial by these two organizations as well as by the US 
authorities. Hence, the government accepted the arguments of the Ministry 
                                                     
7 See minutes from the meetings of the Foreign Exchange Council on January 3, 
April 6, May 14, June 11, 1948, HD-V; letter of May 1, 1948, from Gunnar Jahn to 
Erik Brofoss, the Brofoss Archive at the Labor Movement Archives and Library, 
Oslo [hereafter: EB], series Dc, box 41, file 11; note of January 31, 1949, the 
archives of the International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. [hereafter: IMF] 
C/Norway/320 Economic Conditions 1948-49; GJD September 6, 1948. 
8 During the period 1947-1970, Norway borrowed only twice from the IMF. In 
1948, Norway drew US$5 million from the country’s quota, and in 1949, it was 
granted an exceptional, additional drawing of BF 200,000, or US$4.6 million, in 
order to solve an acute payment problem with Belgium. See the IMF’s annual 
reports 1947-1970, in particular: the International Monetary Fund, Annual Report 
1948. Washington D.C.: The International Monetary Fund, 1948; The International 
Monetary Fund, Annual Report 1949. Washington D.C.: The International Monetary 
Fund, 1949. 
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of Commerce and the BoN and once more postponed the nationalization 
process.9 
The third proposal to nationalize the BoN was launched in the spring of 
1949, when both the foreign exchange problems and the monetary 
imbalances in the domestic economy had eased. This time, however, the 
Ministry of Finance added a new item to the proposal, concerning the 
traditionally close ties between the central bank and the Storting, which 
changed the issue of nationalization from being a mere formality into a 
highly controversial matter both in the general political debate and in the 
process of developing a new role for the central bank. 
3.2 Meisdalshagen initiates increased governmental control 
The third proposal to nationalize the BoN was prepared by the new finance 
minister Olav Meisdalshagen. Governor Jahn had initially met the 
appointment of Meisdalshagen with an air of expectation. Meisdalshagen 
was an experienced politician who had studied law, but had no formal 
education in economics. Hence, from a professional point of view and 
compared to Erik Brofoss, he was ill-prepared for the post as finance 
minister, which probably is why Meisdalshagen himself was both reluctant 
and worried about accepting his new post.10 To Jahn, however, this did not 
necessarily represent a disadvantage. Quite the contrary, in his diary Jahn 
argued that it was “of importance to have a man of common sense in the 
Ministry of Finance”, even though the new finance minister was “fairly 
illiterate in this field”.11 This suggests that Jahn believed that Meisdalshagen 
would be more amendable to his advice than the Frischian economist Erik 
Brofoss, who had plenty of both theoretical and practical confidence and was 
difficult to influence. Even when Jahn observed that Meisdalshagen 
continued to pursue the policy of low interest rates, he believed that this 
                                                     
9 For an illustration of how the authorities regarded the uncertain foreign exchange 
situation and their efforts to obtain foreign loans during the spring and summer of 
1948, see minutes from the Foreign Exchange Council in 1948: January 3, February 
10 and 24, March 12 and 19, April 5 and 23, May 14, and June 8, all HD-V minute 
books 1/3-28/5-1948 and 1/6-28/12-1948. 
10 See N. O. Berheim, Olav Meisdalshagen, Oslo: Tiden, 1982, pp. 110-112. 
11 GJD January 26, 1948. [Quote: ”Det er av betydning å få en mann med common 
sense i Finansdepartementet, selv om han er en nokså stor analfabet når det gjelder 
disse tingene.”] 
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would change once the new finance minister became “more steady in the 
saddle”.12 
The nationalization issue made Jahn realize that his assumptions had been 
wrong. As it turned out, Meisdalshagen was actually harder to convince than 
Brofoss. Rather than contributing to a fruitful dialogue based on ‘common 
sense’, Meisdalshagen’s non-economic background in fact complicated the 
development of a common understanding with Jahn regarding the main 
economic challenges of the recovery period. After a few months, Jahn had 
lost his initial optimism and instead expressed frustration over 
Meisdalshagen’s lack of competence. Jahn claimed Meisdalshagen’s only 
concern was domestic politics and votes, and he paid no interest to Jahn’s 
arguments either regarding the cheap money policy or regarding the negative 
effects of a nationalization on the availability of credit from the USA. 
Instead, the finance minister worried that borrowing abroad would make 
Norway seem dependent on the USA and other foreign countries.13 
In a situation with a dollar shortage and general balance of payments 
problems, Meisdalshagen’s skepticism towards foreign loans reveals a 
fundamentally different approach to economic policy than his party 
colleague Brofoss, a difference that also reflected underlying conflicts within 
the Labor Party. Based on economic theory considerations as well as recent 
experiences with the currency crisis, Brofoss saw access to foreign capital as 
a crucial element in the reconstruction and modernization of the Norwegian 
economy. Meisdalshagen, on the other hand, based his views more on 
ideological and domestic political concerns and emphasized in particular 
regional and agricultural interests. Growing up on a small farm in the rural 
areas of Eastern Norway, Meisdalshagen had long-standing ties to the 
organization of petty farmers [Småbrukarlaget], and represented a line 
within Labor opposed to the industrialization strategy advocated by Brofoss, 
who promoted agricultural reorganization, large-scale industry and export-
led growth. From Meisdalshagen’s point of view, most of the domestic 
small-scale agricultural sector and regional settlement pattern had to be 
preserved, and the Norwegian economy should be modernized in a less 
radical fashion. Access to foreign loans thereby appeared as less of a 
necessity and more of a threat to national sovereignty. This skepticism about 
foreign capital also reflected a more general concern that led Meisdalshagen 
                                                     
12 GJD February 19, 1948. 
13 GJD April 7, 1948. 
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to become a pronounced opponent of Norwegian membership of the defense 
alliance NATO.14 
According to Meisdalshagen, increased political control of the BoN was not 
only a pragmatic policy instrument but also an act of great ideological and 
symbolic value. With his rural background, Meisdalshagen had experienced 
first-hand the debt crisis in the agricultural sector and probably shared the 
widespread assumption that there were close links between the crisis and the 
par policy conducted by the independent central bank. Hence, the 
nationalization of the BoN would at least symbolically improve the political 
control and should thus be carried out as soon as possible. In 1948, the 
severity of the foreign exchange problems and the ongoing negotiations with 
the IMF and the Marshall Aid program made Meisdalshagen back down, but 
only a few months later, in the spring of 1949, the Ministry of Finance 
brought the matter back onto the agenda. This time, to Jahn’s great surprise 
and dismay, Meisdalshagen added a second proposal to the parliamentary 
bill, an addition that prepared for further governmental control over the 
central bank. 
This third proposal to nationalize the BoN was presented publicly as a bill 
before the Storting. The bill contained two parts. One concerned the 
redemption of privately owned stocks and was mainly a copy of the 
government’s previous proposals to buy the stocks at 180 per cent of face 
value, which was slightly above the estimated market value. The second part 
was a brand new proposal to change the formal reporting line between the 
BoN and the political authorities. According to section 36 in the Central 
Bank Act of 1892, the BoN was to submit an annual report and accounts to 
the Storting. This was part of a long-standing tradition that established the 
central bank as the bank of the national assembly.15 In the new parliamentary 
bill, the government proposed to break this traditional link and instead 
instruct the central bank to send its reports directly to the Ministry of 
Finance, which then would forward them to the Storting after having added 
comments and evaluations from the government.16 
                                                     
14 E. Lange, Samling om felles mål. 1935-1970, Aschehoug’s History of Norway, 
vol. 11, Oslo: Aschehoug, 1998, pp. 150-152, 154-159. 
15 See chapter 1.2. 
16 Ot. prp. no. 65 (1949). 
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This additional proposal came as a big surprise to governor Jahn. While he 
had previously regarded the nationalization of the central bank as a 
formality, he interpreted this new proposal as an attack not only on the 
authority of the BoN, but also on its organizational autonomy: 
I understand very well what the background is. The background is 
that the government wants to turn the Bank of Norway into a 
directorate under the Ministry of Finance.17 
To governor Jahn, Meisdalshagen’s proposal to change the reporting line of 
the central bank thereby appeared as a variant of Frisch’s old idea to turn the 
central bank into a cashier’s office in the Ministry of Finance.18 Moreover, in 
the preparations of this new bill, Meisdalshagen had demonstrated a renewed 
disregard for the opinions of the central bank. While the matter of 
nationalization had previously been the subject of several rounds of 
comments from the BoN, Meisdalshagen neglected to inform Jahn about the 
new addition until only one day before the government presented the bill to 
the Storting. The new reporting line was a last-minute addition that was first 
discussed in the Ministry of Finance in early March 1949.19 However, by the 
time governor Jahn was informed, the Ministry had been working on the new 
proposal for weeks and the central bank could thereby have been informed 
had the finance minister wanted to do so. Instead, as in the case of the 
establishment of the Ministry of Commerce in 1947, the BoN was kept 
totally in the dark, but this time the disregard appeared even worse since the 
initiative concerned the central bank directly. 
The Ministry of Finance not only neglected to involve the BoN in the 
preparation of the new proposal. Ignoring normal procedures, Meisdalshagen 
also intended to prevent the central bank from commenting on the proposal 
                                                     
17 GJD March 30, 1949. [Quote: ”Jeg forstår godt hva som er bakgrunnen. 
Bakgrunnen er den at Regjeringen ønsker å gjøre Norges Bank til et direktorat 
under Finansdepartementet.”] 
18 See chapter 1.4. 
19 In the archives of the Ministry of Finance, the proposal to change the reporting 
line is first mentioned in a PM of March 3, 1949, handwritten by G.F. Nissen, while 
there is no mention of this in a draft for the redemption of the privately owned 
stocks dated February 17, 1949. Both: FIN-fin box 449, file “Statens overtakelse…”. 
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altogether.20 Governor Jahn, however, was not willing to accept such 
disregard. After hearing of the new proposal, he insisted that it was formally 
submitted to the BoN for comments, and two days after presenting the 
parliamentary bill, the Ministry of Finance complied with this demand and 
submitted the bill to the BoN for comments.21 
When the central bank’s Board of Directors discussed Meisdalshagen’s new 
initiative, the only Board member to support the parliamentary bill was 
Labor’s representative Alfred Madsen, who agreed to an immediate 
nationalization and also supported the proposed change to the reporting line 
of the central bank. The remaining four Board members advised against both 
parts of the bill. Despite the eased economic situation, they continued to 
argue that the timing of the nationalization was wrong and recommended 
further postponement. When it came to changing the reporting line, they had 
more fundamental objections. The majority of the Board found that this new 
addition not only involved far-reaching constitutional matters, which 
concerned primarily the authority of the Storting, but that it also could have 
serious consequences for the standing of the central bank. Following the 
earlier advocacy of Jahn, the Board majority emphasized that a central bank 
should be submissive and loyal to directions from the political authorities, 
but this did not imply that it should surrender as an autonomous 
organization: 
The Bank of Norway has always been, and will always be, 
conducting a monetary policy in accordance with guidelines drawn 
up by the Storting and the Government, but the Bank of Norway 
cannot be regarded as a monetary policy office belonging to a 
particular ministry.22 
                                                     
20 Jahn claims this in his diary (GJD March 30, 1949), and Meisdalshagen seems to 
confirm this in a letter of April 2, 1949, to the BoN’s Board of Directors, see FIN-
fin, box 449, file “Statens overtakelse…”. 
21 Letter of April 2, 1949, from finance minister Meisdalshagen to the BoN’s Board 
of Directors, FIN-fin, box 449, file “Statens overtakelse…”. 
22 Letter of April 12, 1949 from the BoN’s Board of Directors to the Supervisory 
Council, FIN-fin, box 449, file: “Statens overtakelse…”. [Quote: ”Norges Bank har 
alltid fort og vil alltid måtte føre en pengepolitikk som er i samsvar med de linjer 
som blir trukket opp av Storting og Regjering, men Norges Bank kan ikke betraktes 
som et pengepolitisk kontor under et bestemt departement.”] 
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The Board thereby drew a direct parallel with Frisch’s earlier idea and 
argued that such an organizational submission could be the unfortunate 
outcome if the BoN reported to the Ministry of Finance rather than to the 
Storting.  
The Supervisory Council, which was the superior governing body of the 
central bank, also evaluated Meisdalshagen’s new parliamentary bill, after 
being summoned for an extraordinary meeting by governor Jahn. Like the 
Board of Governors, the Supervisory Council delivered a split resolution, as 
will be discussed more thoroughly below, but a narrow majority supported 
Jahn and the majority of the Board of Governors in their rejection of the bill. 
The Council majority elaborated on why the proposal to change the reporting 
line of the central bank should be turned down by arguing that the BoN in 
“all of its organizational structure” was the bank of the national assembly. 
According to section 32 in the Central Bank Act of 1892 (‘the 
disqualification section’), a member of the government could not serve as a 
representative, director or manager in the central bank, a disqualification that 
entailed that the BoN belonged to the State’s legislative and budgetary 
powers, not to the executive government. Like the Board of Directors, the 
Council majority repeated that this did not imply any kind of antagonism 
between the central bank and the government. Nevertheless, they argued, 
“during today’s complex economic circumstances, it is of importance to 
have an autonomous institution, whose purpose is to constitute a well-
organized monetary system, and which represents the necessary expert 
knowledge”.23 
From the central bank’s point of view, the new parliamentary bill on 
nationalization and changing the reporting line represented a fundamental 
challenge to its organizational autonomy and general authority. Moreover, 
governor Jahn seemed genuinely concerned that these proposals could harm 
the recovery process by aggravating the domestic monetary imbalance and 
undermining access to foreign exchange and capital. In this respect, Jahn had 
                                                     
23 Letter of April 22, 1949, from the Supervisory Council to the Board of Directors, 
printed appendix to Innst.O.XI (1949) and referred in letter of April 22, 1949, from 
the Board of Director to the Ministry of Finance, FIN-fin, box 449, file: “Statens 
overtakelse…”. [Quote: ”… nettopp under nåtidens innviklede økonomiske forhold 
er det av betydning å ha en selvstendig institusjon hvis arbeid er konsentrert om å få 
gjennomført et ordnet pengevesen, og som representerer den fornødne økonomiske 
sakkunnskap.”] 
Chapter 3 Downgrading vs. participation 
119 
an ally within the government: the Minister of Commerce Brofoss. 
According to Jahn, Brofoss confidentially told him that he completely 
disagreed with finance minister Meisdalshagen regarding not only the 
parliamentary bill on the nationalization and the reporting line, but also on a 
new bill on the occupational account, which the Ministry of Finance 
presented almost simultaneously (see section 3.5). However, Brofoss 
claimed he stood alone on this in the government, and since this was an 
election year, he could not dissent. He had therefore chosen to be absent 
from the government conferences at which these bills were discussed.24 
There are no surviving sources that elaborate on Brofoss’ views in these 
matters, but minutes from the government conferences confirm that Brofoss 
did not participate in the final discussions of the nationalization bill.25 This 
discord within the government reflected the fact that rather than appearing as 
a monolithic unity, the Labor Party consisted of different interest groups 
with different backgrounds and mental structures and, to some extent, 
diverging views on the development of post-WWII Norway. Somewhat 
simplified, we can regard the new leaders of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Ministry of Finance as personifications of two partly contradicting trends 
within Labor, which influenced both Norwegian policy-making and the role 
of the BoN in this period. On the one hand, Erik Brofoss advocated a 
practical and pragmatic approach to policy formulation as well as the central 
bank. Brofoss’ main focus was to reconstruct the Norwegian economy 
through the systematic use of market controls and centralized planning. His 
main strategy was to modernize and develop the manufacturing industry, 
export industries in particular, a strategy that gave lower priority to the 
agricultural sector and implied a certain centralization of the population in 
rural areas. In order to make the economy run smoothly and, not least, to get 
access to foreign exchange and capital, Brofoss took a pragmatic approach to 
political matters such as formal ownership, whether in the manufacturing 
industry or the central bank. Hence, rather than linking policy initiatives to 
specific policy measures, his approach was to evaluate to what extent the 
measures fulfilled the economic and political goals, and, if not, to have them 
reconsidered or replaced. As an economist, even though of a tradition less 
                                                     
24 GJD April 22 and May 7, 1949. 
25 Minutes from government conference of March 29, 1949. This matter was first 
discussed at a meeting March 15, 1949, where Brofoss was present; see: the archives 
of the Prime Minister’s Office, Regjeringskonferanser-referater, at the National 
Archives of Norway, Oslo [hereafter: STAT-regj], minute book no. 6 (1949-50). 
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optimistic about market controls, Gunnar Jahn clearly associated with these 
views. 
Olav Meisdalshagen, on the other hand, did not share this pragmatic 
approach. Based on strong ideological conviction and opposing views on 
industrialization and regional matters, Meisdalshagen had different priorities 
regarding the modernization process and strategies, as illustrated above, and 
also had a less pragmatic view on the role of the BoN. Thus, to him and his 
associates in the Labor party, state ownership and political control of the 
central bank probably went beyond the matter of policy formulation and 
coordination. It had a symbolic value in itself. 
Meisdalshagen held a strong position in Labor’s parliamentary group and 
represented a line opposed to important parts of the government’s economic 
policy. By appointing him as finance minister, Prime Minister Gerhardsen 
had tried to neutralize a potential critic and simultaneously increase the 
legitimacy of the government’s policy in the eyes of the parliamentary 
group. Moreover, by placing Meisdalshagen in charge of fiscal and monetary 
policy and also exposing him to the world of international finance far from 
Meisdalshagen’s home ground, Gerhardsen might have intended to alter 
Meisdalshagen’s understanding of the economic and political challenges of 
the recovery period. 
Thus, from Gerhardsen’s perspective as head of a relatively fragmented 
party, appointing Meisdalshagen may have been a wise political move. From 
both Brofoss’ and Jahn’s point of view, however, Meisdalshagen represented 
a challenge. Even though Brofoss had taken the coordinating national budget 
office with him to the Ministry of Commerce, Meisdalshagen still formally 
controlled the most important domestic policy measures. And as it turned 
out, Meisdalshagen continued to speak his mind and influence policy 
formulation. This became obvious in the spring of 1949, when the 
government chose to carry through the nationalization of the central bank 
and changes to its reporting line against the advice of both Jahn and Brofoss. 
From one angle, this can bee seen as a defeat for Jahn and the BoN, since the 
government ignored their advice and proposed measures that could, at least 
formally, undermine the autonomy of the central bank. However, we will see 
that this internal discord in the government and the mutual understanding 
between Jahn and Brofoss in a longer-term perspective enabled more active 
participation for the BoN in the policy-making process. 
3.3 Political confrontation and constitutional debate 
The parliamentary debate on the nationalization of the BoN brings two 
interesting perspectives to our analysis. First, it clarifies the different 
political views at the time regarding the future role of the central bank. 
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Second, it illustrates how Meisdalshagen’s proposal to change the reporting 
line of the central bank linked the BoN directly to one of the most heated 
general debates in modern Norwegian history, concerning the constitutional 
division of power between the government and the Storting. This debate has 
been a much-disputed topic among Norwegian historians, who have 
concentrated their studies to the so-called price and rationalization acts, two 
comprehensive enabling acts on the regulation of prices and production that 
Labor first proposed and later modified in 1952/53.26 However, the less 
controversial debate on the reporting line of the central bank, which took 
place already in June 1949, served as a predecessor to this later political 
battle, as the arguments and intensity of the two debates correspond 
consistently. The controversy also had implications for role of the central 
bank.27 
The constitutional debate on the relative power of the government and the 
Storting was rooted in different views on the role of the state in the 
economy. On the one hand, Labor politicians, backed by the new generation 
of Frischian economists, advocated active state planning and intervention in 
order to prevent economic slumps and unemployment and allocate resources 
more efficiently and more fairly than in a free-market situation. From this 
perspective, the extended use of enabling acts and the centralization of 
power gave the government essential freedom of action. On the other hand, 
the non-socialist parties, the conservative Høyre and the liberal Venstre in 
particular, emphasized the problematic sides of a powerful State, and 
regarded the concentration of authority as a threat to liberty. While there was 
an all-party understanding that extensive direct regulations were necessary 
during the extraordinary recovery period, the non-socialist parties grew 
increasingly worried about what they saw as attempts to establish such 
                                                     
26 For a comprehensive summary of this debate up until the early 1990s, see T. 
Grønlie, Forvaltning og fullmaktslovgivning som etterkrigshistorisk forskningsfelt, 
LOS-senter report no. 9308, Bergen: LOS (Norwegian Research Center in 
Organization and Management), 1993, pp. 25-43; G. Yttri, Pris- og 
rasjonaliseringslova. Ordskiftet i og ikring DNA-regjeringa 1952-1953, post-
graduate thesis [hovedoppgave] in history, Oslo: University of Oslo, 1993, pp. 16-
21. Later contributions include: Lie 1995, pp. 202-218; R. Slagstad, Nasjonale 
strateger, Oslo: Pax, 1998, pp. 233-250. 
27 The parallel between the debates over the price and rationalization acts and the 
nationalization of the BoN has been pointed out by the historian Egil Borlaug, but he 
does not elaborate on possible implications for the role of the BoN. Borlaug 1994, 
pp. 25-34. 
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regulations on a permanent basis. With reference to Germany in the 1930s, 
when the increasing use of enabling acts became a means of giving the 
transition from democracy to dictatorship an appearance of legality, the non-
socialist parties drew a parallel with Labor’s extensive use of enabling acts 
since 1945, and interpreted the proposal to change the reporting line of the 
central bank as yet another initiative to delegate more power to the 
government.28 
Hence, in the parliamentary debate, the non-socialist MPs claimed that the 
bill on the nationalization of the BoN implied a clear violation of the 
constitutional rights of the Storting. A leading Conservative, Sjur 
Lindebrække, stated that both the proposal to nationalize and change the 
reporting line of the central bank and Labor’s ambition to introduce new and 
permanent price and rationalization acts were steps towards a change of the 
political system, which presupposed a centralization of power that was 
incompatible with constitutional norms.29 The leader of the Conservative 
party, Carl J. Hambro, described the new parliamentary bill as: 
part of a system that aims to deprive the Storting – step by step, 
always in the same direction – of more and more of its 
constitutional scope of influence, and transfer it to ministries or 
directorates or cabinet ministers, sometimes by enabling acts, 
sometimes by other restrictive measures, and sometimes by 
pleading that transferring all power to the hand of the Government 
is done for merely practical reasons.30 
According to the non-socialist parties, the authority of the BoN and the fact 
that the central bank was considered to be the bank of the national assembly 
was closely associated with the overall power of the Storting. They claimed 
that the proposal to change the reporting line was a clear violation of section 
75c of the Constitution, which assigned the Storting the supervision of the 
national monetary system. Furthermore, they emphasized that within a 
framework established by legislation and guidelines from the Storting, the 
                                                     
28 F. Sejersted, “From liberal constitutionalism to corporate pluralism: the conflict 
over enabling acts in Norway after the Second World War and the subsequent 
constitutional development”, in J. Elster and R. Slagstad (eds.) Constitutionalism 
and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 276-278. 
29 Sjur Lindebrække (Høyre), Parliamentary document Odelsting no. 49 (1949), St. 
forh. 1949, vol. 8, p. 386. 
30 Carl J. Hambro (Høyre), Odelsting debate no 49 (1949), p. 402. 
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BoN was intended to have an autonomous position, precisely because this 
enabled the Storting  – through the central bank – to supervise and control 
the financial dispositions of the government.31 
As a consequence of the above views, the non-socialist parties went further 
than the advice of the BoN and rejected not only any change to the reporting 
line but also the nationalization proposal. The non-socialist minority of the 
parliamentary finance committee found “no objective reason” for either of 
the proposals and argued that nationalization of the central bank was a break 
with tradition that could harm the recovery process. They found the proposal 
to change the reporting line even worse, as it represented a threat not only to 
the BoN but was an attack on the constitutional rights of the Storting.32 
However, this did not imply that the non-socialist parties were in favor of 
traditional central bank independence, in the sense that the BoN should be 
allowed to carry out a monetary policy at its own will. Like governor Jahn, 
they argued that the central bank ought to be an autonomous organization 
but yet operate under guidelines given by the political authorities. However, 
the most important factor was that this political control should be maintained 
by the Storting, not the government: 
The decisive element is not the independence of the Bank of 
Norway in itself. There is no one who would dare to incline 
towards the opinion that the Bank of Norway should be allowed to 
follow its own line of politics, its own monetary policy, or that the 
central bank in any way should be sovereign when it comes to 
issuing final guidelines in this vital area. However, the key point is 
the Bank of Norway’s independence from the government, and its 
equally clear dependence on this assembly, on the Storting.33 
While the non-socialist parties portrayed the parliamentary bill as an attack 
not only on the central bank but also on the constitutional rights of the 
Storting, Labor accused the opposition of creating a storm in a teacup. “This 
                                                     
31 Parliamentary documents Innst. O.XI (1949), p. 5; Odelsting debate no 49 (1949), 
pp. 385-386 (Lindebrække, Høyre(H)), 391 (Moseid, the Farmers Party (B)), 395 
(Wikborg, the Christian People’s Party (KrF), 399-400 and 416 (Sundt, the Liberal 
Party Venstre (V)), 401-402 (Hambro, H) and 405-406 (Utheim, V). 
32 Recommendations from the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic 
Affairs [Finanskomiteen], Innst. O.XI (1949), pp. 4 (quote) -5. 
33 Sjur Lindebrække (Høyre), Odelsting debate no. 49 (1949), p. 385. 
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is not a matter of power”, Labor MP Carl J. Westerlund stated; “it is a 
practical matter (…), a matter of common sense”. Labor flatly rejected the 
idea that the government was trying to undermine the power of the Storting, 
and clamed that the handing over of annual reports and accounts was hardly 
significant, as the Storting would still have the power to appoint most of the 
representatives to the BoN.34 However, while Labor MPs accused the non-
socialist parties of exaggerating the constitutional consequences of these 
proposals, when it came to the role of the central bank, they themselves 
painted a gloomy picture of the intentions of their political opponents. Even 
though the non-socialist parties had argued against traditional central bank 
independence, several Labor MPs accused them of trying to establish the 
BoN as a “Supreme Court of monetary policy” and a “Fourth Estate”, 
independent of political control altogether.35 These arguments underline the 
strong ideological dimensions of this debate, where Labor saw central bank 
independence as a symbol of unrestrained marked forces, a system they 
accused the non-socialist parties of trying to reintroduce. 
Even though Labor’s main argument was that the parliamentary bill 
represented only minor practical adjustments, a closer look at the 
argumentation behind these proposals uncovers a radical view on the role of 
the central bank. Firstly, the government tried to put the BoN on the same 
footing as other state-owned and state-guaranteed banks. While the non-
socialist parties accentuated the unique position of the central bank in the 
monetary system, Labor argued that after the nationalization, the BoN could 
easily be compared to more specialized state-owned banks that were 
established to provide credit for politically preferred sectors such as housing, 
manufacturing industry, fisheries, and education. It was common practice for 
these banks to hand their annual reports and accounts directly to the Ministry 
of Finance, and the government argued that it was only natural that the same 
routines applied for the BoN.36 By toning down the superior position of the 
central bank compared to other financial institutions, the government 
communicated a view that seems closely associated with an ambition to turn 
the BoN into a directorate under the Ministry of Finance, as Gunnar Jahn 
had feared. 
                                                     
34 Odelsting debate no 49 (1949), pp. 388 (quote), 403-404. 
35 Odelsting debate no 49 (1949), pp. 388 (Westerlund), 411 (Strøm), 415 
(Meisdalshagen). 
36 Ot. prp. no. 65 (1949), p. 3. Non-socialist opposition: Odelsting debate no. 49 
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Secondly, indirectly finance minister Meisdalshagen admitted that the bill 
aimed at increasing the political control over central bank, as part of 
extending democratic control over the economy. In the parliamentary debate, 
Meisdalshagen stated that the central bank should be an executive body of 
the Ministry of Finance, and nothing more. He further pointed out that 
although the governing bodies of the central bank were politically appointed, 
they did not follow parliamentary election results. Because both the Board of 
Directors and the Supervisory Council had been appointed before Labor won 
the parliamentary majority in 1945, the non-socialist representatives held a 
majority in the central bank, although they had a minority position in the 
Storting.37 Meisdalshagen claimed that this represented a democratic 
problem. Since the government always would reflect the national will far 
more than the heads of the central bank, and since the monetary policy had 
become an increasingly important measure in the societal policy, it was 
therefore a matter of democracy to ensure that the government controlled the 
central bank. Hence, he concluded, “all thinking human beings know that 
this is not an attack on democracy. On the contrary, this is a coordination 
and extension of democracy.”38 
Compared to traditional ideals of central bank independence, and even to 
non-socialist visions of an autonomous BoN controlled by the Storting, 
Meisdalshagen’s ideas of the central bank as a regular state-owned bank 
merely executing orders from the Ministry of Finance appear fairly radical. 
However, the parliamentary debate revealed that some Labor representatives 
had far more extreme ideas. While the official argument of the government 
was to tone down the significance of the new proposals, Labor MP Gundvald 
Engelstad laid out the nationalization and changed reporting line as steps on 
the road to a socialistic society. In his speech, Engelstad regretted the slow 
pace of this development but ensured the audience that the Labor 
government was on a steady course towards this goal. The nationalization of 
the BoN was only one step on the road, and the remaining financial 
institutions would follow. His party colleague Olav A. Versto joined in and 
                                                     
37 For an overview of the appointments to the BoN’s governing bodies during 1945-
1950, see Parliamentary documents Innst. S. no. 72 and no. 161 (1947), St. forh. 
1947, vol. 6a; Innst. S. no. 65 and no. 179 (1950), St. forh. vol. 1950, vol. 6a. 
38 Olav Meisdalshagen (Labor), Odelsting debate no. 49 (1949), pp. 389 (quote), 399 
and 415. 
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claimed that these changes were contributions to the goal of a society in total 
control of the monetary system: a complete economic democracy.39 
These socialist visions from the Labor MPs, on the one hand, and the heated 
response from the non-socialist parties, on the other, illustrate the strong 
ideological undertones in the debate on nationalization and changes to the 
reporting line of the central bank. Rather than being practical adjustments of 
minor importance, as the government tried to argue formally, the 
parliamentary debate suggests that, whether in favor or not, many MPs 
recognized the symbolic value of a central bank owned by the State and 
controlled by the government. By linking the proposals to the conflict over 
the enabling acts or visions of more extensive nationalization, both non-
socialist and Labor representatives turned the debate into a conflict, which in 
the last resort, concerned the future development of Norwegian society. 
While foreign exchange problems had previously postponed the 
nationalization process, this third initiative from the Ministry of Finance 
passed successfully through the Storting. Despite surprising support from the 
Communist Party, the non-socialist parties lost the parliamentary vote by the 
narrowest possible margin.40 Hence, the Labor majority put an end to two 
institutional cornerstones in the 135-year history of the BoN: the private 
ownership and the traditional position of the Storting as the main supervisor 
of the central bank. However, the consequences for governor Jahn and his 
staff went beyond these formal institutional changes. The heated debate on 
the nationalization and changes to the reporting line confirmed that the role 
of the central bank was not only a matter of practical, rational 
considerations. The strong ideological undertones and Meisdalshagen’s 
declared link between democracy and the subordination of the central bank 
constituted an informal institutional basis for increased political control, 
which in practice probably had wider consequences than the formal 
legislative changes. Moreover, the non-socialist emphasis on central bank 
autonomy as a way of strengthening the power of the Storting took the role 
                                                     
39 Odelsting debate no. 49 (1949), pp. 407 and 414. 
40 Odelsting debate no. 49 (1949), p. 422; Besl. O. no 159 and 160 (1949); approval 
by the Lagting, St.forh. 1949, vol. 8, pp. 459-460. The rationale behind the 
Communist votes was a fear that the nationalization and change to the reporting line 
would have little practical effect but still would delay a total revision of the old 
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financial sector. 
Chapter 3 Downgrading vs. participation 
127 
of the central bank into the realm of high politics. Hence, for the BoN, the 
support from the non-socialist parties probably had the opposite of the 
desired effect. Rather than strengthening its autonomy and authority, the 
non-socialist support instead increased the suspicion of the Labor 
government, and finance minister Meisdalshagen in particular, of any notion 
of central bank independence. 
3.4 The governing bodies: political exercise or professional advice?  
In the process of nationalizing the BoN, we have seen that there were 
internal disagreements in the governing bodies of the central bank. This 
brings focus to the role and importance of these governing bodies internally, 
in their relations with the governor, and externally, in their relations with the 
political authorities. What role did the governing bodies play in the 
nationalization process and in the process of developing a new role for the 
central bank? 
During the nationalizing process, at least two important tendencies in the 
operations of the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Council emerged. 
Firstly, in the discussion of all three nationalization initiatives, the members 
of the governing bodies were strongly guided by their political affiliation. In 
1947, the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Council voted 
unanimously in favor of postponing the nationalization, but since their 
advice coincided with the outburst of the currency crisis, this consensus 
probably reflected a common sense of emergency rather than political 
neutrality. Thus, already by the 1948 proposal, when the foreign exchange 
situation still was highly uncertain, there was a clear-cut split between the 
Labor representatives and the non-socialist members of the governing bodies 
regarding the timing of the nationalization. When in 1949 Meisdalshagen 
extended the nationalization proposal and added the changes to the reporting 
line, this political divide was even more pronounced. 
Gunnar Jahn seemed extremely frustrated by the political biases of the 
governing bodies. Prior to the votes, he expressed some hope that the 
governing bodies would set aside their political agendas and instead give 
priority to economic considerations regarding the recovery process. And 
once the split resolutions were a stated fact, he complained in his diaries 
about undue “party-based alliances” and “clear-cut party voting”.41 
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From a methodological point of view, there is generally reason to be critical 
of Gunnar Jahn’s descriptions and self-presentation in his personal diaries. 
Even though the diaries were private at the time, they were probably 
designed for future public reference and historical research. Hence, Jahn’s 
general tendency to present himself as a sober-minded professional in 
matters of economic policy, as opposed to more politically biased 
colleagues, must be handled with care. In this case, however, there is reason 
to trust Jahn’s indignation over the governing bodies as a genuine response, 
since the non-socialist majority in the Board of Directors and the 
Supervisory Council in fact ensured internal support for his views. While 
Meisdalshagen had seen this as a democratic problem, the main difficulty 
from Jahn’s point of view appears to have been that such ‘party voting’ 
involved the central bank in the political tug of war. Instead, Jahn seemingly 
sought to establish the central bank as an expert organization that could 
provide the political authorities with relatively neutral professional advice. 
A second tendency regarding the role of the governing bodies can be gleaned 
from an interesting twist to this story, namely that the idea to change the 
reporting line of the central bank probably originated from within the BoN 
itself. According to Jahn, Erik Brofoss revealed that the proposal was raised 
by one of Labor’s representatives in the Supervisory Council, Albert Sund, 
who brought the matter up at a meeting of Labor’s parliamentary group, 
which then forwarded the suggestion to the government.42 If the original 
source of this proposal indeed was a member of the Supervisory Council, 
this suggests that the formal constitution and reporting line of the central 
bank’s governance bodies was less important than informal relations and 
personal networks. Despite being in a minority position, Labor 
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alternative sources. In the books of minutes from the meetings of Labor’s 
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representatives could promote their views by sidestepping the formal 
communication channels. Finance minister Meisdalshagen seems to have 
had few reservations about this procedure. He embraced the new proposal 
and ignored advice from his own officials in the Ministry of Finance, who 
warned against changing the reporting line since this was a far-reaching 
proposal that could complicate the nationalization drive.43 From this 
perspective, the new finance minister confirmed that the formal change of 
the reporting line probably would have few practical consequences, 
however, not because it represented only a minor adjustment, as the 
government claimed, but because this de jure provision in practice was less 
important for influencing policy outcomes than informal communication 
behind the scenes. 
To the extent that the governing bodies of the BoN influenced the 
nationalization process, they did so by reinforcing the political dimension of 
this matter. The members of the Board of Governors and the Supervisory 
Council, whether Labor or non-socialist representatives, mainly reproduced 
the arguments of their political parties, rather than giving independent 
professional advice, as governor Jahn had hoped for. However, the case of 
the nationalization and changes to the reporting line was much more 
politicized than the regular business of the governing bodies, and in the daily 
conduct of the BoN, the governor appears to have had substantial influence. 
An examination of the minutes from the meetings of the Board of Directors 
and the Supervisory Council from 1945-1954 leaves the impression that the 
governing bodies played a limited role. In particular the Supervisory 
Council, which usually met 5-6 times per year, seems mainly to have given 
formal approval to the recommendations from governor Jahn and the Board 
of Governors. The governor or deputy governor attended and participated 
actively at all meetings of the Supervisory Council and only very rarely did 
the Council debate or reject their advice. The Board of Governors, on the 
other hand, met daily to discuss a wide range of practical and political 
matters. Nevertheless, also in this arena, the minutes leave the impression 
that the governor played a leading part in the sense that his views were 
decisive for the recommendations of the Board. All in all, the remaining 
sources thereby seem to confirm that governor Jahn, like his predecessor 
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Nicolai Rygg, left a highly personal mark on the resolutions and advice from 
the central bank.44 
3.5 The occupational account: the key to a new role? 
By the Liberation, we have seen that the so-called occupational account, the 
separate account from which the German occupants withdrew more than 11 
billion NOK during the war, offered two fundamental problems from the 
BoN’s point of view. Firstly, it generated a monetary surplus that not only 
represented a constant inflationary danger but also paralyzed the traditional 
ways in which the central bank had influenced the financial system. 
Secondly, it left the central bank technically insolvent since this account was 
recorded without any formal debtor, and thereby helped to undermine its 
professional credibility, especially in the eyes of the international financial 
markets.45 Hence, from the central bank’s point of view, settling this account 
could be a key to renewed influence not only by improving its credibility and 
access to foreign loans but also by withdrawing liquidity from the domestic 
economy and thereby enabling the direct regulations to be replaced by new 
policy instruments. For Gunnar Jahn and his staff, this was thus a matter of 
potentially great importance, but during the first postwar years, the central 
bank failed to catch the attention of the Labor government on this matter. In 
the autumn of 1948, however, the occupational account was brought back up 
onto the political agenda, and this time the initiator was not the central bank 
but the international Marshall Plan administration. This forced the Labor 
government to take the question more seriously. 
Previously, we have seen that the Marshall Plan influenced the BoN 
indirectly by directing political attention towards the central bank’s 
traditional area of expertise, the foreign exchange policy, and by setting 
preconditions for the aid program that hastened the liberalization of domestic 
regulations. In the autumn of 1948, the Marshall Plan administration 
                                                     
44 This account is based on examinations of minutes from the 1945-1954 meetings of 
the Board of Governors, the Supervisory Council, and the Permanent Committee 
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45 See chapters 1.5 and 2.1. 
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intervened more directly in the state of the Norwegian central bank and 
suggested a down payment of the occupational account as part of the 
technical implementation of the aid program. The specific request from the 
Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA), the US organization in charge of 
administrating Marshall Aid, was that the Norwegian government should use 
the occupational account to underwrite the main part of the Marshall funds.46 
The underlying rationale for this proposal was a general and absolute 
precondition from the ECA that, in order to avoid inflationary effects of 
Marshall Aid, most of the funds had to be withdrawn from circulation in the 
domestic economy. In the case of Norway, the proposal from the ECA 
implied that Norwegian kroner exchanged for Marshall dollars should be 
used to pay off the occupational account and thereby should be withdrawn 
permanently from circulation. Such an arrangement would not only prevent 
further monetary expansion linked to Marshall Aid but also potentially 
reduce the war-related excess liquidity. The proposal from the ECA was 
thereby linked directly to the controversial issue of monetary reorganization, 
for which Gunnar Jahn had fought in vain after the war.47 
For the BoN, this request from the Marshall administration represented a 
new window of opportunity. In 1948, the occupational account still 
amounted to 7.9 billion NOK, or 90 per cent of the central bank’s total 
assets, and from the Bank’s point of view, a solution to this problem was 
long overdue.48 Thus, in November 1948, governor Jahn and the Board of 
Governors drew up a proposal containing three elements: 1) to pay off 1.6 
billion NOK on the occupational account to withdraw domestic liquidity; 2) 
to settle the technical insolvency of the central bank by letting the State pose 
as the formal debtor for the remainder of the occupational account, though 
without being subject to any interest or repayment obligations; and 3) to 
create a new monetary policy instrument by using a part of the remaining 
account to issue treasury bills that the BoN could sell in order to further 
withdraw liquidity.49 
                                                     
46 GJD January 5, 1949; Jahn’s speech at the meeting of the BoN’s Supervisory 
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47 See chapter 2.1. 
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The Labor government had an ambivalent approach to the occupational 
account. On the one hand, it resisted paying off the account because, as a 
matter of principle, it rejected the idea of taking responsibility for any action 
of the occupying regime. The government also showed little concern for the 
financial state of the central bank, which it regarded as a technical formality. 
Moreover, based on the theories of Ragnar Frisch – which argued that the 
monetary side of the economy was of little importance compared with the 
real side and that direct regulations could control inflationary tendencies 
caused by excess liquidity – Labor had originally seen little reason for 
withdrawing liquidity through the occupational account. 
On the other hand, with the new international requirements and growing 
problems in economic policy, paying off this account appeared increasingly 
relevant. By the late 1940s, the stabilization line was threatened from all 
sides as domestic and imported prices continued to rise inexorably and the 
index-linked wage system thereby became increasingly expensive, while 
there were rumors that the fixed foreign exchange rate could be under 
pressure. Moreover, the currency crisis of 1947 had demonstrated 
considerable difficulties in maintaining and coordinating the direct 
regulations, and also revealed extensive foreign exchange problems that 
threatened to undermine the reconstruction process. Norway was in need of 
foreign exchange, US dollars in particular, a problem that the Marshall Aid 
program could ease, and the Norwegian authorities thereby could hardly 
afford to reject demands from the ECA regarding the occupational account. 
The response from the Labor government appeared in May 1949 in a 
parliamentary bill on the occupational account, which reflected the above 
ambivalence and constituted a compromise between Labor’s original stand 
and the advice from the Marshall Aid administration and the BoN. The 
government accepted a reduction in the occupational account, but declared 
that reducing this account was not “a goal in itself”. It therefore proposed to 
pay off only 566 million NOK, of which 110 million were donations from 
the Marshall Aid program. This was only a third of the amount proposed by 
the BoN, and suggested that the government at this point was not prepared to 
use the occupational account to withdraw war-related liquidity. However, in 
accordance with the Marshall Aid agreement of July 3, 1948 between the US 
and Norwegian governments, the government agreed to further reductions of 
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the occupational account in relation to possible future Marshall Aid 
donations.50 
While the government at least to some extent accepted the need to withdraw 
liquidity, it rejected the two other proposals from the BoN. The Ministry of 
Finance completely ignored the proposal to introduce a new monetary policy 
instrument through the trading of treasury bills, and also rejected the idea 
that the State should pose as the debtor for the occupational account. Instead 
it argued that the central bank’s credibility and creditworthiness in 
international financial markets would be sufficiently secured through the 
nationalization of its privately owned stocks. There was thus no need for 
additional initiatives to sort out the Bank’s questionable accounting status.51 
Both before and after the government presented this parliamentary bill, the 
occupational account was subject to heated political debate. In his annual 
speech in February 1949, Governor Jahn characterized this matter as a 
“boil”, which he knew was controversial to bring up but was nevertheless 
too important to ignore.52 The question of a monetary reorganization and 
whether to withdraw war-related liquidity had been a key controversy 
between Labor and the non-socialist opposition since the Liberation, and 
once the government presented its compromise proposal, the non-socialist 
parties interpreted this as a victory. Labor, on the other hand, once again 
tried to tone down the importance of its initiative, as it had done in the 
matter of nationalization of the BoN, and argued that it was rather a 
technical formality.53 However, while the government was probably right 
that the nationalization and changes to the reporting line of the central bank 
were formal alterations of limited practical consequence, the withdrawal of 
liquidity through the occupational account did in fact represent a turning 
point in the post-WWII economic policy.54 
                                                     
50 Parliamentary document St. prp. no. 86 (1949), quote p. 3. 
51 St. prp. no. 86 (1949), p. 2-3. 
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1949, Norges Banks beretning og regnskap 1948, pp. 14-15. 
53 Parliamentary debate of July 23-25, 1949, St. forh. (1949), vol. 7b, Tidende S, pp. 
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In practice, the withdrawal of liquidity through the occupational account 
became much more comprehensive, and more in terms with the original 
recommendations of the BoN, than the government had suggested. By 
around 1950, the monetary surplus generated during World War II had more 
or less vanished. This was caused by a gradual withdrawal of liquidity, 
which seems to have accelerated after 1948. Fiscal policies, especially taxes, 
accounted for some of this effect. Unquestionably the most important factor, 
however, was withdrawal through the exchange of currency in the BoN. The 
total net withdrawal of liquidity through these foreign exchange transactions 
was 3.5 billion NOK,55 and table 3.1 shows that almost 2.4 billion NOK of 
this was paid off on the occupational account between 1948-1952. 
Table 3.1: The occupational account 1945-1952 (million NOK) 
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 
8163 8108 8094 7924 7114 6202 6202 5546 
Sources: annual accounts of the Bank of Norway, Beretning og regnskap, 1945-
1953; St. prp. no. 86 (1949); Innst. S. no. 201 (1949); St. prp. no. 28 (1952); Innst. 
S. no. 52 (1952). 
Table 3.2 illustrates the importance of the occupational account from an 
alternative perspective, through an overview of the use of the Marshall Aid 
donations. Marshall Aid was granted partly as loans and partly as donations, 
and in the Norwegian case, the total value of grants between 1948-1952 has 
been estimated at 460 million US dollars, of which 90 per cent was 
donations. Contemporary estimates by the BoN show that out of a total 2.5 
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billion NOK in donations from the Marshall Aid program, more than 1.9 
billion NOK was generated through the occupational account.56 
Table 3.2: Use of Marshall aid, donation part (million NOK) 
Written off on the occupational account 1931
Extraordinary investments, Northern Norway 
(of which 26 mill. For military purposes) 
110
Military house building 75
Other defense and standby arrangements 300
Productivity purposes 44
Total 2460
Source: The Bank of Norway, Beretning og regnskap 1955,  
St.meld. no. 61 (1956), p. 18. 
To what extent was this withdrawal of liquidity through the occupational 
account the result of a conscious policy? Originally the Labor Party, 
supported by the new generation of Frischian economists, had argued that 
the monetary surplus generated during the war did not represent a problem. 
Did Labor change its views? There are indications that the government did at 
least to some degree change its views during the second half of the recovery 
period, both regarding policy instruments as well as the working of the 
economy. The currency crisis of 1947 and the increasing problems with 
maintaining the stabilization line seem to have contributed to such a 
reorientation. In August 1948, Jahn reported a private conversation with Erik 
Brofoss in which the latter had been extremely worried about the balance of 
                                                     
56 The exact amount of funds granted through the Marshall Aid program has been 
difficult to determine. Contemporary estimates by the BoN suggested a total of 
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H. Thommessen, who estimates a total grant of US$460 million or 2,950 million 
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rolle?, discussion paper no. 12, Department of innovation and economic 
organization, Sandvika: Norwegian School of Management BI, 1999, pp. 5-7.  
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payments problems as well as the imbalances in the domestic economy. 
According to Jahn, for a moment Brofoss “was on to the monetary side and 
the occupational account and many things that he has previously not been 
willing to touch”. At the time, Jahn was uncertain how deep-rooted these 
changes were, and he also feared that in any case Brofoss would fail to 
convince the rest of the government to change its policy, since the 
stabilization line had so far been almost “an article of faith”.57 
However, during the winter of 1948/49, the impression of a reorientation in 
the government regarding the future economic policy became stronger. Jahn 
repeatedly referred to “Brofoss’ turn” towards monetary issues, a turn that 
Jahn – not surprisingly – interpreted as consent to his own long-standing 
arguments.58 At first, Brofoss seemed to stand alone within the government 
in his reorientation, but there were also signs of a new tone from the 
Ministry of Finance, which previously had denied that the excess liquidity 
represented a noteworthy problem. In finance minister Meisdalshagen’s 
annual financial address in January 1949, he emphasized the problematic 
consequences of the over-expansionary monetary policy during the war, and 
declared: 
There is probably no doubt that the monetary liquidity at this point 
is too high compared to available real economic resources.59 
Jahn’s reports of a turn in Labor’s economic policy must of course be 
reviewed with a critical eye. From the governor’s point of view, these 
changes implied that his own arguments had gained ground, and thus he 
might have exaggerated the impression of a political turnaround. 
Nevertheless, Meisdalshagen’s public emphasis on the problematic liquidity 
situation, and a proposal for a relatively tight fiscal policy in the national 
budget of 1949, indicate that the government no longer took the efficiency of 
the direct regulations for granted. Moreover, even though the parliamentary 
bill of 1949 proposed a relatively limited down payment of the occupational 
account, it did acknowledge the need to withdraw liquidity. Hence, 
compared to the immediate postwar years, by the end of the recovery period 
the Labor government seemed more preoccupied with the monetary side of 
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the economy and less optimistic about curbing inflation through direct 
regulations. 
While the economic effects of the reduced occupational account were 
considerable, the problems related to the technical insolvency of the BoN 
remained. By 1954, the occupational account still amounted to 86 per cent of 
the central bank’s assets, assets that continued to have no formal debtor. This 
concerned governor Jahn, and one of his last initiatives before retiring as 
governor in the summer of 1954 was a new attempt to sort out the financial 
state of the BoN. The Bank once again requested that the State should take 
formal responsibility and pose as the debtor for the occupational account, 
which should be renamed Statens konsoliderte konto [the consolidated 
account of the State].60 This initiative had few immediate results apart from 
yet another parliamentary debate, but Jahn’s successor as governor, Erik 
Brofoss, continued to pursue these arguments, and in 1958 the Storting 
finally settled the matter for good. In accordance with Jahn’s proposal from 
1954, the remaining sum in the occupational account was transferred to a 
new account in the government’s balance sheet, Statens konsoliderte konto, 
and the technical insolvency of the Norwegian central bank became a thing 
of the past.61 
For the BoN, the occupational account had fundamental consequences, 
initially by undermining its credibility and traditional tasks, and later by 
helping to remove the monetary surplus and thereby preparing for the 
dismantling of the extensive regulations and rationing in the domestic 
economy. This represented a potential for introducing new policy measures, 
which in practice would prove more important for the credibility of the 
central bank than its ongoing dubious financial state. In the summer of 1949, 
however, the government still held on to the stabilization line, but this 
situation was about to change as international events once again affected 
Norwegian domestic affairs. 
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3.6 Devaluation and the fall of the stabilization line 
Towards the end of the recovery period, we have seen that the stabilization 
line proved increasingly difficult to maintain. Despite extensive direct 
regulations, both domestic and imported prices continued to rise, and during 
1945-1949, the consumption index of the SSB increased by 15 per cent. In 
accordance with the income policy agreement between the government and 
labor organizations, this price inflation was met with rising subsidies, which 
from 1945/46 to 1949/50 more than tripled from 250 to 800 million NOK. 
Hence, the stabilization line threatened not only to end up in a price-wage 
spiral but also represented a considerable fiscal burden.62 While the BoN 
hardly took part in maintaining these domestic price and wage policies, it 
was directly involved in the third element of the stabilization line: the 
exchange rate policy. In the final stage of the stabilization line, the BoN 
played an active role, and this time the governor and his officials not only 
developed further their working relations with Erik Brofoss and the civil 
servants in the domestic central administration, but also took advantage of 
their own international networks to obtain and process information on the 
foreign exchange situation. 
Throughout its long history, the BoN had developed stable relations with 
other central banks, especially the Nordic ones and the Bank of England. 
Through annual meetings, written and telephonic contact and personal visits, 
the central bank governors and their senior staff discussed matters of 
principle concerning their operations as well as more immediate policy 
problems. The nature of this contact appears both professional and personal, 
as for example the annual meetings of the Nordic central banks seem to have 
contained a substantial element of social activities and sightseeing, which 
supplemented the more formal professional arrangements. This socialization 
probably helped to build personal trust and produced off-the-record 
discussions and exchanges of information. The relations with the Bank of 
England had a similar, yet somewhat less intimate tone, and included annual 
visits by British central bankers to Oslo and more irregular visits by civil 
servants from the BoN to London. In addition, the BoN developed and 
maintained networks with other central bankers at international events, such 
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as the annual meetings of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the 
World Bank and, not least, the IMF, which we will see below.63 
Through this interaction, governor Jahn and his staff had access to 
information on current affairs in the international financial markets, and in 
August 1947, a dramatic rumor reached the Norwegian central bank. 
According to “a reliable source” in the Bank of England, Britain planned to 
devaluate Sterling by 25 per cent. The source claimed that Britain would do 
this “suddenly” without regards to its obligations under the Bretton Woods 
agreement to go through specific administrative procedures. This news 
coincided with the emerging currency crisis, and when Jahn informed Erik 
Brofoss of the rumors, he claims the then finance minister “almost had a 
stroke”.64 This time, the rumors turned out to be false, but from then on, the 
possibility of a British devaluation was the subject of ongoing debate. At the 
annual meeting of the Nordic central banks in November 1947, the future 
foreign exchange policies were discussed in detail, and the central bank 
governors agreed to maintain an old understanding that – as far as possible – 
any changes of their exchange rates should be subject to prior discussion and 
coordination between the central banks.65 
During the next couple of years, the pressure on the British pound continued. 
In an attempt to maintain its previous hegemony as the leading international 
currency, Britain had fixed Sterling at what turned out to be an 
unrealistically high level, and in practice, it was the US dollar that became 
the main international currency. This trend that was reinforced by the 
massive trade and balance of payments deficits of Western Europe towards 
the United States, and from 1948 onwards, the US government put pressure 
                                                     
63 For some interesting insights into the cooperation between the Nordic central 
banks during 1945-1955, see various minutes from annual meetings and internal 
notes filed in: BoN-DirI, boxes D-0148 and F-0003. In the archive of the Bank of 
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64 GJD August 19, 1947. 
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on Britain to readjust its exchange rate.66 The prospect of a British 
devaluation thus seemed increasingly realistic. Nevertheless, when in 
September 1949 the British government finally devalued Sterling against the 
US dollar by 30.5 per cent, both the timing and the extent came as a surprise 
to the Norwegian government. 
The process leading up to this devaluation gives interesting insights into the 
role of Gunnar Jahn and the BoN by the end of the recovery period, and 
suggests that once more, practical problems related to the foreign exchange 
policy generated the active participation of the central bank. Moreover, this 
process illustrates the importance of personal networks, both at home and 
internationally, for the ability of the BoN to contribute to policy formulation 
and implementation. 
The British devaluation took place during the annual meeting of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington. As central bank 
governor, Gunnar Jahn had participated at every IMF gathering since the 
inaugural meeting in March 1946, and he knew this organization and its 
delegates fairly well. Jahn was also known to bureaucrats of the IMF, who in 
internal evaluations of Norway tended to regard the governor as something 
of a watchdog as far as the Norwegian government was concerned.67 Thus, 
Jahn appeared as a respected and well-known representative to the IMF, and 
one of his tasks at the 1949 meeting was to gather confidential information 
regarding a possible British devaluation. 
Before heading for Washington, Jahn had discussed the prospect of a British 
devaluation with the government and, at length, with Erik Brofoss. The 
Ministry of Commerce had been particularly concerned about this matter, 
and internal estimates suggested that a devaluation of 25 per cent through 
increasing import prices would give a domestic price rise equivalent to 3.6 
points on the cost of living index, a jump that could definitely blow the 
stabilization line since the authorities would probably be unable to provide 
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sufficient compensational subsidies.68 According to international 
newspapers, a British devaluation was more or less unavoidable at this point, 
and even if such speculations were wrong at first, they contributed to a lack 
of confidence in Sterling and could thereby turn out to be self-fulfilling 
prophecies. Thus, the Norwegian government had to prepare for a British 
devaluation and make up its mind whether to follow the pound or not. 
After several cabinet meetings in August and September 1949, the 
government was divided on this matter. Erik Brofoss was the strongest 
advocate of devaluation, supported by governor Jahn, who was present at 
two of the cabinet meetings. They argued that Norway had to follow a 
British devaluation to protect the export industries, which would otherwise 
suffer a dramatic loss of competitiveness in relation to Norway’s main 
trading partner. Opposing Brofoss and Jahn was, among others, the Minister 
of Labor, Ulrik Olsen, who feared negative reactions to a comprehensive 
devaluation from the labor organizations, since this probably would 
compromise the stabilization line. Abandoning this basic element of Labor’s 
economic policy right before the autumn election would be very challenging 
politically. In the end, the government did not reach any final conclusions. 
Instead of making a principal decision regarding the devaluation and the 
stabilization line, the government chose to provide Jahn with preliminary 
authority to inform the IMF that the Norwegian authorities would follow a 
moderate British devaluation of approximately 20 per cent. However, 
informally Brofoss countered this decision by privately telling Jahn to follow 
a British devaluation, seemingly regardless of its extent.69 
Once in Washington, Jahn searched actively for information on the British 
strategies and wrote daily reports to Brofoss. On September 14, he stated 
that there were no signs of an immediate devaluation but that the Norwegian 
government probably should be prepared for such an event within a few 
months.70 The following day, however, Jahn had to reconsider this timing 
after having spoken to the vice-president of the IMF and a senior civil 
servant in the Bank of England, who both stated that the devaluation would 
definitely come. The British official added that it probably ought to happen 
as soon as possible. Jahn immediately forwarded the news to Brofoss by 
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telegram and at the same time asked for more formal and explicit 
authorization from the government to negotiate on behalf of Norway.71 
The exact time and extent of the British devaluation was made known to 
Jahn on September 16, 1949, in what appears as a rather amusing incident, in 
which the governor failed to acknowledge that his contacts in the Bank of 
England had handed him confidential information. At an IMF dinner, the 
wife of one of Jahn’s acquaintances in the British central bank approached 
Jahn, handing him one of her husband’s business cards. The card contained a 
handwritten date, the number 30,5 and the words “tell Bramsnæs” [the 
Danish central bank governor]. Jahn interpreted this as an internal message 
to Bramsnæs that could wait until later. He thus continued his dinner and sat 
through all the formal speeches. The time was approaching midnight before 
Jahn finally handed over the business card to Bramsnæs, just as the British 
central banker and his wife passed by and apologized for not having been 
able to tell them the news any sooner. It was at that point the two Nordic 
central bank governors realized that the business card revealed the time and 
extent of the British devaluation.72 
Governor Jahn immediately retreated to his hotel room along with his 
Danish counterpart and their officials to discuss this new turn of events. 
They all agreed that a devaluation of 30.5 per cent was larger than expected 
and anticipated that this could cause some serious trouble at home. Jahn had 
not received any further instructions from the government, and according to 
recollections by Svend Viig, a civil servant from the BoN present at this 
meeting, the Norwegian central bank governor “paced restlessly up and 
down the floor without knowing what to do”. Rather than complying with 
Brofoss’ informal instruction to follow Britain no matter what, Jahn 
forwarded the new information and asked for further instructions in an 
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meetings, where the formal representatives often brought along their wives and took 
part in organized sightseeing as well as a long series of lunches and dinners. As in 
the case of the annual meetings of the Nordic central banks, this emphasis on 
creating a jovial social atmosphere probably contributed to the development of 
personal networks also in professional matters.  
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express telegram to Brofoss, where he also, out of consideration for the 
export industries, repeated his previous advice to follow the British 
devaluation in full.73 
Due to the above misunderstanding, Jahn’s information reached Brofoss 
after the Ministry of Commerce had been informed directly by the British 
authorities. In this situation, one might expect Brofoss to summon the 
government and discuss what steps to take next. However, as the historian 
William Jansen has shown, Brofoss instead made the decision on his own. In 
accordance with Jahn’s advice and without consulting anyone else in the 
government, he instructed Jahn to inform the IMF on behalf of the 
government that Norway would devalue the krone by 30 per cent, a decision 
that Jahn followed up in a formal letter to the IMF.74 
Jansen interprets this procedure as an act of “enlightened despotism” by an 
intellectual elite of economic experts, that is Brofoss and Jahn, who set aside 
the democratic rules of the game in order to carry through a devaluation that 
they must have known would lead to the fall of the stabilization line.75 
Considering how Jahn has usually been viewed as an inferior and an 
opponent of the government, it is interesting that Jansen seems to put the 
governor on the same footing as Erik Brofoss. However, as we have seen, 
after the currency crisis of 1947, Jahn and Brofoss did have a working 
relationship that was often characterized by a greater mutual understanding 
than Brofoss shared with other members of the government, including 
finance minister Meisdalshagen. In cases of disagreement between Brofoss 
and Jahn, the Minister of Commerce would undoubtedly have the final say. 
However, surprisingly often these two political opponents ended up with 
similar conclusions, despite their different views on the working of the 
economy. Hence, Jansen’s depiction of the two as a unified intellectual elite 
seems quite pertinent when it came to cooperation and problem solving in 
practice. Jansen’s emphasis on the undemocratic aspects of this procedure 
also seems correct, since despite lengthy discussions the government had not 
                                                     
73 Quote: Interview with Svend Viig conducted by William Jansen in August 1974, 
see Jansen 1975, p. 11. 
74 Letter of September 17 from Gunnar Jahn, “governor of the Central Bank of 
Norway Acting on behalf of the Government of Norway”, to the IMF, in enclosed 
file to GJD Ms4° 2579: 14, ”Møte i Bank and Fund 1949. Ad Devalueringen”; 
Jansen 1975, pp. 11-12. 
75 Jansen 1975, pp. 100-101. 
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agreed on what to do. However, a modifying practical side of Brofoss’ 
procedure was the fact that government members were scattered all over the 
country campaigning before the parliamentary election, and were therefore 
difficult to summon at short notice. 
By participating actively in the devaluation process, governor Jahn 
demonstrated a will to cooperate loyally with the government to solve 
practical policy problems. This also implied a will to compromise, since 
Jahn by professional conviction still opposed important parts of Labor’s 
economic policy, especially the continuing emphasis on economic planning 
and the lack of deregulation. However, this represented only one dimension 
of the central bank’s relations the political authorities. In public, governor 
Jahn still could appear as a fierce critic of the Labor government. An 
example of such opposition occurred in the aftermath of the devaluation of 
1949, when Jahn delivered the keynote speech at a dinner of the Norwegian 
Shipowners’ Association [Rederforbundet], in front of a prominent assembly 
of 220 politicians, senior civil servants and leading businessmen. There, Jahn 
launched a fundamental attack on Labor’s economic policy and accused the 
government of deceiving the public. Jahn claimed that the government tried 
to tone down the serious state of the Norwegian economy, criticized the 
estimates of the national budget for being inaccurate, and stated that the 
devaluation was caused not so much by the British steps as by underlying 
imbalances that required extensive retrenchment measures.76 
This attack could be interpreted as professional advice from the central bank 
governor to the government and public to ‘tighten their belts’. But by 
launching such profound criticism of Labor’s economic policy just before 
the parliamentary election, Jahn appeared more as a politician than a neutral 
professional. The speech created big headlines in leading newspapers, and 
caused the Ministry of Commerce to issue a statement completely rejecting 
Jahn’s account.77 Thus, rather than promoting changes in Labor’s economic 
policy, Jahn’s opposing arguments probably instead helped to undermine his 
                                                     
76 A full version of Jahn’s speech of September 30, 1949 was printed in Norges 
Handels- og Sjøfartstidenende October 1, 1949. 
77 Norges Handels- og Sjøfartstidende October 7, 1949; Verdens Gang October 8, 
1949. 
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professional credibility in the Labor government and increase its skepticism 
about the BoN.78 
3.7 Summary: contradictory trends and signals 
During the second part of the recovery period, the BoN was subject to two 
partly contradictory types of signals from the Labor government. On the one 
hand, based on ideological and political considerations, there was a drive to 
reduce the central bank into an agency completely subordinated to the 
Ministry of Finance. This drive induced initiatives to nationalize the 
privately owned stocks of the central bank and change the traditional 
reporting line between the BoN and the Storting, and also explains the 
government’s long refusal to settle and take formal responsibility for the 
occupational account in order to sort out the technical insolvency of the 
central bank. On the other hand, due to practical problems with the economic 
policy, the authorities continued to include the BoN in policy formulation 
and implementation. The foreign exchange and balance of payments 
problems in the aftermath of the currency crisis of 1947 meant that the 
nationalization drive was postponed twice and also caused the government to 
accept preconditions for receiving Marshall Aid that meant down payments 
on the occupational account and the withdrawal of surplus liquidity from the 
domestic economy. These practical challenges also occasioned governor 
Jahn and his officials to participate in negotiations for loans abroad and act 
on behalf of the Norwegian government during the devaluation process in 
1949. 
                                                     
78 Behind the scenes, minister Brofoss appeared less dismissive of Jahn’s arguments. 
According to Jahn’s own records, Brofoss privately admitted that retrenchment 
measures were called for, among them the reduction of the investment level. 
However, Brofoss feared reactions from the labor organizations and stated that 
nothing could be done before the general election. Jahn also reported that Brofoss 
had declared he would resign from the government after the election. The reason 
was that he repeatedly had been voted down in the government. Jahn regretted this 
news. He feared that Prime Minister Gerhardsen would replace Brofoss with “a new 
Meisdalshagen”, that is a politician who could “calm down the parliamentary group, 
the labor organizations and the Party” rather than a person with economic 
knowledge. Jahn encouraged Brofoss to continue in the government, and after Labor 
had won the 1949 election, he also personally contacted Gerhardsen in order to 
convince him to hold on to Brofoss. Gerhardsen gave no clear answers at the time, 
but the final outcome was that Brofoss continued as Minister of Commerce without 
any further commotion. 
See GJD September 24, October 3 and 18 (quotes), November 7, 1949. 
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Hence, the development of a new role for the central bank that had started 
with the currency crisis of 1947 continued, although not on a straightforward 
path. In this chapter, we have discussed several possible factors that 
influenced this development in different ways, some by promoting further 
influential integration of the central bank into Labor’s policy-making, others 
by reinforcing the drive for reducing the status of the Bank and increased 
control over it. A determining factor in the former development was 
governor Jahn’s continuing working relationship with Erik Brofoss. In 
public, the two could appear as fierce opponents, as in the case of Jahn’s 
attack on Labor’s economic policy just before the 1949 parliamentary 
election, but behind the scenes, based on a common priority of practical 
problem solving, Jahn and Brofoss cooperated constructively. The growing 
problems of maintaining the stabilization line and obtaining sufficient 
foreign loans also appear to have promoted a more common understanding 
between these two regarding the underlying causes, as Brofoss at least to 
some extent reconsidered his earlier disregard of the monetary side of the 
economy and the internal and external imbalances in the Norwegian 
economy. Hence, despite some remaining professional differences, 
especially concerning the efficiency of market regulations, Brofoss and Jahn 
surprisingly often ended up in the same position on key policy issues such as 
the timing of the nationalization, the settlement of the occupational account, 
and the devaluation. They also agreed on the importance of maintaining the 
BoN as an autonomous expert organization, and within the government, 
Brofoss could thereby try to counter Meisdalshagen’s initiatives to 
downgrade the status of the central bank. 
Governor Jahn’s cooperation with Erik Brofoss gave the central bank access 
to information and possibilities for influence, and networks between lower-
ranking civil servants in the central bank and the central administration in 
matters of foreign exchange yielded similar positive results for the BoN as 
an organization. However, the BoN not only benefited from these domestic 
relations, but also made good use of its international network of policy-
makers and other central bankers. During its history, the Norwegian central 
bank had developed particularly close contact with its Nordic counterparts 
and the Bank of England, and in connection with the devaluation of 1949, 
these contacts served as partners in ongoing discussions as well as sources of 
information. At the IMF meeting where the British devaluation finally took 
place, governor Jahn used his personal relations within the IMF and the 
Bank of England to obtain confidential information regarding the timing and 
extent of the devaluation. And once the devaluation was a fact, Jahn and his 
staff also discussed the consequences with their Danish colleagues. By 
operating at international arenas, such as the annual meeting of the IMF, 
governor Jahn and his staff strengthened the legitimacy of the Norwegian 
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central bank in foreign financial circles, a legitimacy that also improved its 
odds of surviving as an autonomous organization in domestic policy-making. 
The international context helped to strengthen the position of the BoN also 
from another perspective, as external events and demands continued to 
generated opportunities for active participation. Just as with the currency 
crisis of 1947, the lengthy process of the British devaluation in 1949 created 
an uncertain situation in which the government requested professional advice 
and information from the central bank. The BoN thereby became further 
involved in the formulation and implementation of the foreign exchange 
policy. Furthermore, in connection with the Marshall Aid program, the 
central bank had a renewed opportunity to promote the withdrawal of 
domestic liquidity as well as improving its own financial state, after the 
Marshall administration requested that its donations should be written off on 
the occupational account. In the end, the government delayed taking formal 
responsibility for the occupational account and thereby solving the technical 
insolvency of the central bank. However, by reducing a substantial part of 
the domestic monetary surplus, the partial installment of this account became 
a turning point not only in the postwar economic policy but also in the 
process of finding a new role for the central bank. Combined with the 
devaluation of 1949, which dealt a final blow to the stabilization line, the 
removal of the excess liquidity enabled the government to step up the 
liberalization of the domestic direct regulations, regulations that the central 
bank had taken little part in maintaining. The deregulation thus implied a 
renewed opportunity for the BoN to expand its participation in policy-
making, by suggesting much-needed new policy instruments, as we will see 
in chapter 4. 
Whereas the above relations and events contributed to the influential 
integration of the BoN into policy formulation and implementation, there 
was simultaneously a contradictory drive towards the downgrading of its 
status and increased political control. This drive was closely linked to 
finance minister Olav Meisdalshagen, who in economic policy appears 
almost as an opposite not only to Gunnar Jahn but also to his fellow minister 
Erik Brofoss. As a non-economist, Meisdalshagen did not share Brofoss and 
Jahn’s concern for the foreign exchange situation and appeared more 
preoccupied with domestic regional interests and national sovereignty. 
Meisdalshagen was also a leading force behind the drive for increased 
control over the BoN, and prepared for a downgrading that would have 
placed the central bank on the same footing as other state-owned banks, 
completely subordinated to the government. This was quite in accordance 
with Frisch’s earlier ideas of turning the BoN into an office in the Ministry 
of Finance. Meisdalshagen represented the left wing of Labor and many 
approved of his views on the BoN, an approval that grew when the central 
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bank became involved in the broader political debate between Labor and the 
non-socialist parties. 
The status of the central bank was subject to general political evaluation in 
the debate on Meisdalshagen’s proposal for nationalization and the changes 
to its reporting line. This debate revealed an all-party agreement that totally 
independent central banks in the orthodox sense were a thing of the past. 
Despite some Labor accusations to the contrary, the non-socialist parties 
accepted that the authority of the central bank in policy formulation and 
implementation had to be subject to political control. However, they 
disagreed with Meisdalshagen’s proposals in two important respects. Firstly, 
they rejected any attempts to break the traditional ties between the central 
bank and the Storting, and insisted that it was the national assembly rather 
than government that should exert the political control. Secondly, in 
continuation of this argument, they claimed that the BoN should be 
maintained as an autonomous organization. The ability of the Storting to 
control the dispositions of the government depended on maintaining the 
central bank as an autonomous expert organization that could provide the 
national assembly with independent information. Thus, the non-socialist 
parties saw the nationalization drive and the proposal to change the reporting 
line, along with the government’s reluctance to settle the occupational 
account, as threats not only to the legitimacy and status of the central bank 
but also as a constitutional challenge. 
Paradoxically, this advocacy in defense of central bank autonomy probably 
had the opposite of the intended effect. By linking the position of the BoN to 
the highly controversial balance of power between the government and the 
Storting, the non-socialist parties involved the central bank in high politics. 
This brought focus on Jahn’s political background and, from Labor’s point 
of view, created a close association between the central bank and the 
political opposition. Although governor Jahn mostly cooperated loyally with 
the government behind the scenes, in public, he often helped to confirm this 
impression, for example when he attacked the government just before the 
1949 election. By such public displays, Jahn thereby countered his own 
ambition of establishing the BoN as a politically neutral expert organization. 
Involvement in politics, with the subsequent undermining of professional 
legitimacy, was also the most important effect of the nationalization process, 
as well as the main contribution of the governing bodies, in terms of the 
changing role of the central bank. Whereas the formal shift of ownership 
from private to public had no practical consequences for the conduct of the 
central bank, since the private owners never had any operational influence, 
the fact that Meisdalshagen’s extended proposal to change the reporting line 
turned the nationalization process from a formality into a major controversy 
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helped to raise Labor’s political suspicions of the BoN as an autonomous 
organization. 
During the process of nationalization, the politically appointed members of 
the BoN’s governing bodies further politicized the central bank by voting 
according to party lines rather than providing more independent advice. 
Apart from such extraordinary political cases, however, the governing bodies 
seem to have played a limited role in developing a new role for the central 
bank during the first post-WWII decade. The Supervisory Council usually 
followed the advice of the Board of Governors, while the latter, according to 
the surviving sources, appears to have voted in accordance with the advice of 
governor Jahn. Jahn thereby follow up the tradition of his predecessor 
Nikolai Rygg and left his personal mark on most of the advice and 
resolutions from the central bank. 
Throughout the recovery period, a general trend in Norwegian policy-
making appears, a trend that probably also continued into more recent times, 
where informal communication behind the scenes often outweighed formal 
reporting lines and statutory provisions. In the process of nationalizing the 
BoN, this trend was exposed when the proposal to change the reporting line 
was launched by a Labor representative in the Supervisory Council, ignoring 
Labor’s formal minority position in the governing bodies and promoting his 
views through informal interaction with party colleagues. It was also 
underlying the attempts from finance minister Meisdalshagen to disregard 
standard procedures and exclude the central bank from both designing the 
new provisions and commenting on this matter. More fundamentally, this 
trend legitimized the replacement of the de jure rights of the BoN according 
to the Central Bank Act of 1892 with more informal political control. Hence, 
from one perspective, this emphasis on informal decision-making 
constrained the influence of the central bank in its relations with the political 
authorities. 
On the other hand, this trend also offered possibilities for the BoN. It implied 
that formal institutional changes such as the nationalization of ownership 
and changes to the reporting line as well as its continuing technical 
insolvency caused by the occupational account had only a limited effect on 
the de facto authority and autonomy of the central bank. Moreover, to the 
extent that governor Jahn and his staff managed to establish well-functioning 
networks with influential policy-makers such as Erik Brofoss, the central 
bank could benefit from this trend of informality. The devaluation of 1949 
illustrates that through such networks, the BoN could be closer to the center 
of events than the main parts of the Labor government. From the central 
bank’s point of view, there was never any doubt that Brofoss and the 
government had the final authority, but through active participation and 
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integration in the policy-making process, the BoN still obtained some 
influence. Moreover, and more importantly, this contributed to the process of 
finding a role in the new post-WWII political environment. And in this 
environment, nursing personal relations and participating in informal 
networks became an important path to influence for the central bank. 
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4 Opposition and compromise: from legislation 
to suasion (1950-51) 
 
In a contemporary perspective as well as in retrospect, the years 1950-51 
represented a watershed in post-WWII economic policy. After an 
unexpectedly rapid recovery from war damages, the economy was on the 
verge of transition from extraordinary to ‘normal’ times. At the same time, 
direct regulations of prices and resources in the domestic economy had to be 
phased out due to the international contractual obligations to liberalize, as 
well as experiences at home – including the currency crisis, the devaluation 
and the collapse of the stabilization line – which had demonstrated that 
direct regulations were difficult to maintain. As a result, around 1950, the 
Norwegian government, like most of its Western counterparts, was looking 
for new policy measures to handle inflationary dangers and balance of 
payments problems as well as ensuring continued influence on the economic 
development. 
At the 1949 election, the Labor Party had won a solid parliamentary majority 
and held a more powerful position than ever. The question was, however, 
which way the government would proceed when the direct regulations were 
abandoned. We have seen that Labor contained a wide range of opinions, 
from those who saw a socialist society as the final goal via representatives 
such as finance minister Meisdalshagen, who favored rural interests and the 
national control of resources, including firm control of the central bank, to 
associates of the Minister of Commerce, Erik Brofoss, who had a pragmatic 
approach to the choice of policy instruments as long as it promoted his 
strategy of large-scale industrialization and export-led growth, but who also 
seemed increasingly concerned with the economic imbalances caused by the 
direct market regulations. Did this concern imply a turn towards more 
market-based policy instruments, in accordance with governor Jahn’s 
principal views? Or would Labor further its ambitions to control the 
economy via market regulations, even if the direct controls over the 
production and distribution of goods and services had to be abolished? 
For the BoN, these uncertainties regarding the future economic policy 
represented a new window of opportunity. So far, the central bank had 
established an active role in the foreign exchange policy, and now there was 
a renewed possibility to influence also the choice of domestic policy means. 
How did the BoN respond to this opportunity? Previously, we have seen that 
in relation to the Labor government, governor Jahn switched between loyal 
cooperation and fierce opposition. Did this seemingly contradictory behavior 
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continue? And what were the consequences for the role of the BoN in 
domestic economic policy? 
This chapter will discuss the above questions in eight sections of which the 
first five analyze a little-noticed proposal to introduce a new policy 
instrument in the domestic financial market: deposit reserve requirements. 
Section 4.1 demonstrates how governor Jahn and his officials launched this 
as a new monetary policy instrument that would place the BoN in an 
influential position, while section 4.2 debates why this proposal had 
unexpected support from Frischian economists. The following two sections 
analyze the launch of an alternative model for deposit reserve requirements, 
which agreed more with the ambitions and views of finance minister 
Meisdalshagen. Section 4.3 discusses the primary purpose of this alternative 
model, namely to fund the struggling state-owned banks, while section 4.4 
focuses on the suggested role of the BoN in this new proposal and compares 
this to Meisdalshagen’s previous initiatives to downgrade the central bank. 
Section 4.5 presents reactions to the new proposal from Erik Brofoss and 
Jahn, and debates why the two responded differently despite sharing a 
common understanding of its consequences. Section 4.6 analyzes the role of 
governor Jahn in the establishment of yet another policy strategy, this time 
based on voluntary cooperation rather than statutory provisions. Section 4.7 
debates this cooperative strategy in a historical and international context. 
The concluding section 4.8 summarizes the shifting strategies of the BoN 
during this transitional period, and discusses their consequences for the 
establishment of a new role in domestic economic policy. 
4.1 Jahn initiates a flexible monetary instrument 
In February 1950, Gunnar Jahn forwarded a draft law to the Ministry of 
Finance, suggesting the introduction of flexible deposit reserve requirements 
as a new monetary policy instrument to influence bank liquidity and the 
general credit volume.1 This was the first step in a legislative process, which 
lasted until the Storting passed a new Act on deposit reserve requirements in 
June 1952. Historians have paid little attention to this process and without 
further comment have written off the deposit reserve requirements as an 
insignificant policy measure with few practical implications. From an 
economic and political perspective, this is understandable. As we will see in 
this and the following chapter 5, this Act was not implemented until 1955 
                                                     
1 Letter of 17.02.1950 from the Money and Finance Council to the Ministry of 
Finance, unpublished appendix to Parliamentary document St.prp. no. 129 (1950). 
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and then the reserve requirements were set at such a low level that it had 
only minor or no effect on bank liquidity. However, this outcome was not 
accidental. It was rather the result of a tug of war regarding not only the 
future economic policy but also the role of the BoN, a process in which 
governor Jahn and the central bank played a decisive part. 
The principal idea of Jahn’s draft law was that deposit reserve requirements 
would be a flexible and permanent monetary policy measure, maintained 
mainly by the BoN. As a model, Jahn explicitly referred to the US system 
where the central bank, the Federal Reserve, since 1917 had been allowed to 
instruct banks to place parts of their deposit on separate accounts in the 
Federal Reserve system and thus withdraw these means from circulation. 
After legislative revisions in the 1930s and in the summer of 1948, these 
deposit reserve requirements were gradually transformed into a flexible and 
potentially powerful instrument that the central bank could adjust relatively 
frequently in order to influence market liquidity and the circulation of 
money. These deposit reserve requirements were used in combination with 
instruments such as flexible discount rates and so-called open market 
operations, and thereby appeared as part of a market-based monetary policy.2 
Inspired by the US system, Jahn suggested that Norwegian joint-stock banks 
and savings banks could be instructed to deposit a maximum 20 per cent of 
their demand deposits and 10 per cent of their time deposits in a separate 
account in the BoN. This new instrument was designed as a separate act in 
order to make a clear distinction between these deposit reserve requirements 
and the reserve requirements already included in the two existing banking 
laws, which were established to promote bank solidity. Jahn argued that the 
new deposit reserve requirements should be a specific monetary policy 
measure, and to emphasize this exclusive purpose, he proposed that their 
basis of calculation should be each bank’s total deposits, except deposits 
from other domestic banks, and should not include less liquid assets such as 
government bonds and securities. By including the most liquid assets only, 
the deposit reserve requirements could be an effective instrument to 
influence bank liquidity and lending ability, and thereby the total credit 
                                                     
2 PM no. 1103 of April 19, 1950, by Alf Eriksen, the BoN, BoN-S box F-0003. 
Open market operations were a policy measure developed in Great Britain and the 
USA in the interwar period. They allowed central banks to influence the level of 
economic activity by buying and selling securities, short-term treasury bills in 
particular. 
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volume. Jahn also proposed that the new act should be permanent, to 
underline that this was intended as a long-range policy instrument.3 
The main purpose of Jahn’s initiative was to establish a policy instrument to 
battle the continuing inflationary dangers in Norwegian economy. Once the 
war-related excess liquidity had been abolished, the inflationary tendencies 
continued due to a growing credit volume. This growth was partly caused by 
Labor’s intensive public investment program to reconstruct and modernize 
the Norwegian economy, but private demand for credit had also increased. 
The traditional way to curb credit demand had been to increase interest rates, 
but unlike the many other countries that gave up their cheap money policies 
around 1950, the Norwegian government held on to its ambition to maintain 
low and stable interest rates. In addition to the inflationary challenges, this 
cheap money policy also created an allocation problem, namely to ensure 
sufficient funding for the specialized state-owned banks that were 
established to provide means to sectors of political priority. These banks 
were funded mainly by government bonds, but the traditional buyers of such 
securities, the financial institutions, were reluctant to purchase at the existing 
low rates. 
In Norway, increasing interest rates were politically unacceptable, and 
instead the short-term solution to this dilemma had been to appeal to the 
banks to volunteer to adapt their lending policy to the overall guidelines for 
the economic policy, in terms of both volume and purpose. This approach 
reflected a predominant view in Labor that financial institutions should 
operate less as ordinary business enterprises and more as part of a national 
infrastructure that promoted socially desirable activities. This implied not 
only a quantitative control of the credit volume, but also a qualitative control 
of the purpose of the loans. In January 1949, the BoN communicated this 
view in an appeal to the two national associations for joint-stock and savings 
banks: 
                                                     
3 Letter of 17.02.1950 from the Money and Finance Council to the Ministry of 
Finance, unpublished appendix to St. prp. no. 129 (1950). 
To compensate for the decentralized structure of the Norwegian banking system and 
prevent unintended and invidious consequences of the reserve requirements, Jahn’s 
draft also allowed varying percentages based on a bank’s size and geographical 
location. 
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If the banking community is to fulfill their function in society, they 
have to base their dispositions on social rather than private 
economic considerations. (…) We have found reason to issue an 
appeal to the banks to help lead the business community on to a 
healthy track and refuse to support enterprises that cannot be 
described as persistently benefiting our community.4 
When the BoN issued such a message, which could easily be associated with 
the Labor Party, this partly reflected the political control over the central 
bank. However, there was a wider historical precedent for appeals of social 
responsibility to the banking sector, which went beyond Labor’s governing 
regime. During the interwar period, based on similar ideas, we have seen that 
the authorities established voluntary cooperation with the banks to handle 
the foreign exchange crisis.5 And in the aftermath of the banking crisis in the 
1920s and the early 1930s, the BoN had also requested the banks to take 
social considerations into account. In 1924, in a letter to the Norwegian 
Bankers’ Association, the BoN had urged the joint-stock banks to ensure that 
“available capital was distributed in such a way that the most important 
needs – seen from a national economic perspective – were favored”, that the 
banks abstained from granting loans even if they were justifiable from a 
private economic point of view, and that they “endeavored to limit 
unnecessary consumption and less important imports”. In 1931, the central 
bank issued a similar statement, which, as in 1924, the Bankers’ Association 
distributed to its members.6 
                                                     
4 Letter of January 6, 1949, from the BoN to the Norwegian Bankers’ Association, 
the archives of the Norwegian Bankers’ Association at the National Archives, Oslo 
[hereafter: DnB-3], box: 42 B 103-106, file 103. 
[Quote: ”Skal bankvesenet fylle sin oppgave i samfunnet må bankene la 
samfunnsøkonomiske, ikke rent privatøkonomiske, synsmåter være avgjørende for 
sine disposisjoner. (…) Vi har funnet det riktig å rette en appell til bankene om å 
medvirke til at utviklingen av næringslivet ledes i et sundt spor, og at de avslår å gi 
sin støtte til foretak som ikke kan betegnes som en varig vinning for vårt samfunn.”] 
5 See chapter 1.4. 
6 Letter of November 1, 1924, from the BoN to bank director Kamstrup Hegge, 
Kristiania; circular no. 42-1924 of November 14, 1924, from the Norwegian 
Bankers’ Association to its members; letter of December 11, 1931, from the BoN to 
the Norwegian Bankers’ Association; circular no. 58-1931 of December 17, 1931, 
from the Norwegian Bankers’ Association to its members, all: DnB-3 box: 42 B 
103-206, file 103. 
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In times of crisis, such appeals appeared as a necessary measure to gain 
control, and it is probably that for governor Jahn and his staff this historical 
precedent legitimized, to a certain degree, the appeals of 1949, since they 
could not be seen merely as part of Labor’s governing ambitions. However, 
from an economic and political point of view, the fact that the banks could 
choose to obey or not to obey these one-way appeals made them insufficient 
as a long-term policy instrument, especially once the direct regulations were 
liberalized and monetary policy appeared as a key area of focus. Thus, the 
BoN was looking for more powerful instruments to influence the financial 
markets. Flexible deposit reserve requirements based on statutory provisions 
appeared as one such instrument. 
Gunnar Jahn’s draft law assigned an important role to the BoN. Although 
acknowledging that the government would have the final authority, the draft 
envisaged that the BoN would play a leading part in policy formulation and 
implementation by suggesting that the government should delegate authority 
so the central bank would be responsible for monitoring bank liquidity, 
initiating when and how the reserve requirements should be effectuated, and 
making sure that the banks followed their obligations according to the law. 
Thus, this proposal would reestablish monetary policy as a key part of the 
domestic economic policy as well as reintroduce the central bank as an 
expert organization and leading participant in this policy area. This latter 
ambition would be reinforced by an additional anticipation that: 
… such reserve requirements would facilitate a natural contact 
between the central bank and the private banks, a contact that has 
been non-existent since the war.7 
Maintaining the deposit reserve requirements could thereby help to restore 
the position of the central bank as a boundary organization, a position that 
                                                                                                                            
[Quotes from letter of November 1, 1924: “[Bankdirektør N.Rygg] innskjærpet 
betydningen av at bankerne drog omsorg for, at den disponible kapital fordeles på 
en saadan maate at de – nationaløkonomisk seet – vigtigste behov blir tilgodeseet”; 
”laan, som vel kunde ansees forsvarlige seet fra den laagivende banks standpunkt, 
men som under nuværende forhold ikke kan ansees berettigede”; ”[bankene] i det 
hele retter sine bestræbelser paa at begrense unødvendig forbruk og mindre nyttig 
import”.] 
7 Quoted from the Money and Finance Council, “Statement of  August 30th, 1950” 
[Uttalelse av 30. august 1950], p. 8, appendix to St. prp. no. 129 (1950). 
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had been lost once the surplus liquidity and direct regulations had 
marginalized the role of the BoN in domestic policy-making. As pointed out 
earlier, the theory on boundary organizations portrays central banks as 
agencies operating in the zones between international and domestic concerns 
and between the public and private spheres. By providing expert advice and 
participating in the foreign exchange policy, the BoN had reestablished some 
of its former boundary position between the political authorities and the 
banking sector and also maintained some influence regarding international 
concerns.8 By maintaining the new flexible deposit reserve requirements, the 
central bank could hope to regain a similar position also in the domestic 
monetary policy.9 
4.2 Surprising expert backing, but political resistance 
Gunnar Jahn designed the proposal for new deposit reserve requirements on 
his own, probably with some assistance from his officials in the central bank, 
but rather than forwarding the proposal from the BoN, he chose to send it to 
the Ministry of Finance in his capacity as chairman of the Money and 
Finance Council [Penge- og finansrådet], a committee of inquiry established 
in 1945 to assist the Ministry of Finance in matters of monetary policy, 
public debt, foreign exchange and credit control. Besides Jahn, the Money 
and Finance Council had a majority of economists more in favor of 
centralized planning and direct controls, including professor Ragnar Frisch 
and his former students Petter Jakob Bjerve, Gunnar Bøe and Knut Getz 
Wold. This choice of sender indicates that Jahn expected finance minister 
Meisdalshagen to be better disposed to this expert Council than to the central 
bank. 
Jahn was right to assume that the Ministry of Finance had confidence in the 
Money and Finance Council, and Meisdalshagen’s immediate response was 
to ask the Council for further investigation, where Jahn’s proposal for 
deposit reserve requirements would be discussed in a wider context of the 
monetary and fiscal policy measures that could replace the direct regulations. 
In his diaries, Jahn characterized the Money and Finance Council as the most 
difficult committee he had ever worked with, and he was particularly 
frustrated with the endless arguments from Frisch and his students regarding 
the theoretical basis for policy instruments that Jahn felt would in any case 
                                                     
8 See chapters 1.1, 1.2, and 2.5. 
9 PM no. 1176 of 06.07.1950, Minute from the annual meeting of the Nordic central 
bank governors in Oslo June 5th 1950, BoN-S, box F-0003. 
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be chosen for political reasons.10 Nevertheless, in the case of his proposal for 
flexible deposit reserve requirements, the Council gave Jahn unanimous 
support. 
In August 1950, the Money and Finance Council presented a report that 
concluded that due to balance of payments problems and the scarcity of 
financial and material resources as well as labor supply, new contractionary 
measures were necessary in both fiscal and monetary policy. In addition to 
budgetary cuts and tax increases, the Council suggested several monetary 
policy instruments, the most important being Jahn’s proposal for flexible 
deposit reserve requirements. Without reservations, the Council adopted 
Jahn’s draft law both regarding purpose and design. Flexible deposit reserve 
requirements ought to be a permanent part of the future monetary policy, the 
Council argued, and the BoN should play a key role in initiating and 
executing such a law. Moreover, the Council stressed the importance of 
improving the “natural” relations between the central bank and the private 
banking industry. In that connection, the Council also referred to a new, 
additional proposal from governor Jahn to arrange regular meetings between 
the BoN and the two banking associations, in order to discuss matters of 
qualitative credit control and to promote development that corresponded 
with guidelines laid down by the political authorities at any given time.11 
There are several possible reasons why the Council accepted Jahn’s proposal 
for deposit reserve requirements. Firstly and perhaps foremost, there was a 
definite and critical need for new policy measures to replace the direct 
regulations, and in itself Jahn’s proposal was compatible with Labor’s 
economic policy. Elsewhere such flexible reserve requirements often were 
part of market-based monetary policies, but they were also possible to 
implement without challenging the cheap money policy, since they merely 
were a way to tie up bank liquidity. Hence, compared to more radical advice 
from Jahn, for example to use the discount rate as a flexible measure, the 
deposit reserve requirements did not fundamentally challenge Labor’s policy 
strategies. Secondly, several other countries besides the USA had recently 
introduced deposit reserve requirements, among them neighboring Denmark 
(temporary act of 1942, suspended in 1949) and Sweden (temporary act of 
1937, replaced by a new act of June 3, 1949). Thus, combined with the wider 
                                                     
10 GJD November 24, 1951. 
11 The Money and Finance Council, “Statement of August 30th, 1950” [Uttalelse av 
30. august 1950], p. 8, appendix to St. prp. no. 129 (1950). 
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set of measures that the Council proposed, flexible deposit reserve 
requirements probably appeared as adequate to control the growing credit 
volume. 
A third explanation why the Frischian economists in the Money and Finance 
Council accepted Jahn’s proposal relates to the fact that this draft law 
represented a first attempt to introduce a monetary policy instrument based 
on statutory provisions, which implied active and frequent intervention in the 
Norwegian banking market.12 Traditionally, the principle of free banking had 
had a strong standing in Norway, and unlike in many other countries, 
Norwegian joint-stock banks had not been subject to any regulation until 
after the banking crises of the inter-war period.13 Hence, Jahn’s proposal in 
itself was by no means a liberalist initiative that could be associated with 
laissez-faire policies, but rather an attempt to introduce an effective macro 
management tool to control the credit volume, a purpose to which the 
Council majority also could relate. 
Jahn’s proposal for flexible deposit reserve requirements prepared for such a 
degree of state intervention in the banking sector that it provoked strong 
objections from the banks. In their written assignments on the Council 
report, the Norwegian Bankers’ Association and the Central Association for 
Norwegian Savings Banks both rejected the need for new, permanent 
legislation in monetary policy. Although they admitted that the direct 
regulations had to be replaced by new policy instruments, they claimed that 
any new legislation should be designed as temporary additions to the 
existing banking laws rather than be given any permanent character. 
However, the Bankers’ Association was highly critical even of such 
temporary provisions. Rather than immediately passing new legislation 
based on the Council’s proposal, the Bankers’ Association called for more 
thorough and comprehensive examinations and suggested that a second 
committee of inquiry, the newly appointed Money and Banking Committee 
of 1950 [Penge- og bankkomitéen av 1950], should reconsider the draft law. 
As an immediate action, the Association proposed expanding the voluntary 
cooperation between the banks and the political authorities. Unlike Jahn and 
                                                     
12 There was one prior instrument based on statutory provisions, namely the central 
bank’s discount rate, but the main purpose of this provision was not to serve as a 
monetary policy instrument in the domestic financial markets but to maintain the 
external value of the krone. 
13 See Ecklund and Knutsen 2000. 
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the Money and Finance Council, however, it did not present such 
cooperation as a permanent element of monetary policy.14 
This dismissive response from the banking associations appears primarily as 
an attempt to avoid regulations. In principle, Norwegian bankers, 
particularly the joint-stock banks, opposed Labor’s strategies for governing 
the economy and instead shared Jahn’s views on the need for flexible 
interest rates and market-based solutions. In practice, however, they 
followed the argument that any policy instrument should intervene as little, 
and with as much flexibility, as possible in the day-to-day business of the 
banks. Thus, even if Jahn’s proposal seems to agree well with the principal 
views of the banks, it also represented a powerful instrument that could curb 
their ability to grant loans and thereby appeared as a threat. 
To the Ministry of Finance, reexamining the proposed deposit reserve 
requirements was a welcome idea. Meisdalshagen probably perceived this 
proposal as yet another attempt from the central bank governor to oppose 
Labor’s economic policy. Jahn’s references to the US system were a 
provocative reminder of the fact that he primarily wanted a market-based 
monetary policy with flexible interest rates, while in the eyes of the finance 
minister, his emphasis on the BoN as the initiator and executor of a new law 
was like a red rag to a bull. To Jahn’s great frustration, Meisdalshagen 
basically considered him a political opponent rather than a professional 
advisor, and in March 1950 Jahn concluded in his diary: “Meisdalshagen has 
obviously no confidence in either the Bank of Norway or in me”.15 
Hence, based on his ambition to control the central bank, Meisdalshagen 
wanted changes in the proposal for new deposit reserve requirements. Even 
more importantly, however, such changes were required because Jahn’s 
proposal did not attempt to solve the critical problem of funding the state-
owned banks. In the following section, we will analyze this latter dimension 
in the light of a new law, before in section 4.4 we discuss how the Ministry 
of Finance and the Money and Banking Committee of 1950 prepared for a 
                                                     
14 Letter of October 19, 1950, from the Norwegian Bankers’ Association; letter of 
October 20, 1950, from the Central Association for Norwegian Savings Banks, both: 
BoN-S box H0001, file: “Penge- og finansrådet. Forslag til lov om bankers 
innskottsreserver i Norges Bank”, 1950-1951; P-1-1 
15 GJD March 15, 1950. [Quote: ”Meisdalshagen har åpenbart ingen tillit til Norges 
Bank eller meg.”] 
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complete exclusion of the central bank as an active participant in the 
monetary policy. 
4.3 Launching an alternative model: reserve requirements as a source 
of funding 
While the Money and Finance Council appeared as an expert committee of 
economists and civil servants appointed to give general advice to the 
Ministry of Finance, the Money and Banking Committee of 1950 had a 
broader composition and a more controversial purpose. This Committee was 
established by Royal Decree in March 1950 with a commission to examine 
the organization, functioning and purpose of the public and private financial 
system, as well as to propose legislative changes for joint-stock banks, 
savings banks, the Banking Inspectorate, and the BoN. The Committee was 
headed by Anders Frihagen, former Labor cabinet minister, director of the 
state-owned industrial bank Industribanken, and one of the most Labor’s 
most pronounced advocates of the socialization of private banks. Hence, 
many perceived this as a Committee in charge of reorganizing and increasing 
the political control over the financial system. Governor Jahn was originally 
offered a seat in the Money and Banking Committee but he was totally 
against this initiative, which he regarded as a first move by radical Labor 
members to nationalize the banking sector. Jahn tried in vain to convince 
Prime Minister Gerhardsen not to establish the Committee, and when he 
failed and was denied the role as chairman of the Committee, he refused to 
participate and instead asked deputy governor Sven Viig to serve as the 
representative of the BoN.16 Thus, when the Money and Banking Committee 
of 1950 was charged with redesigning the deposit reserve requirements, 
there was reason to expect some fundamental changes to Jahn’s original 
proposal. 
Besides the BoN and the two banking associations, the Money and Banking 
Committee of 1950 had a majority of members with a background in Labor 
and Frischian economics. Two of these members, Petter Jakob Bjerve and 
Gunnar Bøe, were also members of the Money and Finance Council, but in 
                                                     
16 Minute of March 14, 1950, from government conference, STAT-regj, series Db, 
minute book no. 6; GJD March 15, 1950; Borlaug 1994, chapter 2; T. Bergh, 
Storhetstid (1945-1965), the history of the labor movement in Norway, vol. 5, Oslo: 
Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1987, pp. 195, 200, 379f. 
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this new setting they no longer found reason to support Jahn’s original 
proposal.17 
When receiving the commission to redesign the deposit reserve 
requirements, this Committee majority immediately appointed an internal 
working committee constituted only of representatives who were critical of 
Jahn’s proposal, namely Anders Frihagen and the two representatives from 
the banking associations, Rolf Thorsteinsen (director of the Norwegian 
Bankers’ Association) and Arne Jensen (office manager of the Central 
Association for Norwegian Savings Banks). This confirmed governor Jahn’s 
expectations that the BoN would have little influence on the 
recommendations from this Committee. 
Within only a month, in early November 1950, the working committee 
presented a revised draft law that fundamentally changed the nature and 
design of the deposit reserve requirements, in terms of purpose, 
administrative routines and long-term position in the economic policy. The 
most important distinction from Jahn’s original proposal was that the new 
draft changed the purpose of the deposit reserve requirements from a specific 
monetary policy instrument into a more diversified tool that also could be 
used to fund the state-owned banks through the bond market. While Jahn had 
included bank deposits only in the basis of calculation of the deposit reserve 
requirements, the revised draft law of the working committee suggested that 
banks could meet the reserve requirements also by keeping government 
securities and government-guaranteed bonds. In this way, the working 
committee tried to ease the problem of funding the state-owned banks.18 
By expanding the basis of calculation, the working committee 
simultaneously reduced the liquidity effect of the reserve requirements and 
thereby their effectiveness as a macro-economic instrument. Moreover, any 
                                                     
17 The original members of the Money and Banking Committee of 1950 were 
Anders Frihagen (Labor), Trygve Bratteli (Labor), Konrad Nordal (the Norwegian 
Federation of Trade Unions), Gunnar Bøe (Labor), Knut Getz Wold (Ministry of 
Trade), Petter Jakob Bjerve (SSB), Rolf Thorsteinsen (the Norwegian Bankers’ 
Association), Arne Jensen (the Central Association for Norwegian Savings Banks), 
and Sven Viig (the BoN). 
18 Draft law of November 4, 1950, “Utkast til midlertidig lov om tillegg til aksje- og 
sparebanklovgivningen”, prepared by a working committee in the Money and 
Banking Committee of 1950, printed in Parliamentary document Ot. prp. no. 82 
(1950), appendix 2. 
Chapter 4 Opposition and compromise 
163 
anti-inflationary effects were more or less neutralized by a provision that 
allowed banks to increase their loans in the BoN against the security of 
government securities and government-guaranteed bonds. Banks could 
thereby effectively counter the liquidity effect of the requirements. The 
effectiveness and flexibility of this instrument was further reduced by the 
introduction of complicated and time-consuming administrative procedures 
to change the reserve requirements. While Jahn had based his proposal on a 
US model, in which the central bank easily could adjust the reserve 
requirements depending on current economic developments, the working 
committee proposed a procedure that among other things introduced 
mandatory submissions from the central bank, the Banking Inspectorate and 
the two bankers’ associations before the reserve requirements could be 
raised. Moreover, the committee created an additional administrative delay 
by stating that the government could not demand the requirements should be 
met “until 90 days at the earliest” from the date of an increase, a provision 
that definitely eliminated Jahn’s ambitions to use the reserve requirements to 
wield continuous influence over bank liquidity.19 
The new proposal also removed the element of permanency that Jahn had 
intended for the new deposit reserve requirements. In accordance with the 
requests of the two banking associations, the working committee 
recommended that the new provisions were made temporary. They thereby 
signaled that deposit reserve requirements were not meant as a long-range 
policy instrument. Finally, the committee suggested that the new reserve 
requirements were designed not as a separate act, but as an expansion of the 
existing banking acts. One technical reason for this was that the new and 
broader basis of calculation corresponded with the provisions on reserve 
requirements in these banking acts. In the following section 4.4, however, 
we will see that this seemingly practical solution had wider political 
consequences, as it generated a direct challenge to the role of the BoN as the 
executive agency in monetary policy. 
Governor Jahn had designed the new deposit reserve requirements as a long-
range, flexible and potentially powerful instrument that the authorities could 
use to wield continuous influence over liquidity in the banking sector and 
thereby the credit volume. The revised version created by Anders Frihagen 
and the representatives of the banking associations jeopardized this vision. 
The working committee – with the approval of a majority of the full Money 
                                                     
19 §2 of the working committees’ draft law, Ot. prp. no. 82 (1950), appendix 2, p. 15. 
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and Banking Committee of 1950, including Bjerve and Bøe – instead 
proposed a policy measure that could ease the problems of funding the state-
owned banks but, on the other hand, reduced its effectiveness and efficiency 
in the general monetary policy. From Labor’s point of view, the revised 
proposal thereby provided a temporary relief to the pressure for rising 
interest rates, while the representatives of the banking associations regarded 
this as an acceptable compromise regarding introduction statutory 
provisions, since it was only temporary, it limited the ability of the 
authorities to influence bank liquidity and it introduced favorable 
administrative arrangements such as extended deadlines for meeting the 
requirements and opportunities to influence through submissions. Hence, 
interestingly enough, this revised deposit reserve requirement appeared as a 
less interventionist solution than Jahn’s original proposal. 
4.4 The BoN challenged as an executive agency  
The redesigned deposit reserve requirements proposed by the Money and 
Banking Committee of 1950 represented a setback for governor Jahn in his 
efforts to generate more flexible monetary policy instruments. However, an 
equally serious challenge for the BoN was the Committee’s lack of 
guidelines regarding the role of the central bank. In this section we will see 
that by failing to make explicit the intended role of the central bank in the 
wording of the new act, the Money and Banking Committee of 1950 paved 
the way for an attempt from the Ministry of Finance to undermine the 
traditional role of the BoN as an executive agency in monetary policy. 
In the original draft law, Jahn had allocated a significant role to the BoN as 
the principal initiator and executor of the deposit reserve requirements, while 
he intended the Ministry of Finance to be relatively inactive apart from 
giving final approval to suggestions made by the central bank. The Money 
and Banking Committee of 1950, on the other hand, paid relatively little 
attention to this aspect. The main focus of the working committee was to 
design deposit reserve requirements as a source of funding and a policy 
measure, and, unlike Jahn’s proposal, paid little explicit attention to the 
possible side effects for the central bank. The only discussion of the role of 
the central bank was in the elaborating comments to §1 of the draft law, 
where the Committee introduced a fundamentally new element in Norwegian 
monetary policy by suggesting a division of labor between the central bank 
and the Banking Inspectorate. 
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Traditionally, the Banking Inspectorate had been engaged only in bank 
supervision and control that aimed at protecting depositors and promoting 
financial stability, and it had never played any part in the formulation or 
execution of the monetary policy.20 The Money and Banking Committee 
proposed to change this, and suggested the Banking Inspectorate should be 
co-responsible for enforcing the new deposit reserve requirements. The 
Committee stated that a “natural” practice of the new provisions would be 
that the BoN took initiatives to change the reserve requirements as part of 
the monetary policy, whereas the Banking Inspectorate through its on-site 
inspections and documentary examinations should ensure that the individual 
banks met these requirements. The Ministry of Finance would have an 
overarching responsibility to coordinate these two agencies.21 
By introducing the Banking Inspectorate as a participant in monetary policy, 
the Money and Banking Committee to some degree challenged the unique 
position of the central bank in this policy area. Nevertheless, the explicit yet 
almost casual remark in the elaborating comments to the new Act, which 
labeled the BoN as a ‘natural’ policy initiator, demonstrates that the 
Committee still intended the central bank to play a key part in policy 
formulation and execution. In the actual wording of the draft law, however, 
the Committee failed to express this intention. The draft law did not allocate 
any explicit function to the central bank as either initiator or executive 
agency. Instead, the Ministry of Finance was granted full authority to 
enforce the law, while the BoN was put on the same footing as the two 
banking associations and the Banking Inspectorate as bodies entitled only to 
comment on changes to the reserve requirements suggested by the Ministry 
of Finance.22 Furthermore, since the Committee’s draft law was designed as 
an addition to the two existing banking acts rather than a separate act, the 
Banking Inspectorate – which had the daily responsibility of enforcing these 
banking acts – intuitively appeared as the immediate executive agency for 
the Ministry of Finance also as regards the new deposit reserve 
requirements. 
                                                     
20 For an analysis of the supervision of financial markets in Norway, see: Ecklund 
and Knutsen 2000. 
21 Ot. prp. no. 82 (1950), appendix 2, p. 17. 
22 See §4, ”Midlertidig lov om tillegg til aksje- og sparebanklovgivningen”, Ot. prp. 
no. 82 (1950), appendix 2, p. 15. 
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By failing to define the intended role of the BoN in the wording of the law, 
the Money and Banking Committee gave an opening to the Ministry of 
Finance to undermine yet further the autonomy and authority of the central 
bank. Finance minister Meisdalshagen’s personal distrust of Gunnar Jahn, 
whom he regarded primarily a political opponent, and of the BoN as an 
autonomous organization, which he associated closely with the crises of the 
interwar period, suggested that he had no intention of assigning a renewed 
and active role to the central bank. 
Since the process of nationalizing the central bank, the relationship between 
finance minister Meisdalshagen and governor Jahn had deteriorated, and 
during the discussions about the new deposit reserve requirements this 
conflict peaked. The Ministry of Finance prepared a new Act on deposit 
reserve requirements without consulting the central bank at all, a neglect that 
caused Jahn to complain directly to Prime Minister Gerhardsen about 
Meisdalshagen’s behavior. After consulting Erik Brofoss, Jahn arranged a 
meeting with Gerhardsen in November 1950, where he ended up presenting 
the Prime Minister with an ultimatum: 
Either you dismiss me, or Meisdalshagen has to agree to consult 
me.23 
Jahn claimed that Meisdalshagen was wrong to consider him a “scheming 
Venstre politician”, and insisted that his main concern was to contribute 
professionally to improving the state of the Norwegian economy. 
Gerhardsen, however, was not prepared either to dismiss Jahn or to 
reprimand Meisdalshagen. Instead, he encouraged Jahn to talk directly to 
Meisdalshagen to sort out their problems.24 
When failing to make the Prime Minister intervene, Jahn confronted the 
finance minister directly in a meeting a few days later. Meisdalshagen 
denied that he consciously avoided conferring with the central bank, but 
pleaded his right to consult party colleagues without informing Jahn. 
Nevertheless, Jahn’s complaints seem to have made some impression, as the 
                                                     
23 GJD November 4, 1950. 
[Quote: ”Enten får dere avsette meg, eller Meisdalshagen får finne seg i å konferere 
med meg.”] 
24 GJD November 4, 1950. [Quote: “…han ser på meg utelukkende som en intrigant 
venstremann...”] 
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Ministry of Finance a few days later forwarded its draft for a new Act on 
deposit reserve requirements to Jahn. The BoN thereby received this draft 
even before Erik Brofoss.25 
From the BoN’s point of view, the proposal was even worse than expected. 
The Ministry of Finance ignored Jahn’s original suggestions for flexible 
deposit reserve requirements and instead based the bill directly on the draft 
by the Money and Banking Committee of 1950. Also, it envisaged even less 
authority for the central bank than the Committee had intended. In the 
parliamentary bill, the Ministry of Finance chose to disregard the elaborating 
remarks in which the Committee had depicted the central bank as the 
initiator of a new law. Instead it merely copied the wording of the Act 
without any further comments regarding the central bank. Consequently, the 
bill prepared for further downgrading of the BoN, quite in line with the ideas 
underlying Meisdalshagen’s previous initiative to change the reporting line 
of the central bank. All these initiatives challenged the traditionally unique 
position of the BoN in the financial system. In the case of the reporting line, 
the finance minister had argued that after the nationalization, the central 
bank could be placed on the same footing as regular state-owned or state-
guaranteed banks.26 In this new proposal for deposit reserve requirements, 
the Ministry of Finance went even further and wrote off the central bank off 
as a body entitled only to comment, on a level with the joint-stock and 
savings banks. 
The peripheral position of the BoN was confirmed by the fact that the bill 
was designed as an addition to the existing banking laws. It was thereby the 
Banking Inspectorate rather than the BoN that became formally responsible 
for maintaining this new policy instrument. Unlike the BoN, which was an 
autonomous legal entity, the Banking Inspectorate was organized directly 
under the finance minister. Without exaggerating the importance of such 
formal organizational differences, this was likely to facilitate the ministerial 
control over the Act, especially since the Banking Inspectorate had no prior 
experience in issues of monetary policy and therefore depended on the 
expertise of the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, from January 1951, the new 
managing director of the Banking Inspectorate would be Anders Frihagen, 
chairman of the Money and Banking Committee of 1950, who would 
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obviously offer the government less opposition than governor Jahn and the 
BoN. 
While the Ministry of Finance prepared for tighter political control of the 
central bank than ever before, in most other respects it followed the 
proposals of the Money and Banking Committee of 1950, regarding both 
motivation and design of a new law. It included securities and government-
guaranteed bonds in the basis of calculation, and thereby aimed at easing the 
problem of funding the state-owned banks at the cost of the liquidity effect 
of the new Act. The Ministry of Finance also retained the complex 
administrative routines for changing the reserve requirements, including the 
presupposed submissions, with one minor modification. Instead of a deadline 
of “90 days at the earliest” to meet the requirements, the bill reduced this to 
“60 days at the earliest”.27 Still, the bill was in every way far from the 
flexible instrument originally suggested by Jahn. 
The draft law provoked strong reactions, not only in the BoN but also in the 
Ministry of Commerce. Jahn characterized it as “the most obvious 
inflationary plan ever put forward by a Cabinet Minister”, and in his diaries 
he claimed that the Minister of Commerce, Erik Brofoss, was “almost as 
appalled as I am” over Meisdalshagen’s initiative.28 In a joint effort to stop 
the new Act, Jahn and Brofoss confidentially planned a strategy behind the 
back of the Ministry of Finance. Brofoss promised to argue strongly against 
the bill in the government, where he expected to have enough support to 
make Meisdalshagen ask for another revision of the proposition. Based on 
these expectations, Brofoss requested that the BoN should start such a 
revision right away. Jahn had set his civil servants to prepare written 
comments and alternative solutions immediately after receiving 
Meisdalshagen’s proposal, and now they started preparing another revision. 
Before meeting the rest of the government at the Prime Minister’s office, 
Jahn and Brofoss also carefully coordinated their arguments and discussed 
their speaking order in order to secure the desired support.29 
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ennå har sett lagt fram av noe statsråd.”]; GJD November 14, 1950 [Quote: ”Han er 
nesten likeså forfærdet som jeg…”]. 
29PM no 1186 of November 13, 1950, by Alf Eriksen, marked ”Confidential”, BoN-
S, box F-0003; GJD November 14 and 15, 1950. 
Chapter 4 Opposition and compromise 
169 
After lengthy discussions, the meeting with the government concluded with 
the seemingly promising agreement that Anders Frihagen and Jahn would try 
to reach a compromise between their two proposals. However, it turned out 
that Frihagen, who according to Jahn had received his instructions from the 
Ministry of Finance, could not be swayed.30 Still, the BoN completed its 
preparations for a revised bill, which Jahn then forwarded to Brofoss. After a 
few days of silence, the Minister of Commerce informed Jahn that their 
strategy had failed. Finance minister Meisdalshagen had demanded a vote of 
confidence in the government over his proposal for deposit reserve 
requirements, and although Brofoss had managed to gather support from two 
Cabinet Ministers, he had failed to convince the Prime Minister and thereby 
Meisdalshagen had his way. On November 17, 1950, the government 
thereby adopted the bill by Royal Decree and forwarded it to the Storting for 
further discussion.31 
4.5 Brofoss objects – Jahn prepares a new initiative   
The adoption of Meisdalshagen’s Act on deposit reserve requirements 
seemed to represent a total defeat for the BoN. Jahn’s attempts to introduce a 
policy instrument that could be part of a more market-based monetary policy 
and would have assigned an active and autonomous role to the central bank 
were completely set aside. Surprisingly enough, however, once the bill had 
been forwarded to the Storting, the governor seems to have refrained from 
further action. Instead it was Erik Brofoss who confronted the government. 
Several times before, Brofoss had suffered defeats in the government in 
matters concerning economic policy and the BoN, for example regarding the 
timing of the bills on nationalization and the occupational account in 1949. 
In these cases, Brofoss had avoided formal dissent by not attending the final 
preparations in the Cabinet.32 In the case of the new deposit reserve 
requirements, by contrast, Brofoss chose direct and forceful confrontation, 
and his main focus was the unfortunate consequences for the BoN. 
In a letter to Prime Minister Gerhardsen, dated three days after the 
government had forwarded the bill to the Storting, Brofoss raged against the 
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proposal to downgrade the BoN to a body entitled only to pass comments, 
and argued that this was a clear disavowal of both Jahn and the central bank. 
After having stated that the final control of the monetary policy 
unquestionably should be in the hands of the Ministry of Finance, Brofoss 
warned the Prime Minister against carrying through this parliamentary bill 
and thereby further undermining the authority of the central bank: 
After having made this clear [the final authority of the Ministry of 
Finance], it is also necessary to state that the Bank of Norway 
should be the executive agency of the Ministry of Finance (…). 
Before this arrangement [the deposit reserve requirements] is 
introduced, I request the Prime Minister to consider what would be 
the consequences if Jahn decided to tender his resignation. He has 
not indicated any such thing, but the present proposition must be 
understood as a clear disavowal of him and the institutions he is set 
to lead. In his place, I would not have hesitated a moment, but 
quite simply resigned. Whether he will do so, I do not know, but if 
he does, the Government must have an opinion on what to do 
next.33 
Whereas Brofoss clearly stated his mind after the government had passed the 
new bill, the objections from governor Jahn died down. The historian Einar 
Lie points out that Jahn, “who usually would not hesitate to take out the 
sledgehammer when things didn’t go his way”, seemed far less concerned 
than Brofoss with the fact that the bill left only a minor role to the central 
bank. Lie explains this apparent paradox by directing attention to Brofoss, 
and suggests that the Minister of Commerce used the argument of central 
bank autonomy in order to stop a bill that he felt had other significant 
weaknesses. The fundamental problem of Meisdalshagen’s bill, according to 
Brofoss, was the use of deposit reserve requirements as a source of funding 
for state-owned banks. The new deposit reserve requirements should instead 
be used to curb the increasing inflationary tendencies. Brofoss thereby 
agreed with Jahn that the reserve requirements ought to be designed as a 
specific monetary policy measure, and, according to Lie, he used the 
argument of central bank autonomy to push this point.34 
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By calling attention to Brofoss’ motives rather than Jahn’s lack of response, 
Lie seems to indicate that the bill did not represent any real threat to the 
position of the BoN and therefore did not alarm the central bank governor. 
However, there can be little doubt that Jahn and his officials were very 
concerned about the consequences of the new bill, both for the Norwegian 
economy and for the role of the BoN. They not only realized that the deposit 
reserve requirements in their present form would be insufficient to control 
liquidity and inflation, but also fully acknowledged that the bill undermined 
the position of the central bank in the financial system.35 Moreover, we have 
seen that Jahn, in cooperation with Erik Brofoss, worked hard behind the 
scenes in order to revise or stop the bill before its passing. Thus, the BoN 
was not quite as compliant as Lie assumes. 
Nevertheless, it remains a fact that Jahn toned down his opposition once the 
bill had been forwarded to the Storting. This, however, does not necessarily 
represent a paradox. In earlier chapters we have seen that Jahn throughout 
his time as governor had demonstrated that the sledgehammer was not his 
only weapon. He had also often turned to compromise and cooperation to 
obtain influence. Such a shift from opposition to compromise seems to have 
taken place once Jahn realized his objections to Meisdalshagen’s deposit 
reserve requirements had failed. Rather than continuing his opposition, Jahn 
instead turned his attention towards the second policy initiative he and the 
Money and Finance Council had proposed earlier, namely formalized 
cooperation with the banks. 
In their report of August 1950, Jahn and the Money and Finance Council had 
presented voluntary cooperation between the BoN and the banks as an 
instrument to supplement stationary provisions. From the point of view of 
the authorities, the rationale for choosing cooperation as a policy measure 
was to influence financial institutions to accommodate their operations to 
politically determined guidelines for economic policy in general and credit 
policy in particular. In 1950, this meant that joint-stock and savings banks 
should adapt their lending and investment practices in order to counteract 
inflationary pressures and provide funding to politically prioritized sectors. 
By trying to achieve this through negotiations rather than statutory 
provisions, the authorities could hope that banks would feel obliged to meet 
the agreed stipulations rather than try to evade political demands based on a 
law. 
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From the BoN’s point of view, formalized cooperation also represented an 
alternative way of improving its relations with the banking sector, now that 
the new deposit reserve requirements no longer assigned a key position to 
the central bank. Internal evaluations by the BoN concluded that 
Meisdalshagen’s bill would leave the central bank unable to “feel the pulse 
of the banking sector”.36 Thus, by obtaining a leading position in a 
cooperative system with the banks, the BoN could get access to information 
as well as possibilities for influence. This could also imply a renewed 
opportunity to become an important participant in domestic policy-making. 
A precondition for voluntary cooperation as a policy measure was the 
presence of common benefits and mutual trust between the parties involved. 
Hence, in order to make such a system work, Jahn would have to ensure that 
the banks were willing to commit to voluntary cooperation on a long-term 
basis. In the aftermath of the November bill, Jahn therefore approached the 
Bankers’ Association in confidence regarding a possible new arrangement 
for regular meetings between the BoN and the banks.37 
From the banks’ point of view, systematic cooperation with the authorities 
implied a possible danger of being taken “hostage” in the sense that the 
outcome of the negotiations could be cited as support for the government’s 
economic policy. Moreover, due to the dual role of the authorities as both 
participant in and supplier of terms for such cooperation, the banks had 
reason to question how equal the negotiating parties would be. Nevertheless, 
it turned out that the joint-stock banks were prepared not only to support an 
idea of cooperation as a short-term initiative to solve immediate problems 
but also to commit in a longer time-perspective. At a board meeting in early 
December 1950, the Norwegian Bankers’ Association gave “its fullest 
approval” to Jahn’s initiative, and stated that such meetings could create a 
basis for voluntary agreements with the authorities.38 
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With the support of the Bankers’ Association secured, Jahn was ready to 
address the Ministry of Finance again. And this time his proposals were met 
with approval. 
4.6 The Joint Cooperation Council: a compromise solution 
Just before Christmas of 1950, Jahn discussed the future credit policy at a 
conference with finance minister Meisdalshagen, Minister of Commerce 
Erik Brofoss, Minister of Local Government Ulrik Olsen, and several civil 
servants.39 At this meeting, Jahn presented his ideas on formalized 
cooperation with the banks, although his primary advice to the government 
was to ease the problems of funding the state-owned banks and controlling 
the credit volume by revising the interest rate policy and give up the fixed 
2.5 per cent level. Jahn underlined that raising interest rates would be no 
panacea, but it represented one of several necessary measures. However, as 
usual, the governor’s proposal for a more market-based monetary policy did 
not win much approval. To a majority of the government, and finance 
minister Meisdalshagen in particular, giving in to the upward pressure on the 
2.5 per cent discount rate was an unacceptable option. Formalizing and 
extending the cooperation with the banks, on the other hand, agreed much 
better with Labor’s ideas. Corporatist cooperation had been intended as a 
core element in Labor’s economic policy after World War II, and the 
government was eager to promote negotiations between the authorities and 
various industrial and professional groups in all areas of economic life. The 
introduction of formalized cooperation in the banking sector thereby went 
hand in glove with Labor’s party program. 
The outcome of the above meeting was that Meisdalshagen gave Jahn 
authority to compose a formal proposal for cooperation with the banks, a 
move that suggests that the finance minister – despite personal and 
professional reservations – still accepted the central bank as a key participant 
in such negotiations. The BoN had prepared a detailed proposal in advance, 
and already the following day, Jahn forwarded a letter to the Ministry of 
Finance, including a complete plan for systematic cooperation between the 
authorities and the banks. This plan offered descriptions of every aspect of a 
new council, from possible member candidates to its organization, frequency 
of meetings and membership conditions. 
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Governor Jahn proposed to establish a permanent council that would meet on 
a regular basis, at least every other week, in order to discuss various 
monetary policy issues such as the liquidity of the banking sector, lending 
policy etc. The council should serve as a link, or consultative group, between 
the banks and the authorities, and thereby help to “exercise a certain control” 
over the allocation of credit in accordance with economic and political 
guidelines at any given point of time.40 Jahn once again prepared to assign an 
influential position to the BoN, and stated that he intended to serve as 
chairman of the new council and preside at meetings. He also added a new 
dimension to the negotiations compared to previous cooperative solutions in 
the monetary and foreign exchange policy by suggesting that the council 
should include not only representatives from the central bank and the other 
banks, but also from the political authorities. Thus, Jahn proposed that the 
Council should have one member from the Ministry of Finance and one from 
the Banking Inspectorate. Jahn suggested that the Norwegian Bankers’ 
Association should be represented by three members and the Central 
Association for Savings Banks by one, a distribution that reflected the 
relative importance of these two groups as buyers of government bonds. 
While finance minister Meisdalshagen consistently ignored Jahn’s advice 
regarding flexible interest rates and new deposit reserve requirements, he 
proved more willing to listen to his initiatives on cooperation. As explained 
above, the primary view of the Ministry of Finance had been that statutory 
provisions should form a context for cooperative arrangements between the 
banks and the authorities. The idea was that measures based on legal 
authority, such as the new deposit reserve requirements, could serve as a 
‘hidden threat’ that would make banks more ready to comply with economic 
and political guidelines. In practice, however, formalized cooperation turned 
out to be an appealing instrument in itself. 
When the Ministry of Finance received Jahn’s proposal for a new 
cooperative council, the Storting had not yet passed the bill on deposit 
reserve requirements. Despite this, Meisdalshagen accepted Jahn’s plan with 
minor modifications. In a letter in early January 1951, the Ministry of 
Finance agreed to establish an advisory council, the Joint Cooperation 
Council [Samarbeidsnemnda], with representatives from the BoN, the 
Banking Inspectorate, the Ministry of Finance, and the two banking 
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associations. The new Council would be headed by governor Jahn, and in 
accordance with Jahn’s proposal, the mandate was to be a consultative body 
and a connecting link between the participating organizations. The Joint 
Cooperation Council would discuss guidelines for the loans and liquidity of 
the banks as well as their position in other respects, all in accordance with 
the fundamental principles for the economic policy as stated by the 
government at any given time.41 
Only in two respects did the Ministry of Finance diverge from Jahn’s 
original proposal. Firstly, it decided that the Association for Savings Banks 
would have two representatives instead of one, and thereby provided a more 
balanced representation between the two banking groups. Secondly, and 
more importantly, the Ministry of Finance made the new arrangement 
temporary. Rather than viewing formal cooperation as a long-term policy 
measure and creating a permanent agency, the Ministry of Finance dated the 
appointment of the new Council from January 1, 1951 “until further notice 
but for the time being no longer than until December 31, 1953”.42 This 
indicates that the Ministry regarded voluntary negotiations as a trial 
arrangement that could be abolished if they did not serve their purpose, an 
interpretation that agrees well with its earlier skeptical approach to 
formalized cooperation. As we will see, however, the Joint Cooperation 
Council became a more long-lasting agency than the Ministry expected. 
In the first – and so far only – comprehensive empirical study of the Joint 
Cooperation Council, the historian Marit Graff Hagen argues that “there is 
reason to believe” it was finance minister Meisdalshagen, not Gunnar Jahn, 
who extended the scale and scope of the Council from ‘bilateral’ 
negotiations between the central bank and the banks to an arena in which the 
banks also met with representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the 
Banking Inspectorate. Graff Hagen does not substantiate this claim 
empirically, and instead her interpretation seems to be based on a 
predisposed assumption that the Ministry of Finance was the dominant 
                                                     
41 Letter of 06.01.1951, from the Ministry of Finance to Gunnar Jahn, file no. 
7068/1950 C, BoN-S box D-0131. 
42 Letter of 06.01.1951, from the Ministry of Finance to Gunnar Jahn, file no. 
7068/1950 C, BoN-S box D-0131. 
Chapter 4 Opposition and compromise 
176 
player in post-WWII policy-making, an assumption that has been adopted 
and developed further by later scholars.43 
The surviving sources do not reveal any details of discussions between Jahn 
and the government before the Council was established, and it is therefore 
difficult to make any final assessment of who said what. Still, there is reason 
to believe that it was governor Jahn who initiated and drove this process. In 
his letter to the Ministry of Finance, there are no indications that his detailed 
proposal was the result of a joint effort or discussions with the government. 
Instead, Jahn consistently uses terms like “my intention is”, “in my opinion”, 
and “I propose”. He concludes the letter by encouraging the Ministry of 
Finance to “confirm” his suggestions.44 These phrases might of course have 
been the result of an oversized ego, but there are no signs of objections or 
alternative proposals either from the Ministry of Finance or the other 
participants. 
Thus, while the Ministry of Finance had expressed clear reservations about 
cooperation without underlying statutory provisions, the surviving sources 
indicate that it was Gunnar Jahn who first launched the idea of formalizing 
the cooperation between the BoN and the banks, he was the one to make a 
confidential approach to the Bankers’ Association in order to receive support 
for this idea, and he probably also designed the final proposal for the new 
Council, which included representatives from the political authorities. And 
in all essentials the Ministry of Finance accepted this proposal in terms of 
mandate, composition, and the role of the BoN governor as council 
chairman.  
For the BoN, there were also obvious reasons for expanding the scale and 
scope of the new Council. The strained relations between Jahn and 
Meisdalshagen and the lack of communication between their two 
organizations suggested that unless the Council in some way included the 
Ministry of Finance, its influence and importance would be limited. 
                                                     
43 M. Graff Hagen, Samarbeidsnemnda. En studie av samarbeidet mellom staten og 
de private kredittinstiusjoner 1951-1965, post-graduate thesis [hovedoppgave] in 
history, Oslo: University of Oslo, 1977, pp. 19, 34 and 201. See also: T. Nordby, 
Korporatisme på norsk. 1920-1990, LOS-series, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1994, p. 
63; Lie 1995, pp. 226-227. 
44 Letter of 21.12.1950, from Gunnar Jahn to finance minister Olav Meisdalshagen, 
BoN-S box D-0131. 
Chapter 4 Opposition and compromise 
177 
Participation by the Ministry of Finance thereby appeared as a precondition 
rather than an obstacle for actual influence over policy formulation. 
Moreover, from the theoretical perspective of boundary organizations, 
including the Ministry of Finance in the Council could also benefit the 
central bank by reestablishing its position as an intermediary between the 
political authorities and the private banks also in domestic policy. Hence, no 
matter who initiated this expansion, it was almost certainly welcomed by the 
central bank. 
Rather than trying to decide who initiated and decided the design of the Joint 
Cooperation Council, an alternative and perhaps more interesting approach 
is to emphasize the element of compromise on which it was based. The new 
Council represented advantages and drawbacks for all the main parties 
involved. For the Ministry of Finance, it implied an immediate way to ease 
the critical problem of funding the state-owned banks as well as an arena that 
might potentially improve communication with and influence over the 
banking sector. On the other hand, the Ministry had explicitly stated 
reservations about formalized cooperation without underlying statutory 
provisions, and since the Storting not yet had passed the new Act on the 
deposit reserve requirements, the government had no alternative measures to 
fall back on if the negotiations failed. Moreover, to the Frischian economists 
in the Ministry of Finance, with their high ambitions of centralized planning 
and coordination of economic policy, the idea of formulating credit policy 
through negotiations rather than instructions probably appeared less than 
ideal. 
The Joint Cooperation Council also had it its pros and cons from the point of 
view of the central bank. To governor Jahn, this arrangement appeared as a 
second-best solution, and he did express doubts regarding the outcome of 
such negotiations.45 Jahn and his staff would have preferred to govern the 
economy through flexible discount rates and deposit reserve requirements, 
which they believed would lead to a more balanced economy, more effective 
control of the general economic development, as well as a more efficient role 
for the BoN. However, given the poor results when trying to advocate 
market-based monetary policies, the Joint Cooperation Council appeared as 
an alternative that could to some extent balance the lack of policy measures 
after the liberalization of direct controls. Furthermore, as chairman of the 
Council, governor Jahn could reestablish the central bank in a key position in 
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domestic economic policy and thereby potentially improve the relations not 
only with the banking sector but also with the political authorities. 
The element of compromise in the establishment of the Joint Cooperation 
Council was most limited for the banking organizations. By engaging in 
formalized negotiations, the banking organizations could obtain information 
and improve their relations with the BoN and the political authorities and 
thereby make their problems and considerations better known. They could 
also hope that the formalized cooperation would postpone, or even replace, 
statutory provisions as the main policy instrument in the future credit policy. 
Still, they ran the risk to becoming too closely associated with the economic 
policy of the Labor government, and, since the banking organizations only 
had the authority to advise rather than instruct their members, they could 
also risk jeopardizing the new negotiations if their members did not live up 
to the agreed result. In that case, the Joint Cooperation Council would 
probably be a short-lived affair as the Ministry of Finance could refuse to 
continue the arrangement. 
4.7 Moral suasion – beyond Labor corporatism  
In historical analyses of Norwegian post-WWII economic policy, most 
scholars have, without further discussion, interpreted the Joint Cooperation 
Council mainly in a national context and seen it as part of Labor’s 
corporatist ideas and ambitions.46 No doubt, the Joint Cooperation Council 
agreed well with Labor’s economic and political program. Since the interwar 
period, corporatist ideas had been central to the Labor movement, and a 
corporatist reorganization of Norwegian economic production was a key 
element of Labor’s political program. From the perspective of the 
government, the basic idea of corporatism was to combine democracy with 
efficiency: through binding negotiations the authorities could force and 
motivate trade associations and other industrial organizations and 
corporations to take social responsibility.47 Formal negotiations became a 
cornerstone in Labor’s income policy, and the government also tried to apply 
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corporatist principles in other areas, such as the introduction of industrial 
democracy and worker participation in corporate management.48 Hence, 
Jahn’s initiative to use negotiations as a credit policy measure agreed well 
with Labor’s program. 
Nevertheless, viewing the voluntary negotiations in the Joint Cooperation 
Council merely as a result of Labor’s corporatist ambitions is too simplified. 
We have already seen that this Council was in fact initiated by governor Jahn 
and the BoN rather than the Labor government, and that similar techniques 
had historical precedent in Norwegian politics well before Labor entered 
office. During the foreign exchange and banking crises of the interwar 
period, appeals for social responsibility had been made to the banking sector, 
and the BoN had also established formalized cooperation with the banks in 
the so-called Foreign Exchange Committee [Valutakomitéen].49 Moreover, 
after World War II, so-called ‘moral suasion’ appeared as an increasingly 
popular policy measure also in other countries, without being part of any 
wider corporatist systems or ambitions. 
Moral suasion can be defined as a persuasion tactic used by an authority to 
influence and pressure, but not force, members into adhering to a policy. 
This tactic can be used either as a supplement or an alternative to statutory 
provisions, and in the latter case, moral suasion has been characterized as the 
“rule of men” as opposed to the “rule of law”.50 A brief international 
comparison shows that in the early 1950s, a series of countries tried out 
moral suasion as a strategy in monetary policy. In Europe, countries like 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Finland and Denmark 
introduced formal but not legally binding understandings, usually called 
‘gentlemen’s agreements’ between the political authorities and the financial 
institutions. And in the USA, market-based policy measures such as open 
market operations and flexible deposit reserve requirements were 
supplemented by formalized cooperation in 1951, when the Board of 
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Governors of the Federal Reserve System appointed a National Voluntary 
Credit Restraint Committee comprising representatives of commercial 
banking, investment banking and life insurance, which aimed at restraining 
private credit expansion through voluntary initiatives rather than statutory 
provisions.51 
This raises the question to what extent was the Joint Cooperation Council 
inspired by practices in other countries. In historical studies where oral 
sources no longer are available, the direct transfer of knowledge on 
relatively informal policy measures such as moral suasion can be difficult to 
trace, since such transfers are rarely manifested in writing and kept in 
archives. In the case of the Cooperation Council there are no surviving 
sources that provide direct confirmation of any international sources of 
inspiration, but there are still some indirect indications of inspiration from 
the two countries that probably served also as models for the cheap money 
policy, namely Great Britain and Sweden.52 Both these countries introduced 
moral suasion through systematic appeals and negotiations with the banking 
sector before 1950. 
In Great Britain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer issued appeals and 
qualitative guidelines in 1939, 1945, 1947, and twice in 1949. These 
encouraged banks to restrict their lending to sectors and projects without 
political priority, to give priority to initiatives that could improve the balance 
of payments, and to help to curb inflation by reducing their loans in general. 
These appeals were thus designed to fight some of the same problems that 
the Norwegian authorities faced, and were similar to the 1949 appeal from 
the BoN. In Sweden, the authorities extended the form of the moral suasion 
by entering into formal agreements with the banks in 1947, 1948, 1949, and 
1950. These committed the banks to restrict their lending policies. From 
1950, these agreements were supplemented by with statutory provisions; 
first on deposit reserve requirements and later on interest rate control. 
However, the Swedish government avoided carrying through the new Act on 
interest rate control and instead allowed these statutory provisions serve as 
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“a gun on the table” during negotiations with the banks.53 This Swedish 
practice was therefore similar to the strategy preferred by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance, that is, to use statutory provisions as a hidden threat 
rather than carry them into effect. 
The surviving sources do not offer much information on any direct transfer 
of moral suasion as a policy measure from these or other countries. And the 
fact that similar arrangements had been used before in Norway indicates that 
the Joint Cooperation Council could have been established without such 
international influence. Nevertheless, through international publications as 
well as direct interaction with other countries, it is highly likely that the 
Norwegian policy-makers were well aware of similar arrangements abroad. 
Thus, it is probable that the increasing international popularity of moral 
suasion as a monetary policy instrument did at least contribute to an 
awareness of this as a possible solution to ease the domestic problems of 
curbing the credit volume, keeping interest rates low, and funding the state-
owned banks. 
4.8 Summary: leaving the traditional role behind 
During the transition from postwar recovery to more regular times, the 
search for new instruments revealed that Labor still had high ambitions to 
govern the economy through market regulations. Even though there had been 
indications of a reorientation in the government regarding economic policy 
and the underlying causes of the inflationary problems, this did not imply a 
more positive attitude towards market-based policy solutions, as governor 
Jahn had hoped. While several other countries, such as Great Britain and 
Sweden, abandoned or eased their cheap money policies around 1950, the 
Norwegian government adhered to this strategy, which became a cornerstone 
in the economic policy during the following decades and meant that the 
volume and allocation of credit could not be influenced by manipulation of 
the price mechanism but instead were subject to quantitative and qualitative 
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controls. Monetary policy in the traditional sense was thereby abolished also 
on a long-term basis and replaced by a new credit policy, which implied the 
indirect regulation of resource allocation and the level of economic activity 
but still maintained much of Labor’s previous ambitions to maintain 
centralized planning and control. 
The search for new policy instruments in 1950/51 appeared as an 
opportunity for the BoN to expand its participation and influence from the 
foreign exchange policy to the domestic economic policy. Governor Jahn 
initially responded to this by advising the government to ease the interest 
rate controls and introduce flexible deposit reserve requirements. Although 
this latter policy measure in itself was compatible with Labor’s ambitions for 
market regulations, the deposit reserve requirements could easily be 
integrated into a market-based monetary policy, and since Jahn explicitly 
referred to the US system in his advocacy, this initiative was – rightfully – 
perceived as opposition to Labor’s economic policy. 
The fact that Jahn forwarded his proposal from the Money and Finance 
Council rather than the BoN suggests an attempt to counter minister 
Meisdalshagen’s lack of confidence in the central bank. And even though 
this ruse was not successful, it did occasion surprising support from Ragnar 
Frisch and several of his students. A reason for this support might have been 
that these economists not only realized the urgent need for new policy 
instruments that could curb inflation, but also recognized Jahn’s proposal as 
a first attempt to introduce statutory provisions that could be used effectively 
to influence bank liquidity. Jahn’s proposal prepared for active state 
intervention to such a degree that it was rejected by the banking 
organizations, which preferred the alternative version of the deposit reserve 
requirements designed in the Money and Banking Committee of 1950 and 
adopted by the Ministry of Finance. Hence, Jahn’s flexible deposit reserve 
requirements in fact prepared for more effective intervention in the banking 
sector than Labor’s later proposal. This confirms the impression that at this 
point in time, Jahn’s economic and political approach by was far from one 
based on liberalist ideas of laissez-faire politics. 
When the Ministry of Finance still rejected Jahn’s proposal, this was 
probably caused partly by the influential role assigned to the BoN, which 
gave the Bank the authority to monitor the liquidity in the banking sector, 
initiate and carry out changes in the reserve requirements and ensure that the 
banks met their obligations. It also suggested a correspondingly passive role 
for the Ministry of Finance, which would provide formal approval of the 
proposals from the central bank. The response from the Ministry of Finance 
to this initiative was to prepare for a hitherto unprecedented downgrading of 
the BoN. In the previous changes to the reporting line of the central bank, 
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Meisdalshagen had compared the BoN to regular state-owned banks and 
thereby played down its traditional superior position in the financial system. 
In its alternative proposal for new deposit reserve requirements, the Ministry 
of Finance went even further and ignored the intention of the Money and 
Banking Committee of 1950, which felt that the central bank would have a 
natural role as the initiator of a new Act. Instead, this proposal reduced the 
BoN to a body entitled to comment only, on the same level as the private 
banks. Moreover, by designing this new policy measure as an extension of 
the existing banking acts, which were maintained by the Banking 
Inspectorate, the Ministry of Finance introduced this traditionally 
supervisory body into policy formulation and implementation, a initiative 
that also fundamentally challenged the role of the central bank in monetary 
policy.  
Jahn’s attempt to reintroduce the central bank in a traditional role thus 
apparently failed, and his proposal for a new monetary instrument was also 
rejected. From the point of view of the Ministry of Finance, a fundamental 
flaw in Jahn’s proposal was that it did not address the urgent problem of 
funding the state-owned banks without raising interest rates. By including 
government bonds and securities in the basis of calculation for the deposit 
reserve requirements, the Ministry of Finance tried to ease this problem, but 
this simultaneously reduced their effect as a monetary instrument to 
influence liquidity. This effect was further undermined by the provision that 
secured the banks the right to increase their loans in the central bank against 
the security of government securities and government-guaranteed bonds. The 
flexibility of the reserve requirements was abolished by complex and time-
consuming administrative procedures. Thus, instead of a potentially potent 
and flexible instrument to fight inflation, as Jahn had intended, this new 
version of deposit reserve requirements appeared as an ineffective measure 
barely suited to ease the funding of the state-owned banks. 
Rather than objecting to this disavowal of the central bank, governor Jahn 
kept a low profile once Meisdalshagen’s parliamentary bill was forwarded to 
the Storting. Instead, the governor seems to have shifted his strategies from 
opposition to compromise. Previously, we have seen that Jahn had often 
shifted between opposition and cooperation in his relations to the political 
authorities, often in a seemingly random way. One moment he cooperated 
loyally with the government and confirmed his ambition to establish the 
central bank as a neutral expert organization, the next he launched fierce 
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public attacks and appeared as a political opponent of the government and 
thereby helped to politicize the central bank.54 While these previous shifts 
often seemed somewhat arbitrary, Jahn’s shift from opposition to 
compromise this time appears more conscious and strategic, based on a 
repeated experience that any initiatives that conflicted with Labor’s 
ambitions to maintain continuous market regulations were futile. Jahn thus 
refrained from further protests and instead prepared for a new policy 
instrument based on voluntary cooperation with the banks; one that agreed 
with Labor’s corporatist ideals, but was also legitimized by historical and 
international precedent, and still assigned an active and influential role to the 
BoN. 
For governor Jahn, as for all the parties involved, the Joint Cooperation 
Council was based on the will – or necessity – to compromise. Jahn would 
primarily have preferred market-based policy instruments, but settled for 
voluntary negotiations in which the central bank played a key role. The 
Ministry of Finance favored statutory provisions (although of a different 
design) as the basis for the new credit policy: provisions that would not 
necessarily would be carried out but could also serve as a ‘hidden’ threat in 
more informal negotiations, but still accepted the establishment of the 
Council before the Storting had passed the new deposit reserve requirements. 
The banking organizations were willing to participate in order to avoid more 
extensive state intervention, despite running the risk of being ‘taken hostage’ 
and becoming too closely associated with Labor’s economic policy. 
The composition of the new Council implied a formalization and further 
development of earlier practices in the monetary and foreign exchange 
policy. From the authorities’ point of view, it had a similar purpose as the 
previous one-way appeals and formalized cooperation, namely to persuade 
banks to adapt their operations to political guidelines. To some extent the 
organization of the Council also was based on previous experience since it 
was headed by the BoN, and the banking organizations were represented 
through their national organizations.55 Moreover, like the earlier 
arrangements that were initiated to solve crises in the monetary and foreign 
                                                     
54 See chapter 3. 
55 These historical lines were present not only at an organizational but also at an 
individual level, since one member of the Foreign Exchange Committee in the 
interwar period, the president of the Central Association for Savings Banks, H. 
Gundersen, also was one of the original members of the Joint Cooperation Council. 
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exchange policies, the Cooperation Council was also established to ease an 
immediate problem, namely the funding of the state-owned banks. However, 
unlike previous arrangements, the new Council was not a pure ad-hoc 
solution. It had, at least from the perspective of the BoN and the private 
banks, a potential of permanency. Another novelty was that the political 
authorities were represented in the negotiations, which previously had been 
held between the central bank and the banking organizations. For the BoN, 
including the Ministry of Finance in the negotiations probably appeared as a 
precondition for success, since this reduced the chances that finance minister 
Meisdalshagen and his staff would ignore this new policy arena. In addition, 
as head of the new Council, there was a potential for the central bank to 
strengthen its boundary position between the political authorities and the 
banking sector. 
This process of introducing new measures in 1950-51 reveals three 
important characteristics, which were decisive for how and why the BoN 
found a new role in Labor’s policy regime after World War II. Firstly, 
governor Jahn and his staff displayed an ability to ‘stay in the game’: to 
continue their efforts to influence policy formulation and implementation 
despite facing repeated defeats and attempts to undermine the authority and 
autonomy of the central bank. Rather than leaving the arena to the Ministry 
of Finance and accept submission, the BoN continued to define and redefine 
policy measures and test the limits of the new political framework 
surrounding the central bank. This endurance finally led to the second 
decisive point for finding a new role, namely to develop a policy instrument 
that the Labor government not only accepted but actually welcomed, a tool 
that still assigned an important role to the BoN as intermediary between the 
political authorities and the banks. 
Thirdly, in this process, governor Jahn continuously used his personal 
relations and interaction behind the scenes to promote the interests of the 
central bank. On the one hand, Jahn confronted his opponent Olav 
Meisdalshagen, when he felt that the BoN was ignored in the policy-making 
process. In the case of the deposit reserve requirements, this conflict peaked, 
and Jahn tried in vain to involve Prime Minister Gerhardsen but ended with a 
personal confrontation with Meisdalshagen, who seemingly complied with 
Jahn’s demands. On the other hand, Jahn nursed his working relationship 
with Erik Brofoss. Jahn consulted Brofoss before confronting Gerhardsen 
and Meisdalshagen, whereas Brofoss protested against the new deposit 
reserve requirements on behalf of governor Jahn and the BoN. Jahn and 
Brofoss, who agreed that these reserve requirements were insufficient to 
battle inflation and also mistreated the central bank, also made a joint effort 
to stop the new Act, an effort that included consultations behind 
Meisdalshagen’s back, a redesigning of the new proposal, and careful 
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coordination of their arguments and presentation. Although their efforts 
failed, this cooperation gave governor Jahn and his staff access to important 
information not only on the policy-making process but also on internal 
conditions within the government. Nevertheless, since Brofoss repeatedly 
failed to convince the government in important policy matters, this working 
relationship generated fewer results for the BoN in domestic economic 
policy than it had initially in the foreign exchange policy. 
All in all, both governor Jahn’s use of personal networks and the 
establishment of the Joint Cooperation Council agreed well with the general 
trend in Norwegian policy-making, that informal communication behind the 
scenes often outweighed formal reporting lines and statutory provisions. In 
the following chapter 5, we will se how this interaction affected the 
emerging role of the BoN, once the new Cooperation Council started its 
operations. 
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5 Towards the institutionalization of a new role 
(1951-54) 
 
Since the currency crisis of 1947, the BoN had gradually reestablished a 
more influential role in Labor’s economic policy, first in the foreign 
exchange policy, and, with the establishment of the Joint Cooperation 
Council (JCC), potentially also in the new domestic credit policy. The 
question was to what extent would this become an institutionalized part of 
Labor’s new policy regime. The institutionalization of new practices and 
structures occurs when they are taken for granted and they appear to be the 
obvious solution. So far, we have seen that the increased de facto 
participation and influence of the BoN had been countered by attempts from 
the government to downgrade its autonomy and authority. Would these 
contradictory tendencies continue during the final years of Gunnar Jahn’s 
governance, or would the role of the central bank finally be clarified and 
settled? 
The position as head of the JCC offered the BoN possibilities of improving 
its boundary position between the political authorities and the banking 
sector. This could reestablish the central bank as an influential intermediary 
and boundary organization not only between these two entities but also 
between international and domestic concerns, a position that the central bank 
had lost since the breakdown of the gold standard system. However, this 
presupposed that the JCC became an important policy-making arena. If the 
voluntary negotiations failed, it was highly likely that the Ministry of 
Finance would resume its original idea of controlling the volume and 
allocation of credit through statutory provisions, beginning with the new 
deposit reserve requirements, the latest version of which had envisaged an 
unprecedented downgrading of the role of the central bank. Hence, the 
ongoing practices and the degree of influence of the JCC appeared to be of 
vital importance for resolving the future role of the BoN. 
So far, the de facto role of the BoN had diverged from the declared 
ambitions of the government to establish full political control over the 
central bank, in the sense that the Bank had established a somewhat more 
active and influential position in policy formulation and implementation. 
However, in the legislative processes for nationalization and changes to the 
reporting line of the central bank, as well as in the proposal for new deposit 
reserve requirements, we have seen that the government had consistently 
attempted to underpin its declared ambitions by assigning the Bank a 
subordinate de jure role. Nevertheless, according to the old Central Bank Act 
of 1892, the formal de jure position of the Bank still was one of political 
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autonomy and authority. Would the government try to substantiate its 
ambitions of increased political control by changing the Central Bank Act? 
From an institutional perspective, such changes in formal legislation could 
underpin and perhaps also further increase the political control over the 
BoN. This suggests that the government would take new legislative 
initiatives, and if not, why did it refrain from doing so? 
The above questions will be discussed through the eight sections of this 
chapter. The first two analyze the role of the BoN and the JCC in the 
continuing process to introduce new deposit reserve requirements. Section 
5.1 examines how the central bank, through its position in the JCC, had 
renewed opportunities to influence this legislative process, while section 5.2 
discusses how and why the new Act on deposit reserve requirements had 
little significance as a policy instrument but still was important for the 
formal position of the central bank. Sections 5.3 through 5.5 analyze the role 
of the BoN and the JCC in practical policy-making during the early 1950s, 
and question the established view that the Ministry of Finance controlled and 
drove the development of a new credit policy. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 examine 
the active role of the BoN and the JCC in designing and maintaining new 
credit controls, while section 5.5 debates why they failed to establish a 
similar position in the matter of funding the state-owned banks. Section 5.6 
illustrates how the cheap money policy entered a new phase in the early 
1950s, and discusses how this cornerstone in Labor’s economic policy 
continued to influence the autonomy and authority of the central bank. 
Section 5.7 discusses initiatives to establish a new de jure position for the 
BoN by replacing the old Central Bank Act of 1892, whereas the concluding 
section 5.8 sums up the period 1951-54 and discusses to what extent the 
BoN institutionalized a new role during these final years of Gunnar Jahn’s 
governance. 
5.1 The postponement and redesign of the deposit reserve 
requirements 
The founding convention of the JCC was on January 18, 1951, only a couple 
of weeks after finance minister Meisdalshagen had accepted governor Jahn’s 
proposal for the establishment of such a corporatist arena in the credit policy. 
The Council immediately started working on a broad range of tasks, from 
critical economic and political problems such as credit control and funding 
of the state-owned banks, which will be discussed below, to the design of 
more long-term credit policy instruments, such as the new deposit reserve 
requirements. Despite this rapid constitution, most historians have neglected 
the first years of the Council’s operations, and instead emphasized its role as 
a policy measure after 1954, when Erik Brofoss succeeded Gunnar Jahn as 
chairman. The usual assumption is that Jahn’s critical approach to the Labor 
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Party prevented the Council from achieving influence, whereas Erik Brofoss 
turned it into a relatively powerful agency.1 
Our previous observations of cooperation between the BoN and the Labor 
government throughout the recovery period give reason to question this 
assumption, since governor Jahn, despite fundamental opposition to 
important parts of Labor’s economic policy, still managed to compromise 
and participate actively in the policy-making process. Moreover, finance 
minister Olav Meisdalshagen signaled from the very beginning that the JCC 
would be included in the development of the new credit policy. Hence, even 
though he had a strained personal relationship with Jahn, Meisdalshagen 
appeared perhaps even more eager than the governor to try out voluntary 
cooperation in practice. 
In the process of establishing the JCC, governor Jahn operated individually 
in his dealings with both the private banks and the Ministry of Finance, 
whereas the central bank officials seemingly did not take part. As soon as the 
Council started its operations, however, Jahn made sure that his staff was 
involved. At the founding convention of the new Council, he put forward a 
motion the BoN should serve as the Council secretariat, just as it previously 
had in the Foreign Exchange Council.2 As Council secretariat, the civil 
servants of the central bank would be responsible for preparing and reporting 
from meetings, providing underlying information, producing drafts for 
resolutions and completing Council decisions. The BoN as an organization 
could thereby potentially become deeply involved in formulating and 
implementing the new credit policy and could also reestablish networks with 
other parts of the central administration involved in domestic policy-making. 
The JCC unanimously accepted Jahn’s proposal, and from the very 
beginning, the BoN thereby took part in the Council work at a broad basis. 
One of the first tasks of the JCC was to reevaluate the proposal for new 
deposit reserve requirements, which the Ministry of Finance had forwarded 
to the Storting only a couple of months earlier. While Meisdalshagen had 
pushed through this parliamentary bill against the advice of both Erik 
                                                     
1 See for example F. Sejersted, Opposisjon og posisjon, 1945-1981, the history of 
Høyre, vol. 3, Oslo: Cappelen, 1984, pp. 118-120; Bergh 1987, p. 378; Lie 1995, pp. 
275-276. 
2 Minute of January 26, 1951, from the founding convention of the Council on 
January 18, 1951, BoN-S box D-031. See also chapter 2.5. 
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Brofoss and the BoN, he now rather surprisingly asked the JCC for a 
reassessment. This retreat probably reflected the fact that the Ministry of 
Finance realized that the bill had fundamental flaws, and once formalized 
cooperation was established as an alternative way to ease the funding of the 
state-owned banks, the finance minister could allow another reevaluation of 
the reserve requirements. This also reinforces the impression that 
Meisdalshagen intended to take moral suasion through the Council seriously 
as a policy measure. 
The process of reevaluating the deposit reserve requirements was a time-
consuming task, which tested the members’ will to negotiate as well as the 
actual influence of the central bank. Since Meisdalshagen’s bill had been 
based on recommendations from the Money and Banking Committee of 
1950, which included representatives from the political authorities and the 
banking associations, the BoN would have to convince the other members to 
reassess their original views on both the purpose and design of the Act in 
order to obtain a more flexible version of this new policy measure. A first 
step, however, was to stop the Storting from passing the existing bill in order 
to achieve a proper reconsideration of the design of the deposit reserve 
requirements compared to other instruments. Thus, at its second meeting, the 
JCC asked the government to withdraw the bill from the Storting, or 
alternatively “let the matter rest” more informally, a request that the Ministry 
of Finance accepted despite long having argued that corporatist negotiations 
should be backed up by statutory provisions. Rather than formally 
withdrawing the bill, however, the government asked the Storting for a 
postponement.3 
In November 1951, after several delays and long negotiations, the JCC 
presented a revised version of the deposit reserve requirements, which 
illustrates some of the scope and limitations of the central bank’s influence 
at this stage. On the one hand, governor Jahn and his officials managed to 
convince the other Council members in important respects regarding the 
purpose and design of the reserve requirements as well as the role of the 
central bank but, on the other hand, the new version still lacked the 
flexibility and effect as a monetary policy measure that Jahn had originally 
intended. Moreover, despite giving the BoN a more prominent position in 
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enforcing the new Act, the Council majority did not explicitly define its 
autonomy and powers. 
Compared with previous versions, the new proposal for deposit reserve 
requirements from the JCC agreed more with Jahn’s original proposal than 
with Meisdalshagen’s bill. Firstly, it stated that the main purpose of this new 
measure should be to control the credit volume, and the Council thereby 
abandoned the idea of using the reserve requirements to fund the state-
owned banks. The new basis of calculation included the most liquid assets 
only, that is deposits and not securities, and, as originally suggested by Jahn, 
the new reserve requirements were designed as a separate Act rather than an 
addition to the existing banking laws. This latter element implied a second 
victory for the central bank, since it excluded the Banking Inspectorate from 
the enforcement of the new Act, a point that was reinforced by a proposal to 
omit the Banking Inspectorate as a body entitled to comment on changes to 
the reserve requirements. Instead, the Council reserved this right to the two 
banking associations and the central bank.4 
The Cooperation Council also explicitly assigned a more prominent role to 
the BoN. In the elaborating comments to the new Act, the Council stated that 
the central bank, after consultation with the Ministry of Finance, should be 
responsible for determining the percentage level of the reserve requirements. 
This would contribute to an effective and fair implementation of the 
requirements, and could also create better coordination and cooperation 
between the central bank and the banking communities. The Council thereby 
reassigned the responsibility for enforcing the deposit reserve requirements 
to the BoN, but like the Money and Bank Committee of 1950, the Council 
failed to express this intention in the wording of the new Act. A question 
was thus whether the government would once again ignore this advice.5 
Despite this lack of de jure recognition, the redesigned deposit reserve 
requirements demonstrated that governor Jahn and his officials had 
succeeded in convincing the other Council members regarding both the 
purpose of the Act and the declared position of the central bank. However, 
they failed in other respects concerning the actual effect of the deposit 
reserve requirements. Most importantly, the Council majority kept the 
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complex administrative routines established in Meisdalshagen’s bill, with 
hearing rounds and long deadlines for meeting the requirements. To be sure, 
the new proposal did reduce the number of bodies entitled to comment from 
four to three and also lowered the deadline from “60 days at the earliest” to 
“30 days at the latest”, but these routines still ruled out the reserve 
requirements as a flexible and effective monetary policy measure since they 
gave the banks time to counter-argue implementation and thus also offered 
opportunities to evade the requirements. In addition, the private banks 
insisted on keeping maximum limits for the reserve requirements as low as 
possible. The Banking Inspectorate supported this view, as it was more 
concerned with potential negative effects on the solidity of the banks than 
the effect of the reserve requirements as a monetary policy measure. At the 
final meeting before forwarding the new draft law to the Ministry of 
Finance, governor Jahn managed to convince the Council to raise the 
maximum limit from 10 to 15 per cent, but this was still lower than the 
central bank would have preferred.6 
The above account suggests that the position as chairman and secretariat 
offered the BoN considerable possibilities to influence the recommendations 
of the JCC, whether through direct persuasion of the members or by 
providing underlying information. However, this influence was limited since 
it depended on the ability to persuade, rather than any formal authority or 
sanction. Hence, in the case of implementing the reserve requirements, the 
BoN failed to promote the flexibility suggested by the original US ideal. 
Despite different underlying reasons, the Ministry of Finance and the banks 
instead joined forces and introduced complex routines that gave the banks 
opportunities to influence and evade the law and offered the Ministry 
bureaucratic control.  
By contrast, in the case of the maximum limit of the reserve requirements, 
the arguments of the BoN were more appealing to the Ministry of Finance. 
During the Council negotiations, the central bank had failed to persuade the 
private banks and the Banking Inspectorate to accept the need for a higher 
limit. The Ministry of Finance, however, was also concerned with the effect 
of the reserve requirements as a monetary policy instrument, a concern that 
implied an opportunity for the central bank to promote its ideas outside the 
arena of the JCC. Unlike the other members, who backed the joint 
recommendations from the Council with only minor comments, the BoN 
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thus chose to appeal the outcome through a written submission to the 
Ministry of Finance, where it continued its arguments for higher maximum 
limits and proposed a further raise from 15 to 25 per cent.7 
This procedure illustrates that for the BoN, the JCC represented only one of 
several possible arenas to promote its views. The various professional 
positions of governor Jahn – whether as central bank governor or as 
chairman of several public councils and commissions – offered him and his 
officials opportunities to communicate their opinion to the political 
authorities. In chapter 4, we saw that Jahn originally forwarded his proposal 
for new flexible deposit reserve requirements through the Money and 
Finance Council [Penge- og finansrådet] rather than the BoN.8 Now, Jahn 
used his position as governor, with the support of the Board of Directors, to 
make his alternative stand known when he did not get his ideas through as 
chairman of the JCC. 
5.2 Reestablishment of the central bank – and displacement of the 
reserve requirements 
In March 1952, the government presented another revised bill on deposit 
reserve requirements, which by and large followed the recommendations of 
the JCC both in terms of purpose and design, and thereby simultaneously 
rejected the previous proposal from the Ministry of Finance. In addition, the 
government chose to adopt a maximum limit for the requirements of 25 per 
cent, as suggested by the BoN outside the Council. Thus, from the 
perspective of the central bank, the redesigned bill represented a 
considerable improvement, although it was still far from the flexible 
monetary policy instrument originally proposed by governor Jahn. Instead, 
the government used the contributions from the JCC and the BoN to develop 
a compromise instrument, which aimed specifically at regulating the credit 
volume but was still based on administrative rather than market-based 
control. 
In several important ways, this new bill reestablished the BoN as a key 
agency in the credit policy. The government dropped Meisdalshagen’s 
previous initiatives to bypass the BoN in the enforcement of the law, and 
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8 See chapter 4.2. 
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followed the advice of the JCC to exclude the Banking Inspectorate from 
enforcing the law as well as removing its entitlement to pass comment. It 
also informally acknowledged the BoN as responsible for implementing the 
reserve requirements. However, the government still refused to provide a 
more explicit definition of the legal position of the central bank in the 
wording of the Act. 
In its written submission on the proposal from the JCC, the BoN had pointed 
out the lack of clarification of its de jure position. In order to reflect the 
actual autonomous position of the central bank in the financial system, the 
Board of Directors had argued that the new Act should assign initiating 
authority to the BoN and state explicitly that the level of the deposit reserve 
requirements should be determined by “the King after a proposal from the 
BoN”.9 The government rejected this proposal. In the underlying comments 
to the new parliamentary bill, the Ministry of Finance approached the matter 
pragmatically by stating that “it would hardly have any important practical 
consequences whether one used this formulation or that one”, but it still 
concluded that “from a constitutional perspective” it was more appropriate to 
assign this responsibility to “the King”, that is, the government through the 
Ministry of Finance.10 
In this way, the Ministry continued to emphasize the political control over 
the central bank, but the new Act on deposit reserve requirements still 
represented a new acknowledgement of the BoN as the executor of policy. 
Whereas the integration of the Bank into Labor’s economic policy had so far 
proceeded on an informal basis, through practical policy-making, the 
government now confirmed an active role for the central bank in the legal 
proceedings to the Act, even if it still assigned the formal authority to the 
Ministry of Finance in the wording of the Act. 
Symbolically, this hesitant acknowledgement represented a formal 
improvement of the central bank’s position. In practice, however, the new 
deposit reserve requirements had little significance. The redesigned bill was 
passed by the Storting with only minor comments in June 1952, but the new 
Act was not put into effect until February 1955, and then the reserve 
requirements were set at such a low level that they had little effect. Thus, 
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during 1955-1960, the banks generally had larger deposits in the BoN than 
was required by law.11 Moreover, the reserve requirements were not used in 
a flexible way to influence changes in the credit volume. In fact, after their 
implementation, they were changed only once, in 1961, when the savings 
banks were exempted from the provision.12 Instead, voluntary negotiations 
inside as well as outside the JCC became the main credit policy instrument. 
Why did moral suasion displace the new statutory provisions in this way, 
despite the fact that both the Ministry of Finance and the BoN seemed eager 
to introduce new deposit reserve requirements? 
Historians who have discussed this question usually emphasize the indirect 
effect of the deposit reserve requirements; that the new Act served as a 
hidden threat, which would be put into effect if the banks did not comply 
with the demands of the authorities during negotiations. In his 
comprehensive study of the Ministry of Finance, Einar Lie thus characterizes 
the postponement of the first bill on deposit reserve requirements, its 
redesign and later replacement by negotiations as “a deliberate game by the 
Ministry of Finance, a game that had sure gains”.13 As we will see below, 
there is little doubt that the government made the most of these indirect 
effects and used statutory provisions as an underlying threat in negotiations 
with the financial institutions. However, there is still reason to add some 
nuance to the above interpretation. 
Firstly, the indirect effect of this specific Act on deposit reserve 
requirements as a hidden threat should not be exaggerated. Even after the 
redesign, the reserve requirements appeared too complex and cumbersome to 
be efficient, and the complicated administrative routines ruled this out as an 
effective way to control bank liquidity in practice. Within the BoN, the new 
Act was thus described as “quite useless”.14 Hence, even if the new Act on 
deposit reserve requirements could serve as a rhetorical threat, it was 
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probably rather the potential introduction of further legislation in the future 
that had a disciplinary effect on the negotiations. 
Secondly, the process of replacing statutory provisions with voluntary 
negotiations can hardly be seen as a game controlled by the Ministry of 
Finance. As we have seen, other participants, including the Ministry of 
Commerce and the BoN, intervened actively in this process and had 
considerable influence on the outcome. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance 
did not necessarily operate as a unified agency. In the balance between 
statutory provisions and voluntary negotiations in monetary and credit 
policy, there was growing discrepancy between the political leadership and 
civil servants in the Ministry of Finance. While the finance minister and his 
political staff generally preferred negotiations as the main policy instrument, 
the economists in the civil service consistently argued for more extensive 
statutory provisions as part of their ambitions of centralized planning and 
control. This discrepancy was detectable already in the early 1950s and 
continued until the late 1960s, first under different Labor governments and 
from 1965 onwards under a non-socialist coalition government.15 Bearing 
this in mind, the political commitment to negotiations as a policy instrument 
can be seen as a setback for the civil servants in the Ministry of Finance, 
while it reflected a breakthrough for ideas advocated by the Ministry’s 
political management, the BoN, and the private banks. 
5.3 Negotiating new credit controls 
In its daily work, the JCC focused on solving practical problems, in 
particular related to the volume and allocation of credit. Already at its first 
meeting, the Council started working on the development of new guidelines 
for credit control. Within the JCC, the BoN took the leading role, and 
governor Jahn and his officials played an active role in all parts of the 
design, from outlining the first drafts of the new guidelines to completing the 
final version. However, the main content of these guidelines was initiated by 
a government office outside the Council, namely the Ministry of Commerce. 
For governor Jahn, this process of developing guidelines for credit control 
thereby became a continuation of the working relationship he had 
established with the Minister of Commerce, Erik Brofoss. The process also 
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helped to strengthen the boundary position of the central bank between the 
political authorities and the private banks. 
Within three days after the first Council meeting, the BoN produced a first 
draft for new guidelines. This draft was based on two memorandums from 
the Ministry of Commerce, which in general terms pointed out the 
international considerations that had to be taken into account in the design of 
domestic credit controls. The Ministry emphasized that the codes of 
liberalization to which Norway had made international commitments 
allowed restrictions on credit for funding trade as long as these restrictions 
did not relate to the issuing of licenses itself. Another precondition was that 
the credit controls were not biased in favor of products manufactured in 
Norway at the cost of import goods. Based on these underlying 
considerations, the BoN composed a tentative draft for new guidelines with 
an eight-item list of instructions on credit refusals, self-financing, high- and 
low-priority goods, and terms of payment for import and export goods. 
This draft from the central bank served as a starting point for negotiations in 
the JCC. The draft was first handled by in an internal working committee, 
which after lengthy discussions forwarded its views to the central bank 
officials, who then rewrote and expanded their previous draft into a copious 
note of more than twenty pages. This note was launched as a preliminary 
draft for a joint statement from the Cooperation Council.16 The process of 
designing the new guidelines continued throughout the spring of 1951, and 
the BoN produced new drafts based on comments from governor Jahn and 
from the JCC, comments that only slightly modified the original content. In 
this way, the BoN served as a facilitator in the ongoing negotiations and also 
offered original contributions to the design, based on the underlying 
preconditions laid down by the Ministry of Commerce. 
In March 1951, the Ministry of Commerce tried to intervene more directly in 
the design process by presenting a list of 36 items, specifying detailed 
qualitative guidelines for the funding of different types of goods, 
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investments, imports and exports.17 Governor Jahn acknowledged that these 
guidelines clarified some important political priorities, but stated that they 
were “far too detailed and hardly possible to carry through”.18 The remaining 
members of the Council approved of his view, and in its formal 
recommendations for new guidelines, which was forwarded to the Ministry 
of Finance in April, the JCC proposed to cut back on the list of priorities, 
include high-priority goods only, and instead use more general formulations 
to instruct the banks. The Council pointed out that the qualitative rationing 
of credit that the guidelines envisaged represented a completely new element 
in the financial system, and it was thus important to implement the new 
guidelines “with a certain elasticity” in order to gain experience on how the 
individual banks would respond to this new measure.19 
So far in this process, the Ministry of Finance had kept a low profile, and 
merely participated in the design as a regular member of the JCC. Thus, 
governor Jahn was uncertain how Meisdalshagen and his officials would 
respond to the redesigned and simplified proposal from the JCC.20 To Jahn’s 
surprise, however, the Ministry of Finance accepted the proposal with only 
minor adjustments. By contrast, the Ministry of Commerce criticized the 
JCC for proposing too superficial guidelines, and argued that the guidelines 
at least should have a more comprehensive introduction, which explained the 
economic situation and demands facing the banks. The two Labor Ministers 
Brofoss and Meisdalshagen thereby once again had diverging opinions on 
strategy, a discord that the JCC feared would leave the guidelines ending up 
drifting between the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Finance and 
finally emerge as “an economic treatise” rather than succinct instructions 
that could be of practical use to bank managers and employees.21 
In order to settle this dispute, the JCC took an interesting initiative: it 
encouraged governor Jahn to discuss this privately with Erik Brofoss to find 
an acceptable solution. The other Council members, including the 
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representative from the Ministry of Finance, thereby trusted the governor to 
handle this matter on their behalf through his personal relations with 
Brofoss. On the one hand, this suggests that in the matter of establishing 
credit controls that balanced domestic and international concerns, the 
Ministry of Finance accepted that the Ministry of Commerce attended to the 
interests of the government. On the other hand, this reflected the 
intermediary position of the central bank between the political authorities 
and the banking sector. 
No sooner said than done. Governor Jahn discussed the design of the 
guidelines directly with Brofoss, and made the Ministry of Commerce finally 
yield to the arguments of the JCC. Hence, in May 1951, the Ministry of 
Finance could issue a new set of guidelines on credit control based on the 
final proposal from the JCC, a proposal that was distributed to the banks 
through their associations along with an appeal from the Cooperation 
Council that urged each and every joint-stock and savings bank to do its best 
to accommodate its lending policy to the guidelines and base its operations 
on loyal cooperation with the authorities.22 
5.4 Credit control through the JCC 
The active role of the Ministry of Commerce in the initial design of new 
guidelines on credit control probably facilitated the participation and 
influence of the central bank, since governor Jahn had a much more 
productive working relationship with Erik Brofoss than with the 
representatives of the Ministry of Finance. In the history of the JCC, 
however, the close cooperation between the BoN and the Ministry of 
Commerce during this process appears as an exception to the rule, since 
there are no records of the Ministry of Commerce participating in later 
negotiations in the JCC, either regarding credit control or on other issues. 
Once the basic principles of the guidelines of May 1951 had been 
established, the role of the Ministry of Commerce in the domestic credit 
policy faded out. In other respects, however, the above process formed a 
precedent for the formulation of credit controls during the following years. 
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The JCC continued to play a decisive role in the control of bank lending, and 
rather than being controlled by the Ministry of Finance, the JCC operated as 
an independent negotiating arena that was substantially influenced by 
governor Jahn and the civil servants of the central bank. 
These above tendencies are obvious during later initiatives to improve the 
credit controls. In the spring of 1952, the Ministry of Finance asked the JCC 
to evaluate the results of the guidelines of May 1951, bearing in mind the 
need for a redesign. The Council handed the matter over to the BoN, which 
organized a survey among the joint-stock and savings banks in order to find 
out how the guidelines had worked in practice. The survey, which was 
carried out on a representative selection of banks from both banking 
associations, concluded that the guidelines had probably not had much 
effect, even if they had made it somewhat easier for the banks to refuse 
loans. Nevertheless, the banks claimed they had done their best to comply 
with the priorities laid down in the guidelines, a statement that was 
confirmed by former Labor Cabinet Minister Anders Frihagen, who now 
served as managing director of the Banking Inspectorate and was therefore a 
member of the JCC. Based on this information, the Council advised the 
Ministry of Finance to let the matter rest.23 And even if reemerging problems 
of inflation and balance of payments deficits could have called for stricter 
credit controls, the Ministry of Finance chose to comply with this advice. 
The recommendation not to expand the credit controls was obviously in the 
interest of the banking associations, but the JCC was by no means a 
mouthpiece for the banks. Instead, the Council appears as an alternative 
voice to the Ministry of Finance in the debate on when and how to 
implement new policy initiatives. This gave the BoN an opportunity to 
influence the timing as well as the content of the credit controls. 
In the autumn of 1952, the Council, on its own initiative, suggested 
reinforcing the credit controls. New estimates showed continuing high 
inflation in Norway while many other countries experienced deflation, a 
situation that threatened not only the domestic economy but also reinforced 
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the balance of payments problems. At the same time, liquidity had once 
again increased substantially in the domestic credit and monetary market. In 
order to meet these problems, the JCC found reason to remind the banks of 
the need for continuing credit control. The Council therefore asked the BoN 
to issue an appeal directly to the banks, urging them to comply with these 
instructions and continue to restrict their lending. The civil servants of the 
central bank composed such an appeal, which was forwarded to the banks in 
November 1952. To the financial institutions, the BoN thereby appeared 
partly as a representative of the political authorities and partly as a 
communicator of a message negotiated by their own organizations. Governor 
Jahn reinforced this intermediary role at a personal level, by underlining the 
need for restraints in private conversations with bank managers.24 
In the summer of 1953, the Ministry of Finance once again initiated 
revisions of the guidelines on credit control, and this time the Council 
accepted its request. The outcome of this revision also agreed well with the 
requests of the JCC, as the new guidelines were based directly on the 
previous version of May 1950. The Ministry of Finance added some 
information on changes in the international economic situation and the 
aggravation of the balance of payments problems, but in other respects 
retained the wording of the previous agreement. The Ministry also chose to 
drop the list of high-priority goods that had been attached to the 1951 
guidelines, just as the Council had argued earlier. Moreover, after objections 
from the Cooperation Council, the Ministry of Finance designed this 
additional information as an appendix to the instructions of 1951, rather than 
as a new set of guidelines. Thus, to repeat the conclusion of the Bankers’ 
Association, the new guidelines of 1953 contained “essentially nothing 
new”.25 
Einar Lie has argued that in the early 1950s, there was no complete 
institutional framework within which the formulation and implementation of 
the credit policy could take place. Instead, to a large extent the policy was 
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designed after improvised negotiations between the Ministry of Finance and 
the financial institutions, where promises and threats were used alternately to 
control credit and fund the state-owned banks. As in the above case of the 
deposit reserve requirements, Lie views this as a process largely controlled 
by the Ministry of Finance. He thus argues that at this point in time, the 
Ministry attached very limited importance to the JCC as a corporatist body. 
Lie contrasts this with the period after 1954, when Erik Brofoss became the 
governor of the central bank and the BoN established a more important role 
as a link between the financial institutions and the Ministry of Finance.26 
The above account gives reason to question Lie’s interpretation as regards 
the matter of credit control. Firstly, the process of developing new guidelines 
on credit control took place largely within the JCC, whereas the underlying 
political priorities and main content of the guidelines were provided not by 
the Ministry of Finance, but by the Ministry of Commerce and the BoN. 
Secondly, although the JCC was a newly established institution, it did 
provide a defined framework for policy formulation and implementation 
from the very beginning, a framework in which governor Jahn and the BoN 
played an active role as a provider of information, head of negotiations, and 
mediator between the political authorities and the banks. This can perhaps 
offer an alternative explanation why the Ministry of Finance initially 
attached little importance to the new Council: not because the Ministry 
controlled policy formulation and implementation and found the Council 
irrelevant, but because it lacked control and influence over the Council’s 
work. 
While the JCC and the BoN substantially influenced the development of new 
credit controls, Lie’s interpretation is more accurate when it comes to the 
matter of funding the state-owned banks. In the following, we will see that 
even though the Council and the central bank initially took part in sorting out 
this main problem in Labor’s economic policy, the process of funding the 
state-owned banks was gradually taken over by the Ministry of Finance. 
5.5 From Council participation to independent negotiations 
The most critical reason for establishing the JCC had been to find ways to 
fund the state-owned banks. These banks, which allocated credit to sectors of 
political priority such as housing, manufacturing and fisheries, had 
traditionally been funded through the bond market. Since the late 1940s, 
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however, the trade of bonds had come to an almost complete stop. Due to 
Labor’s aim to keep interest rates at a low and stable level, combined with 
tax rules that discriminated against securities and a general fear of future 
deflation, the demand for bonds vanished completely during 1950, as bond 
rates dropped to 93-95 per cent of par value. The state-owned banks thereby 
quickly ran out of fresh funds to cover their lending activities.27 
The JCC immediately started examining this problem. During its first month 
of operation, the Council surveyed the existing and future borrowing 
requirements of the state-owned banks and discussed possible ways to cover 
these needs. In February 1951, it presented a report to the Ministry of 
Finance, which concluded that the bond market was dead and immediate 
action had to be taken. Data collected by the BoN showed that parallel to the 
drop in the demand for bonds, the state-owned banks had increased their 
lending substantially. From the end of 1946 to the end of 1950, the total 
lending from state-owned banks increased from 782 million to 1775 million 
Norwegian kroner (NOK). The Norwegian Housing Bank was responsible 
for a large part of this growth, and by September 1950, loans from this bank 
alone amounted to almost 500 million NOK.28  
The Council estimated that in order to cover their contractual lending 
obligations for 1950 and 1951, the state-owned banks needed funding for a 
total of 700 million NOK, of which 200 million NOK had already fallen due 
and been met by temporary, short-term loans in various private banks. This 
critical state threatened to overthrow the whole system of state-owned banks. 
As an immediate measure, the Council therefore recommended using up to 
400 million NOK from the war-related Statens reguleringskonto, an account 
on which the government had disposed part of the loans from the Marshall 
Aid program, to provide loans to state-owned banks.29 This initiative would 
generate increased liquidity in the banking sector, which the Council 
proposed to constrain by enforcing effective qualitative rationing of bank 
credit. 
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To create long-term balance in the bond market, the JCC proposed curbing 
lending from the Housing Bank and other state-owned banks by revising 
their lending instructions and stimulating demand for bonds by abandoning 
the so-called acquisition clause, a right for issuers of bonds to cover 
contractual installments by market acquisitions rather than by payments. The 
Council rejected the possibility of any substantial increase in the bond 
portfolios of the private banks or life insurance companies, given the present 
rate of returns. It thereby avoided commenting directly on the politically 
controversial matter of stimulating demand by raising interest rates, but 
indirectly criticized the cheap money policy by refusing to commit the 
private financial institutions to further purchases of bonds without a prior 
rise of interest rates.30 
Despite these careful formulations, these recommendations from the JCC 
were not well received in the Ministry of Finance, which only a couple of 
weeks later presented a parliamentary bill on this matter. Although the 
Ministry acknowledged the fundamental imbalances in the bond market, it 
was not willing to implement any of the long-term suggestions. Instead, it 
concluded that these proposals and alternative measures should be subject to 
further examination. As an emergency measure, however, the Ministry 
accepted the proposal to transfer 400 million NOK from the Statens 
reguleringskonto to provide temporary funding for the state-owned banks.31 
To the BoN, this unenthusiastic response hardly came as a surprise. Even 
though the Cooperation Council had refrained from direct attacks on the 
rigid control of interest rates, which the central bank regarded as the main 
obstacle to a more liquid bond market, the fact that the Council pinpointed 
fundamental imbalances and refused any commitments of funding from the 
private banks appeared as an indirect criticism. However, through his 
position as chairman of the Money and Finance Council, governor Jahn had 
a renewed opportunity to reintegrate both the BoN and the JCC into this 
process when the parliamentary Finance Committee proposed to let this 
expert committee examine the funding problem. Thus, when the Money and 
Finance Council received this commission in the autumn of 1951, Jahn 
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immediately integrated his own officials as well as the JCC into these 
examinations. 
Through his double position as chairman of both councils, governor Jahn in 
practice served as a link, which allowed him to mediate between the 
financial institutions, which were represented in the JCC, and the 
government’s expert advisors in the Money and Finance Council. He also 
had a renewed opportunity to express his own views on behalf of the central 
bank. Hence, along with the JCC, the BoN provided the Money and Finance 
Council with both information and advice. The JCC developed a new 
proposal for the Money and Finance Council, which recommended a transfer 
of a further 350 million NOK from the Statens reguleringskonto to ease the 
problems with the state-owned banks. The Money and Finance Council 
adopted this proposal, along with several other measures suggested by the 
JCC, including abandoning the acquisition clause and revising the lending 
instructions of the Housing Bank. At one point, however, the two councils 
parted, namely the interest rates. While the JCC this time suggested a partial 
raise of the nominal bond yield, the Money and Finance Council instead 
proposed a shorter term of maturity in order stimulate demand. The nominal 
rates of interest could thus remain stable, which was crucial from a political 
point of view.32 
The proposals from the Money and Finance Council and the JCC attempted 
at improving the balance between supply and demand in the bond market. 
However, apart from the emergency measure of transferring more funding 
from the Statens Reguleringskonto, the Ministry of Finance was not willing 
to comply with its advice either by improving the rates of return or by 
revising the lending instructions for the Housing Bank. Providing low-cost 
housing was a top priority in the Labor party, and the government had no 
intention of restricting the growth of this or any other state-owned bank. 
Hence, the fundamental imbalances in the bond market were to continue. 
In the autumn of 1952, all the funds on the Statens reguleringskonto had 
been spent and the government had to find other ways to allocate funding to 
the state-owned banks. The Ministry of Finance then turned to another short-
term solution suggested by the JCC and the Money and Finance Council: to 
fund the state-owned banks over the state budget by raising new government 
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loans from the private financial institutions. This solution implied consent 
from the financial institutions, and would normally have been subject to 
negotiations in the JCC. However, the Ministry of Finance deliberately 
avoided this formal negotiating arena and instead initiated independent 
negotiations with the two banking associations, outside the Council and 
without consulting the BoN.33 
Governor Jahn was informed of the ongoing negotiations by representatives 
of the banking associations at a JCC meeting. This illustrates that this 
Council not only operated as an advisory and policy-making agency, but also 
served as an independent arena for the exchange of information. Moreover, 
this confirmed the Bank’s expectations that the Council could improve its 
contact with the banking sector and thereby strengthen its traditional 
boundary position between the banks and the political authorities. Based on 
the information from the banking representatives, governor Jahn 
immediately approached the Ministry of Finance and insisted that the 
ongoing negotiations fell under the responsibility of the JCC and therefore 
should be subject to discussions within the Council. The Ministry accepted 
Jahn’s objection. It forwarded the case documents to the central bank and 
asked the JCC to evaluate once more how the joint-stock and savings banks 
could contribute to funding the state-owned banks.34 The BoN, backed by 
the Cooperation Council, thereby managed to change an ongoing policy-
making process and, for the time being, stop the Ministry of Finance from 
carrying out independent negotiations outside the Council. 
Once back in the negotiations, the JCC also managed to redefine the 
outcome. The Council argued that the State should fund the state-owned 
banks by issuing treasury bills, which were far more liquid than bearer bonds 
and therefore a less risky investment for the banks. The JCC recommended 
that the Ministry of Finance ask the Storting for permission to issue treasury 
bonds for up to 500 million NOK, and also a medium-term bond loan of up 
to 100 million NOK. As long as these bonds were issued directly by the 
State, the Council assumed they would be possible to sell. The Council also 
argued that to the extent that the banks were able to raise these funds, there 
should be little reason for the government to implement the new Act on 
deposit reserve requirements. The Council thereby used this process to 
                                                     
33 GJD April 24, 1952; Hagen 1977, p. 62. 
34 Minute from meeting of the JCC on May 20, 1952, BoN-S box: D-0131. 
Chapter 5 Towards the institutionalization of a new role 
207 
confirm voluntary negotiations as the main credit policy instrument, a move 
that also consolidated its own position in the policy-making process.35 
The Ministry of Finance fully accepted the proposal from the JCC, in terms 
of the nature and size of the government loans as well as regarding the 
preference of voluntary negotiations over statutory provisions. A 
precondition for the latter, however, was that the banks actually signed up 
for the new loans. If this voluntary arrangement failed, the Ministry of 
Finance indicated it would effectuate the new deposit reserve requirements.36 
The Storting also consented to this proposal without much debate, and 
during the following months, the banks by and large signed up for the agreed 
amount. Nevertheless, the fundamental funding problems of the state-owned 
banks continued. 
In the beginning of 1953, the Ministry of Finance initiated a new round of 
negotiations, which this time were carried out partly as independent talks 
between the Ministry and the banking associations and partly within the 
framework of the JCC. Again, the result was only a temporary relief. 
Throughout 1953 and 1954, the Ministry of Finance therefore arranged new 
negotiations but unlike before, it did not include either the JCC or the BoN. 
This time, the Ministry maintained its initial strategy and prevented the 
Council and the central bank from reentering the negotiation process. 
Instead, the Ministry carried out independent negotiations with the major 
joint-stock banks and the Bankers’ Association, based on a strategy of 
threatening to introduce statutory provisions unless the banks complied with 
government demands. In this way, by the skin of its teeth, the Ministry 
managed to generate further funding from the private banks.37 
In sections 5.3 and 5.4, we saw that the BoN and the JCC played an active 
role in the process of introducing credit controls during the early 1950. Why 
did the two agencies fail to maintain a similar position in the funding of the 
state-owned banks? One reason concerns the urgency of the two problems 
and the outcome of the respective negotiating processes. In the early 1950s, 
funding the state-owned banks appeared as a more acute and critical problem 
than controlling the credit volume and allocation. Although it represented a 
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potential inflationary threat and contributed to continuing balance of 
payments problems, the growing credit volume from the private banks was 
at times stalled by substantial variations in bank credit due, among other 
things, to international events such as the Korean War. Hence, the problem 
was in practice limited by varying market conditions. Moreover, in the 
matter of credit controls, the JCC, in cooperation with the Ministry of 
Commerce and the BoN, had managed to establish specified guidelines to 
which the banks had sincerely tried to live up. By contrast, the negotiations 
on funding the state-owned banks did not produce any long-term 
commitments, and were characterized by many more disagreements 
regarding the definition of the underlying problems as well as the preferred 
solutions. 
This leads us to the second and equally important reason why the Ministry of 
Finance gradually edged out the central bank and the JCC from the 
negotiation process, namely the fact that the problem of funding the state-
owned banks was directly linked to Labor’s cheap money policy. With 
increasing intensity, the BoN and the JCC argued that the funding problem 
could only be permanently solved by, on the one hand, restricting lending 
from the state-owned banks, and on the other hand, increasing the rate of 
return on bonds and other loans. To a certain degree, the Ministry of Finance 
had to comply with these demands, as the official lending limits for the state-
owned banks were reduced by almost 40 per cent from 1953 to 1954, from 
950 to 580 million NOK, and the negotiations of February 1954 concluded 
with a raise of yields for bonds reserved for life insurance companies from 
2.5 to 3.5 per cent. Nevertheless, the Labor government maintained its 
fundamental ambitions of expanding the state-owned banking system and 
keeping interest rates low and stable. 
The continuing objections from the BoN and the JCC to the cheap money 
policy and the imbalances in the bond market represented an oppositional 
approach, which was perceived as incompatible with Labor’s economic and 
political aims. As the BoN had repeatedly experienced, such opposition 
tended to result in marginalization. Furthermore, it was the Ministry of 
Finance that controlled the matter of funding the state-owned banks, while 
the new guidelines for credit controls had been handled mainly by the 
Ministry of Commerce, with which the BoN had much closer relations. 
Thus, governor Jahn and the JCC had fewer possibilities to influence the 
former policy issue, and consequently ended up in a more marginal role. 
5.6 A new Interest Control Act – and fresh attempts to downgrade 
the BoN  
Throughout this dissertation, we have seen that Labor’s cheap money policy 
influenced the role of the BoN in several ways. The most obvious 
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consequence was that the central bank lost its traditionally most important 
policy instrument: the flexible discount rate. The cheap money policy was 
also a main reason for not carrying out a comprehensive monetary 
reorganization immediately after the war, a measure that could have 
eliminated the excess liquidity left by the Nazi regime, and it prevented the 
introduction of market-oriented policy instruments proposed by the BoN, 
which would reestablished the central bank in an active and autonomous 
role. 
Around 1950, the cheap money policy entered a new phase. Until then, the 
debate whether to keep interest rates low had been rather theoretical since 
the war-related excess liquidity implied low rates in any case. Once this 
liquidity decreased, however, the cheap money policy had more practical 
consequences, by creating increasing problems of controlling the credit 
volume and funding the state-owned banks. So far, we have seen that when it 
came to solving practical problems in the foreign exchange policy and other 
areas of the domestic credit policy, the government had been willing to 
compromise and chose policy solutions that assigned a key role to the BoN, 
even if this partly contradicted the political ambition to downgrade the 
central bank. Regarding the cheap money policy, however, Labor was 
unwilling to lower its demands. Rather than reconsidering the ambition of 
keeping interest rates down when pressure increased around 1950, the 
government chose to reinforce the market controls, not only of the volume 
and allocation of credit but also of the interest rates per se. Thus, the 
government proposed the introduction of new statutory provisions. And 
instead of explicitly confirming an active position for the BoN in the 
enforcement of this new Interest Control Act, the Ministry of Finance 
initially made yet another attempt to exclude it from policy formulation and 
implementation. 
After having observed that effective yields on long-term government bonds 
increased from 2.5 to 3 per cent between the spring of 1950 and the autumn 
of 1951, and having registered a general trend towards increasing interest 
rates, the government asked the Money and Finance Council to consider 
adequate ways to bring interest rates back to the level of early 1950 or, at 
least, prevent a further rise.38 This caused heated discussions within the 
Money and Finance Council between, on the one hand, Ragnar Frisch and 
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his former students, who accepted low and stable interest rates as a political 
premise that they tried to underpin with theoretical arguments, and, on the 
other hand, chairman Gunnar Jahn and the more traditionally-oriented 
economist and member of the conservative party Høyre Erling Petersen, who 
argued that interest rates should be allowed to reflect and affect market 
conditions flexibly. Briefly summarized, a main difference between their 
arguments was that the Frischian economists regarded interest rates 
primarily as a cost factor for manufacturing industry and housing, which 
influenced incomes and profits, while the latter two argued that interest rates 
also had a profound impact on the demand for credit and were an important 
capitalization factor. 
The outcome of these long-lasting discussions was a split recommendation 
presented in January 1952. The majority of the Money and Finance Council 
provided arguments why interest rates should be kept low in order to 
maintain a high level of investment, secure full employment, and provide 
reasonably priced housing to the public. Jahn and Petersen issued separate 
dissents in which, using different wording, they argued that the government 
should abandon the cheap money policy, introduce flexible interest rates, 
and compensate for any unfortunate social effects of increasing rates with 
other policy measures.39 
In April 1952, the Ministry of Finance presented a white paper on the future 
credit policy, which in all essentials agreed with the majority of the Money 
and Finance Council and ignored the advice of Jahn and Petersen. The 
Ministry also confirmed that preventing increasing interest rates was a 
separate policy objective, and declared that the discount rate of the BoN 
should be kept at a 2.5 per cent level. The preferred way to keep interest 
rates down would be through appeals and cooperation with the private 
banks, but the government also announced that it would soon present a 
parliamentary bill on a new Interest Control Act, based on similar legislation 
that had recently been passed in Sweden. The Ministry indicated that this 
new Act would serve as an underlying threat to be implemented if the 
voluntary arrangements failed.40 
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Money and Finance Council, pp. 57-63. 
40 St. meld. no. 75 (1952), p. 22. 
Chapter 5 Towards the institutionalization of a new role 
211 
In June 1952, the Ministry of Finance forwarded a first draft for an Interest 
Control Act to the BoN. This draft had been developed under new political 
management as in November 1951 Einar Gerhardsen had handed over the 
Prime Minister’s post to his party colleague Oscar Torp, while Trygve 
Bratteli had replaced Olav Meisdalshagen as finance minister. Like 
Meisdalshagen, Bratteli had close relations with the grassroots of the Labor 
Party but unlike his predecessor, he also mastered economic reasoning and 
terminology. He has thus been described as a “translator of the professional 
language of economists” and a bridge builder between professional 
economists and the masses.41 From governor Jahn’s point of view, this 
replacement probably appeared positive not only because of his strained 
personal relations with Meisdalshagen but also because he had repeatedly 
experienced the difficulties of communicating with a finance minister with 
only a minimal knowledge of economics. Nevertheless, based on the draft 
for a new Interest Control Act, it appeared that the Ministry of Finance 
would continue its efforts to downgrade the central bank. 
The proposal combined elements from the Swedish Interest Control Act with 
previous temporary legislation on interest controls in Norway that had been 
introduced during the interwar period and by the outbreak of World War II.42 
It contained provisions for controlling interest on both loans and deposits in 
private banks, as well as an obligation for banks to submit reports on any 
changes to their interest rates. It also prohibited the emission of all bearer 
bonds without approval from the government, and assumed the authority to 
control the level of interest and provision on such securities. 
In one crucial respect, however, this first draft from the Ministry of Finance 
diverged from the new Swedish legislation, namely regarding the role of the 
central bank. While the Swedish Act stated that interest controls could be 
implemented only after an initiative from the central bank, the Riksbanken, 
the draft from the Ministry of Finance assigned this initiative to the 
government through the Ministry itself, without mentioning the BoN at all. 
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42 Temporary enabling act of June 29, 1934, regarding instructions on interests on 
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Moreover, the Ministry once again tried to introduce the Banking 
Inspectorate into the monetary policy, and proposed that this agency, not the 
central bank, should manage the implementation of interest controls. In 
terms of the role of the central bank, these proposals were therefore direct 
replicas of the early initiatives from the Ministry of Finance to exclude the 
BoN from enforcing the Act on deposit reserve requirements. On top of this, 
the draft of the Interest Control Act did not clarify whether the controls 
would include not only the private banks but also the central bank’s own 
interest rates. It could therefore also be seen as an attempt to establish by law 
political control over the BoN’s discount rate. 
This draft on new interest rate controls made governor Jahn and his staff 
conclude that the Ministry of Finance wanted to exclude the BoN from 
enforcing monetary policy. They found it extremely worrying that the 
Ministry of Finance wanted to introduce interest controls based on such a 
poor model as the new Swedish Act, but even worse that this draft law went 
much further than the Swedish provisions in terms of undermining the 
authority of the central bank.43 Jahn of course also criticized the proposal 
from an economic and political perspective and argued that it would require 
comprehensive “police controls” for it to be respected. Such extensive 
controls, Jahn stated, could have very unfortunate effects not only for the 
domestic economy but also for Norway’s reputation abroad.44 
This first draft for a new Interest Control Act had been designed by the 
Frischian economists in the Ministry of Finance, who, since Labor entered 
office, had effectively promoted centralized planning and controls of the 
economy. From their point of view, a new Interest Control Act maintained 
by the Ministry of Finance and the Banking Inspectorate appeared as an 
efficient instrument to underpin the cheap money policy. However, these 
ideas met resistance not only from the central bank but also from within the 
Ministry itself. As Einar Lie has demonstrated, there was a strong heritage of 
legal expertise within the Ministry of Finance, which emphasized fiscal 
elements in economic policy-making rather than planning and control. And, 
                                                     
43 Note of June 12, 1952, from G. Kielland to governor Jahn, “Ad utkast til lov om 
regulering av rentesatser”, BoN-S box: D-0139, file: Samn. Om adgang til 
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as it turned out, representatives of this more established tradition were 
prepared to defend the position of the BoN in the case of the new interest 
controls, probably because the de jure authority of the central bank as the 
body responsible for executing monetary policy had a long historical 
precedent. Thus the legal experts prepared an alternative draft for a new 
Interest Control Act, which reestablished the BoN as responsible for 
enforcing the new Act and also explicitly excluded the central bank’s rates 
from the provisions.45 Even though this new draft still reserved the formal 
initiating rights for the political authorities, the central bank, rather than the 
Banking Inspectorate, thereby appeared once again as the obvious executor 
of monetary policy. 
In the autumn of 1952, the government presented a revised proposition for a 
new Interest Control Act, which was largely based on this alternative draft 
by the legal experts of the Ministry of Finance. This suggests that even 
though the Frischian economists had established an influential role within 
this Ministry with surprising speed, their authority still had its limits. In 
addition to reassigning a more prominent role to the central bank, the revised 
proposition suggested that the Ministry of Finance should no longer 
implement interest controls at its own discretion, but had to await written 
submissions from the BoN and the Banking Inspectorate. Moreover, the 
provision to control emissions on bearer bonds should include only 
emissions above 5 million NOK. Besides this, the proposal upheld the 
provisions on the control of interest on deposits and loans, as well as on the 
obligations to submit reports on interest rate changes.46 
Although governor Jahn in principle was against introducing new statutory 
provisions on interest rate controls, he described this alternative draft law as 
“far more moderate” and therefore somewhat more acceptable.47 Even so, in 
their formal comments on the revised proposal both the BoN and the private 
banks declared that they saw no justification for introducing such far-
reaching provisions. They therefore advised the government against 
forwarding the proposal to the Storting. To the extent that the authorities still 
wanted to pass a new Interest Control Act, the two banking associations 
recommended that the Swedish experience should serve as a model, firstly, 
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by leaving the formal initiating authority with the central bank rather than 
the government and, secondly, by continuing the voluntary negotiations 
established between the authorities and the financial institutions.48 
While the banking associations thus softened their stance towards the new 
Act, the BoN continued to advocate its principal view that the cheap money 
policy should be abandoned. Governor Jahn consistently argued against a 
new Act and instead insisted that the government should break the “political 
taboo” of keeping interest rates low and stable.49 As before, however, this 
led nowhere. Abandoning the cheap money policy was out of the question 
for Labor, especially since 1953 was an election year. Instead, despite 
repeated postponements of the parliamentary debate, the cheap money policy 
stood firm. 
The cheap money policy became a key characteristic of Labor’s economic 
policy for decades, but this policy also had a much broader foundation in 
Norwegian politics. When the Storting passed the new Interest Control Act 
in July 1953, only the Conservative Party (Høyre) voted against the bill. The 
other non-socialist parties did question the need for such legislation and 
argued that the only permanent way to prevent rising rates would be to 
improve market imbalances, but they were nevertheless willing to accept the 
new Act without any reservations regarding the controls themselves. This 
suggests that there was a solid and broad political basis for the cheap money 
policy, which was probably caused partly by the collective memory of the 
high interest rates and debt crisis during the interwar period. Instead, the 
non-socialist parties once again attacked the constitutional dimension of this 
enabling Act, and insisted – in vain – that the final implementing authority 
was assigned to the Storting rather than the government. This echoed the 
previous heated debates on the change to the central bank’s reporting line 
and the Price and Rationalization Acts. It also reflects the timing of the 
parliamentary reading, shortly before the general election, when 
                                                     
48 Letter of November 1, 1952 from the Central Association for Norwegian Savings 
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49 Jahn in meeting with Prime Minister Torp, GJD November 10, 1952. 
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constitutional principles probably seemed a more appealing topic than 
potentially higher interest rates.50 
While the BoN failed in its opposition to the cheap money policy per se, the 
final version of the Interest Control Act and, not least, the practical 
implementation of the policy of low interest rates assigned a more prominent 
role to the central bank than had been indicated in the first draft from the 
Ministry of Finance. According to the new Act, the BoN was responsible for 
sanctioning emissions of all bearer bonds as well as administering and 
approving the reports on interest rate changes. The final authority for 
implementing the new Act was “the King”, that is the Ministry of Finance, 
but the provisions on the control of interests (§2) and bond emissions (§3) 
could be implemented only after procuring advance statements from the 
BoN. Furthermore, unlike the original proposal, the interest controls applied 
only to loans, not deposits. Hence, the new Act was more moderate than the 
initial proposals, both in terms of its scope and the role of the central bank, 
but it still contained a potential for considerable intervention in the financial 
markets.51 
In one respect the new Act still contained a potential threat to the position of 
the BoN, as the final version of the Act included a role for the Banking 
Inspectorate and the corresponding supervisory agency for insurance 
companies, the Insurance Council [Forsikringsrådet], which were entitled to 
comment before any execution of interest rate controls and were responsible 
for supervising the implementation of the Act as a whole. This represented a 
unique element in Norwegian monetary policy, in which the supervisory 
agencies traditionally had no formal authority. In practice, however, these 
provisions had no consequences. The only part of the Interest Control Act 
that was ever implemented was the control of emissions of bearer bonds; a 
section in which the supervisory agencies played no part and the BoN was in 
charge of enforcing the law. The other sections on interest controls and 
reporting obligations were never carried out. Instead, the Norwegian 
authorities followed the example of neighboring Sweden and continued to 
                                                     
50 See Parliamentary document Innst. O.XXIII (1953), “Tilråding frå finans- og 
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control interest rates by moral suasion, with statutory provisions as an 
underlying threat.52 
5.7 New central bank legislation abandoned 
Previously, we have seen that in the development of credit policy 
instruments, the Labor government had been reluctant to specify the de jure 
position of the BoN. Although the central bank in the end obtained an active 
role in enforcing the new Acts on deposit reserve requirements and interest 
controls, the government still insisted it was constitutionally more 
appropriate to reserve the formal right to initiate these measures for the King 
through the Ministry of Finance. From a legal point of view, these statutory 
provisions thereby confirmed the declared ambitions of the Labor 
government to subordinate the central bank to the Ministry of Finance. 
By contrast, the legislation that concerned the role of the BoN directly, the 
Central Bank Act of 1892, was still based on previous liberalist ideals and 
prescribed a central bank that developed and implemented monetary policy 
independently of the political authorities. Hence, it was not surprising when 
in 1950 the government began to examine ways of redesigning this old 
legislation in accordance with new ambitions and practices. More 
unexpected was the fact that, unlike the new credit policy provisions, this 
initiative to change the central bank legislation petered out. After 
comprehensive accounts and discussions, the proposal for a new Central 
Bank Act was postponed and later abandoned. Instead, the old legislation 
was formally maintained until 1985. Throughout the whole post-WWII 
period, there was thus a conspicuous discrepancy between the de jure role of 
the BoN, the declared ambitions of the government, and the de facto 
practices. In this section, we will see that the failed process of redesigning 
the Central Bank Act sums up important characteristics and controversies in 
the debate on the role of the central bank after World War II. It also serves as 
a good example of how the central bank used its international relations and 
evidence from abroad to legitimize its arguments. 
The government assigned the task of redesigning the Central Bank Act to the 
Money and Banking Committee of 1950, which we have seen also held the 
commission to develop new legislation for the joint-stock banks, savings 
banks and the Banking Inspectorate, and was involved in designing 
Meisdalshagen’s alternative model for new deposit reserve requirements. 
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The majority of this Committee sympathized with Labor and Frischian 
economic ideas, so there was reason to believe that the outcome of the 
deliberations over a new Central Bank Act would agree with the ambitions 
and expectations of the Labor government.53 
From May 1951 to June 1953, when its final recommendations were ready, 
the Money and Banking Committee prepared several drafts for new statutory 
provisions that reflected the double message that the government had 
conveyed in its communications with the central bank throughout the 
recovery period. On the one hand, the Committee assigned a pronounced 
position to the Bank in practical policy implementation by stating: “the Bank 
of Norway is the executive agency for the country’s monetary and foreign 
exchange policy”.54 It thereby removed any remaining doubts regarding the 
balance of power and division of tasks between the central bank and the 
Banking Inspectorate. The Committee also explicitly established the Bank as 
an autonomous legal entity, and thus formally blocked any ideas of 
transforming it into an office or directorate under the Ministry of Finance. 
On the other hand, however, the Committee majority proposed the 
introduction of a series of new arrangements that aimed to increase political 
control over the central bank. 
Among the most consequential recommendations was a proposal to 
downgrade the governor and deputy governor to the rank of ordinary 
members of the Board of Directors. This represented a fundamental blow to 
the traditionally influential role of the governor. It implied that any of the 
remaining Board members, who were politically appointed by the Storting 
for a limited period only, could be nominated as chairman and thereby not 
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Governor Jahn had tried to prevent the establishment of the Money and Banking 
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only obtain a double vote at Board meetings but also appear as the public 
face of the central bank. The consequence would be a substantial 
downgrading of the BoN’s administrative management and corresponding 
increase of political control over the bank. The Committee also proposed to 
establish by law the norm that the BoN could not change its discount rate 
without prior consultations with the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, it 
suggested introducing an explicit objects clause that gave the government 
the right to instruct the operations of the central bank. This represented a 
fundamental break with tradition that the Storting formally controlled and 
was responsible for the monetary system, and reinforced the undermining of 
the traditional strong ties between the central bank and the Storting that had 
been challenged during the process of nationalization in 1949. The proposal 
from the Money and Banking Committee suggested that the BoN should 
present its reports and accounts to the Ministry of Finance rather than the 
Storting, and also extended the scope of these reports. The Committee 
majority thus endorsed the Labor stance in the debate on the constitutional 
balance of power and the position of the central bank as the bank of the 
national assembly.55 
Despite the introductory statements regarding the autonomous position of the 
BoN, these proposals represented an erosion of authority, something that had 
occurred in practice but had never before been established by law. They also 
strengthened the position of the Ministry of Finance at the cost of the 
Storting in the monetary system as well as towards the central bank. To 
justify these initiatives, the Money and Banking Committee referred to 
negative historical experiences, concerning the independent role of the BoN 
during the interwar period, and new contemporary practices that drew 
parallels between the central bank and other state-owned banks. The 
Committee thereby reproduced the arguments underlying the 1949 debates 
of nationalization and changes to the reporting line.56 
From the BoN’s point of view, these proposals represented a challenge not 
only to the authority of the administrative management, the governor in 
particular, but also to the traditional autonomy of the central bank as an 
organization. Governor Jahn did acknowledge that the historical legacy of 
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the BoN made it politically problematic to maintain full autonomy, as he 
admitted that the role of the central bank during the par policy had damaged 
both its reputation and its ability to influence policy-making.57 Nevertheless, 
he was not willing to accept what he regarded as an attack on the efficiency 
and professional force of the central bank. Instead, Jahn advocated a status 
quo solution, which implied that the existing statutory provisions should be 
maintained and the administration of the Bank should remain unchanged. 
Since the Central Bank Act of 1892 was based on the gold standard system 
and therefore in many ways appeared outdated, governor Jahn thus 
suggested that the de jure position of the Bank could be ignored and instead 
was prepared to accept the predominant trend during the post-WWII period: 
that the position of the Bank was defined through informal networking and 
problem-solving in practice. 
The BoN repeatedly expressed these views at various arenas throughout the 
legislative process. Deputy governor Viig objected to the majority view 
throughout the work of the Money and Banking Committee and expressed 
his diverging opinions through minority statements in the Committee’s 
reports, supported by the banking representatives. Governor Jahn, who 
described the proposal to downgrade the administration of the central bank 
as “insane”, used his personal relations to campaign against what he 
considered to be an attempt to undermine not only the authority but also the 
professional efficiency of the BoN as an expert organization. During the 
whole process, Jahn held repeated meetings and discussions on the matter 
with several members of the government, including the Prime Minister Torp 
and the Minister of Commerce Erik Brofoss, as well as representatives of the 
political opposition. Finally, the central bank’s Board of Directors and 
Supervisory Council issued formal complaints in various written 
submissions where they strongly advised against passing the proposed 
provisions. An interesting point here is that, apart from some discrepancies 
on technical matters concerning the monetary system, the governing bodies 
of the central bank, which now had a majority appointed by the Labor Party, 
supported the views of governor Jahn. This confirms our earlier suggestions 
that the governing bodies were fundamentally influenced by the governor.58 
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Behind these informal and formal objections lay huge amounts of work by 
Bank’s officials. In order to evaluate the proposals and prepare 
counterarguments, they gathered information from a number of sources. An 
important approach was to read up on international literature and theory 
evaluating the new role of central banks after the breakdown of the gold 
standard and the ideal of central bank independence. This predominantly 
British and American literature discussed the various responsibilities of 
central banks and generally emphasized that they had to adapt their 
operations to changing economic and political contexts but, on the other 
hand, they also had to maintain a certain degree of autonomy in order to 
perform their tasks effectively.59 
The civil servants in the BoN also gathered information on legislation and 
practices in other countries, through brochures, public newsletters and 
reports as well as direct inquiries. In late 1951, they sent letters of inquiry to 
a number of central banks abroad. This was done partly in order to provide 
information for the Money and Banking Committee of 1950, but also served 
as a basis for internal discussions and evaluations within the BoN. The 
replies from the other central banks revealed that legislation and practices 
varied between countries, from relative independence in Finland, Denmark 
and Belgium to close cooperation with the political authorities in Great 
Britain and Sweden. However, most replies agreed with the above-
mentioned literature, that central banks now had to combine close 
communication with the political agencies with some degree of autonomy in 
order to maintain a stable monetary system.60 
In the process of opposing – or promoting – the introduction of new central 
bank legislation in Norway, international provisions and experiences could 
provide inspiration for new policy solutions as well as legitimacy for or 
against established views. In numerous memos and reports, the central bank 
officials referred to practices in other countries when they prepared the 
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formal counterarguments from the BoN.61 Governor Jahn and his staff also 
used their international relations to discuss the Norwegian developments at 
international meetings and conferences, such as at the annual meetings of the 
Nordic central banks, where the proposal for a new Central Bank Act was an 
item on the agenda in 1951 and 1952. Although the organization and 
autonomy of the Nordic central banks varied, the Norwegian delegation 
found unanimous support among their Nordic colleagues. According to 
Jahn’s personal record, the other central bankers found the proposals from 
the Money and Banking Committee quite sensational: 
It [the preliminary proposal for a new Central Bank Act] created a 
lot of commotion, and landshöfding Johnsson, who is chairman of 
the Riksbank’s General Council and an old Social Democrat, came 
up to me and said: ‘This must not go public, it can have very 
harmful effects in Sweden. It is an amazing proposal.’ It caused 
alarm also among the other Swedes and Danes and Finns, who all 
thought we are approaching Russian conditions.62 
Backed by the support from Nordic colleagues and well updated on foreign 
conditions, the BoN argued strongly against the majority proposal from the 
Money and Banking Committee of 1950. And, seemingly, the government 
was willing to listen. Or at least, in practice the government abandoned the 
idea of redesigning the Central Bank Act, first by postponing the legislative 
process and then by shelving the new Act altogether. Why was this the 
outcome, when new statutory provisions could have substantiated Labor’s 
ambitions of achieving full control over the central bank? Well-founded 
objections from the BoN might of course have had some effect, especially if 
the foreign financial markets perceived this as an initiative that clipped the 
Bank’s wings. However, such objections and the potentially negative 
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response from abroad had not stopped the government from carrying through 
legislative reforms on previous occasions. We therefore also have to 
consider other explanations. 
In his study of the changing position of the BoN after World War II, the 
historian Egil Borlaug explains the abandonment of the new statutory 
provisions as a practical solution to a technical problem concerning the so-
called gold clause case. This refers to a prior lawsuit against the Norwegian 
State by French bond owners, who argued that their bonds, dating back to 
the late 19th century, should be paid back at gold value. The French lost this 
lawsuit, and the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled that as long as the gold 
standard system was formally suspended only, the bond should be paid back 
at nominal – and considerably lower - value. A consequence of the proposal 
from the Money and Banking Committee, however, was that the gold 
standard would be permanently abolished, since the draft for a new Central 
Bank Act was combined with new statutory provisions on the monetary 
system as a whole, and redefined the value of the Norwegian krone. Borlaug 
thus argues that the government feared that a new Central Bank Act would 
make it difficult to escape complying with the French claims. It therefore 
abandoned the amendment. The date of redemption of the last bonds was 
1984, and until then the old central bank legislation was maintained.63 
From a technical point of view, Borlaug’s emphasis on the gold clause case 
seems quite reasonable, since new statutory provisions would have 
represented a legal challenge that could have generated a net fiscal burden. 
However, considering the contemporary debate regarding the role of central 
banks around 1950 and the process of generating new policy measures and 
practices, the abandonment should also be discussed in a broader context, 
and at least three additional – and interconnected – explanations can be 
added. 
First, the general trend in Norwegian policy-making during the post-WWII 
period, when informal solutions and communication often outweighed 
statutory provisions, implied that the old Central Bank Act could be set aside 
without causing many problems of legitimacy for the government. In section 
5.1, we saw that during the process of introducing the new deposit 
requirements, the government argued that it would hardly be important 
whether one used “this formulation or that one” in the wording of a new Act, 
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a statement that of course can be seen as playing to the gallery but it also 
reflected the fact that informal procedures appeared to be a commonly 
accepted approach. 
This brings us to a second explanation why the new statutory provisions 
were abandoned, namely the emphasis on practical problem solving in 
Norwegian policy-making in the aftermath of World War II. This emphasis 
had underlain the working relationship between Erik Brofoss and governor 
Jahn and it had helped to reintegrate the BoN first into the foreign exchange 
policy and later into the domestic credit policy, despite the ambitions to 
reduce its authority and autonomy. Thus, even though the government 
probably regarded a new Central Bank Act as desirable from an ideological 
and constitutional point of view, there were no sufficiently strong forces 
within Labor to drive through this legislative process. Instead, the scale and 
scope of the central bank’s operations were gradually clarified through 
practical policy-making. 
A third explanation concerns the process of institutionalizing a new role for 
the central bank. Was the new Central Bank Act abandoned because the BoN 
had already established a new de facto role in Labor’s economic policy? 
There are several indications that this was the case. Through the processes of 
trial and error, the tasks and authority of the central bank had been defined, 
first in the foreign exchange policy and later in the domestic credit policy. 
Within the new political and economic context of the post-WWII period, 
through opposition and compromise, governor Jahn and his officials had to a 
large degree reestablished the central bank as a boundary organization and 
intermediary between the political authorities and the banking sector, and 
between international and domestic concerns. This role allowed the central 
bank to operate as an autonomous expert agency outside the Ministry of 
Finance, but was still subject to sufficient political control to be acceptable 
to the Labor government. However, as we will discuss more thoroughly 
below, by the end of Jahn’s governance, this new role had not been fully 
institutionalized in the sense that it was taken for granted. 
5.8 Summary: clarified position and new tasks 
Historians have usually assumed that neither the BoN nor the JCC had much 
influence on Labor’s economic policy during the leadership of Gunnar Jahn. 
Instead, it was the Ministry of Finance that drove the policy-making process, 
while the central bank and the Cooperation Council had influential roles only 
after Jahn had been replaced by Erik Brofoss. This chapter, which handles 
the final years of Jahn’s governance, challenges this interpretation in 
important ways. First, we have seen that the JCC from the very beginning 
served as a coordinating arena for developing new guidelines for credit 
control, a development in which the central bank played a decisive role. 
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Initially, the underlying premises for these guidelines came from the 
Ministry of Commerce, which operated outside the JCC, but when this 
Ministry later intervened more directly in the negotiating process and tried to 
expand the scope and level of detail of the guidelines, the JCC prevented this 
by letting governor Jahn negotiate personally with Brofoss. Moreover, the 
JCC had substantial influence not only on the implementation of these new 
guidelines, but also on the timing and content when they were revised. 
Hence, in the matter of establishing, implementing and developing the 
guidelines on credit control, the JCC and the central bank appear as active 
and influential agencies, while the Ministry of Finance seems to have played 
a more subdued role. 
Governor Jahn and his officials were involved in all the stages of developing 
the new guidelines, both as chairman and secretariat of the JCC and in direct 
negotiations with the authorities outside the Council. This development took 
place at several levels and arenas: first, directly between the civil servants of 
the BoN and the Ministry of Commerce, then within the JCC, between the 
Council and the Ministry of Commerce, and finally between governor Jahn 
and Cabinet Minister Brofoss. Throughout this process, the central bank 
composed the initial proposals, headed the negotiations in the JCC, and 
transformed the outcome of these negotiations into the final guidelines. 
When the Ministry of Finance tried to bypass the JCC and negotiate directly 
with the private banks, Jahn objected successfully and managed to 
reintroduce the Council as the main negotiating arena. Thus, the central bank 
became deeply involved in the domestic policy-making process, not only 
through Jahn’s individual position, personal networks and negotiating skills 
but also as an organization, just as it previously had done with the foreign 
exchange policy. 
While the JCC and the BoN took an active part in developing new guidelines 
for credit controls, they failed to obtain a similar role in the process of 
funding the state-owned banks. In this policy issue, the Ministry of Finance 
gradually took over the negotiations, whereas the JCC and the central bank 
ended up on the sidelines. This was the outcome of several factors: funding 
the state-owned banks appeared to be a more urgent problem and the 
negotiations within the JCC produced less binding results than in the matter 
of credit controls, and, even more importantly, the funding problem was 
linked directly to core elements of Labor’s economic policy – the expanding 
system of state-owned banks and the cheap money policy. When the JCC 
with growing intensity insisted that the funding problem only could be 
solved on a long-term basis by restricting lending from the state-owned 
banks and raising interest rates, the response from the Ministry of Finance 
was the same as the central bank had met with when it tried to oppose 
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fundamental parts of Labor’s economic policy: the price of such opposition 
was marginalization. 
The process of reinforcing the cheap money policy by introducing new 
legislation in the early 1950s generated an additional challenge, since the 
Ministry of Finance’s first proposal for an Interest Control Act once again 
envisaged the downgrading of the central bank and the introduction of the 
Banking Inspectorate as the executive agency for the credit policy. This was 
a direct replica of the proposal that the Ministry had originally launched as 
part of the new deposit reserve requirements. While this earlier initiative had 
been shelved after renegotiations in the JCC, this latter proposal was 
abandoned after opposition from legal experts within the Ministry. Hence, in 
the final version of the Interest Control Act, the BoN was again formally 
established as the main monetary policy agency along with the Ministry of 
Finance. The original proposal thereby appears as the final attempt to 
displace the central bank from its role in monetary policy. After this, there 
seem to have been no further initiatives to include the Banking Inspectorate 
in the implementation of monetary policy. 
In its proposal for a new Central Bank Act, the Money and Finance Council 
acknowledged this by clearly establishing the Bank as an autonomous 
organization in charge of executing the government’s monetary policy, even 
though the Council majority of Frischian economists and Labor 
sympathizers otherwise strove for a de jure confirmation of the declared 
political ambitions to control the central bank. However, when this new 
legislation was postponed and later abandoned, the de jure position of the 
BoN throughout the post-WWII period remained one of independence and 
authority, a legal status that in practice had little relevance since the 
government continued to set aside the old Central Bank Act. This approach 
was in accordance with the general trend in Norwegian politics, where 
informal solutions often outweighed statutory provisions. In practice, the de 
facto position of the central bank thus continued to be characterized by a 
combination of political control and active participation with corresponding 
possibilities of wielding influence. This was reflected in the implementation 
of the cheap money policy, which in itself represented a strong element of 
political control but was simultaneously carried out through moral suasion 
instead of statutory provisions, a strategy in which the central bank took an 
active part. The Bank was also initially in charge of maintaining the only 
section of the new Interest Control Act that was ever effectuated, the control 
over the issuing of bearer bonds. 
In the summer of 1954, governor Jahn retired from his post as governor of 
the BoN and was replaced by Erik Brofoss, after a process that clearly 
demonstrated that from now on the government wanted a Labor sympathizer 
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as head of the Bank but also reflected the fact that there still were forces in 
Norwegian political and economic life opposed to Labor’s predominant 
position. There was one additional applicant for the position as governor, 
namely Svend Viig, the former deputy-governor who shared Gunnar Jahn’s 
views on the working of the economy. According to internal documents in 
the Bank of England, based on recent visit by British officials to Norway, 
Viig’s decision to apply for the job was not made with any expectation of 
getting it. Instead ”his aim, reportedly encouraged by a prominent 
shipowner/bank director, was to indicate to Brofoss that his appointment was 
not unanimously supported in the bank and to inspire a cautious rather than 
provocative start in the bank by the new Governor”.64 In the BoN’s 
Supervisory Council Viig lost with 6 votes to Brofoss’ 7, and the final 
decision was made by the government, which not surprisingly chose Brofoss 
over Viig.65 
To what extent were the tasks, authority and autonomy of the BoN settled by 
the time Brofoss took office? Had the new role of the Bank been 
institutionalized in the sense that it appeared as an obvious and clarified part 
of Labor’s economic policy? In the foreign exchange policy, the answer 
appears to be yes. Here, there is little evidence of controversy regarding the 
role of the Bank as an expert organization and coordinating agency. In the 
domestic credit policy, by contrast, the position of the Bank was still 
somewhat uncertain, or at least not taken for granted. However, in retrospect, 
we can see that all the main elements of what would become the new 
institutionalized role of the BoN were, in fact, established under Jahn. They 
only lacked the political legitimacy necessary for them to be accepted 
without question. The elements in the new role of the central bank that were 
established and clarified under Gunnar Jahn’s governance but would finally 
become institutionalized under Erik Brofoss can be summarized in seven 
points. Firstly and most fundamentally, the BoN was maintained as a legal 
autonomous entity. Rather than being formally subordinated to the Ministry 
of Finance in the way Frisch originally proposed (as a cashier’s office) or as 
suggested by the later initiatives under Meisdalshagen (as a directorate 
subordinated directly to the finance minister), the central bank continued to 
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1952 May 9 – 1956 Nov 23, Country files. 
65 On the voting in the Supervisory Council, see BoN-R, book A-0007, minute of 
June 18, 1954. 
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serve as an autonomous agency outside the administrative control of the 
political authorities. 
Secondly, the Bank also remained the executive agency for monetary and 
credit policy. The ideas and initiatives to supplement or replace the central 
bank with the Banking Inspectorate were abandoned, and the traditional 
division between monetary policy-making and financial supervision in 
Norway was maintained. However, it was also clearly established that the 
Ministry of Finance also could initiate policy changes, and that it was the 
Ministry, not the central bank, that had the final say in such changes. 
Thirdly, as a continuation of this, important limits to the central bank’s 
ability to change Labor’s economic policy had been clarified under governor 
Jahn. It was obvious that the cheap money policy stood firm as an 
underlying precondition for the new credit policy and more traditional, 
market-based monetary instruments, such as flexible interest rates, deposit 
reserve requirements, and open market operations, were out of the question. 
As a fourth element, the nature of the favored policy instruments had been 
determined, namely the preference of voluntary cooperation over statutory 
provisions. The JCC had been established as a main arena for negotiating 
and exchanging information, whereas existing or possible new legislation 
was used as a threat underlying this strategy of moral suasion. A basic 
institutional framework of the credit policy was thus in place, a framework 
that Brofoss developed further by including the life insurance companies in 
the JCC from 1955 onwards and by introducing formal yet voluntary 
agreements that quantified the allocation and volume of credit from the 
financial institutions.66 
Fifthly, as chairman of the JCC, the governor of the BoN had established a 
position as head of these negotiations, while his officials served as the 
Council secretariat, which provided information and advice. The Bank was 
thereby involved in Labor’s policy-making not only at an individual level 
but also as an organization. This helped to increase the legitimacy of the 
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a new Money and Credit Act caused the financial institutions to withdraw from 
further cooperation, against the wishes of the BoN as well as the political 
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Bank in the eyes of the political authorities as well as the financial 
institutions. 
A sixth element in the new role of the central bank was the use of 
international relations and information in policy formulation and 
implementation. This international approach had been developed throughout 
the history of the Bank and represented a continuous element in the on-going 
institutional changes. It included direct interaction with other central banks, 
the Nordic ones and the Bank of England in particular, participation in 
international arenas, such as the annual meetings of the IMF, the World 
Bank and the BIS, as well as the more general gathering of information on 
theory and practice abroad from journals, newspapers and other publications. 
The seventh and final point was that the BoN, within the new institutional 
framework of the post-WWII world, was reestablished in a boundary 
position between the political authorities and the private banks, and between 
international and domestic concerns, as it previously been during the gold 
standard system. As we will discuss more thoroughly in the concluding 
chapter, this boundary position helped to confirm the renewed influence of 
the central bank. 
Paradoxically, the main obstacle for institutionalizing the above elements in 
a settled role for the central bank appears to be the individual who 
contributed to their constitution, namely governor Gunnar Jahn. Jahn’s 
repeated attacks on Labor’s economic policy and his public image as a 
political and professional opponent of the government overshadowed his 
more subdued will to compromise and cooperate. Hence, he still lacked the 
necessary political legitimacy for these new institutional arrangements and 
practices to gain final acceptance. It was therefore not until Brofoss took 
over as governor that Labor relaxed its fundamental suspicion of the BoN as 
an agency that ultimately wanted independence and power to change Labor’s 
policies, a change of thinking that was essential for the final 
institutionalization of a new role.  
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6 Conclusion: creating a new role for an old 
central bank 
 
In this thesis, we have discussed how and why the BoN found a new role in 
policy formulation and implementation after World War II. The 
conventional view has been that the BoN lost most of its former autonomy 
and authority during the first post-WWII decade, when the oppositional 
politician and economist Gunnar Jahn served as the governor of the central 
bank. The Bank was re-established as part of Labor’s new policy regime 
only after Labor strategist Erik Brofoss succeeded Jahn in 1954 – and even 
then it obtained only a modest and subordinate position. However, existing 
research on this matter has been limited, and in order to identify more clearly 
the actual role of the BoN, including its tasks, degree of influence, and 
independence, it has been necessary to carry out a detailed empirical study of 
the policy-making processes in which the Bank took part. This study has 
uncovered complexities and variations in the position of the central bank, 
and added new information on how and why the role of the Bank changed. 
These findings also have consequences for our understanding of the broader 
economic and political development of post-WWII Norway. 
This concluding chapter is organized in eight sections, which debate the 
main research questions and theoretical perspectives presented in the 
introductory chapter. The first two sections give a summary of how the role 
of the BoN developed during the first post-WWII decade. Section 6.1 
presents the development of the Bank in policy formulation and 
implementation from marginalization to influential integration, whereas 
section 6.2 takes a closer look at the complex nature of the interaction 
between the central bank and the political authorities during this period. 
These first two sections serve as a background to the following discussions 
of why this development occurred. Section 6.3 debates to what extent the 
theory on boundary organizations can explain these changes, while section 
6.4 examines the importance of the international context for the development 
of a new role. Section 6.5 analyzes how practical participation influenced 
this process, whereas section 6.6 turns the attention towards institutional 
theory and discusses why the institutional changes under the new Labor 
government represented both possibilities and constraints for the central 
bank. Section 6.7 examines the broader nature of the institutional and 
political changes that took place in Norway after World War II and questions 
the interpretation of a static dichotomy between an old and a new regime. 
Section 6.8 sums up the main conclusions of this thesis, with focus on the 
dimensions of continuity and change. 
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6.1 From marginalization to influential integration 
The position of the BoN relative to the political authorities went through 
important changes during the governance of Gunnar Jahn. Rather than being 
a relatively stable period characterized by a lack of influence and autonomy, 
as usually assumed by scholars, our examinations have revealed that the 
initial marginalization of the central bank was followed by increased 
participation in policy formulation and implementation, an engagement that 
developed towards the institutionalization of a new, integrated role in 
Labor’s economic and political regime. 
In chapter 1, we saw that before taking office in January 1946, Gunnar Jahn 
had been well aware that new economic theories and new norms for central 
banking, combined with Labor’s political progress and high ambitions of 
governing the economy, implied that the BoN would play a subordinate role. 
However, the extent to which the government ignored the Bank was 
dramatic. Chapter 2 demonstrated that despite facing huge challenges of 
economic recovery, the Ministry of Finance, which was responsible for 
coordinating and formulating the economic policy, completely neglected to 
consult the central bank. Jahn’s critical approach to long-term direct 
regulations and his advocacy of a comprehensive monetary reorganization 
confirmed his public image as a political opponent of the Labor party as well 
as an economist on a collision course with the new generation of economists 
trained by Ragnar Frisch, an image that made the government ignore him as 
a political advisor. Jahn’s personal lack of influence was reflected in the 
marginalization of the BoN as an organization, as the central bank hardly 
took part in policy formulation, whether in maintaining the domestic direct 
regulations or in the new economic planning. 
Besides this lack of political influence, the future organizational autonomy 
of the central bank in itself was uncertain. A comment from Professor Frisch 
that the BoN ought to be reduced to a cashier’s office in the Ministry of 
Finance may in retrospect appear somewhat farfetched, but at the time the 
degree and nature of Labor’s political control over the central bank was by 
no means settled. As part of a modern economy, the authorities of course 
needed the technical tasks of a central bank, such as issuing and distributing 
money. However, given Labor’s high ambitions of coordinating and 
controlling the economy, an organizational integration of the politically 
oriented operations of the Bank – that is, the formulation and 
implementation of the monetary and foreign exchange policy – appeared 
quite realistic. Immediately after entering office, Labor had started 
preparations for nationalizing the central bank, and the extent to which the 
government would allow the BoN to continue as an autonomous legal entity 
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was yet to be decided. Hence, in 1946-47, it seemed likely that the 
Norwegian central bank would have to fight for survival as in institution of 
influence. 
A turning point in this – from the central bank’s point of view – sad story 
occurred with the currency crisis in the autumn of 1947, which was 
examined in chapter 2. This crisis came as a shock to the government, even 
though the BoN had tried to warn about potential problems in advance. And 
while the Ministry of Finance had ignored these warnings before the crisis, 
finance minister Erik Brofoss now recognized the expertise and experience 
of the central bank in foreign exchange matters. He thus appointed governor 
Jahn and his officials as head and secretariat of the new Foreign Exchange 
Council, which was in charge of coordinating and maintaining the currency 
controls, and at a personal level, Brofoss established regular contact with 
Jahn through weekly meetings and more frequent informal discussions. 
This renewed recognition of the BoN as an expert organization was rooted in 
its long history of responsibility for formulating and implementing foreign 
exchange policy. In chapter 1, we saw that this responsibility included not 
only the market-based policy during the gold standard, when the ideal of 
CBI still was predominant, but also continued after the breakdown of the 
gold standard, when free capital movements were replaced by clearing 
agreements and the occasional rationing of foreign exchange. In this new 
institutional setting, the BoN remained autonomously in charge of 
formulating and implementing the new foreign exchange policy. During the 
currency crisis of 1931/32, the Bank also gained valuable experience in so-
called ‘moral suasion’, since the rationing of foreign exchange was not based 
on statutory provisions but rather implemented through voluntary 
negotiations with the private banks. As pointed out in chapter 4, this strategy 
of combining voluntary cooperation with an underlying threat of introducing 
new statutory provisions in the foreign exchange policy served as a historical 
precedent for the informal appeals and more formal cooperation in the 
domestic credit policy after World War II.   
For the BoN, the events following the currency crisis of 1947 represented a 
breakthrough in the process of finding a new role. The reform of the foreign 
exchange policy was important, as was the position as head of the new 
Foreign Exchange Council, not primarily because it added to the power of 
the central bank, but because it generated a new and constructive interaction 
between the central bank and the political authorities. While governor Jahn 
and his officials had so far operated on the margin of politics, for the first 
time they became an integrated part of Labor’s regulatory regime. By 
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heading the coordination of the currency regulations and providing updated 
information, the BoN became closer associated with the Labor government’s 
policy formulation, without losing any of its organizational autonomy. 
Hence, unlike the idea of turning the central bank into an office of the 
Ministry of Finance, this was a type of integration that in fact increased the 
influence of governor Jahn and his officials in the foreign exchange policy 
rather than depriving them of power. 
The second major breakthrough in the process of creating a new role came 
with the establishment of the Joint Cooperation Council (JCC) in 1951, 
which was the subject of analysis in chapters 4 and 5. As head and 
secretariat of this new Council, governor Jahn and his officials obtained a 
key position in the new credit policy and thereby became integrated also into 
the domestic economic policy. By accepting the cheap money policy as a 
political premise and proposing a policy instrument that agreed well with 
Labor’s corporatist ideas, governor Jahn had managed to reestablish a role 
for the central bank in practical policy-making. The JCC also 
institutionalized a new pattern in the contact with the financial institutions, a 
contact that until then had often consisted of direct approaches by the 
Ministry of Finance to individual financial institutions. From its 
establishment, the JCC gradually took over as the main arena for persuading 
the financial institutions through their national associations, and as head of 
this Council, the BoN thereby obtained a key position. 
The JCC has usually been interpreted as a part of Labor’s corporatist 
strategy after World War II. Our examinations suggest, however, that 
although the idea of voluntary cooperation agreed well with Labor’s 
program, the underlying rationale of this arrangement went beyond Labor 
corporatism. For one thing, the establishment of the JCC was initiated not by 
the government but by governor Jahn, whereas the Ministry of Finance 
played a relatively modest role in its establishment as well as in its initial 
development of new guidelines for credit control. Moreover, the idea of 
using moral suasion in dealings with the financial institutions not only had 
historical precedent in the foreign exchange policy well before Labor entered 
office, but also was part of an international trend around 1950, when a series 
of countries introduced similar arrangements to curb inflation and promote a 
development in accordance with political priorities. In addition, as we 
argued in chapter 4, that the JCC represented a compromise solution for all 
parties involved, including the Ministry of Finance, which at the least would 
have preferred to underpin the negotiations with more extensive statutory 
provisions and, as part of Labor’s persistent ambitions of planning and 
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economic control, perhaps also primarily would have chosen to instruct the 
banks rather than to negotiate with them. 
Also for the BoN, the JCC represented a compromise. In chapter 4, we saw 
that Jahn’s initiative to establish this council came only after his previous 
proposal to introduce flexible deposit reserve requirements, based on an US 
model and intended as part of a wider set of market-based policy 
instruments, not only failed but also led to a fresh attempt from the Ministry 
of Finance to eliminate the Bank from policy formulation and 
implementation. Thus, Jahn and his officials considered the JCC to be a 
second-best solution that still was worth trying out when the government 
rejected more market-based solutions. 
As head and secretariat of the Foreign Exchange Council and the JCC, the 
BoN obtained a potentially influential position in Labor’s new economic 
policy. However, it is important not to exaggerate the power of either of 
these councils. The Foreign Exchange Council had important coordinating 
and administrative tasks, in addition to giving policy advice, but it was the 
government that had the final say in the formulation of the foreign exchange 
policy within the international framework of the Bretton Woods system. The 
same went for the JCC, since the government could overrule any politically 
undesirable results from the negotiations and instead it could activate and 
establish new statutory provisions. Moreover, in chapter 5 we saw that the 
Council had to operate within strict limits, particularly in terms of accepting 
the cheap money policy as an underlying premise, and if the Ministry of 
Finance felt that its priorities was threatened, such as for example in the 
process of funding the state-owned banks, it still could bypass the JCC and 
the BoN and instead negotiate directly with individual banks. 
Despite these limitations, for the BoN, the leading role in these two councils 
formed an important institutional basis for a new role, firstly, by removing 
any remaining doubt regarding its organizational autonomy and position as 
co-executor in the monetary and credit policy, and secondly, by providing 
access to information and policy-making processes in a way that still 
increased its influence within Labor’s politically defined limits. 
6.2 Complex and conflicting interaction 
The above development in the role of the BoN from marginalization to 
influential integration was by no means a straightforward process. Instead 
the relations between the government and the central bank during the first 
post-WWII decade were characterized by conflicting trends, as political 
initiatives that undermined the authority and legitimacy of the central bank 
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coincided with the active and influential participation of governor Jahn and 
his officials in policy-making, whereas fierce opposition from the central 
bank often concurred with a distinct willingness to compromise, as 
illustrated in figure 1. 
Figure 1: Norwegian government – central bank relations 1945-1954 
 
What can explain these conflicting trends? The Labor government’s 
approach towards the central bank can be understood at an individual level 
as well as from a more general perspective. After the currency crisis, there 
was increasing personal disagreement within the government between Erik 
Brofoss, who promoted active participation and the influential integration of 
the central bank, and his successor in the Ministry of Finance, Olav 
Meisdalshagen, who took several policy initiatives that sought the 
fundamental downgrading of the Bank in terms of policy formulation and 
implementation (an approach that was originally adopted also by the next 
finance minister, Trygve Bratteli). 
The initiatives to downgrade the central bank included the changes to the 
reporting line of the Bank from the Storting to the government, which was 
discussed in chapter 3, a seemingly minor proposal that caused a huge 
political stir and became part of the constitutional debate at the time 
concerning the division of power between these two. From the BoN’s point 
of view, this proposal implied a break with its traditional position as the 
bank of the national assembly and reflected the Ministry of Finance’s 
ambition of increased political control. In chapters 4 and 5, we saw that the 
Ministry’s initiatives to downgrade the Bank also included proposals that the 
Banking Inspectorate, rather than the central bank, should be responsible for 
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implementing the new Acts on deposit reserve requirements and interest 
controls, while the BoN was referred to as a regular state-owned bank and 
was to be reduced to a body entitled to comment only, on the same footing 
as the private banks. Hence, these proposals envisaged a downgrading that 
would have undermined the traditionally superior position of the central 
bank in the financial system. After sharp protests, among others from 
Brofoss, and the launch of the alternative policy measure by the JCC, these 
proposals were abandoned, and in practice the BoN maintained its position 
as policy co-executor, whereas the Banking Inspectorate, as before, stayed 
out of policy formulation and implementation. 
The personal differences between Brofoss and Meisdalshagen that led to 
conflicting initiatives towards the BoN reflected a more general discord 
within Labor, between advocates of a pragmatic and practical approach to 
politics and the role of the central bank, such as Brofoss, and more 
ideologically based activists, such as Meisdalshagen. The former advocated 
the modernization of the Norwegian economy through the development of 
large-scale export industry, a strategy that required access to foreign capital 
and implied the downsizing of the agricultural sector and the centralization 
of the rural population. To the extent that the central bank could contribute 
to such a development as an expert organization, it was welcome to take an 
active part in policy formulation and implementation. Meisdalshagen and his 
associates, in contrast, saw national and political control over both economic 
resources and the BoN as crucial. They argued that the domestic small-scale 
agricultural sector and regional settlement pattern should be preserved on the 
whole, and the Norwegian economy should be modernized in a less radical 
fashion. Access to foreign loans thereby appeared as less of a necessity and 
more of a threat to national sovereignty. Based on the unfortunate 
experiences with independent central banks in the interwar period, they also 
regarded state ownership and political control over the central bank as 
something that went beyond the matter of policy-making and instead had a 
symbolic value in itself. 
Whereas the contradictory approach of the government towards the central 
bank can be explained by different groups of interests, the conflicting trends 
in the reverse communication, from the Bank towards the political 
authorities, appear more puzzling since they originated from the same 
individual, namely governor Gunnar Jahn. How can we understand Jahn’s 
repeated shifts between opposition and compromise? From one perspective, 
they can be viewed as strategic maneuvers to obtain increased political 
influence or, at the least, survive as an autonomous organization. After 
discovering repeatedly that attempts to oppose fundamental parts of Labor’s 
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economic policy led only to marginalization – whether with the monetary 
reorganization, the cheap money policy, or the introduction of more market-
based policy instruments – governor Jahn shifted his strategy towards 
compromise and launched the idea of establishing the JCC, a proposal that 
agreed well with Labor’s preferences but still assigned an important role to 
the central bank. 
As a prominent and long-standing participant in Norwegian public life, 
Gunnar Jahn obviously had experience in strategic evaluation and 
maneuvering. However, there is still reason to add some nuance to this 
emphasis on rational strategy underlying his behavior. Throughout the whole 
recovery period, including his period as finance minister in the transitional 
government in 1945 as well as his acceptance of the position as central bank 
governor, Jahn had demonstrated a will to compromise that seemingly went 
beyond his personal interests and power. This was a result of the general 
atmosphere of cooperation that characterized Norwegian politics after World 
War II. However, in accordance with the normative branch of institutional 
theory, which was presented in the introductory chapter, this behavior can 
also be understood as an adaptation to expectations in the surrounding 
institutional environment. Instead of explaining individual behavior as a 
result of the rational evaluation of what best serves one’s interests, this 
theoretical approach argues that individuals – consciously or unconsciously 
– can base their behavior on expectations of their role in an institutional 
setting. From this perspective, Gunnar Jahn’s switches between opposition 
and compromise can thereby also be linked more explicitly to his role as 
governor of the BoN. 
A complicating factor regarding this latter perspective is the fact that this 
was a time of institutional change. Hence, the expectations of the role of the 
governor of the central bank governor were unclear. Whereas the new, 
emerging role prescribed loyal subordination to political guidelines, the 
governor’s old role had been to oppose the authorities publicly in cases of 
dissent. In the political setting after World War II, Labor was obviously an 
exponent of these new ideals, whereas the expectations of the non-socialist 
parties were more in accordance with the traditional role model. These 
diverging expectations can help to explain the abrupt shift between 
compromise and opposition that we saw in chapter 3, when in 1949 Jahn 
first cooperated loyally with Brofoss and the government in preparing and 
implementing the devaluation of the krone and immediately after launched a 
fierce public attack on Labor, right before the autumn election. Although this 
attack was seemingly based on professional arguments, the timing helped to 
politicize the central bank. Strategically, Jahn thereby undermined his own 
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ambition to establish the Bank as a politically neutral and professional expert 
organization. From a normative institutional point of view, however, Jahn’s 
attack agreed well with the expectations of the non-socialist parties linked to 
the traditional role of the central bank governor, whereas his cooperation 
during the devaluation process was in keeping with new expectations of 
political subordination. 
The contradictory communication between the political authorities and the 
central bank during the first post-WWII decade had a parallel in the 
interaction between the authorities and private business at the time, as has 
been pointed out by Francis Sejersted in his analysis of Norwegian and 
Swedish economic development during the 1950s and 1960s. Sejersted 
suggests that Norwegian business circles, like the central bank, pursued a 
similar double strategy of cooperation with and ideological opposition to the 
political authorities. The reverse communication from the authorities 
towards business circles, however, was different, as Sejersted argues that the 
authorities seemingly intervened only cautiously in the capitalist system but 
in reality pursued policies that sought to “pluck the feathers off the 
capitalists”.1 We have seen that the way the Labor government 
communicated with the BoN was, in contrast, to declare an ambition to strip 
the central bank of all authority and independent tasks, but in practice allow 
it to participate actively in policy formulation and implementation. Hence, 
the double nature of the government’s stance towards the central bank in fact 
appears to be the opposite of the one it took towards business circles. 
The above analysis has concerned key elements of how the role of the BoN 
developed during the first post-WWII decade, including the complexities in 
government-central bank relations. The following sections will discuss, from 
various angles, why these changes took place. First, we will discuss the 
relevance of a reoccurring perspective throughout this thesis, namely the 
theory on boundary organizations. 
6.3 The BoN as a boundary organization 
The theory on boundary organizations, as laid out in the introductory 
chapter, suggests that the influence and autonomy of central banks depend 
                                                     
1 F. Sejersted, Sosialdemokratiets tidsalder. Norge og Sverige i det 20. århundre, 
Oslo: Pax Forlag, 2005, pp. 340-345 and 357 (quote). 
Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
238 
on their capacity to provide necessary resources to principals of the political 
authorities and financial institutions as well as their ability to act as 
intermediaries not only between these public and private spheres, but also 
between domestic and international concerns. To what extent can this theory 
help to explain the development of a new role for the BoN, from 
marginalization towards influential integration? When we examine the 
quality and frequency of the interaction between the BoN, the political 
authorities and the banking sector during the period from 1945 to 1954, as 
well as the bank’s degree of influence over domestic and international 
concerns, we see that they varied in ways that agree with the theoretical 
suggestions of a correspondence between the bank’s boundary position, or 
lack of such, and its influence and autonomy. 
During the first half of the recovery period, when the BoN was completely 
marginalized in the economic policy, the central bank no longer operated as 
a boundary organization. The contact with the political authorities was at a 
minimum and because of the high liquidity in the domestic economy, the 
BoN also lost its traditional close contact with the banking sector. The banks 
could finance their operations without borrowing from the central bank, and 
there were no other instruments or mechanisms that generated mutual 
interaction. Hence, the BoN had neither access to information nor did it 
control other resources that appeared important to the political authorities 
and the banking sector. We have seen that this was a recognized problem 
within the bank and an underlying motive for proposing new policy 
instruments, such as flexible deposit reserve requirements. 
Just as the initial marginalization of the BoN coincides with its dysfunction 
as a boundary organization, the gradual reintegration of the Bank into policy 
formulation and implementation corresponds with its reestablishment in an 
intermediary position between the political authorities and the banking 
sector. When the BoN was granted the chair and secretariat of the Foreign 
Exchange Council, it obtained closer relations not only with the Ministry of 
Finance and other governmental agencies involved in currency regulations, 
but also with important parts of the banking sector. The extensive currency 
regulations implied a growth of the central bank staff involved in foreign 
exchange matters, a development that was reinforced by the currency crisis, 
and the civil servants from the BoN had regular, at times daily, contact with 
the authorized foreign exchange banks. The administration of the currency 
controls thereby to some degree countered the lack of contact with the 
banking sector caused by the excess liquidity in the domestic economy. The 
BoN could thus provide necessary information regarding the foreign 
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exchange banks to the political authorities, and also keep the banks informed 
of policy aims and instruments. 
The establishment of the JCC in 1951 confirms the co-occurrence between 
increasing influence and the reinforced position as a boundary organization. 
The position as head and secretariat of the JCC also established the BoN as 
part of the domestic credit policy, and placed governor Jahn and his officials 
in a key position between the political authorities and the two bankers’ 
associations. The Council thereby further improved the contact between the 
central bank and the banking sector as a whole, a development that was 
reinforced by the withdrawal of excess liquidity from the domestic economy 
at the time. It also cleared the ground for a more constructive working 
relationship between the BoN and the Ministry of Finance, a relationship 
that until then had been characterized not only by a lack of contact but often 
by direct conflict. Hence, with improved access to the political authorities as 
well as the banking sector, the central bank increased its influence and could 
mediate more efficiently between these two spheres and provide them with 
resources. 
According to theory, central banks as boundary organizations operate also on 
a second axis, where they balance domestic and international concerns. 
During the gold standard system, where the politically independent central 
bank had been in charge of a market-based monetary policy, this had implied 
a balance between managing the domestic currency and safeguarding its 
international value. With the extensive market regulations after World War 
II, this direct link between domestic inflation and the exchange rate was 
replaced by administrative controls, and in chapters 1 and 2, we saw that 
during the recovery period, the government completely ignored governor 
Jahn’s attempts to argue along traditional lines that the foreign exchange 
problems were caused by domestic imbalances. As the regulatory problems 
grew, Jahn claimed that the Labor government, to an increasing extent, 
acknowledged this link between the international and domestic situation, but, 
nevertheless, neither the market-based policy instruments that reinforced 
these links nor the independent role of the central bank were reintroduced. 
Thus, during the post-WWII period, the balance between international and 
domestic concerns became more a matter of politics and administration than 
of changing market conditions. 
In this new institutional setting, the BoN also found its place. As the central 
bank was reintegrated into policy formulation and implementation, its 
arguments on the balance between domestic and international concerns 
received greater acknowledgement, for example when the process of 
Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
240 
nationalizing the central bank was postponed with reference to the foreign 
exchange situation, as demonstrated in chapter 3. Moreover, and more 
importantly, governor Jahn and his officials gradually became involved in 
the new political and administrative procedures underlying both the foreign 
exchange policy and the domestic credit policy. Hence, even though the 
central bank was no longer formally in charge of balancing domestic and 
international concerns, it could once again provide necessary information 
and expert advice to the political authorities, in accordance with the theory 
of a successful boundary organization. 
The above account identifies a parallel development between the influence 
of the BoN and its position as a boundary organization. However, the causal 
link between the two seems less straightforward. According to theory, it is 
the intermediary position that causes influence. But this theory does not 
explain how an organization ends up in a boundary position. In the case of 
the BoN, we have seen that this intermediary position was not an automatic 
feature, but something that varied and had to be achieved. Thus, the causal 
explanation may just as well be the opposite: it was the successful 
reintegration of the BoN into policy formulation and implementation that 
increased its influence and thereby improved its access to the political 
authorities and the banking sector, an improvement that, in turn, enabled the 
Bank to serve as a boundary organization. Once situated in an intermediary 
position, its influence was reinforced, since mediation gave the central bank 
further access to information that again could be forwarded to principals on 
either side of the public-private boundary. Hence, rather than a simple one-
way causal link, there appears to be a mutually reinforcing mechanism 
between power and influence, on the one hand, and the position as a 
boundary organization on the other. This theoretical perspective can thereby 
be applied as a useful analytical tool for understanding the nature of the 
interaction between the central bank and the other agencies, but in itself it 
has limited explanatory power for understanding why the BoN found a new 
role. 
6.4 The fundamental importance of the international context 
A second theoretical approach that may help to explain why the role of the 
central bank changed as it did, relates to the term ‘embedded statism’, a 
concept presented in the introductory chapter that emphasizes how national 
processes are embedded in an international context. This approach suggests 
that changes in the role of central banks are not caused by domestic political 
processes and conflicts alone, as often assumed by political scientists, but 
also by the international institutional, political and economic context in 
which they take place. In keeping with this perspective, we have seen that 
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external events, changes and initiatives had fundamental consequences for 
the emerging role of the Norwegian central bank. On the one hand, these 
external changes influenced the Bank indirectly by altering the institutional 
preconditions within which it had to operate. On the other hand, they 
intervened more directly in Norwegian developments by changing the 
domestic political agenda and thereby creating windows of opportunity for 
the central bank. 
The most fundamental formal institutional change was of course the 
breakdown of the gold standard and later the constitution of the Bretton 
Woods system, which altered the international preconditions not only for 
central banking but also for trade and financial interaction in general. By the 
provisions that allowed the regulation of capital movements, the Bretton 
Wood system was a necessary precondition for the shift from orthodox 
monetary policy to the cheap money policy, a shift that in itself changed the 
tasks, authority and autonomy of the central bank. Before this, the 
international economic unrest during the interwar period had also generated 
more informal institutional changes such as new norms for the conduct of 
economic policy as well as the trend towards increased political control over 
central banks. These norms were reinforced by the two World Wars, which 
demonstrated that centralized planning and market controls could be both 
efficient and effective and thereby supported the idea that central banks 
should play a more subordinate role. As demonstrated in chapter 1, the two 
World Wars also had more direct consequences for the Norwegian central 
bank, the first by fueling the financial boom that later led to crisis, the 
second by leaving the Bank technically bankrupt and politically in standstill 
due to questions regarding its political loyalty during the Occupation. All in 
all, these international changes and events helped to undermine the 
legitimacy of traditional central banking and prepare for new types of 
political control. 
The process of creating a new role for the BoN was thus embedded in an 
international context that initially triggered and provided a legitimate basis 
for the general and worldwide changes towards increased political control. 
However, international events can also help to explain the specific outcome 
of the Norwegian case after World War II, both directly and indirectly. The 
first crucial event was the currency crisis of 1947, which we have seen 
represented a first turning point in the process of finding a new role for the 
BoN. This international calamity created a window of opportunity in the 
sense that it enabled the Bank, for the first time since after the war, to 
become part of policy formulation and implementation once again. 
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Another important international event was the devaluation of Sterling in 
1949, which not only triggered the fall of the stabilization line and prepared 
for the introduction of new policy instruments in the domestic economic 
policy, but also confirmed the key role of the BoN in the foreign exchange 
policy. Chapter 4 demonstrated that during the process of examining the 
rumors of a British devaluation and implementing the subsequent 
devaluation of the Norwegian krone, governor Jahn and his officials 
participated in high-level politics, in the international arena as well as at 
home. Before the devaluation, the BoN used its international relations with 
the other Nordic central banks and the Bank of England to provide 
information to the government, it offered evaluations and advice on possible 
Norwegian countermoves, and once the British devaluation was a stated fact, 
Jahn helped to decide the scale and scope of the devaluation, in close 
cooperation with the Minister of Commerce, Erik Brofoss, and without the 
formal consent of the government. This demonstrated that in this policy area, 
the central bank could be closer to the center of events than most of Labor’s 
Cabinet Ministers.  
A third international event that directly influenced the process of finding a 
new role was the US aid program for Western Europe known as the Marshall 
Plan. In our context, the Marshal Plan is relevant because it reinforced the 
political focus on the foreign exchange situation and supported Jahn’s 
repeated emphasis on the connection between external and internal 
imbalances in the economy. However, in chapter 4 we saw that the Marshall 
Plan also intervened more directly in the affairs of the BoN by bringing the 
controversial matter of the occupational account back on to the political 
agenda. This war-related separate account in the Norwegian central bank, 
from which the Nazi occupants withdrew more then 11 billion NOK, had not 
only generated a monetary surplus that represented a constant inflationary 
danger and paralyzed the traditional ways in which the central bank had 
influenced the economy, but also left the Bank technically insolvent since 
this account, which constituted nine-tenths of the BoN’s total assets, was 
recorded without any formal debtor. It thereby helped to undermine the 
Bank’s professional credibility, especially in the eyes of the international 
financial markets. When the Marshall Plan administration insisted that the 
main part of their financial donations was used to pay off this account, the 
Labor government could no longer ignore this matter. Hence, even though 
the technical insolvency of the Bank was not finally settled until the late 
1950s, the substantial withdrawal of liquidity through the occupational 
account became an important element in the process of finding a new role, 
since it was a precondition for introducing new instruments into the domestic 
economy that included the participation of the central bank. 
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One additional dimension that underlines the importance the international 
context concerns the possible transfer of policy ideas. Below, as part of a 
general discussion of the importance of personal networks, we will analyze 
the value of international relations in the process of finding a new role. Here, 
we will emphasize how such relations could generate and diffuse new policy 
solutions, such as voluntary cooperation and moral suasion in the financial 
markets. As pointed out above, at the same time as governor Jahn suggested 
the establishment of the JCC, similar solutions were implemented in several 
countries. Although it has been difficult to establish empirically any direct 
transfer of this or other policy solutions, it is highly likely that the 
international context also served as a source of information and inspiration in 
domestic policy-making, whether regarding specific policy instruments or 
the role of the central bank. 
By providing a new institutional framework, generating events that 
intervened directly in Norwegian policy-making, and probably also 
contributing to the transfer of ideas, the international context thus had a 
fundamental impact on the process of changing the role of the Norwegian 
central bank. 
6.5 Influence and legitimacy through participation 
Another main explanation of why the role of the BoN developed as it did 
concerns its participation in practical policy-making. Rather than being 
decided by pre-designed theoretical or de jure guidelines, we have seen that 
the BoN discovered the limitations and possibilities of its new role, its new 
tasks and authority, in direct interplay with ongoing policy formulation and 
implementation. 
In the policy-making processes during the first post-WWII decade, at least 
three characteristics stand out as decisive for the renewed influence of the 
central bank. Firstly, it was the ability of the Bank to ‘stay in the game’ and 
continue its efforts to influence policy formulation and implementation 
despite facing repeated defeats. Rather than leaving the arena to the Ministry 
of Finance and accept complete submission, governor Jahn and his officials 
continued to define and redefine policy measures and test the limits of the 
new political framework surrounding the central bank. 
Through this endurance, they contributed to the survival of the central bank 
as an autonomous agency, and also discovered the second decisive element 
in the process of finding a new role, namely the development of a policy 
instrument that the Labor government not only accepted but also welcomed, 
and one that still assigned an important role to the BoN. In chapter 4 we saw 
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that although the flexible deposit reserve requirements that Jahn initially 
proposed appeared as a powerful policy instrument to control the credit 
volume, the underlying ideological dimension of market-based policies and 
the direct reference to the US model completely clashed with Labor’s 
approach to politics and were thus abandoned. The JCC, on the other hand, 
wend hand in glove with Labor’s corporatist ideas and could thereby be 
implemented. 
The third characteristic was the central bank’s ability to utilize personal 
networks and contacts. In the ongoing policy-making processes, governor 
Jahn used his networks to block attempts to downgrade or bypass the central 
bank, to search for advice, and to promote new ideas and proposals. Without 
some of these contacts, the working relationship with Erik Brofoss in 
particular, the Bank would have probably ended up in a less influential 
position whilst facing more persistent pressure on its organizational 
autonomy. 
Our analysis of the interaction between the BoN and its surroundings has 
included both the individual and the organizational level. Governor Jahn’s 
personal networks and relations are important, first and foremost because 
Jahn, like his predecessor Nikolai Rygg, had a prominent position within the 
Bank itself. In chapter 3 we saw that, apart from particularly politicized 
cases such as the nationalization of the privately owned stocks, the surviving 
sources indicate that Jahn left his personal mark on most resolutions and 
advice from the BoN, as well as on the daily conduct of the bank. Jahn held 
a powerful position both within the Board of Governors and the Supervisory 
Council and in the external interaction with other agencies. Hence, his 
personal conduct and relations were major determinants in the process of 
defining a new role. 
In our context, the interaction between governor Jahn and Labor Ministers 
Erik Brofoss and Olav Meisdalshagen has been of particular interest. We 
have seen that after the currency crisis of 1947, Jahn and Brofoss developed 
an increasingly close working relationship that included ongoing discussions 
on general policy matters as well as more specific evaluations of the 
authority and autonomy of the BoN. Despite their political and economic 
differences, Jahn and Brofoss agreed surprisingly often on policy 
controversies, from the timing of the nationalization of the BoN, the design 
of the new deposit reserve requirements, the withdrawal of liquidity through 
the occupational account, to the position of the BoN as an autonomous 
agency and co-executor of policy. In all these cases, Meisdalshagen 
appeared more as an opponent than a political ally of Brofoss. For example, 
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as we saw in chapter 4, Brofoss and Jahn confidentially planned a strategy 
behind Meisdalshagen’s back to stop his proposal for new deposit reserve 
requirements, and when this strategy failed, Brofoss appealed directly to the 
Prime Minister to stop this initiative, with reference to its negative 
consequences for authority of Jahn and the BoN. Hence, even when his 
initiatives and protests failed, Brofoss represented a crucial contact for the 
BoN, both as a source of information and a connecting link to the 
government. 
Besides his ongoing working relationship with Brofoss, Jahn also interacted 
directly with other members of the government, particularly Prime Ministers 
Gerhardsen and Torp, for example during the repeated attempts from the 
Ministry of Finance to bypass the central bank in policy formulation. Jahn’s 
professional and personal network also included politicians from the non-
socialist parties, business executives, and bank managers, whom he met both 
as head of various committees and councils and in more private settings, 
such as participation at dinner parties, and visits to his office in the bank.2 
We have also seen that Jahn had substantial international networks, with 
personal contacts in other central banks, in the IMF and the World Bank, and 
to some extent in the BIS, as well as with his fellow statisticians, established 
during his time as director of the National Bureau of Statistics. 
These networks at home and abroad had several functions. They served as 
sources of information on specific policy instruments as well as international 
policy processes, such as the Marshall Aid program and the devaluations of 
1949. As in the above case of the attempts to stop Meisdalshagen’s proposal 
for new deposit reserve requirements, they could also provide arguments and 
advice on how to proceed in ongoing domestic processes and disputes. 
Moreover, through his international networks, especially with their Nordic 
counterparts, Jahn and his officials found much-needed support and 
sympathy as regards his lack of influence and the attempts to downgrade the 
bank, as we saw in chapter 5, in connection with the later-abandoned 
proposal for a new Central Bank Act. Ultimately, these networks also added 
legitimacy to the BoN, since they helped to confirm the professional 
                                                     
2 Gunnar Jahn’s diaries can serve as an interesting starting point for further 
examination of these relations, since Jahn usually recorded whom he had met during 
the day. See for example GJD November 10, 1952, when Jahn had a meeting with 
the Prime Minister in the morning and dinner with bank directors in the evening.  
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reputation of governor Jahn and his officials, and added to the personal trust 
between the Norwegian central bankers and their counterparts abroad. They 
also proved that the international agencies acknowledged the governor and 
his officials as expert national representatives and integrated the BoN 
directly into the new institutional context of the Bretton Woods system. 
Thus, these international relations also helped to strengthen the legitimacy of 
the Bank in its dealings with the domestic authorities. 
Although Jahn’s personal position and relations were important, his 
individual efforts alone cannot provide sufficient explanation of the 
constitution of a new role for the BoN. This required that the Bank had to be 
included also at an organizational level. Hence, the establishment of the BoN 
as secretariat first of the Foreign Exchange Council and later of the JCC was 
crucial. These positions ensured that the central bank as an organization was 
integrated into all parts of the policy-making process, from providing 
underlying data and questions for discussion, via facilitating the coordination 
and cooperation within these councils, to developing their final results and 
resolutions. As part of this council work, the civil servants of the central 
bank established their own networks and relations within the central 
administration as well as with the banking sector. The central bank thereby 
both became better equipped as an expert organization and more familiar 
with these important parts of its context. 
In the introductory chapter, we asked to what extent legitimacy and trust 
appear as crucial elements for understanding the changing role of the BoN 
after World War II. This question was based on Francis Sejersted’s emphasis 
on legitimacy and trust as necessary underlying preconditions for the 
efficiency of central bank independence (CBI) as a policy model. Our 
examinations seem to confirm Sejersted at this point. By contributing 
constructively to the daily policy-making process at home and abroad, 
insisting on staying in the game, fighting too vigorous attempts to impose 
political control but still cooperating with the government, and utilizing and 
developing networks with the surrounding environment, the BoN gained 
legitimacy and trust of the political authorities, the bureaucracy of the central 
administration, the financial institutions and their organizations, as well as 
the general public. This was an important precondition in the process of 
finding a new role. However, under Jahn’s governance, this legitimacy and 
trust were not sufficient to institutionalize these new practices as self-evident 
parts of Labor’s new policy regime. In the eyes of the Labor Party, Jahn’s 
public image as a political and professional opponent of the government 
overshadowed his will to cooperate. Hence, as long as Jahn remained in 
power, the process of institutionalization could not be completed. 
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6.6 Institutionalization and institutional change 
In a stable institutional context, organizations and individuals face formal 
rules and informal norms and beliefs that define their freedom of action and 
explain, “what is and what is not, what can be acted upon and what cannot”. 
By conforming to such rules and requirements, they can receive support and 
legitimacy.3 In the post-WWII setting, the BoN in a way searched for – and 
tried to establish – such institutional clarifications. With the old rules and 
norms for economic policy and central banking in retreat, and new 
institutions still to be finally settled, the Bank was in a special position since 
it both operated as an organization within this changing institutional 
framework and simultaneously constituted a part of the same framework. 
Hence, by going through processes of trial and error, of strategic opposition 
and initiatives as well as attempts to comply loyally with surrounding 
expectations, the BoN helped to clarify not only its own role but also a new 
institutional context, which would help to stabilize economic and political 
activities in Norway during the following decades. 
Even though the new role of the central bank was not finally institutionalized 
– in the sense that its redefined tasks and authority were taken for granted – 
under Jahn’s governance, we have argued that in contrast to the conventional 
views, the main elements of this role had been introduced and clarified by 
the time he left office. On the one hand, the organizational position of the 
Bank regarding the political authorities was settled. The Bank was no longer 
challenged as an autonomous legal entity, not only because its de jure 
autonomy was maintained by the Central Bank Act of 1892, but more 
importantly because any ideas of subordinating the administration of the 
Bank to the Ministry of Finance had been abandoned. So were the initiatives 
to introduce the Banking Inspectorate into policy formulation and 
implementation, and the central bank was thereby de facto reestablished as 
the executor of the credit policy, along with the Ministry of Finance. The 
traditional division between monetary policy-making and financial 
supervision in Norway was thereby maintained, whereas the Ministry of 
Finance obtained an overarching responsibility for both these policy areas. 
                                                     
3 A.J. Hoffman, “Institutional Evolution and Change: Environmentalism and the 
U.S. Chemical Industry”, Academy of Management Journal, vol. 42, no. 4, 1999, pp. 
351-371 (quote: p. 351); Scott 1995. 
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On the other hand, the nature of the future policy instruments, including the 
participation of the central bank, was basically set. Important limitations to 
the influence of the Bank on policy formulation had been clarified, since the 
repeated attempts by Jahn and his officials to introduce market-based policy 
instruments had failed and the cheap money policy had been confirmed as 
the basis of the new credit policy. Moreover, moral suasion and voluntary 
cooperation in the JCC had been established as a main policy instrument, to 
a large extent replacing statutory provisions. Instead, the possibility of 
implementing existing or new legislation served as an underlying threat in 
the negotiations. As chair and secretariat of the JCC, the BoN had 
established an influential position in these negotiations, a position that also 
helped to reinforce the function of the Bank as a boundary organization. 
When Erik Brofoss succeeded Jahn as governor of the BoN, these 
characteristics in the new role of the central bank and in the credit policy 
were developed further and institutionalized as an obvious part of Labor’s 
new policy regime. With party colleague Brofoss as governor, the 
government no longer feared that the BoN would try to undermine Labor’s 
economic policy, and the practices and arrangements established under Jahn 
could thereby gain final acceptance. Brofoss expanded the scope of the JCC 
by including the national organization for life insurance companies as a 
Council member, and also turned the general guidelines for credit control 
into more formalized agreements between the political authorities and the 
financial institutions. The JCC, headed by the BoN governor and supported 
by his officials, thereby remained a main arena for the formulation and 
implementation of the credit policy until it was shut down in 1965, by the 
introduction of a new Act on money and credit regulation. The central bank 
also remained chair and secretariat of the Foreign Exchange Council, but the 
importance of this council gradually faded out after full convertibility was 
reintroduced in 1958.4 
A basic behavioral presumption in this thesis is that individuals and 
organizations are institutionally embedded, yet capable of maneuvering 
                                                     
4 The Foreign Exchange Council was revived in 1983 to serve as a coordinating and 
advisory agency for the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in matters of foreign exchange. In keeping with 
tradition, the governor of the BoN served as Council chair. This Council was 
formally closed down by the Royal Decree of September 3, 2003. 
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purposefully. In continuation of this, the process of institutional change after 
World War II has been presented as a result of externally generated formal 
and informal elements, such as the Bretton Woods system, the new 
institutional framework for international trade as well as new norms 
regarding the role of the state in the economy, combined with a domestic 
process in which a number of actors and agencies influenced the new 
practices and ideas that gradually developed into a new, stabilizing 
institutional framework. As part of this latter process, the BoN was one of 
several ‘institutional entrepreneurs’. This theoretical concept, which was 
presented in the introductory chapter, emphasizes how institutional change is 
brought about strategically by skillful individuals or organizations. 
According to theory, institutional entrepreneurs will try to narrate and 
theorize change in ways that convince other groups to cooperate and accept 
their initiatives. This emphasis on deliberate entrepreneurship implies a 
danger of exaggerating the strategic element behind institutional change, as 
opposed to a gradual and less conscious implementation of new norms. 
Nevertheless, this concept captures important aspects by presenting 
institutional change as an ongoing process, a negotiating scene, rather than 
the result of a ready-made recipe or plan. Moreover, it brings focus to the 
necessary participation of individual decision-makers for such processes to 
take place. Hence, bearing in mind that individuals are not only strategic and 
rational but also adapt to the expectations of their surroundings, the concept 
of institutional entrepreneurship can add to our understanding of why the 
institutional setting changed the way it did after World War II. 
As institutional entrepreneurs, governor Jahn and his officials had limited 
direct success, since they failed to promote their primary vision of a new 
institutional framework of market-based policy instruments maintained by 
an active and autonomous central bank within guidelines provided by the 
political authorities. Even so, the central bank exercised decisive 
entrepreneurial skills by continuing its efforts to influence the ongoing 
institutional changes, by adapting its proposals to predominant political 
norms, and by opposing the most ambitious initiatives of state intervention. 
The Bank thereby helped to shape the emerging formal regulations and 
informal norms, in a process that was dominated by Labor but one in which 
all parties involved were obliged, to some extent, to compromise and adapt 
their views. 
The new institutional framework that evolved after World War II 
represented both possibilities and constraints for the BoN. The new norms 
for central banking along with new statutory provisions that prescribed a 
subordinate role towards the political authorities definitely limited the 
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Bank’s room for maneuver compared with earlier practices. However, to the 
extent that the Bank managed to adapt its ways to these predominant norms, 
they could also work in its favor. An example of this was the increasingly 
accepted tendency that informal solutions and negotiations behind the scenes 
outweighed statutory provisions and formal lines of communication, a 
tendency we have detected throughout this thesis. On the one hand, this 
norm led to numerous attempts to bypass the central bank and, at times, 
prevent it from participating in policy-making. On the other hand, it was 
simultaneously the underlying basis of the working relationship between 
Gunnar Jahn and Erik Brofoss. In this way, this initially constraining norm 
also contributed to increased influence and autonomy for the Bank in 
practical policy-making. 
6.7 Convergence rather than static dichotomy 
The nature of the changes in Norwegian economic policy that took place 
after World War II has been subject to debate among historians. While some 
present this a quite distinct shift between old and new policy systems, others 
have rather emphasized the element of gradual development.5 This study of 
the changing role of the BoN supports the latter interpretation, and suggests 
that the emphasis on static dichotomies between old and new, plan and 
market, and socialism and liberalism should be modified in several ways. 
Firstly, we have seen that rather than being developed systematically by a 
new generation of Labor politicians and Frischian economists, the economic 
policy after World War II evolved in a complex process in which other 
agencies and people of different orientation than Labor also contributed 
actively, among them governor Jahn and the BoN. Whereas the initial 
ambition of the Labor government may have been to formulate a new 
economic policy without assistance from the central bank, it was ‘hit by 
reality’ with the currency crisis of 1947, after which the government, 
somewhat hesitantly, allowed the BoN to contribute as an expert 
organization to policy formulation and implementation. 
Secondly, our examinations have demonstrated that Labor did not appear as 
a uniform entity. Instead, it was constituted of several groups and individuals 
                                                     
5 The former historians include Lie 1995; Søilen 1998, whereas the latter include 
Bergh 1987; Grønlie 1989; Lange 1998.  
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with different interests and approaches to economic theory as well as 
practical policy-making. This is confirmed not only by the repeated 
confrontations between Erik Brofoss, Meisdalshagen and other Cabinet 
Ministers, but also by the differences between the Labor politicians and the 
Frischian economists, for example regarding moral suasion as a policy 
instrument. Here, Gerhardsen and Meisdalshagen supported the idea of 
voluntary cooperation with the financial institutions, whereas the Frischian 
economists in the Ministry of Finance (and later the Ministry of Commerce) 
preferred, to an increasing extent, to govern by statutory provisions. By 
contrast, when he became the governor of the BoN, the Frischian economist 
Brofoss followed his predecessor Jahn and advocated voluntary cooperation 
over statutory provisions. Hence, in practical policy-making, there was room 
for unexpected alliances across party lines and professional backgrounds. 
Thirdly, there is also reason to question the importance of economic theory 
in ongoing policy formulation and implementation. Whereas the economic 
planning through the national budgets was based directly on Frischian 
economics, the choice of policy instruments towards the financial sector 
appears to have been influenced just as much by practical and ideological 
considerations. An emphasis on pragmatic problem solving was not only the 
basis of the working relationship between Jahn and Brofoss but also of 
Brofoss’ approach to policy-making in general. By contrast, Olav 
Meisdalshagen was more driven by ideological concerns, and he was also far 
less educated and interested in economics. Still, our examinations suggest 
that both these politicians influenced Labor’s policy-making, a finding that 
contradicts the usual assumption that Brofoss had a dominant position. We 
have seen that Brofoss’ influence had definite limits, and he suffered 
repeated defeats in the government, for example regarding the timing of 
nationalization of the central bank, the payment of the occupational account, 
and the design of the new deposit reserve requirements. Thus, all in all, 
Labor’s economic policy after World War II appears less as a result of 
systematic implementation of theory-based instruments and more as a 
process of trial and error, internal bargaining, and adaptation to changing 
international conditions. 
In continuation of this, there is also reason to discuss the assumption of a 
relatively abrupt shift between old and new systems, and between the old 
and new generations of policy-makers. When reflecting upon the political 
situation after World War II, Gunnar Jahn seems to support the idea of a 
distinct systemic shift. In his diaries, he compared his own situation to 
another famous political shift in Norwegian politics, when the conservative 
government headed by Prime Minister Fredrik Stang in the 1870s and 1880s 
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had tried in vain to stop the introduction of a parliamentary system. Jahn 
referred to a poem by Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, a famous Norwegian poet and 
critic of Fredrik Stang, which describes how Stang fought a losing battle 
against the will of a new generation. In his poem, Bjørnson warned Stang 
against “building a barrier against the great river [of people who wanted a 
new regime]”, and he ended his poem by urging Stang to give in and change 
his views. A rough translation of the poem goes as follows: 
This is a meeting of the old and the new: 
our people are reborn to participate! 
Look around, old man, 
you nearly have the whole country against you. 
Det er det gamle og det ny, der mødes: 
til sin bestæmmelse vort folk gænfødes! 
 Nu må du se dig om, du gamle mand, 
du har imod dig fast det hele land.6 
Gunnar Jahn commented in his diaries that “Yesterday, I read Bjørnson’s 
poem to Fredrik Stang, which was healthy reading for me these days”.7 In 
retrospect, Fredrik Stang’s regime appeared as a reactionary effort to prevent 
necessary change. Jahn wrote these reflections in 1945, which indicates that 
by then, he was ready for a serious reevaluation of his previous totally 
dismissive approach to Labor’s political ideas. This generates an alternative 
interpretation of the economic and political changes that took place after 
World War II: namely that instead of an abrupt shift, this was a gradual 
process that started in the interwar period with two distinctly opposing 
approaches that, to an increasing extent, converged towards a more moderate 
position. 
There have been several indications throughout this thesis that both Gunnar 
Jahn and leading Labor politicians changed their views regarding the degree 
and nature of state intervention in the economy. Whereas Jahn in the 1930s 
                                                     
6 “Til stats-råd Stang” by Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, first published in Norsk Folkeblad, 
vol. 6, no. 37, Kristiania, 1871. 
7 GJD, October 8-15, 1945 [”Jeg leste Bjørnsons dikt til Fredrik Stang i går og det 
var sund lesning for meg i disse dagene”]. 
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rejected all ideas of countercyclical initiatives to curb the economic crisis 
and had repeated public confrontations with Ragnar Frisch regarding the 
working of the economy, after World War II his approach to state 
intervention was far more positive. Jahn still disapproved of what he 
regarded as undemocratic elements in Labor’s program as well as the degree 
of control and centralized planning that the government envisaged. However, 
this did not reflect any liberalist ideas or ambitions of laissez-faire politics. 
In chapter 1 we saw that Jahn explicitly rejected any association with 
liberalist circles gathered around the periodicals Farmand and Morgenbladet 
and claimed he had more in common with Labor. In retrospect, he also 
regretted that he had not carried out countercyclical measures as finance 
minister in the early 1930s. Most importantly, however, his initiatives to 
introduce market-based policy instruments such as flexible discount rates 
and deposit reserve requirements were based on a will to intervene 
effectively in the economy in order to promote economic growth and prevent 
future crises. He rejected Labor’s direct regulations of the market 
mechanisms mainly because he did not think they would work but rather 
would teach people to evade the law. Instead, Jahn aimed at manipulating 
the market mechanisms by changing the discount rate and influencing 
liquidity in order to obtain more effective control. The private banks seem to 
have recognized this when they rejected Jahn’s original proposal for new 
deposit reserve requirements and preferred Meisdalshagen’s modified but 
less effective version. 
Whereas governor Jahn became increasingly more amenable towards state 
intervention, leading Labor politicians such as Erik Brofoss also to some 
extent seem to have changed their views. Also in this respect, the currency 
crisis of 1947 appears as a turning point in the sense that after this, Brofoss 
gradually became less optimistic about the government’s ability to control 
the economy directly without considering underlying domestic and external 
imbalances. As suggested in chapter 4, the increasing problems of 
maintaining the stabilization line also appear to have caused a more general 
reorientation regarding the working of the economy, with increasing 
attention paid to the previously neglected monetary side of the economy. 
This did not imply that the government abandoned its ambitions to govern 
the economy, however, but rather that it realized that the underlying market 
conditions had to be taken into account.  
By the mid-1950s, there were obviously still fundamental disagreements 
between Labor and Jahn, most importantly regarding the cheap money 
policy, which remained a cornerstone in Labor’s economic policy, probably 
more for ideological and social reasons than because of any underlying 
Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
254 
economic theory. Nevertheless, there seems to have been a greater 
overlapping between these two policy systems than has usually been 
assumed, both as regards participants and ideas. Thus, based on experience, 
the supporters of both approaches changed in interaction with their 
surroundings. 
6.8 Concluding remarks: continuity and change 
The new role of the BoN after World War II was developed in a process in 
which the international context and participation in practical policy-making 
appear as the two most important influencing factors. This role contained 
elements of both change and continuity. On the one hand, the tasks and 
independent authority of the Bank in policy formulation and implementation 
changed, as part of the general political and institutional changes that took 
place after World War II. Whereas previously, the BoN had independently 
maintained a market-based monetary policy, the Bank now appeared as an 
integrated part of a policy system in which political and administrative 
control of the financial markets became a fundamental element. This 
integration implied a degree of political control, but also generated renewed 
possibilities of influence on policy formulation and implementation, 
compared to the total marginalization that the Bank originally experienced 
after the war. 
On the other hand, the new role of the BoN was marked by the fact that this 
was an old central bank, which during well over a century had been part of 
both the Norwegian and international economy and policy-making. This 
represented an element of continuity and stability that continued also into the 
post-WWII period. The Bank kept its traditional position as an autonomous 
legal entity and also maintained a superior position in the financial system. 
Moreover, throughout its long history, the BoN had gained experience and 
expertise that became of vital importance in the process of finding a new 
role. Both in general policy areas, such as the foreign exchange policy, or 
regarding specific policy measures, such as moral suasion and voluntary 
cooperation, the BoN had developed knowledge that, as it turned out, the 
Labor government needed more than it originally assumed. In addition, 
through its longstanding international relations and participation in 
international policy-making arenas such as the founding convention of the 
Bretton Woods and the annual meetings of the IMF, the BoN was part of a 
wider institutional framework that helped to increase its legitimacy and 
effectiveness also at home. Hence, it proved more difficult to abolish the 
central bank as an autonomous agency than some of the more radical 
advocates of State planning and control had originally assumed. 
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In the introductory chapter, we drew a conceptual distinction between the de 
facto and the de jure role of central banks, and we added a third dimension, 
namely their declared role. During the first post-WWII decade, we have seen 
that the role of the BoN diverged in all these respects. The de facto influence 
and participation of the Bank became more extensive than declared by the 
political authorities. However, this de facto role was subordinate compared 
to earlier practices and diverged from the de jure position of the Bank, as 
stated in the old Central Bank Act of 1892, an Act that was based on the 
ideal of CBI. As discussed in chapter 5, the ideas of coordinating the 
declared and de jure role of the BoN in a new Central Bank Act were 
abandoned partly for technical reasons linked to the so-called gold clause 
case, but perhaps more importantly because the BoN in practice had already 
found a new role. The informal setting aside of the old Central Bank Act also 
agreed with the predominant norm at the time, which often generated 
informal solutions rather than legislative changes. 
From a methodological view, this story of the BoN during the first post-
WWII decade can serve as an interesting example of how research results 
depend on the questions asked and the approach taken. From one angle, this 
is a story of decline, a story of a central bank governor and his officials 
fighting a losing battle against increased political control, an old economic 
and political regime succumbing to new ideas, instruments and initiators. 
From another perspective, however, this is a success story. For the BoN as 
an organization, the main purpose was to survive as an autonomous entity 
and find a meaningful place in its new political and institutional 
surroundings. In this respect, the struggles of the Bank during the first post-
WWII decade can be viewed as a display of successful adaptation. 
Bearing this methodological point in mind, an interesting question regarding 
future research on central banking is: what will we find if we abandon our 
usual emphasis on the dichotomy of independence and political change, and 
instead focus on the interdependence between the central bank and the 
political authorities? This shift of attention would probably bring renewed 
interest in aspects of the role of the central banks that often are neglected: in 
the case of Norway, for example, the fact that from its establishment up until 
today, during shifting regimes of CBI and political control, all members of 
the Bank’s governing boards have been politically appointed. Does this 
institutional arrangement imply that throughout history, there has been more 
continuous cooperation and mutual dependence between the Bank and the 
political authorities than has usually been recognized? Such an alternative 
focus on interdependence may also have implications for how we understand 
policy-making and economic development in a broader sense, namely less as 
simple power struggles and more as complex processes of interconnected 
participants. 
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7 Acronyms and abbreviations 
 
In the text 
BoN: the Bank of Norway [Norges Bank] 
JCC: the Joint Cooperation Council [Samarbeidsnemnda] 
SSB: the National Bureau of Statistics [Statistisk sentralbyrå] 
IMF: the International Monetary Fund 
BIS: the Bank of International Settlements 
CBI: central bank independence 
NOK: Norwegian kroner 
 
Parliamentary documents 
St. prp.: Royal Proposition to the National Assembly [Stortingsproposisjon] 
St. meld.: Royal Report (corresponding to the British white paper) to the 
National Assembly [Stortingsmelding] 
Ot. prp.: Royal Bill Proposition to the Odelsting [Odelstingsproposisjon] 
Archives 
BoE: the Bank of England’s central archive (the Bank of England, London) 
BoN-DirI: The Bank of Norway Archives, Direksjonen I [the Board of 
Directors](the National Archives of Norway, Oslo) 
BoN-R: The Bank of Norway Archives, Representantskapet [the 
Supervisory Council], (the National Archives of Norway, Oslo) 
BoN-R-DFK: The Bank of Norway Archives, Representantskapet – Den 
Faste Komite (the National Archives of Norway, Oslo) 
BoN-S: The Bank of Norway Archives, Statistisk avdeling (the National 
Archives of Norway, Oslo) 
BoN-V: Books of minutes from the Foreign Exchange Council [Valutarådet] 
(the Bank of Norway archives, Oslo) 
DNA-St: Books of minutes from the parliamentary group of the Norwegian 
Labor Party (The Labor Movement Archives and Library, Oslo) 
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DnB-3: The Archives of the Norwegian Bankers’ Association  (the National 
Archives of Norway) 
EB: The Brofoss Archive [The personal archive of Erik Brofoss] (The Labor 
Movement Archives and Library, Oslo) 
FIN-Eks: The Ministry of Finance, Ekspedisjonskontoret (the National 
Archives of Norway, Oslo) 
FIN-Fin: The Ministry of Finance, Finanskontoret C (the National Archives 
of Norway, Oslo) 
GJD: Gunnar Jahn’s diaries (the Manuscript Collection at the National 
Library of Norway, Oslo) 
HD-V: The Ministry of Commerce, Valutaavdelingen (the National Archives 
of Norway, Oslo) 
IMF: The IMF archives (The International Monetary Fund, Washington 
D.C.) 
STAT-regj: The Prime Minister’s Office, Regjeringskonferanser-referater 
(the National Archives of Norway, Oslo) 
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8 Sources and archives 
 
Gunnar Jahn’s diaries (GJD) 
at the Manuscript Collection at the National Library of Norway 
(Håndskriftsamlingen ved Nasjonalbiblioteket), Oslo. 
Gunnar Jahn kept detailed private diaries throughout his professional career. 
These provide useful information not only on his own views on a wide range 
of political and economic issues, but also give his personal descriptions of 
and references to meetings with other politicians, civil servants, and 
businessmen. The diaries contain hardly any information on Jahn’s personal 
life. The diaries are part of a larger selection of Jahn’s files, which 
sometimes serve as underlying documentation for his accounts in the diaries. 
Mostly, Jahn seems to have written his diaries on a daily basis, even though 
his accounts sometimes cover several days at the time. However, in some 
places the text appears to have been edited at a later point, as the original 
text has been cut out and in some cases replaced by new versions. As a 
source of ongoing policy processes, the diaries should therefore be handled 
with criticism and care. Nevertheless, their richness in detail and Jahn’s 
frank descriptions make them an interesting source. In this thesis, I have 
used Jahn’s diaries from the period 1944-1955, and whenever possible, I 
have crosschecked his statements with other sources and archives, as 
referred in the footnotes. 
The archives of the Bank of Norway (Norges Banks arkiv) 
The main bulk of this archive is kept at the National Archives of Norway 
(Riksarkivet), Oslo, except the archive of the Foreign Exchange Department, 
Valutaavdelingen (BoN-V), which still remains in the Bank of Norway, 
Oslo. During the past decade, the archives of the Bank of Norway have been 
reorganized professionally. Through its wide range of policy documents and 
preparatory analysis, these archives give good insights to the tasks and 
positions of the BoN in policy-making. In the thesis, I have gone through the 
archives of the following departments, (unless other periods are specified) 
during the period 1945-1955: 
The Department of Statistics (Statistisk avdeling) (BoN-S) 
The archives of the Statistisk avdeling has, with a few exceptions, been 
inaccessible until recently, but have now been reorganized and appear as a 
rich source of information on the role of the BoN in policy formulation and 
implementation. I have gone through the D-series (Serie D – Saksarkiv), 
which contains material from the Joint Cooperation Council 
(Samarbeidsnemnda) as well as background information and minutes from 
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the annual meetings of the Nordic central bank governors; the E-series (Serie 
E- Saksarkiv), which has information on the interest rates policy and money 
and credit policy of the 1950s and 1960s; the F-series (Serie F – PMs 1930-
1962), which contains a numbered series of policy documents (PMs) on 
money and credit policy, legislative issues, the role of the central bank, 
policies and practices in other countries, as well as some minutes and 
documents from the annual meetings of the Nordic central bank governors; 
and the H-series (Serie H – Gabriell Kielland), which is the personal archive 
of a long-standing civil servant of the BoN, Gabriell Kielland. This series 
contains among other issues studies and evaluations of the credit and 
monetary policy, the role and tasks of central banks in Norway and other 
countries in the mid-1950s, as well as preparatory work for the Money and 
Finance Council (Penge- og finansrådet). 
The Board of Governors (Direksjonen I) (BoN-DirI) 
I have gone through the A-series (Serie A – Forhandlingsprotokoller for 
Direksjonen) during the period 1944-1950, which contains books of minutes 
from the daily board meetings. These minutes give relatively comprehensive 
accounts of the discussions and cases under evaluation. 
The Supervisory Council (Representantskapet) (BoN-R) 
I have gone through the A-series (Serie A – Møtebøker) during the period 
1946-1954, which contains books of minutes from the meetings of the 
Supervisory Council. These minutes are far more limited than those of the 
Board of Council and give no accounts of any internal debates. They merely 
provide brief references to the agenda, participants and resolutions of the 
meetings. 
The Supervisory Council – The permanent committee 
(Representantskapet – Den faste komité) (BoN-R-DFK) 
This was a working committee responsible for preparing the meetings of the 
Supervisory Council. I have gone through the Eba-series (Serie Eba – 
Forhandlingsprotokoller) during the period 1945-1950, which contains brief 
minutes from the committee meetings, in the style of the minutes from the 
full Council meetings. 
The Foreign Exchange Department (Valutaavdelingen) (BoN-V) 
This part of the BoN’s archive has not yet been handed over to the National 
Archives. I have gone through the books of minutes from the meetings of the 
Foreign Exchange Council (Protokoll over møtene i Valutarådet) during the 
period 1947-1951. These minutes give comprehensive accounts of the 
discussions and cases under evaluation. 
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The archives of the Ministry of Finance (Finansdepartementets arkiv) 
These archives are kept at the National Archives of Norway (Riksarkivet), 
Oslo. I have gone through box 447 in the archive of the 
Ekspedisjonskontoret (FIN-Eks), which contains material on the 
investigations of the operations of the BoN during the occupation; and the 
Da-series (Serie Da – Banksaker) of the Finanskontoret C (FIN-fin), boxes 
448 “Norges Bank. Okkupasjonskontoen 1948-1956” and 449 “Norges Bank. 
Overtakelse av aksjene i Norges Bank”, which contains letters and 
documents regarding the occupational account and the nationalization of the 
BoN. 
The archives of the Ministry of Commerce  
(Handelsdepartementets arkiv) (HD-V) 
These archives are kept at the National Archives of Norway (Riksarkivet), 
Oslo. I have gone through box 5 “1.2 Valutarådet” in the archives of the 
Foreign Exchange Department (Valutaavdelingen), which contains material 
on the Interministerial Currency Committee (Den interdepartementale 
valutakomité) as well as documents on the foundation of the Foreign 
Exchange Council (Valutarådet) in 1947; and boxes Da 275, Da 276, Da 
277, Da 278, Da 279 and Da 280, which contain minutes and documents 
from the meetings of the Foreign Exchange Council during the period 1955-
1959. The minutes from the Council meetings before this appear to have 
been lost from this archive. 
Erik Brofoss Archive (Brofossarkivet) (EB) 
The personal archive of Erik Brofoss at the Labor Movement Archives and 
Library (Brofossarkivet ved Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek), Oslo. 
Considering that Erik Brofoss was the governor of the BoN from 1954 until 
1970 and had frequent contact with the Bank prior to this, his personal 
archives contain conspicuously little material on the BoN and central 
banking in general. I have gone through the Dc-series (Serie Dc – 
Saksmapper 1948-1970), boxes 41 and 42, which contain personal 
correspondence, including letters from Gunnar Jahn (1948) and 
correspondence regarding Petter J. Bjerve’s appointment, as well as box 43 
with information on the devaluation in 1949; the Di-series (Serie Di – 
Norges Bank), which contains material on the 150th anniversary of the BoN 
in 1966, including Brofoss’ speeches on the occasion; and the Dg-series 
(Serie Dg – Saker 1945-1949), box 115 “Det europeiske 
gjenreisningsprogram”, which contains letters, documents and printed 
publications on the Marshall Plan, including letters from Jahn (1948).  
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The archive of the parliamentary group of the Labor party 
(Arbeiderpartiets stortingsgruppe) (DNA-St) 
This archive is kept at the Labor Movement Archives and Library 
(Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek), Oslo. I have checked the A-series 
(Serie A – Møtebøker), which contains the books of minutes from the 
meetings of Labor’s parliamentary group regarding two cases: the 
appointment of Gunnar Jahn as governor of the BoN in 1945 and the 
nationalization of the BoN in 1949. These books of minutes give only brief 
accounts of the agenda and resolutions from the meetings, and give no 
reference to any internal discussions. 
The archive of the Prime Minister’s Office  
(Statsministerens kontor) (STAT-regj) 
This archive is kept at the National Archives of Norway (Riksarkivet), Oslo.  
I have gone through the Db-series (Serie Db – Referater fra 
regjeringskonferanser) during the period 1945-1950, which contains minutes 
from the Cabinet meetings (protokoll nr. 4 (1945-46), nr. 5 (1947-48), nr. 6 
(1949-50)). These minutes give brief accounts of the agenda and resolutions 
from the meetings, and only very rarely refer to any debates or dissents. 
The Archives of the Norwegian Bankers’ Association  
(Den norske bankforenings arkiv – PA575) (DnB-3) 
These archives are kept at the National Archives of Norway (Riksarkivet), 
Oslo. I have gone through part 3 of this archive (3. Saksarkiv), and used 
material from box 42 B 103-106, which contains information on regulations 
of the bank’s credit policies from 1924 to 1953. 
The Bank of England’s central archive (BoE) 
This archive is kept at the Bank of England, London, UK. The Bank of 
England kept so-called country files on its international relations, and I have 
gone through the Norwegian files (Country files OV26/4 through 11), which 
cover the period 1945-1961. These files contain, at times, comprehensive 
analysis of Norwegian affairs, politicians and economic development, 
including preparations for and reports from the annual visits of Bank of 
England officials to Norway. These accounts offer personal descriptions and 
evaluations by the BoE officials. The files also contain correspondence with 
Norway and other contacts regarding Scandinavian affairs. 
The IMF archives (IMF) 
These archives are kept at the International Monetary Fund, Washington 
D.C., USA. The IMF also kept country files, and I have gone through the 
surviving Norwegian files from 1946 to 1970. These contain a somewhat 
random collection of documents, correspondence and evaluations of 
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Norwegian affairs and economic development, in particular foreign 
exchange matters. My examinations include the series C/Norway/320 
Economic conditions, 1947-1965; C/Norway/420 Exchange controls and 
Restrictions, 1946-1952 and 1957-1970; C/000Norway (some 
correspondence 1948-1964); and C/Norway/810 Mission, which contains 13 
files on so-called IMF missions to Norway between 1948 and 1959. For 
comparative reasons, I have also gone through the corresponding country 
files on Sweden and Denmark. 
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9 Printed sources 
 
The BoN’s annual reports (Norges banks beretning og regnskap) 1945-1960 
Parliamentary documents 
St. prp. no. 1 (1945-46) “Den kongelige proposisjon om Statsbudsjettet for 
budsjett-terminen 1 juli 1945-30 juni 1946” 
St. prp. no. 164 (1947) “Om opprettelse av et nytt departement – 
Handelsdepartementet”. 
St. prp. no. 86 (1949) “Norges Bank. – Okkupasjonskontoen” 
St. prp. no. 129 (1950) “Nedsettelse av bevilgningene til investeringer i 
statsbudsjettet 1950-51 m.m.”, including appendix: “Penge og finansrådet. 
Uttalelse av 30. august 1950”  
St. prp. no. 52 (1951) “Statsbankenes innlån og statens reguleringskonto 
m.m.” 
St. prp. no. 28 (1952) ”Statens konto for lån til statsbankene. – Over føring 
av ytterligere 350 mill.kr. fra statens reguleringskonto” 
St. prp. no. 129 (1952) “Fullmakt til å ta opp innenlandske statslån. – Statens 
konto for lån til statsbankene” 
St.prp. no. 9 (1958), “Ompostering av okkupasjonskontoen m.v. Norges 
Banks markedsoperasjoner” 
St. meld. no. 10 (1947) “Om nasjonalbudsjettet 1947” 
St. meld. no. 75 (1952) “Retningslinjer for penge- og kredittpolitikken” 
Ot. prp. no. 64 (1945-46), “Om utferdigelse av lov om valutaregulering” 
Ot. prp. no. 65 (1949) “1. Lov om statens overtakelse av aksjene i Norges 
Bank. 2: Lov om endring i lov om Norges Bank av 23. april 1892” 
Ot. prp. no. 82 (1950) ”Midlertidig lov om tillegg til aksje- og 
sparebanklovgivningen” 
Ot. prp.  no. 17 (1952) “Lov om aksje- og sparebankers innskottsreserve i 
Norges Bank” 
In the footnotes of this thesis, I have noted my use of any additional 
parliamentary material that followed the above reports and propositions, 
including recommendations from the parliamentary committees and the 
parliamentary debates. 
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